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# The Mind of St. Augustine\*

ANTON C. PEGIS

## I. THE MAN AND HIS WORKS

ST. AUGUSTINE was born of a Christian mother and a pagan father in Tagaste, November 13, 354. After attending schools of grammar at Tagaste and Madaura, he was sent by his father in 370 to Carthage. Amid the tumultuous life that he saw among the students there, he became ashamed, as he says, not to be shameless. From 373 to 384 he taught rhetoric at Tagaste, Carthage (376-383), Rome, Milan (384). In Milan he "heard" St. Ambrose and read the books of the Platonists. In the fall of 386 he retired with some friends, his mother St. Monica and his son Adeodatus, to nearby Cassiciacum. Early in 387 he returned to Milan where he was baptized by St. Ambrose. After Monica's death at Ostia in the autumn of 387, St. Augustine went to Rome, and in 388 he returned to Africa. There, having sold his property, he lived a monastic life in Tagaste. In 391 he was ordained priest in Hippo. Shortly after, and with the permission of the aged bishop Valerius, he founded a monastery. In 395 he was made co-bishop of Hippo, of which he became sole bishop in 396, with the death of Valerius. St. Augustine died as bishop of Hippo August 28, 430.

It would be an injustice to describe that stormy and intense period of St. Augustine's life down to the time of his mother's death. His *Confessions*, written with humility before God and read with never-failing sympathy by men of all ages, is an unsurpassed revelation of Augustine the sinner and the penitent, the passionate seeker after truth and finally the passionate seeker after God. His life is a confession, but so is his thought. Only, he confesses not merely weaknesses, but also the power of God working in him. His confession becomes with him an attitude on man, on the universe and on God: he completes his own confession with a story of the creation—for the world itself proclaims its dependence upon God and its nothingness without Him. It invites St. Augustine to seek what it proclaims, which is also to seek within himself for his own formation. And St. Augustine returns to himself to make that search which so many others made after him, and under his inspiration.

When he was nineteen years old, St. Augustine read the *Hortensius* of Cicero.<sup>1</sup> It awakened him to the pursuit and the love of wisdom. From that moment until the spring of 387, the one question which he asked and sought to answer was: where to find this wisdom? The Manichaeans attracted him for a long time (373-382), and for various reasons. They appeared, by their promises at least, to be able to satisfy important intellectual and moral difficulties. Their materialism and dualism of eternal warring principles eased his inability to avoid conceiving God in a material way, and, by absolving the individual from moral guilt, soothed his tortured conscience. Their pretension to scientific knowledge was a considerable attraction, and Augustine remained among them

\* The following article on St. Augustine forms a part of a history of Scholasticism which I hope to publish shortly. The manner of presentation and documentation depends on this fact. I have tried to include in the notes such references to St. Augustine and his modern interpreters as will enable the student to introduce himself in a reasonably

living way to the thought and the mind of St. Augustine.

I must also take this opportunity to thank my publishers (Messrs. Simon and Schuster, New York) for kindly permitting me the advance publication of this section of my history.

<sup>1</sup> *De Beata Vita* I, 4; PL 32, 961.



by expectation more than by conviction. His meeting with Faustus (in 382) in Carthage broke the spell. In the eyes of Augustine, Faustus was at once ignorant and superficial. From the Manichaeans, therefore, he turned to the philosophers of the New Academy, who began to appear to him quite prudent men because they decreed that man could not grasp the truth. Then came the meeting with St. Ambrose in Milan (384). The personality of St. Ambrose impressed itself with decisive effect on Augustine: he began to think that the Church was not as childish in its beliefs as the Manichaeans had taught him to think.

At this moment, when he was already returning to the Faith of his childhood, he came upon "certain books of the Platonists translated from Greek into Latin: *quosdam Platoniorum libros ex graeca lingua in latinam versos*".<sup>2</sup> These books had been translated into Latin by the Roman rhetorician Marius Victorinus: *quos Victorinus quondam rhetor urbis Romae, quem Christianum defunctum esse audieram, in latinam linguam transtulisset*.<sup>3</sup> From the tract *On the Happy Life* (which dates from November 13-15, 386), we know more precisely what the Platonic books were: "I read a small number of the works of Plotinus . . ." When St. Augustine went to Cassiciacum, therefore, he had already read in Milan some treatises of Plotinus.<sup>4</sup> From the same reference, we know that in reading Plotinus he compared him with the authority contained in the Scriptures. It is literally true, consequently, that in Milan St. Augustine read Plotinus with Christian eyes and with a Christian pre-occupation. The work *Against the Academics*, itself "produced" during the same November, 386 (November 9-12, 19, 21), reveals an Augustine who not only thought that Plotinus was a sort of reincarnate Plato, but who affirmed that he would not depart from the authority of Christ and that he was confident of finding in the Platonists what is not opposed to his faith.<sup>5</sup> And it is in an eminent and rare moment that Augustine is "spoiling the Egyptians", for not only was Plotinus from Egypt, but there was also a story current in later antiquity that Egypt gave birth to a few men, but when she did, they were eminent.<sup>6</sup> The books of Plotinus were from Egypt, but Augustine did not stop to worship where Plotinus had worshipped: ". . . those books were from there, but I did not look in the direction of Egyptian idols . . ." With Plotinus, St. Augustine cries that we must flee to our dear country, but his flight thither is not clothed in the mythical language of a Ulysses fleeing Calypso and her island. From Plotinus he accepts what has well been called an invitation to enter into himself.<sup>7</sup> But what did he find in himself?

This is a notorious question.<sup>8</sup> In the autumn of 386, in that month of November when he wrote three philosophical dialogues, was St. Augustine a convert to Christianity? Or was he a convert to Neoplatonism—plus a moral

<sup>2</sup> *Confessions* VII, 9, 13; PL 32, 740.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.* VIII, 2, 3; PL 32, 750.

<sup>4</sup> *De Beata Vita* I, 4; PL 32, 961. On the text, cf. Paul Henry S.J., *Plotin et l'Occident* (Louvain: Spicilegium Sacrum, 1934), pp. 79, 82-89.

<sup>5</sup> *Contra Academicos* III, 18, 41; 20, 43; PL 32, 956-957.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. David, *In Porphyrii Isagogen Prooemium* IV, ed. A. Busse (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca XVII, 2, Berlin, 1904), p. 91, 11. 24-26.

<sup>7</sup> *Confessions* VII, 9, 15; PL 32, 741-742. Cf. P. Henry, *op. cit.*, pp. 96-103.

<sup>8</sup> P. Henry, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

<sup>9</sup> The questions whether Augustine was or was not a Christian convert at the time he went to Cassiciacum has occupied scholars for over fifty years. The classic defense of

the thesis that in 386 Augustine became a convert to Neoplatonism and not to Christianity is by Prosper Alfarié, *L'Évolution intellectuelle de saint Augustin* (Paris, Émile Nourry, 1918). The more just appreciation of Augustine and the classic defense of the Christian character of his conversion in 386 can be found in Charles Boyer S.J., *Christianisme et néo-platonisme dans la formation de saint Augustin* (Paris, G. Beauchesne, 1920). A recent discussion of St. Augustine during the critical years 386-391 (i.e., from his conversion to his ordination to the priesthood) is the excellent work of Sister Mary Patricia Garvey R.S.M., *St. Augustine: Christian or Neo-Platonist?* (Milwaukee, Marquette University Press, 1938). For an introduction to the history of the controversy, cf. Sister Mary Patricia Gar-

way of life? Before he returned to Milan, very early in the following year, to be baptized by St. Ambrose, St. Augustine had written *On the Happy Life, Against the Academics, On Order, Soliloquies*.<sup>10</sup> Is it possible that Augustine, looking back upon these days from the heights of Christian perfection which he had reached when he wrote the *Confessions* fifteen years later, misread the state of his own heart and mind? Is the master psychologist, that Augustine reveals himself to be, deceived when he examines his own soul? And can a historian really pretend to do that better than Augustine? Without doubt, between the penitent and erstwhile professor of rhetoric in Cassiciacum and the saintly and learned bishop of Hippo there is a considerable difference. But what sort of progress did Augustine make during those fifteen years?

And, first of all, what program did he mark out for himself at Cassiciacum? At the beginning of the thirty-third year of his life, St. Augustine set these facts down concerning himself:

Let me tell you my whole program briefly. Whatever may be the nature of human wisdom, I see I have not yet perceived it. But though I am now in my thirty-third year, I don't think I ought to despair of sometime reaching it. So, I have turned away from all the things that mortal men consider to be good, and I have set myself the goal of serving the pursuit of this wisdom. The arguments of the Academics used to hold me back seriously from such an undertaking: in the present disputation I have, as it seems to me, defended myself sufficiently against those arguments. Furthermore, everyone agrees that we are impelled to learning by a double urge, that of authority and that of reason. *From this moment forward it is my resolve never to depart from the authority of Christ.* For I find none that is stronger. However, I must follow after this with the greatest subtlety of reason. *For I am so disposed now that I have an unbounded desire to apprehend truth not only by believing it, but also by understanding it. In the meantime, I am confident that among the Platonists I shall find what is not opposed to the teachings of our religion.*<sup>11</sup>

Whatever St. Augustine may find in Plotinus, can it be denied that the Augustinian program at Cassiciacum is *growth in understanding WITHIN the truth that he has come to possess through faith*? However imperfectly Augustine may know Christian doctrine at this moment, his heart is Christian; and though that great heart will discover, through the grace of God, new heights from which to proclaim its own humility and to bewail its own unworthiness, it is no less Christian at Cassiciacum for being more Christian fifteen years later at Hippo; just as it will not be any less Christian in the *City of God* for honoring Platonism: "*We set the Platonists above all the others, and we admit that they are the nearest to us*".<sup>12</sup> This honoring of Platonists, be it noted, has deeper roots than a respect for great names: "Now it is quite possible that a Christian man who is educated only in ecclesiastical disciplines should be unaware of the name of the Platonists. And so too he might not know that there existed two philosophical tradition in the Greek tongue, namely, that of

vey, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-38. In accepting the *Christian conversion* of St. Augustine in 386, I am thus also accepting the historical faithfulness of the *Confessions*.

<sup>10</sup> It is impossible to fix precisely the date of the *Soliloquies*. While we know that this work was written at the very end of Augustine's stay at Cassiciacum, the precise date of his departure for Milan is not known. Hence we must be content with an elastic

date: before Easter in 387, but possibly as early as late November, 386. Cf. *Confessions* IX, 4, 7; PL 32, 766; *Retractions* I, 4, 1; 5, 1; PL 32, 589, 590.

<sup>11</sup> *Contra Academicos* III, 20, 43; PL 32, 957. Cf. *De Beata Vita* I, 4; PL 32, 961.

<sup>12</sup> *De Civitate Dei* VIII, 9; PL 41, 234. Cp. *Sermons* CCXL-CCXLII; PL 38, 1132, 1134-1135, 1138.

the Ionians and that of the Italians. But he is surely not so impervious to things human as not to know that philosophers profess the study of wisdom or wisdom itself." And that wisdom the ancients taught! "They agree with us concerning one God, the author of the universe, Who is incorporeal beyond all corporeal things, incorruptible beyond all souls, Who is our cause, our light, our good. And *in this* we prefer them to others".<sup>13</sup> And what is surprising in this? Had not the same Paul, who preached on the knowledge of the invisible things of God from the things that were made, told the pagan Athenians that in Him we live and move and have our being—even as some of their own number proclaimed?<sup>14</sup>

*Wisdom and truth!* Augustine the bishop is not a convert to Neoplatonism for cherishing them: Augustine the spiritually wounded and physically ill man in 386 can desire them surely with Christian motives. At the moment of writing the treatise *On Order*, there is grief in his soul: "My wounds are a sufficient burden for me. With almost daily tears I ask God that they be healed, but time and again I find myself unworthy to be healed as quickly as I desire".<sup>15</sup> There is grief, and there is also a desire for wisdom. This is Augustine speaking to his mother:

You ought to know, mother, that the Greek word which stands for *philosophy* is expressed in Latin by *love of wisdom*. And so it happens that even the divine Scriptures which you so ardently embrace instruct us to avoid and to scorn the philosophers of *this world*, not just *philosophers*. That there is another world, far removed from these eyes of ours, which the intellect of a few pure persons beholds, our Lord Himself clearly signifies. For He does not say that my kingdom is not of the world, but that my kingdom is not of *this world*. *Whoever indeed thinks that we ought to flee from all philosophy really desires that we should not love wisdom*. I should have no regard for you in my discourses if you did not love wisdom; I should have *some* regard for you if you loved wisdom moderately; I should have considerably more, if you loved wisdom as much as I do. Of course, as matters really stand, you love it more than you love me—and I know how much you love me! And not only do you love it, you have also made great progress in it. Hence it is that you are not terrified by the dread of any chance misfortune, nor even by the dread of death, which is the heaviest burden to the most learned men. Now this, as everybody admits, is the highest pinnacle of philosophy. Well, shall I not willingly become also your disciple?<sup>16</sup>

Strange conclusion, *this*, for those who dream of a Neoplatonic convert at Cassiciacum! For Augustine, in seeking philosophy, is seeking wisdom, and in a burst of enthusiasm he thinks to become a disciple of his mother who is herself in love with the wisdom of the Scriptures! Surely, in spite of Monica's playful rejoinder that her son Augustine had never told such a big lie, we can hear tremendous undertones here. Ostia is a scant year away.

Yet even before Ostia, just when he is preparing to return to Milan for baptism, Augustine writes the *Soliloquies*, a dialogue between himself and his own reason. At the very beginning of this work there is a magnificent prayer which rises in spiritual intensity as it proceeds. Augustine prays to God that

<sup>13</sup> *Op. cit.* VIII, 10; PL 41, 234. The two schools referred to are those of Pythagoras and Thales: cf. *op. cit.* VIII, 2; PL 34, 225-226.

<sup>14</sup> *Op. cit.* VIII, 10; PL 41, 234. Cf. St. Paul, *Rom.* i, 20; St. Luke, *Acts* xvii, 28.

<sup>15</sup> *De Ordine* I, 10, 29; PL 32, 891.

<sup>16</sup> *Op. cit.* I, 11, 32; PL 32, 993-994. The correction of this text by the *Retractations* (I, 3, 2; PL 32, 588-589) supposes that Augustine was a Christian in 386.

he may pray well, that God may hear him and set him free. He prays to God the creator, in Whom are all things. He prays to God "the Father of truth, the Father of wisdom, the Father of the true and the highest life, the Father of beatitude, the Father of intelligible light, the Father of our awakening and illumination, the Father of the promise by which we are exhorted to return to you." This God Who is Truth Augustine invokes, this "God to Whom faith urges us, hope raises us, charity unites us." He prays to this God of St. Paul through Whom death will be swallowed up in victory; and to this God of St. Matthew through Whom those who knock are not unanswered. He prays to the God "Who made man to your image and likeness, as everyone acknowledges who knows himself".<sup>17</sup> He wants to be heard by this God:

Hear me, hear me, my Lord, my King, my Father, my Maker, my Hope, my Substance [res], my Glory, my Home, my Country, my Salvation, my Light, my Life. Hear me, hear me, hear me—in that way of yours which so few know!

You and you alone do I love. You and you alone do I follow after. You and you alone I seek. You and you alone am I ready to serve, because you alone rule justly. I desire to be subject to your law. I beg you, order and command whatever you will,—only heal and open my ears, by which I may hear your voice. Heal and open my eyes, that I may see your commands. Drive away madness from me, that I may come to know you again. Tell me where I may wait for you, that I may look upon your face. Then do I hope to accomplish all that you have commanded me. Lord, most merciful Father, receive, I beg you, one who has fled from you. Now at last I have suffered enough, and enough have I served your enemies—who are under your feet. Long enough have I been the plaything of illusions.

Receive me, receive your servant that flees from them, for even when they received me a fugitive from you, I remained a stranger to them! I see that I must return to you! Let your door open to my knocking! Teach me how I may come to you!

I bring only my will with me! I know only that I must spurn all things that are passing and mortal, and that I must seek after what is stable and eternal. This I do, Father, for this is all I know how to do.

I do not know how to come to you! Do you bring to me, and show me and give me the means [*viaticum*]? If it is through faith that they who seek you find you—give me faith! If through virtue, give me virtue! If through knowledge, give me knowledge! Increase the faith that is in me, increase the hope, increase the charity! O how wonderful and how unique is your goodness!

I move towards you, and I seek from you the very things which make possible my movement. If you desert me, everything is lost. But you do not desert, for you are the highest good, and no one has ever truly sought after the highest good without finding it. But everyone who has made a true search has received from you the wherewith to search. Make me to seek you, Father! Rescue me from error! Let nothing else come in your stead, in answer to my search. If I desire only you, I beg now, Father, that I may find you! But if there is to be found in me some useless desire, cleanse me and make me worthy to see you.

As for the salvation of this mortal body of mine, O wisest and best

<sup>17</sup> *Soliloquia* I, 1, 1-4; PL 32, 869-871. Cp. St. Paul, *I Cor.* xv, 54; *Matt.* vii, 8.

Father, as long as I do not know of what use it is to me or to those whom I love, I entrust it to your care, and I shall ask of you for it whatever you advise at the right time. I pray only for your mercy, your most unsurpassed mercy, that you may not make anything hinder me or my way to you. I pray, while I still bear this body of mine, you enjoin upon me to be pure, to be just and prudent; to love your wisdom perfectly no less than to observe it; to be worthy of a dwelling place, and to dwell in your most blessed Kingdom. Amen. Amen.<sup>18</sup>

This is Augustine as of the end of 386. For the next forty-five years we can follow Augustine the priest and bishop, the orator and saint, the preacher and controversialist, as he grows in Christian wisdom, in purity and in peace. This is not the quiet peace that he may have dreamed of when, after his mother's death at Ostia and a short stay in Rome, he returned to his native Tagaste and lived a life of poverty. It was the strenuous and intense peace of a soul living in union with God, of a soul that had found certitude, truth, beatitude and repose together in God;<sup>19</sup> but it was also the peace of a strenuous bishop who, as St. Martin was to say of himself, desired rest but did not refuse to labor. This peace is not only the culmination of the aims and desires of the penitent of Cassiciacum; it is also the exalted possession of the bishop of Hippo. For we shall miss what is best in the *Confessions* if we do not observe its singing qualities and its prayerful elevations. When Augustine cries out:<sup>20</sup> *late, late have I loved you, beauty ever ancient and ever new!* he is announcing a great sorrow, but he is also confessing a great love. And he does not merely speak and think his love. From the opening lines of the *Confessions* he sings it as only men who love God with abandon can sing, in the intimacy of loving prayer. The great doctor that Augustine became surely does not outshine the great lover of God who speaks to his Lord in the *Confessions*. The great theologian and controversialist has an eminent rival in the great contemplative—a great rival and a great teacher.

The works of Augustine belong to many fields of activity. It is scarcely possible even to mention all of them.<sup>21</sup> There are the controversial works directed against the *Manichaeans*, the *Donatists*, the *Pelagians* and the *Arians*. There are sermons and letters, works of scriptural exegesis, treatises on dogmatic and moral theology, works of a more general as well as of a more personal nature. In this rich and diversified literary activity, there are many works which have become the cherished possessions of centuries of Christian thought and meditation, and in these works there are many passages which have exercised an influence that can scarcely be measured. In addition to the dialogues written at Cassiciacum, let us notice, in particular, the following works of Augustine with the approximate dates of their composition and appearance:

*On the Immortality of the Soul (De Immortalitate Animae; 387)*, *On Music (De Musica; 389-391)*,<sup>22</sup> *On the Magnitude of the Soul (De Quantitate Animae;*

<sup>18</sup> *Soliloquia* I, 1, 4-6; PL 32, 871-872.

<sup>19</sup> *Confessions* X, 21, 30-23, 34; PL 32, 793-794.

<sup>20</sup> *Confessions* X, 27, 38; PL 32, 795.

<sup>21</sup> For a detailed and useful table of the works of St. Augustine, cf. E. Portalié, article "Augustin" in *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique* I (1903), cols. 2286-2317. (The whole of this article, *ibid.*, cols. 2286-2472, is an important contribution to Augustinian studies.)

The works of St. Augustine will be cited from the Benedictine edition (originally, 1679-1700) reprinted in Migne, PL 32-47. The critical edition in the Vienna Corpus (1896

ff.) is incomplete.

<sup>22</sup> Of the six books of this work, it is the sixth which is the most important. It contains Augustine's real aim, namely, to raise the minds of men from the corporeal to the spiritual, the changing to the unchanging (cf. *De Musica* VI, 1, 1; PL 32; 1171; *Retractions* I, 11, 1; PL 32, 600-601); it contains also a classic discussion of the nature of sensation. The *De Musica* was begun in Milan at the time of Augustine's baptism, and finished in Africa (*Retraction* I, 6; PL 32, 591).



387-388),<sup>23</sup> *On Free Choice* (*De Libero Arbitrio*; 388-395), *On the Teacher* (*De Magistro*; 389), *On Christian Doctrine* (*De Doctrina Christiana*; 387),<sup>24</sup> *Confessions* (*Confessionum Libri XIII*; 400),<sup>25</sup> *On the Trinity* (*De Trinitate*; 400-416),<sup>26</sup> *A Literal Commentary on Genesis* (*De Genesi ad Litteram*; 401-415),<sup>27</sup> *The City of God* (*De Civitate Dei*; 413-426), *Enchiridion* (*Enchiridion*; 421), *Retractations* (*Retractationes*; 426-428).<sup>28</sup>

The historian is overwhelmed by such riches, which do not even include very important letters, homilies (such as those on the Psalms and on St. John's Gospel), less formal sermons, short treatises and controversial tracts. Not only is Augustine "one of the men who have most honored mankind",<sup>29</sup> he is one of the men who have most influenced European thought. He is, wrote Peter the Venerable to St. Bernard, "the greatest teacher of Christianity after the Apostles."<sup>30</sup> Generations of Christian thinkers have drawn food and inspiration from his works. Mystics, theologians, philosophers, political theorists, educators—who are not his students and even his disciples? If we must single out a name of overwhelming influence, then we may say with more propriety of Augustine what has been said, in a celebrated remark, of Plato, namely, that history is a series of footnotes to him. Truly the works of Augustine have been a unique library for Christian thinkers, even as his heart has been an unflinching mirror for them.

<sup>23</sup> As St. Augustine himself says, his purpose in writing this work was to show how great a reality the soul was, and yet it did not possess corporeal quantity: cf. *Retractations* I, 8, 1; PL 32, 594.

<sup>24</sup> This important treatise was left unfinished in 397. From the *Retractations* (II, 4, 1; PL 32, 631) we know that the work was interrupted at III, 25, 35, and that in 427 or so Augustine completed it before continuing with the revision of his other treatises.

<sup>25</sup> The *Confessions* is a work of prayer and meditation, intended ultimately to praise God. The praise of God is what Augustine confesses. That is why Augustine adds the last three books, which contain the story of the creation, to the first ten, which contain the story of his life down to, and including, the very time in which he wrote the *Confessions*. Not only does the world proclaim God and sing His praises; it exhorts Augustine to return to himself and embark upon that inner voyage of praise to God. The *Confessions* is thus no mere biography: it is a living meditation, as well as an unsurpassed example of what is the authentic Augustinian mood—exalted and prayerful, seeking through love to be joined to God and to possess Him, desiring to embrace truth and to enjoy it, growing in the possession of truth through a more intense and pure love of it. This is the true Augustinianism. It is directed ultimately towards union with God, and it is occupied constantly with enabling the soul to rise to God. Such an occupation not only is *contemplative* and *mystical* in its direction: it implies also an entirely *instrumental* conception of human knowledge. Cf. A. C. Pegis, 'In Defense of St. Augustine', *The New Scholasticism* XVIII (1944), pp. 97-122.

<sup>26</sup> The *Retractations* is a revision and correction of his works undertaken by him at the very end of his life. It is invaluable to the historian on matters concerning chro-

<sup>27</sup> While the first seven books of this work

are a treatise on the Trinity, books VIII-XV form, with the *Confessions*, the basic texts for the study of Augustinian mysticism. Cf. Fulbert Cayré, *La contemplation augustinienne* (Paris, André Blot, 1927) pp. 16-17, 79-88, 95-110.

<sup>27</sup> This work, begun after and finished before the *De Trinitate* (*Retractations* II, 24, 1; FL 32, 640), is the fourth attempt by Augustine to write a commentary on *Genesis* over a period of more than twenty-five years: 1°—*De Genesi contra Manichaeos* (388-390); 2°—*De Genesi ad litteram liber imperfectus* (393-394); 3°—*Confessions* XI-XIII (400); 4°—*De Genesi ad Litteram* (401-415). If we leave aside the *Confessions*, whose purpose is meditative rather than scientific, the development of Augustine's thought on *Genesis* is from the allegorical to the strictly literal method of interpretation. He confesses, in connection with the unfinished literal commentary (2°), that he gave it up because he found himself incapable of doing such a work at the time (*Retractations* I, 18; PL 32, 643). Apparently he had wanted to suppress this work; in any case, as he says (*ibid.*), it does not at all compare with 4°.

nology, etc. His purpose in writing this work, as he indicates in the prologue, was partly to prepare for his own death, partly to aid others to imitate his progress, not his errors. "Whoever reads my works in the sequence in which they were written will possibly find how I have made progress in the course of my writings. With this purpose in mind, I shall do all I can, by means of the present work, to give my reader a knowledge of that sequence." (*Retractations*, Prologue, 3; PL 32, 586).

<sup>29</sup> Paul Monceaux, *Histoire de la littérature latine chrétienne* (Paris, Payot, 1924), p. 131.

<sup>30</sup> *Epistle to Saint Bernard*, among the letters of St. Bernard, Ep. CCXXIX, n. 13; PL 182, 405.

## II. THE SEARCH AND THE IDEAL

### (a) *Beatitude*

To attempt to portray the unity of a heart and a mind which lives as deeply and as intensely as did Augustine is always a rash undertaking. How can the historian reproduce the *life* of a man? As it has well been said, we can only follow after Augustine—and it does not even lie within the power of man to do so. This may be a worrisome paradox, but it is the lesson of Augustine's life and thought, and it is the lesson that is inscribed at the very center of his teaching. He is eminently the disciple of the love of God. But this love is not a doctrine but a life, not an abstract analysis but a journey, not a theory but an experience. Now precisely, how is an *experience* communicated? It can be possessed only by those who live it, and it is as uniquely *theirs* as their own being. The greatest work that Augustine has produced is his own life: how shall we read *that*?

To catch Augustine in his works, therefore, is a task before which the historian of ideas can honestly despair. We can see as much of Augustine as is visible to the intelligence that is seeking abstract knowledge and not love. We can see what is communicable—the universal, the abstract and the intelligible. What is communicable? Augustine the saint? How ridiculous we are even to ask such a question! Do we then at least know Augustine the *thinker* and the *learned theologian* within the saint? But if Augustine the theologian is rooted in Augustine the lover of God, if Augustinian theology is rooted in mysticism,<sup>21</sup> how shall we ever really know Augustine the theologian unless we love God as he has? And what if that love must first be given to us by God as a supernatural gift, before we move towards Him as did Augustine?

Now to ask such questions is already to be disciples of Augustine himself. For what we are saying is that Augustine the thinker is indistinguishable from Augustine the lover of God. What Augustine the thinker wants is the *possession of truth*, and what Augustine the lover wants is the *vision of God* which brings beatitude. To see God, to possess and to enjoy Him Who is Truth: *this* is the fulfillment of Augustine the doctor and the man, the theologian and the mystic. Love is the means of union with God, and the cause and the channel of knowledge—at least of that knowledge which Augustine wants. The mystic who wrote the *Confessions*, the learned theologian who wrote what is often considered his deepest theological work, the great treatise *On the Trinity*, the priest and bishop who preached to the faithful in Hippo or Carthage—all are the same Augustine. They all utter the same words: *blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God.*<sup>22</sup> And what is this spiritual purity which Augustine preaches except the answer of Augustine the believer to Augustine the thinker in search of beatitude and to Augustine the theologian in search of understanding? In the living faith which he preaches to his people he finds the anchorage from which he never departed. But what does he preach? Here are words which are the beginning of wisdom for the humblest Christian as well as for the greatest theologian and the most exalted mystic. This is a lesson, at once, on humility, on faith, on beatitude and on theology:

Above all, bear in mind this, that the Creator transcends in an ineffable way whatever we can learn of the creature with the sense of the body

<sup>21</sup> F. Cayré, *op. cit.*, pp. 241-247. From a somewhat different standpoint, the *affective* character of Augustinian theology has been affirmed more recently by R. Gagnebet, 'La

nature de la théologie speculative, I', *Revue Thomiste* XLIV (1938), pp. 1-39.

<sup>22</sup> *Matt.* v, 8.

or the knowledge of the soul. But do you really want to reach Him with your mind? Then purify your mind, purify your heart! Make pure that eye by means of which such a reality can be reached. Make pure the eye of the heart, for *blessed are the clean of heart for they shall see God . . .*

But that we may finally come to see God the Word, if we cannot do so already, let us listen to the Word made flesh. Because we have become followers of the flesh, let us listen to the Word which was made flesh. Therefore did He come, and therefore did He take on Himself our infirmity, that you may comprehend the strengthening speech of God Who bears your infirmity . . . He was made flesh so that we who are young should be nourished on milk, since we were too young for solid food.

Now what does He tell the infirm? Through what means, does He say, they will be able, by the restoration of the sight they once had, to reach in some measure the vision of the Word through which all things were made? *Come to me, all you that labor and are burdened, and I will refresh you. Take up my yoke upon you, and learn of me, because I am meek, and humble of heart.*<sup>33</sup> What did the Teacher, the Son of God, the Wisdom of God through Whom all things were made, proclaim? He summons mankind and He says, *Come to me, all you that labor, and learn from me.* You were probably thinking that Wisdom would say: 'Learn that I have made the heavens and the stars. In me too were all things ordered before being produced. Learn that in the power of immutable principles even the hairs of your head are numbered.' Did you think that Wisdom would speak in some such way? Rather, and before all else, did He say, *I am meek and humble of heart!*

See, my brethren, what you are to grasp: it is surely a little thing. Our destination is high, but let us grasp little things and we shall be magnified. Do you wish to grasp the majesty of God? Grasp first His humility. Deign to be humble for your own sake, for God has deigned to be humble, nor for His own sake, but for yours. Take on, therefore, the humility of Christ, learn to be humble and turn away from pride. Confess your infirmity, and lie patiently before your healer.

When you have put on His humility, you will rise with Him. Of course, this does not mean that as Word He too will rise; it means rather that you will rise, that He will be more and more comprehended by you. Your understanding was in the beginning uncertain and unsteady: now you have come to understand with greater certainty and clearness. It is not He who increases, but you who progress, and He seems to rise with you. That is how things really are, my brethren. Believe the commandments of God, and fulfill them, *and He will give you the strength of understanding.* Do not be presumptuous, and do not give preference to knowledge over a commandment of God: if you do, you will not grow in strength, you will remain weak.

Consider the tree. It seeks the depths in order to raise its crest to the sky. Does it rest on anythings besides humility? And you, do you seek to grasp the heights without charity? And are you seeking the heavens without roots? That spells ruin, not growth. Through the indwelling of Christ in your hearts by faith, do you root and found yourselves in charity, that you may be filled unto all the fullness of God.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>33</sup> *Op. cit.* xi, 28-29.

<sup>34</sup> *Sermon CXVII* 10, 15-17; PL 38, 670-671.

Cf. St. Paul, *Ephesians*, iii, 17, 19.



This is, it is clear, a sermon and a lesson on humility. But it is also the explanation of Augustine the believer, and the believer is, in turn, the root and cause of the thinker and the mystic. Did St. Augustine's hearers realize that he was preaching to them a faith that they had to *live* with their *whole* souls? that such a faith would result in spiritual *understanding*? Did they realize that he was preaching *love* not only as a work of devotion *but also as a means of a greater knowledge of the mysteries of God*? In short, did they know that he was preaching mysticism and contemplation as a goal which would give them that very beatitude that the philosophers had been haltingly and laboriously seeking, the goal that would yield the enjoyment and the possession of truth? Did they see that faith and charity contained answers to questions that philosophers were asking—and fell short of answering? If so, they should not have been surprised to hear Augustine express in a sermon problems that were highly intellectual, that had caused him so much personal anguish and that were answered in the very faith he was preaching to them:

Listen first to the common aim of all philosophers . . . *It is characteristic of all philosophers that, through their study, inquiry, discussion, their very life, they have sought to come to possess a happy life. This alone was the cause of philosophizing.* Furthermore, I think that even this search the philosophers have in common with us. For if I should ask you why you believe in Christ, and why you have become Christians, every man will answer truthfully by saying: for the sake of a happy life. *The pursuit of a happy life is common to philosophers and to Christians.*<sup>35</sup>

In fact, this is an understatement, for Augustine recognizes that all men seek a happy life and therefore he should have said that this search is common to all men, both good and wicked. For the good are good in order to be happy, and the wicked would certainly not be wicked if they did not expect to be happy through their wickedness.<sup>36</sup> It is in any case true that the whole question at issue is: *what produces the happy life*? What makes man—composed of soul and body—happy? "As everyone knows, man is composed of soul and body. This substance, this reality, this person which is called *man*, is seeking a happy life. Now this fact *you know*: I do not insist that you *believe* it, but I admonish you to recognize it. *Man*, I say,—this not inconsiderable reality, surpassing all beasts, all things that fly and all things that swim, and whatever has flesh and is not *man*; *man*—composed of soul and body, but not of any kind of soul, for a brute animal is composed of soul and body; *man*, therefore, composed of a rational soul and mortal flesh,—*man* is seeking a happy life."<sup>37</sup>

Man—the *evident fact 'in our midst*—is the reality on which we are here building: he is that bit of evidence which we can behold and which will enable us to go on and accept what we do not see. This is thus not only a question of beatitude, but also, be it noted, a question of faith and reason and of the rational anchorage of belief. The Stoics and Epicureans place beatitude in man himself. The Epicureans say that the pleasure of the body is the cause of beatitude, and the Stoics say that virtue in the soul is the cause of beatitude. Between them, therefore, the Stoics and Epicureans epitomize the views which place the cause of man's beatitude in himself. That is why, continues St. Augustine, it is fitting that when St. Paul preached in Athens,<sup>38</sup> though there

<sup>35</sup> Sermon CL 3, 4; PL 38, 809.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>37</sup> *Op. cit.* 4, 5; PL 38, 810.

<sup>38</sup> Acts, xvii, 17 ff. Earlier in the same sermon St. Augustine had already said of the

Athenians: "He spoke in Athens. The Athenians had a great reputation among other peoples for letters and learning. Athens was the fatherland of great philosophers. From there many and varied philoso-

were other schools of philosophy in that city, only the Stoics and the Epicureans conversed with him. But let us leave aside the materialism and the mortalism of the Epicureans. Or, if we too must say: *tomorrow we die*, let us not follow the Epicureans who, looking forward to oblivion after death, seek the present delight of the flesh as the only possession they shall ever have. We too must say: *tomorrow we die*, but since as Christians we look forward to life after death, indeed to a life of beatitude after death, before saying, *tomorrow we die*, let us fast and pray and give to the poor. It ought to be clear, in any case, that the Apostle could not place the cause of beatitude in the body.<sup>39</sup>

Admittedly, the Stoics look a more worthy foe, since they speak, not of pleasure, but of virtue. But if the Epicureans erred by following pleasures, the Stoics are guilty of courting pride. For though they separated themselves from the flesh, and placed their whole hope of beatitude in the soul, yet they trusted in their own strength; and does not Scripture say that those who trust in their own strength ought to fear?<sup>40</sup> In brief, the Epicurean places his hope of happiness in himself, for he places the highest good in the body. The Stoic, though he may have located the highest good somewhat higher than the Epicurean, likewise finds his heaven in himself. Let us now take a poll: "Let us place these three—the Epicurean, the Stoic and the Christian—before our eyes and let us ask each one of them. 'Tell me, O Epicurean, what reality makes man happy?' He replies, 'the pleasure of the body'. 'And you, O Stoic?' 'The virtue of the soul.' 'And you, O Christian?' 'A gift of God.'"<sup>41</sup>

Virtue is a great and glorious thing, O Stoic, and you ought to praise it as much as possible. But it is not the virtue of our soul which makes you happy; it is rather He Who gave you virtue, and Who gave you the will and the power. Virtue delights you? A noble thing delights you. I know that you thirst, but you cannot give yourself to drink the water of virtue. You are dry, and yet if I shall show you the fount of life, you will probably mock me. I know, you are a Greek, and the Greeks seek after wisdom: but we preach Christ crucified.<sup>42</sup> But learn whence is your virtue. You are seeking after virtue? Then say, O Lord, my Power [virtus]! You are seeking a blessed life? Then say, Blessed is the man whom thou shalt instruct, O Lord.<sup>43</sup> For happy is the people that has, not the pleasure of the flesh; nor its own virtue; rather, happy is that people whose God is the Lord.<sup>44</sup> "This, this is the homeland of beatitude, which all desire, but which not all seek after correctly. To such a homeland let us not devise the way, as though by means of our own hearts; and let us not build for ourselves wandering pathways. The way too comes from God."<sup>45</sup>

Once more: what does the happy man desire? He desires not to be deceived, not to die, not to suffer. He wants to possess truth. He wants it so much, so much does unconquerable truth rule him, so much does man flee from being deceived, that he would prefer to weep when he is sane than to be happy and be insane. He wants truth, without deception, without suffering and without end. He wants never to be deceived; he wants to live without the prospect of error or of loss. Otherwise, life will be an eternal hell. He wants eternal life, for only then is it a blessed life. Clearly he who fears death is not blessed. In a word: "This life all desire, this is what we all desire—truth and life. Yet to this great possession, this great felicity—what is the way? The philoso-

phical ideas had gone forth to the other parts of Greece and of the world. It was in this city that the Apostle spoke, and in this city did he proclaim Christ crucified" (Sermon CL, 1, 2; PL 38, 854). St. Augustine then continues with the famous text of I Cor., 23-24.

<sup>39</sup> Sermon CL, 5, 6-6, 7; PL 38, 810-811.

<sup>40</sup> Psalms xlviii, 6-8.

<sup>41</sup> Sermon CL, 7-8; PL 38, 812. Cf. Sermon CLVI, 7, 7; PL 38, 854.

<sup>42</sup> I Cor. i, 22-23.

<sup>43</sup> Psalms xciii, 12.

<sup>44</sup> Op. cit. cxliiii, 15.

<sup>45</sup> Sermon CL, 8, 9; PL 38, 813.

phers have laid out for themselves ways of error. Some have said: *this is the way*. Others have said: *no, not that, but this*. The way was hidden from them, for God resists the proud; and the way would have been hidden from us, too, did it not come to us. Wherefore our Lord has said: *I am the way*. Slothful wayfarer, you refused to go to the Way; so the Way has come to you. You were seeking the Way: *I am the Way!* You were seeking your destination: *I am the Truth and the Life!* You will not err if you go to Him through Him."<sup>46</sup>

To conclude: "This is Christian teaching. Clearly, it cannot be compared with the teachings of the philosophers: it is incomparably superior to them—to the uncleanness of the Epicureans and the pride of the Stoics."<sup>47</sup>

This conclusion of Augustine the preacher can reveal to us many things about Augustine the believer and the thinker. He already knew and desired at Cassiciacum what he is preaching here: truth, certitude, beatitude. He was a believer then as now, and he followed after Christ, God the Word made flesh, then as now. Then as now Paul was victorious over the philosophers, though now Paul triumphs over those who seek—and lose—a heaven of beatitude in themselves; whereas then he triumphed over a Plotinus who at least pointed—O so brightly!—to God, but who did *not* point to the way to God. Then as now the believer possessed better than the philosopher that very life of beatitude which philosophers themselves were seeking. And far from doing violence to the human reason, the Christian Faith presented itself to the seeker after beatitude in such a way that he could remain true to the laws of his reason in accepting the life of Faith, and he could further and promote the deepest life of that reason—*add to its understanding*—by becoming a believer. Is your Plotinus a man of great human intelligence and great human desire? Surely. Does he look upon divine horizons? Again, yes. But he is, after all, a limping giant. Now a Christian Plotinus, a Plotinus who is on fire, as Paul was on fire, with the life and the love of heaven itself,—there is a man!

### (b) Faith and Wisdom

Such is the deep sentiment of Augustine. It is born of many convictions unlearned, no less than of many convictions newly acquired at the time when he was freeing himself of his Manichaean attachments. He was already near the end of his journey when, after his disappointment with the Manichaean bishop, Faustus, he sailed from Carthage for Rome. Poor Monica! That night when Augustine left her in the chapel of St. Cyprian, praying and weeping that her son would stay in Carthage—how could she know that, though God would not answer her momentary prayer, He was already answering the deepest of the wishes in her heart, the wish that Augustine would return to the Faith of his childhood?<sup>48</sup> True, while in Rome, Augustine remained a Manichaean; but, because Faustus had unwittingly unmasked the Manichaean ignorance of that very physics which was supposed to be the strength of their doctrine, Augustine was also on the verge of skepticism. After the meeting with Faustus, he certainly knew that Manichaeism would not bring him to truth; so it was entirely natural that he should become indifferent and negligent in his Manichaean tenets. For the moment he was accepting what was evidently a poor best choice: to continue a Manichaean unless he were to find something better.<sup>49</sup> A nine year diet of myth and fable for a man who was as intellectually hungry as had been Augustine is a veritable desolation of the soul; the pendulum was bound to swing violently, and we find Augustine in Rome, associating to be sure with the Manichaeans, but showing little of

<sup>46</sup> *Op. cit.* 8, 10; PL 38, 814.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>48</sup> *Confessions* V, 8, 15; PL 32, 712-713.

<sup>49</sup> *Op. cit.* V, 10, 18; PL 32, 714-715.

his former enthusiasm in defending their doctrines. What is more, at this very moment we find him beginning to think that the philosophers of the New Academy, those skeptical descendents of Plato, were rather more *prudent* (comforting word!) than all the rest.<sup>50</sup>

Truly, how could Monica have known that this intellectual weariness in Rome was the prelude to the journey to Milan—Milan where Ambrose, fearless bishop and renowned orator, received him, and where Augustine was approaching his Faith “perceptibly, but without perceiving it”?<sup>51</sup> Yet, though Augustine’s materialism continued, Ambrose began to break his Manichaean prejudices against the *Old Testament*; so that, when Monica rejoined her son in Milan, she was joyfully surprised to hear that he was no longer a Manichaean, though he was not yet a Catholic.<sup>52</sup> This was, in fact, the skeptical interval in Augustine’s life. Being still a victim of materialism, he could not overcome his Manichaean theology. As for the physical world around him, he was slowly coming to the conclusion that many philosophers had expressed opinions that were more probable than those of the Manichaeans. Hence this result: “And so, according to the reputed manner of the Academics, I doubted concerning all things and I wavered uncertainly in their midst. However, I decided I had to abandon the Manichaeans, for it seemed to me that in that day of my doubt I could not remain in the sect to which I was already preferring some of the philosophers.”<sup>53</sup> In continuing to be, as he says, a catechumen, therefore, Augustine was waiting for the day when “something fixed, by which to guide my course, would shine forth.”<sup>54</sup>

However much Plotinus was destined to give light, this waiting is not the vigil of a philosophical dawn. For if Plotinus overcame materialism for St. Augustine, the problem of *how to acquire wisdom* is a more serious affair than merely reading the books of the Platonists. Augustine, in fact, was already considering *belief* as an answer to his questions *before* he came across the works of Plotinus. The more Ambrose’s allegorical interpretation of the Old Testament appeared to him as reasonable, the more he lost the Manichaean prejudices against the Catholic Faith; the more he faced also the possibility of faith as containing the answer to what reason was seeking and was not finding. And it was a long wait that Augustine had gone through. “For my part, I was most astonished, as I turned the matter over anxiously in my mind, how far away my nineteenth year seemed, when I had first begun to be fired with the desire for wisdom, intending that when I had found wisdom I would leave behind me all the empty hopes and the false deliriums of fruitless desires. And, behold, I was already thirty years old, and I was still sticking fast in the same mire, because of a greediness to enjoy the fleeting and dissipating pleasures of the present.”<sup>55</sup> How long, O Lord, how long? Through it all, however, through all those years of a life frustrated at every turn by passion and pride in its longing to give itself “entirely to the pursuit of God and of the happy life,”<sup>56</sup> there remained the *belief* that God existed and that the world was ruled by His providence. “This I believed,” says St. Augustine, “at times rather firmly, and at other times rather weakly. But anyhow I always believed that You existed and watched over us; and this in spite of the fact that I did not know what sort of reality You were, what way would lead to You—or *back* to You.”<sup>57</sup>

<sup>50</sup> *Op. cit.* V, 10, 19; PL 32, 715.

<sup>51</sup> *Op. cit.* V, 13, 23; PL 32, 717.

<sup>52</sup> *Op. cit.* V, 14, 24-25; VI, 1, 1; PL 32, 717-719.

<sup>53</sup> *Op. cit.* V, 14, 25; PL 32, 718.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.* *Cp. op. cit.* VI, 10, 17; PL 32, 728.

<sup>55</sup> *Op. cit.* VI, 11, 18; PL 32, 728.

<sup>56</sup> *Op. cit.* VI, 11, 19; PL 32, 728. *Cp.* “I continued to pant after professional advancement, money and a wife, and you laughed at me” (*op. cit.* VI, 6, 9; PL 32, 723).

<sup>57</sup> *Op. cit.* VI, 5, 8; PL 32, 723.

Whither, then, is this storm-tossed Augustine going? He is going back to his God—back to the God of the Scriptures, He is in search of authority: “Hence, since I was inadequate to the task of finding truth by means of pure reason, and since on this account I was in need of the authority of sacred writings, I began to believe that You would never have permitted the Scriptures to gain such a high authority all over the world unless You had desired that men should believe You through them and seek You through them.”<sup>58</sup> A momentous decision, or at least a momentous beginning; but it was not much more than a beginning, for, to say nothing of the misery of his personal life, he did not know how to avoid materialism, even though he was not now yielding to it, and he did not know how to explain the existence of evil. It was at this juncture that he read Plotinus. For the moment let us note only that this reading clarified his intelligence without purifying his will: pride especially was still the enemy of Augustine, and now perhaps even more than ever. In fact, the story within which the Plotinian episode is introduced in the *Confessions* begins and ends as a religious and moral drama: it begins with how God resists the proud and ends with all those lessons in humility that Augustine had still to learn, lessons that he did not learn from Plotinus—that is the point!—and that Paul was to teach him. *This is a journey from pride to humility, from reason to faith, from nature to grace, from man to Christ.* By all his needs and desires, Augustine is on the way to learning what the writings of Plotinus do not contain: the humility of the Incarnation and its significance.<sup>59</sup> In brief, more than freedom from materialism, Augustine was seeking freedom from his own impotence to reach beatitude and wisdom. He had failed to conquer the realm of truth by his own intelligence: he turned to faith as a way of life, and Augustine the believer, rooting himself in the supernatural love of God, found that vision of truth which Augustine the philosopher had failed to find. Like the tree in his sermon, he began in humility.

Out of this journey to humility grew the Augustinian notion of faith. “Those who say”, wrote Augustine to Honoratus in 391, “that we ought to have faith only in what we know fear exactly one thing: *opinion*; and admittedly opinion is a shameful and most wretched thing”.<sup>60</sup> But *authority* is quite another matter: it is an important part of our lives, and to believe on authority has a large place in society. We *believe*, for example, that our parents were our parents, and we believe this on authority, not on our own knowledge. In fact, “many facts can be brought forward to show that nothing in human society would remain free from calamity if we decided not to believe whatever we could not grasp by seeing”.<sup>61</sup>

If belief in authority is thus an essential part of life, the situation is even more decisive in religion: “when we are concerned with religion, that is, with the worship and understanding of God, those men who forbid our believing and very glibly promise us *reason* are scarcely to be followed”.<sup>62</sup> We would all grant, in fact, that only the wise among men are to be followed. We do this in human affairs: how much more in religion? But this is easier said than done,

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>59</sup> *Op. cit.* VII, 18, 24; PL 32, 745.

<sup>60</sup> *De Utilitate Credendi* XI, 25; PL 42, 84.

<sup>61</sup> *Op. cit.* XII, 26; PL 42, 84. Cp. *Confessions* VI, 5, 7; PL 32, 722-723: “Then, Lord, with Your most gentle and merciful hand You gradually touched and soothed my heart, and I saw — how many things I believed which I did not see and whose assurance I had not witnessed: so many things in the history of peoples, so many

things concerning places and cities I had not seen, so many things about which I believed my friends, doctors and various other men (and these things had to be believed, for otherwise life itself would come to a standstill), and finally my fixed and unshaken faith as to the parents from whom I had been born (a fact which I could have known only if I had believed what I heard)”.

<sup>62</sup> *De Utilitate Credendi* XII, 27; PL 42, 84.

for how shall a soul that is stuck fast to the mire of its own ignorance (*stultitia*) be any more successful in seeking a wise teacher of truth than it had been in seeking truth itself? How shall he who lacks wisdom in himself recognize it in someone else? For, unlike the things that we see with the bodily eye, wisdom is grasped by the intellect in the soul: you cannot see it without possessing it, and you cannot possess it and remain in your ignorance. Here is a veritable dead-end street: "No one, so long as he remains ignorant, is able with complete certitude to find a wise man whom he might follow and thus be liberated from the great evil that is his ignorance."<sup>63</sup>

God alone can meet this great difficulty. And, of course, unless we are already certain that He exists and aids the minds of men, there is no point in our seeking the true religion. What, asks Augustine, do we desire by such an effort? To reach what destination? The destination which we believe not to exist or not to have some relation to us? What, in truth, is more perverse than to think in this way?<sup>64</sup> God is and He watches over men: only on this can we build belief.<sup>65</sup> Belief? Most surely, therefore. But why *Catholic*? Augustine raises this point in a somewhat later treatise. Let me leave aside Christian wisdom, he writes, for you, O Manichaeans, do not believe that wisdom exists in the Catholic Church. But "there are many other things which keep me, and keep me for most adequate reasons, within her bosom": (I summarize) the universal acceptance of peoples and nations; miracles; the succession of popes in the Church down to the present from the very chair of St. Peter the Apostle, Peter to whom our Lord entrusted the feeding of His sheep; the really exclusive possession of the name *Catholic*, amidst so many heresies: "these dearest bonds of the Christian name, so many and so great, rightly hold a man a believer in the Catholic Church."<sup>66</sup> But what if a Manichaean tried to show him that their founder was an apostle? I don't believe it, replies Augustine. Will you read me the Gospel, he adds, to prove to me the genuineness of your founder? But, he continues dramatically, suppose you meet someone who does not believe in the Gospel! What are you going to do if he says, "I don't believe in it"? Precisely. For, he it noted, this is not idle dialogue: it has its point, which is this: "*As for myself, I wouldn't believe the Gospel unless the authority of the Catholic Church forced me to it.*"<sup>67</sup>

One who reads these and similar texts of Augustine cannot but remark the continual contrast which he makes between Christians in general and those whom he calls *wise*. He clearly means one Christian faith for all men, though he implies an opposition between those who *believe and know* and those who *simply believe*. Historians have noted this contrast.<sup>68</sup> To understand it is to understand one of the deep motives of Augustinianism. For when Augustine turns to acquire through faith what he cannot acquire through pure reason, he is truly seized by a breathless daring: *he is on the way to seeing God*.

Consider this question: what is the wisdom of man? Piety. What is piety? The worship of God. How is God to be worshipped? He must be worshipped through faith, hope and charity. What is meant by such worship? To answer this question is the purpose of the *Enchiridion* addressed to Laurentius.

<sup>63</sup> *Op. cit.* XIII, 28; PL 42, 86. This page in Augustine has been called "the most vigorous page, and, more than this, the only completely true page on this subject written by an eminent philosopher from Aristotle to Kant and after" (J. Martin, *Saint Augustine*, 2nd ed., Paris, F. Alcan, 1923, p. 25). Cp. *De Utilitate Credendi* VII, 14; PL 42, 75.

<sup>64</sup> *Op. cit.* XIII, 29; PL 42, 86. This is to say that the existence and providence of

God precede any question of a revelation from Him. But this existence and providence are proved rationally by Augustine in his ascent to God. Cf. *infra*, p. 000.

<sup>65</sup> *Op. cit.* XVI, 34; PL 42, 89.

<sup>66</sup> *Contra Epistolam Manichaei* IV, 5; PL 42, 175. (Written in 397).

<sup>67</sup> *Op. cit.* V, 6; PL 42, 176.

<sup>68</sup> E. Gilson, *Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages* (New York, Ch. Scribner's Sons, 1938), pp. 108-109, note 1.

St. Augustine expresses almost in passing the point that concerns us here. "When the mind", he writes, "has been imbued with the starting point that is the faith that works through love, it seeks through a good life to arrive even at vision—that vision in which ineffable Beauty is known to the saints and to the perfect in heart, and the full vision of which is the highest felicity . . . *The beginning lies in faith, fulfillment in vision: inchoari fide, perfici specie*".<sup>69</sup> What sort of vision is this? To be sure here is faith seeking understanding—here is reason (to resume an earlier theme) increasing its understanding by means of a faith that works through love. But what is this if not the ideal of a spiritual marriage as the answer to the search for the vision and possession of truth? Here, in fact, is Augustine traveling upon a mystical highway in search of the vision of God: *this* is the answer of Augustine the Christian contemplative to the Augustine whom the Manichaeans deceived with their promises of reason.<sup>70</sup> All that Augustine had once sought through his own reason alone, he is now seeking through wisdom nurtured by mystical love. Had not Augustine the preacher said that if we believe and fulfill the commandments of God, *God will give us the strength of understanding*? At length, here is understanding, but what understanding, and what a scandal to the Greeks! For here, out of the *Old Testament*, is Rachel with all her beauty, she whom Jacob set out to marry. *This* is what Augustine is proposing to us.<sup>71</sup>

We asked for philosophy and we are given mystical wisdom:

The activity of this human and mortal life in which we live by faith, performing many difficult tasks, uncertain of their usefulness to those whom we wish to aid: *this is Lia*, the first wife of Jacob, who is said to have had poor eyes, for the thoughts of men are weak and their foresight uncertain. *But the hope of the eternal contemplation of God, which possesses the certain and enjoyable understanding of truth: this is Rachel*, pleasing of countenance and of great beauty. Every man of great piety loves her. For her he serves the grace of God by which our sins, though they be as scarlet, shall be made as white as snow.<sup>72</sup>

Like Jacob, we are captured by the beauty of Rachel, and we are willing to serve Laban seven years for her hand in marriage. But this beauty is the "certain and enjoyable understanding of truth": it is *certitude, truth, beatitude*: the penitent of Cassiciacum is in our midst! Furthermore, we live for Rachel, not Lia. Who loves the toil of life, yes, even of a life of justice, for itself? Do we not seek to live tranquilly in the Word Who reveals God? What does every man bear in his heart, what does he love, "except the knowledge of wisdom"?<sup>73</sup> If only he could, he would wish "to reach immediately the delights of the wisdom which is beautiful and perfect"; "but in the proper education of man the labor of doing the works of justice precedes the pleasure of understanding truth".<sup>74</sup> Such a wish has only to be properly ordered: "In those who burn with a great love for a clear vision of truth, we must not condemn the desire, but we must recall it to order, so that, beginning with faith, it should rely on a good life to reach its destination".<sup>75</sup> This destination, it ought to be clear, is the heaven for which we hope; but, *even in this life*, we aim towards

<sup>69</sup> *Enchiridion* V; PL 40, 233.

<sup>70</sup> *De Utilitate Credendi* I, 2; PL 42, 66-67; *Contra Epistolam Manichaei* III, 3; PL 42, 174-175.

<sup>71</sup> On this symbolism in Augustine, cf. F. Cayré, *La contemplation augustinienne*, pp. 34-44.

<sup>72</sup> *Contra Faustum Manichaeum* XXII, 52; PL 42, 432. Cf. *Isaias* i, 18.

<sup>73</sup> *Contra Faustum Manichaeum*, *ibid.*; PL 42, 433.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*,

<sup>75</sup> *Op. cit.* XXII, 53; PL 42, 433.



it, and we have a partial glimpse of truth. If, in the first excesses of his joy in having found truth, Augustine spoke more enthusiastically than he later on approved, he always maintains this ideal of truth seen, in part, in the present life.<sup>76</sup> This is an ideal of the possession of truth which consists in storming heaven through supernatural faith and love: it is an answer, *within a mystical expansion of faith*, to the search for truth that the philosophers did not know how to conduct or terminate. For,

if wisdom-and-truth is not desired with all the powers of the soul, it cannot possibly be found. But if it is sought after properly, it cannot withdraw itself and hide from those who love it. Hence the words which even you [the Manichaeans] have frequently on your lips: *Ask, and it shall be given you: seek, and you shall find; knock, and it shall be opened to you. For nothing is covered that shall not be revealed.*<sup>77</sup> Through love we ask, through love we seek, through love we knock, through love it is revealed to us, and through love we shall rest in what shall have been revealed.<sup>78</sup>

Love. The heavens open, even in this life, to him who adheres to God with his whole heart and who has as his foundation Christ and the humility of Christ. This dominantly mystical conception of *understanding* in the Augustinian notion of *faith seeking understanding*<sup>79</sup> is brought out with considerable development in the *Confessions* and in the later books of the treatise *On the Trinity*; but it is already brought out, in compact and striking fashion, in the concluding chapters of the early dialogue *On the Magnitude of the Soul*.<sup>80</sup> There Augustine proposes seven grades or levels in the ascending march of the soul; but from the fourth level we are already practicing the venerable precept of Isaias: unless you believe, you will not have understanding.<sup>81</sup> With complete devotion and confidence the soul entrusts its spiritual purification to God (4°). This purification reveals to the soul its own grandeur, and when the soul has understood this, it presses on to God, "to the contemplation itself of truth" (5°).<sup>82</sup>

But this activity, that is, the search to understand those things that are truly and most perfectly, is the highest vision [*summus aspectus*] of the soul: it has none more perfect, none better, none more steadfast. This, then, is the sixth level of activity. For it is one thing for the eye of the soul to be purified, . . . another thing for the soul to guard and strengthen the purification itself, and still another thing for the soul to direct a pure and steadfast gaze towards what it must see. . . . There now follow the vision and contemplation of truth, which is the seventh and highest level of the soul; but this is no longer a *level*, but a habitation [*mansio*], which is reached by the former levels. In this vision, what joys there are! What complete enjoyment of the highest and true Good! What shall I say of the breath of His tranquillity and eternity? Some great and matchless souls, which, as we believe, have seen and are seeing these things, have made known such joys, to the extent that, in their judgment, they should be made known.

*But this clearly I now have the daring to say to you: if we shall hold*

<sup>76</sup> *Retractations* I, 14, 2; PL 32, 606; F. Cayré, *op. cit.*, pp. 44-47.

<sup>77</sup> *Matt.* vii, 7; x, 26.

<sup>78</sup> *De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae* I, 17, 31; PL 32, 1324.

<sup>79</sup> E. Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin*, p. 38 ff.

<sup>80</sup> *De Quantitate Animae* XXXIII, 70-XXXVI, 81; PL 32, 1073-1080.

<sup>81</sup> *Isaias* vii, 9 (Septuagint version, on which cf. *De Doctrina Christiana* II, 12, 17; PL 34, 43).

<sup>82</sup> *De Quantitate Animae* XXXIII, 74; PL 32, 1076.



with complete faithfulness to that course which God commands us, and which we have undertaken to follow, we shall reach, through the Power and the Wisdom of God, that highest cause, or that highest maker, that highest principle of all things, or by what other name such a great reality is more fittingly called; and when we have perceived Him, we shall truly see how much the things under the sun are vanity of vanities . . . What is more, there is such great delight in the contemplation of truth, however partial a contemplation of truth one may reach, such great purity, such great clarity, such undoubted trustworthiness in things, as to cause one to think that he did not know anything else formerly when he seemed to himself to know. And death, the complete flight and escape from this body, which was once feared, will be desired as a supreme reward, so that the soul may be all the less prevented from clinging wholly to truth as a whole.<sup>63</sup>

Evidently, this *daring* Augustine speaks as one who has seen: behind him is the ecstatic vision at Ostia, when the world fell away from Monica and her son, when they conversed breathlessly in the presence of God alone, when they reached the region of truth and wisdom, and knew, but only for "a moment of intellectual vision", the meaning of eternal life.<sup>64</sup> Monica had lived only for the conversion of her son. But God gave her not only Milan, but also Ostia: "God has granted me this *as an added gift* . . .".<sup>65</sup>

This servant of God that Augustine became at Ostia is the seed of the great theologian that he was to become; and he is also the daring seeker after the vision of God that we meet, early in 388, in the dialogue with Evodius *On the Magnitude of the Soul*. I say *daring*, for there is a *Christian wise man* emerging in the mind of Augustine, *who contains of his own knowledge and experience a vision of truth*. There have been Greek wise men, and there have been Greek searches for a wise man—for a man of great virtue, of universal vision and of large experience. He was to the Greeks, as to the Romans, the common teacher of mankind. And who is Augustine's wise man? A moment ago we witnessed the magnificent ideal which Augustine called up before the eyes of Evodius. This famous wish is Augustine's prelude to it:

O that we were able, on this problem, to question together someone most learned, nay even someone most eloquent and of unsurpassed wisdom, someone who was a most perfect man! Ah, what a way he would have to explain, by means of discourse and disputation, what the soul was able to do in the body, what it was able to do in itself, and what it is able to do in the presence of God to Whom it is near when it is absolutely pure and in Whom is located its highest and its every good!<sup>66</sup>

Who are these "more perfect men", as he calls them in another dialogue of the same period, *On Free Choice*? They are the Christian believers who have *seen*, those who believe and *know*, because it has been given them to know. They are Augustine's heroes, *Christian wise men* who have, so to speak, taken our Lord at His word. Those whom our Lord called to salvation He first exhorted to believe: "But afterwards when He spoke of the gift that He would give to those who believed, He did not say, 'Now this is eternal life, that they may believe'; rather He said, 'Now this is eternal life: That they may know

<sup>63</sup> *Op. cit.* XXXIII, 75-76; PL 32, 1076-1077.  
Cp. *De Libero Arbitrio* II, 2, 5-6; PL 32,  
1242-1243.

<sup>64</sup> *Confessions* IX, 10, 25; PL 32, 773.

<sup>65</sup> *Op. cit.* IX, 10, 26; PL 32, 775.

<sup>66</sup> *De Quantitate Animae* XXXIII, 70; PL  
32, 1073.

*thee; the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent*.<sup>87</sup> And it is to those who already believe that He says, *seek, and you shall find*.<sup>88</sup> Now clearly that which is believed without being known cannot be called something *found*.<sup>89</sup> Of course it cannot, and our wise men *have found*. To their company Augustine wants to belong, and he already began to be one of them at Ostia. This is the Augustinian ideal of Christian wisdom. In it Augustine discovered the answer to the philosophers; in it he built his own future. The thought of Augustine centers around it with extraordinary fidelity: it is the ground of all his work to come, and whatever he says must be brought back to this central aim to be understood as he understood it. Augustinians have not always done this, and historians have very often not been more observant. But it remains that the authentic Augustine is the servant of Laban living only for the hand of Rachel.

And yet, it is an old search which is here receiving an answer, however surprised the Greeks may be to receive it from Ostia. Hence, since we are now past the pride of intellect that once threatened Augustine, we may go back to that meeting with the works of Plotinus and the ideas of the Platonists. Somewhere in Augustine the great lover of God there are the lessons learned from Plotinus. They are not negligible, and Augustine never forgot them. On the contrary. When, in 397, he was writing the first book of the treatise *On Christian Doctrine*, in which we find his classic distinction between the goods that are to be *used* and the Good Who is to be *enjoyed*, it is entirely characteristic of Augustine that he should both recall Plotinus and foreshadow St. Anselm and St. Bernard. Plotinus is here, with his insistence that we do not need a ship or a carriage for our journey to the joys of our homeland.<sup>90</sup> But Anselm is already here, for what will Anselm say except what Augustine is saying, namely, that when we think of God, "our thinking is such that it strives to reach something than which there is nothing more perfect and more noble"?<sup>91</sup> And this striving is no abstract speculation, for we are seeking a truth *to love*. Hence, Bernard, too, is here, for Augustine is studying the *education of love* which will be the constant occupation of the Abbot of Clairvaux.<sup>92</sup> Plotinus, Anselm, Bernard! Ulysses and Jacob! A strange company, you say? Let us see.

### III. TRUTH AND LIGHT

#### (a) *The Platonic Ascent*

And so we come to Plato, that Plato whose glory shone so brightly as to eclipse all other philosophers. Disciple of Socrates and of the Pythagoreans, he brought together the Socratic interest in morals and the Pythagorean interest in the pursuit of truth. Thus were *action* and *contemplation* made parts of one philosophy, *Platonism*. Now what we are seeking Plato can help us to acquire. We are seeking to find in God the cause of our being, the source of our understanding, as well as the anchorage and order of our lives. "For if man was so created that through what is most excellent in himself he reaches that which is more excellent than all things—the one, true and most perfect God without Whom no nature exists, no teaching instructs us, no life is fruitful—let us seek Him Who is our fashioner, let us perceive Him Who is the cause of our certitude, let us love Him Who makes straight our ways."<sup>93</sup> And precisely, "if Plato said that the wise man is he who imitates and knows and loves this God,

<sup>87</sup> John xvii, 3.

<sup>88</sup> Matt. vii, 7.

<sup>89</sup> *De Libero Arbitrio* II, 2, 6; PL 32, 1243.

<sup>90</sup> *De Doctrina Christiana* I, 4, 4; PL 34, 20-

21. Cp. Plotinus, *Enneads* I, 6, 8.

<sup>91</sup> *De Doctrina Christiana* I, 7, 7; PL 34, 22.

<sup>92</sup> *Op. cit.* I, 26, 27; PL 34, 29.

<sup>93</sup> *De Civitate Dei* VIII, 4; PL 41, 229.

to share in Whom is the cause of the wise man's blessedness, what need is there to examine the other philosophers?"<sup>44</sup> Away, therefore, with the fable-makers, the Varros, the Ionians, the Epicureans, away with them and their myths and their materialisms. Let them yield before those who preach the reality of *life* against the lifeless atoms of the Epicureans and the *immaterial nature* of this *life* against the materialism of the Stoics. Let them yield, in fact, before this splendid vision of the Platonists:

These philosophers [the Platonists], who rightly surpassed the others in fame and in glory, saw that God was not a body. In their search for God, therefore, they transcended all bodies. They saw that God Who is the highest being is not anything that is mutable; and therefore in seeking this highest God they transcended all souls and all mutable spirits. Then they saw that in every mutable thing every form, by which that thing is whatever it is, and in the way that it is, and has the nature that it has,—they saw that every form could be only from Him who truly is, because He is immutably. From this it followed that the body, the arrangements, the qualities, the orderly motion and the fixed elements of this whole world, from the heavens down to the earth, and whatever bodies are in them; that all life, such as that in trees which nourishes and sustains, or such as that in brutes which is also sentient, or such as that in men which is in addition intelligent, or such as that in angels which does not need nourishment but which simply sustains and is sentient and intelligent;—all this could be only from Him Who simply is.

For in Him it is not one thing to *be* and another thing to *live*, as though He could *be* and not be *living*. Nor is it one thing for Him to *live* and another thing to *know*, as though He could *live* without *knowing*. Nor yet is it one thing for Him to *know* and another to be *blessed*, as though He could *know* without being *blessed*. Rather is it true that for Him to *live*, to *know*, and to be *blessed* are for Him to be.

Having risen from things to an immutable God, the Platonists now see that God is uncaused and that He is the cause of mutable things. Let us continue:

Because of this immutability and simplicity, they perceived that He had made all these things and that He Himself could not have been made by anything. They reasoned as follows. Whatever is, is either *body* or *life*, and life is more perfect reality than body. The nature of body is sensible, that of life is intelligible. Hence they placed what is intelligible *above* what is sensible. Now the sensible is whatever can be perceived by the sight and touch of the body, and the intelligible is whatever can be perceived by the sight of the mind. There is no bodily beauty, whether in the *position*, *figure* or the *movement* of a body, as in dancing, on which the soul does not *pass judgment*. It could pass judgment, however, only if this beautiful form in the thing existed in it *in a more perfect way*—without the bulk of the body, without the din of vocal speech, without the interval of space and time.

And yet, even in the soul this form is *mutable*. Otherwise, one man could not judge better than another about the forms in sensible things: the wiser would not judge better than the more slow-witted, the more experienced would not judge better than the less experienced, the more trained would not judge better than the less trained, and one and the

<sup>44</sup> *Op. cit.* VIII, 5; PL 41, 229.

same man, when he has become proficient, would not judge better after than before. But we do find this variation in judgments, and hence what is capable of receiving *more and less* is undoubtedly *mutable*.

Wherefore, these wise and learned men, men of much experience in such matters, concluded without difficulty that the first reality was not to be found among those things where it would be subject to mutability. What is more, since they saw that both body and soul are beautiful in varying degrees, and *would not be at all if they could be absolutely without form*, they saw that there was some reality in which resided the first form, immutable and therefore free of variation. In this first reality, as they most rightly believed, was the source of all things, which was itself not made and by which all things were made.<sup>95</sup>

This is the famous Platonic highway, destined to be traveled indefatigably by Plotinus and Augustine: *from the material to the immaterial, and then, within the immaterial, from the mutable to the immutable*. No wonder Augustine the Christian can say: "*None have approached nearer to us than the Platonists*"!<sup>96</sup> It is absolutely fitting, therefore, that St. Paul should point the moral of this noble effort of the Platonists:

In this way, that which is known of God He made manifest to them, for the invisible things of Him are clearly seen by them, being understood by the things that are made; His power also and divinity. By Him also were all the visible and temporal things created.<sup>97</sup>

Here is Paul, therefore, preaching the kingdom of the invisible God made manifest through the things that are made, and here are the Platonists, practicing better than all the other ancients the ascent to his God,—from the corporeal to the incorporeal and from the incorporeal-and-the-mutable to the incorporeal-and-the-immutable. St. Augustine made this ascent many times and under many different circumstances. But in all cases the same ascending world is discovered and the same ascending life is experienced. Yet this result, so joyfully recorded in the *Confessions*,<sup>98</sup> raises two inevitable questions. What is the world of Augustine that it should enable him to mount it so easily, so inevitably and so directly to God? And what is man, as Augustine understands him, to gaze as he does, and to rise as he does, in this world that Augustine receives gratefully from the Platonists?

We must begin at the beginning, and *the beginning is the transition of Augustine from materialism and skepticism to immaterialism and certitude*. How was it made, and what world of truth did the spiritualism of Plotinus open up for Augustine at the very moment of freeing him of materialism and skepticism? He closed one door and opened another. What lay beyond it? *Truth!*

### (b) *Beyond Skepticism*

To enter into the study of truth, Augustine must begin with what is evident to him; but to begin at all he must refute the skepticism of the New Academy. The three books *Against the Academics*, of whose arguments he still approved some thirty years later,<sup>99</sup> are at the beginning of the persistent and triumphant

<sup>95</sup> *Op. cit.* VIII, 6; PL 41, 231-232.

<sup>96</sup> *Op. cit.* VIII, 5; PL 41, 229.

<sup>97</sup> *Op. cit.* VIII, 6; PL 41, 232. The text is almost a quotation of *Rom. i*, 19-20.

<sup>98</sup> *Confessions* X, *passim*, and especially 5, 7-27, 38; PL 32, 782-795.

<sup>99</sup> *De Trinitate* XV, 12, 21; PL 42, 1074.

defense of the possibility of truth which is the rock of Augustinian philosophy. As it has been said, "We know truth: such is the fact on which rests the philosophy of St. Augustine".<sup>100</sup> To reach this position Augustine installed himself within the world of Plato and Plotinus, and it is from the perspective of such a world that he defeated Carneades, great master of the New Academy. This perspective is even more important for the study of Augustine than the actual polemic against the skeptics.

Let us note simply in passing, therefore, that in reducing the Academy to a state of self-contradiction, St. Augustine is concerned to show *the radical untenability of an absolute state of doubt*. "Do you at least know," asks Augustine of the cautious Navigius, "that you are alive?" "I do" is the reply.<sup>101</sup> Shortly afterwards, in the *Soliloquies*, amidst many things he does not know, Augustine finds two things that he does know:

- Reason.* You who want to know yourself, *do you know that you are?*  
*Augustine.* I do.  
*Reason.* Whence do you know this?  
*Augustine.* I don't know.  
*Reason.* Do you perceive yourself to be simple or multiple?  
*Augustine.* I don't know  
*Reason.* Do you know that you are in motion?  
*Augustine.* I don't.  
*Reason.* *Do you know that you think?*  
*Augustine.* I do.  
*Reason.* *So it is true that you think?*  
*Augustine.* It is.<sup>102</sup>

Navigius knows he is alive, and Augustine knows he exists, he knows that he thinks, and he admits it is true that he thinks.

But we can acquire a stronger and more decisive victory over universal doubt. Or rather, to put matters more precisely, there is more in our present victory than we have as yet seen. Let us look error full in the face and conquer it! We know we are and we know we think. But it is objected: Suppose you are asleep or mad? So we think illusions? Granted: "he who says he knows that he is alive can never be deceived or speak falsely. Let a thousand kinds of deceitful appearances be thrown up against him who says, *I know I am alive*, and he has nothing to fear from any of these. *For he who is deceived is alive*".<sup>103</sup> In fact,

*We are, and we know we are, and we love our being and our knowing.* In these three things that I have mentioned there is no falsehood, parading as truth, to disturb us. For unlike the things which are outside us, we do not touch *these* by any bodily sense (as we do colors by seeing, and sounds by hearing, . . .); but, rather, without the illusion-producing formation of any images, I am absolutely certain that I am and that I know and love this. These truths stand without fear in the face of the arguments of the Academics. Do they say: What if you are mistaken? Well, if I am mistaken, I *exist*. Clearly, he who does not

<sup>100</sup> Charles Boyer S.J., *L'Idée de vérité dans la philosophie de saint Augustin* (Paris, G. Beauchesne, 1921), p. 12. On the Augustinian refutation of skepticism. cf. *op. cit.*, pp. 12-46; Jules Martin, *Saint Augustin*, pp. 39-48;

E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 44-52.

<sup>101</sup> *De Beata Vita* II, 7; PL 32, 963.

<sup>102</sup> *Soliloquia* II, 1, 1; PL 32, 885.

<sup>103</sup> *De Trinitate* XV, 12, 21; PL 42, 1074.

exist can't very well be mistaken; wherefore, if I am mistaken, how can I possibly be mistaken as to my existence, when it is certain that I exist if I am mistaken? Since, therefore, I would have to exist in order to be mistaken, supposing even that I were to be mistaken, it is still without any doubt true that in knowing that I exist, I am not mistaken. It follows as a consequence that I am further not mistaken in knowing that I know; for just as I know that I exist, so do I know also this, that I know.<sup>104</sup>

A celebrated victory, surely, made still more celebrated by a similar victory in the *Meditations* of Descartes. *Though I err, I am, and I know it; and this also do I know, that I know.* Thus is purchased release from skepticism by Augustine and by Descartes. The analogy between Augustine and Descartes is so obvious that it scarcely needs comment. But perhaps it can be misleading. For Augustine defeats skepticism, as we shall see, by *entering* Platonism; Descartes defeats skepticism, not by entering Platonism, but rather by pursuing that pale philosophical ghost which the death of Platonism in the fourteenth century was destined to leave for future generations to bewail. No, as the sequel was to prove, Descartes was saddled with a lifeless and powerless vision, and his disciples tried to work philosophical miracles in order to restore the dead. But, unfortunately, there are no philosophical miracles. For the moment, therefore, let us leave this comparison between Augustine and Descartes entirely open. Yet because the comparison itself is both real enough and eminently justified, and because, too, Platonism is its basis, we are driven to look at our victory over skepticism somewhat more closely. And first as to the significance of the Platonic sources of the Augustinian victory.

#### (c) *Towards Immaterialism*

The significance of Platonism for Augustine is nowhere more sharply apparent or decisive than in the relation of the soul to truth, on the one hand, and to its own body, on the other. For when Augustine went from the materialism of the Manichaeans to the immaterialism of Plotinus, he was opening up for himself (for better or for worse) all the principles and implications of Platonism that Plotinus had so rigorously explored.

This immaterialistic bridge which Augustine crossed when he read Plotinus in Milan is *philosophically* more serious than interpreters of Augustine sometimes imagine. Had the immaterialism of Plotinus meant no more than the recognition of the fact that knowledge inescapably reveals to us its roots in the *intelligible* and *necessary* nature of reality, and that materialism, therefore, cannot possibly be an acceptable philosophy, it would already be a great contribution to Augustine. But we are scarcely on the threshold of Platonism if we see only this in it, and Plato would not have had to write most of his dialogues if all he wanted to teach the Athenians was the distinction between the universal and the particular, the unchanging intelligible and the changing material; nor would Plotinus have been driven to his classic theses if he wished to preach only this much to the Romans. What is more, this much of Platonism would not even be a problem for Augustine or for anyone else. But Plato and Plotinus profess a more advanced intellectualist doctrine than this, and their immaterialism has deeper reaches than this.

Deeper and also more dangerous. What immaterialism and spiritualism meant for Plotinus was that what is intelligible in reality is eternal and divine. In brief, Plotinus was discovering (or so he thought) the *divinity of intelligible being* when he set out on the journey to his dear country; and he was discovering *his own divinity* in the very act of making such a journey. Now, this is a

<sup>104</sup> *De Civitate Dei* XI, 26; PL 41, 339-340. Cp. *Enchiridion* XX, 7; PL 40, 242-243.

problem: *the immaterialism of Plotinus is really the inner life of a god*. Can Augustine successfully pattern his journey to the Christian God on a Plotinian model when, unlike Plotinus, he seeks to discover neither his own divinity nor that of the world in which he lives? I say this is a problem: can Augustine, in accepting from Plotinus *only* a method and an angle of vision, either successfully avoid the *divine man* and the *divine world* of Plotinus or successfully bend this method and this angle of vision to the needs and the purposes of his own Christian mind?

Now because he was looking for release from materialism, rather than for a philosophy, it is quite understandable that Augustine should have read Plotinus in the light of his own occupations, his own desires, his own world. What did he find in Plotinus? He found, he says, though not in so many words, the doctrine of the prologue to St. John's Gospel!<sup>105</sup> He found in Plotinus the doctrine that the Word was God and was with God from the beginning. He found in Plotinus that all things were made by God, Who is light and life, and that the Word is the true light that illumines every man coming into this world.<sup>106</sup> Surely the Plotinus who taught all these truths was already one of the Apostles! What, in fact, did St. Augustine *not* find in Plotinus? "I read there", he writes, "that the Word Who is God was born not from flesh or from blood, not from the will of man or the will of the flesh, but from God. But that the Word was made flesh and dwelt amongst us I did not read there".<sup>107</sup> The Incarnation, therefore, is the only doctrine which Augustine did not find in Plotinus. The Word is God, the Word is the maker of the world, the Word is light and life, the Word enlightens every man: all this the Plotinus whom St. Augustine had read knew! Now it is quite clear that *this* Plotinus never existed except in the mind of St. Augustine. That is why it can be said with justice that "St. Augustine found in Plotinus, not the true Plotinus of history, but the perfect image of what he thought without knowing, or rather, of what he wanted to think and could not".<sup>108</sup>

At the moment of reading Plotinus, therefore, Augustine was more Christian than he knew. Hence, how could he ever have been converted to a Plotinus whom he never even properly discovered? What he discovered, because this is all that he was seeking, is a world sufficiently intelligible to reveal the existence of God and to compel his rational assent to that existence: everything else was simply released from the mind and heart of Augustine—released when his intelligence was released, in a world of intelligibility and truth, to consider the reasonableness of the Christian revelation. Plotinus is a decisive influence in a world which he never produced and to which he could not have led Augustine. Nevertheless, even within these limitations, Plotinus was a decisive influence, for Christian convert though Augustine was in 386, he was also deeply a Platonist. He practiced the immaterialism of Plotinus: truth, participation, reminiscence, illumination—all these Platonic and Plotinian signposts to heaven reappear in Augustine, but they are used to lead to a Christian heaven; and Augustine himself, who practices this Platonic ascent, is a humble creature, full of the sense of his own mutability, full of his need of God. Yet, could Plotinus be used in this way? Can he who releases us from matter *only to make us divine intelligences* teach us to understand our own *creaturehood* and that of the world? If Augustine the convert was always a Christian, it remains to consider the significance for him, and for Christian thought after him, of the immaterialism of Plotinus.

<sup>105</sup> *Confessions* VII, 9, 13; PL 32, 740.

<sup>106</sup> *John* i, 1-12.

<sup>107</sup> *Confessions* VII, 9, 14; PL 32, 740-741.

<sup>108</sup> Jean Guitton, *Le temps et l'éternité chez Plotin et saint Augustin* (Paris, Boivin et Cie., 1933), p. 126.

(d) *A World of Truth*

The outlines of the Platonic ascent Augustine has already pointed out in *The City of God*: from matter to the soul to God; or, what is the same thing, from the material to the spiritual, and, within the spiritual, from the spiritual-and-mutable to the spiritual-and-immutable. This is both a plan and an experience, and the refutation of skepticism has served to effect our point of entrance into it: we began with the thinking self as a basic indisputable truth. The road and the beginning, taken together, produce the distinctively Augustinian stage for the investigation of truth and the pursuit of God. The second book of the dialogue *On Free Choice*, which is considered to be Augustine's most deliberate and successful effort to formulate a proof for the existence of God,<sup>109</sup> furnishes a concrete example of this Augustinian stage.

Augustine is quite aware of his first point of departure. "Hence", he says to Evodius, "in order that we may begin from what is most manifest, I ask you first whether you are. Or is it possible you fear that such a question will catch you in error? But isn't it rather a fact that if you did not exist, you couldn't possibly err?" Evodius: "I agree: go on from there". Augustine then unfolds the various implications of their certainty: "Since it is manifest that you are, and since this would not be manifest to you unless you were alive, that you are alive is also manifest to you. Do you understand that these two facts are absolutely true? Evodius: "I do understand". Augustine: "In that case, this third fact is also manifest, namely, that you understand".<sup>110</sup> We have left the barrier. In the ascent which will now follow, let us note the *mentalism* and the *interiorism* of Augustine's thought. These two characteristics, which will become clearer as we proceed, are the result of a spiritualism or immaterialism whose starting point lies *within* the evidence of the self perceived by itself as a living and thinking being. And thus, while we are beginning a proof for the existence of God, the human reason is the beginning of the proof.

What Augustine is going to prove, as he says, is that if there is a reality above the human reason, God exists. There is deep method in this simplicity. Suppose, asks Augustine, that I would prove to you that there indubitably exists a reality which is superior to our reason, would you have any doubt that that reality, whatever its nature, is God? Let Evodius voice for us our obvious objection: "I wouldn't say right off that, if I shall be able to find a reality which is better than what is best in me, that is God. For I am not minded to call God that reality than which my reason is less perfect; rather God is that reality than which there is none more perfect".<sup>111</sup> (Evodius, thy name is Anselm!) But, pursues Augustine, suppose we find nothing above our reason except what is eternal and immutable, isn't *this* God? If the reason perceives through itself something eternal and immutable, must it not admit both that it is a less perfect reality (for it is perceiving a higher reality) and that what it is perceiving is God? But Evodius remains firm: "*Him* will I admit as God than whom no reality is shown to be more perfect".<sup>112</sup> Augustine accepts the challenge, but in accepting it he undertakes to reach Evodius' *highest* by means of his own *higher-than-the-reason*. This is, in fact, the central point—even though it is not exactly Evodius' point. The method of Augustine implies a certain con-

<sup>109</sup> Ch. Boyer, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

<sup>110</sup> *De Libero Arbitrio* II, 3, 7; PL 32, 1243.

<sup>111</sup> *Op. cit.* II, 6, 14; PL 32, 1248.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.* Augustine is here already parting company with Plotinus. What is above the soul will be separated from the soul as the uncreated from the created. Is there anything above the Plotinian soul in which it does not share *by nature*? The Augustinian

creature and the Plotinian god are poles apart. But if this is a decisive difference, it is also a problem: can the creature speak the language of the god?

We might note, too, how here, as well as in the treatise *On Christian Doctrine*, St. Augustine is laying the foundations and the setting of St. Anselm's famous proof of the existence of God in the *Proslogion*.



ception as to *where* and *how* the human reason is located in reality to be able to look *above* itself with such daring.

St. Augustine first establishes a certain order in the results achieved by Evodius. Evodius knew that he *was*, that he was *alive* and that he had *understanding*. Of these characteristics, evidently to have understanding is the most perfect. For a being can be without being *alive*, and it can be *alive* without having *understanding*; but a being that has understanding necessarily *is* and *is alive*.<sup>113</sup> Hence, our problem is to recognize that the reason by which we have understanding is the *highest* part of us. Having seen this, we can consider the question as to whether there is anything *above* the reason.

Now, although your sense of sight is not my sense of sight, we can *both* see the *same* object. The same is true of the sense of hearing. These objects that we can both *see* and *hear* are *common* and *public*.<sup>114</sup> Does the same thing happen when we *reason*? Is there a *public world* that we all perceive by our reasons? Let Evodius speak for us again: he readily admits that there are many common objects of our reasoning. The nature and the truth of *numbers*, for example, is present to all who carry on a process of reasoning. Each tries by his own reason to grasp them. Some do it better than others; some fail entirely. This truth, however, offers itself equally to all. A man does not make it his private truth when he perceives it, nor does truth fail when he makes a mistake. "While it remains true and entire, he is the more involved in error, the less he sees truth".<sup>115</sup>

Exactly how are we to explain this fact? Will it be said that these numbers come from the senses? This is enough to make any Platonist rise in indignation. By what bodily sense did you perceive and correct the error in a badly added column of figures? Do you use the sense to perform an addition or a subtraction? I certainly do not know how long the heavens and the earth around me, which I perceive by the sense of the body, will endure. But I certainly do know that seven and three are ten; and they are ten now and always, and there never was a time, nor will there ever be a time, when seven and three will not be ten. Behold: "It was this incorruptible truth of number which, I said, was common to any one using his reason".<sup>116</sup>

But there is more than this to delight the heart of Augustine. Every number is a multiple of unity, and unity cannot be perceived by the senses of the body. Whatever we reach with a bodily sense is a body and has many parts: even the smallest body has a distinction within it between the right and the left side, top and bottom, etc. No body can be purely and simply *one*, and yet, we could not discern a multiplicity of parts in a body unless we had a knowledge of unity. In any case, however I may have come to know unity, it was not through the bodily sense. Nor is it through the sense that I have come to know the laws of numbers. What *sense* ever enabled me to apply these laws to *all* numbers?<sup>117</sup> Here, therefore, is the first result which the study of numbers has produced:

By these and similar proofs those whom God has endowed with ability in their disputations and whom stubbornness has not darkened, are forced to admit that the nature and truth of numbers has no relation to the senses of the body, that it exists without change and without blemish, and that it is open to the vision of all who reason.<sup>118</sup>

<sup>113</sup> *De Libero Arbitrio* II, 3, 7; PL 32, 1243.

<sup>114</sup> *Op. cit.* II, 7, 15-16, 19; PL 32, 1249, 1250-1251.

<sup>115</sup> *Op. cit.* II, 8, 20; PL 32, 1251.

<sup>116</sup> *Op. cit.* II, 8, 21; PL 32, 1251-1252.

<sup>117</sup> *Op. cit.* II, 8, 22-23; PL 32, 1252-1253.

<sup>118</sup> *Op. cit.* II, 8, 24; PL 32, 1253.

We can arrive at this same *public world of truth* by considering wisdom. Does each man have his own private wisdom? Or is there one wisdom present in common to all, which enables a man to be more or less wise according as he shares more or less in it? Well, replies Evodius, every one thinks that he is a wise man—the soldier, the farmer, the money-maker; so likewise do they think they are wise men who turn away from all these temporal things and bend all their energies to the study of truth in order to come to a knowledge of God and of themselves.<sup>119</sup> There are many others who likewise think they are wise.<sup>120</sup>

However, this much is immediately clear. Though all these men differ as to what wisdom is, they are agreed in pursuing the good; if they differ, it is because they do not agree on their estimates of what the good is. If a man were to seek as good what he ought not, though he pursues it only because it seems to him good, yet he errs. A man does not err in so far as he seeks beatitude; he errs in so far as he does not take the way which leads to beatitude. Clearly we are in error when we pursue what will not lead us where we desire to go. Clearly, too, the more we err the less wise we are; for the more we err, the more we wander away from the truth where we can perceive and possess the highest good. When we have come to acquire and to possess the highest good, we shall be happy. But more precisely, just as it is clear that we want to be happy, it is also clear we want to be wise; for no one can be happy without wisdom. Hence, just as, before we possess beatitude, there is impressed upon our minds the notion of beatitude, by which we firmly and unhesitatingly say we want to be happy, so, before we are wise, we possess the notion of wisdom impressed upon our minds, and it is through this notion that, if we are asked whether we want to be happy, we answer unhesitatingly that we do.<sup>121</sup>

These impressions on our minds, however we are to understand them, mean at least this, that we see we want to be happy, and we see we want to be wise? I have not the least doubt, says Augustine, that *you* see this. Now, do you see it in such a way that, unless you reveal your thought to me, I don't see? Or do you see it in such a way that you know that it can be seen by me even if you do not tell me? Clearly the latter. So we reach again our previous result: the truth which we see by our individual minds is *common* to all of us.

And what a world is here revealed! *It is true*, is it not, that we must pursue wisdom? And not only is it true, it is *one truth* and a *common truth* for all those who know it, however each may know it by his individual mind. Again, it is true that the incorruptible is more perfect than the corruptible, the eternal than the temporal, the inviolable than the weak. We *know* this. Can anyone say that this truth is his own personal truth, when it is immutably present to all who are able to contemplate it? We know, too, that we should turn our souls away from the corruptible and to the incorruptible. In admitting this to be true, let us observe that it is *immutable* and that it is *present in common* to all those capable of seeing it.<sup>122</sup> But enough. There clearly exist such and similar principles of conduct, true and immutable guiding lights of virtue, present to the gaze of all who are able to see. And not only do they exist, they also belong to the province of *wisdom*, and he who is wise is ruled by them. For he who is wise lives with justice: he gives each his due, and he subordinates an inferior to a superior. He lives with prudence, for he prefers

<sup>119</sup> This is evidently a reference to Augustine and his friends. But there is a special reminiscence here of the beginning of the *Soliloquies*, where, after that long prayer, Reason asks Augustine, "What, then, do you wish to know?" Augustine: "All those things for which I have prayed." Reason: "What

are they—briefly?" Augustine: I desire to know God and the soul". Reason: Nothing more?" Augustine: "Absolutely nothing" (*Soliloquia* I, 2, 7; PL 32, 873).

<sup>120</sup> *De Libero Arbitrio* II, 9, 25; PL 32, 1254.

<sup>121</sup> *Op. cit.* II, 9, 26; PL 32, 1254-1255.

<sup>122</sup> *Op. cit.* II, 9, 27-10, 28; PL 32, 1255-1256.

the incorruptible to the corruptible; and in choosing what he ought to choose, he chooses with wisdom. This is to say that justice and prudence belong to wisdom, that he who uses and observes them lives and acts wisely, and that "what is done wisely cannot correctly be said to be separate from wisdom".<sup>123</sup>

What was true of numbers is thus true of wisdom. We saw that there were true and immutable laws governing numbers, and that the nature and truth of these numbers is immutably and publicly present in common to all who behold them. We now see that there are equally true and manifest laws of wisdom, of which we encountered some examples, and which are present in common for the contemplation of all those who can see them. Having come so far, we can see already that there exists immutable truth, containing wisdom and number within itself, being a sort of public intelligible world that is present to all our minds. It is a public intelligible light, which yet is present to us in the most secret chambers of our souls.<sup>124</sup> We must now measure our relations to this common light of truth. Is this truth, in which we see so many things, *more* perfect than our minds, is it only *equal* to our minds in perfection—or is it even inferior to them?

With these questions we move from the fact of our experience of truth to our *exact place* in it. We can easily say that truth is not less perfect than our minds, for if it were, we would not be ruled by it in our judgments; we would pass judgment on it as we pass judgment on corporeal substances below us. Thus, of bodies we say not only that they are or are not thus and so, but also that they ought or ought not to be thus and so. For example, we say: *This body is not as white as it ought to be*. Such judgments we make according to those laws of truth present within us, and which we all behold in common. *But the laws themselves we do not in any way judge*. "For when it is said that *the eternal is to be preferred to the temporal*, or that *seven and three are ten*, no one contends that they ought to be so, he simply perceives that they are so; he does not act as an examiner making a correction, but as a discoverer taking joy in what he has found."<sup>125</sup>

Will it perhaps be said that this truth is *equal* to our minds in perfection? If it were, then it would be as mutable as our minds. For our minds sometimes see better than at other times, *and this fact reveals them to be mutable*. But truth remains in itself, it does no advance when we see it better, nor does it recede when we see it less well. What is more, whereas we do not at all pass judgment on truth, we pass judgments over our own minds. I say, for example, that *my mind does not understand as well as it ought*. Hence, the mind is not the equal of truth in perfection. The conclusion is evident: if truth is neither less perfect than our minds, nor as perfect, the remaining alternative is that it is more perfect than our minds.<sup>126</sup>

We can almost feel the thrill in Augustine's soul when he makes this conclusion. *Conclusion* did I say? A stale word! Rather a consummation: "Behold, here is truth itself. Embrace it if you are able, and enjoy it; delight in the Lord, and He will grant you the requests of your heart!"<sup>127</sup> There is a certain grandeur now in the language of Augustine, as though he delights to have his eyes run over all the things on which men set their hearts and in which they seek beatitude. This is the delighted rhetoric of retrospect. Against all their food and drink, their songs and their gold, their gems, their moon

<sup>123</sup> *Op. cit.* II, 10, 29; PL 32, 1256-1257.

<sup>124</sup> *Op. cit.* II, 12, 33; PL 32, 1259.

<sup>125</sup> *Op. cit.* II, 12, 34; PL 32, 1259. I am leaving out of the present discussion the distinction which Augustine implies in this text between soul (*animus*) and mind

(*mens*) which is its highest part. Cf. E. Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin*, pp. 53-54, note.

<sup>126</sup> *De Libero Arbitrio*, *ibid.*

<sup>127</sup> *Op. cit.* II, 12, 35; PL 32, 1260. Cf. *Psalms* xxxvi, 4.

and sun and stars, let us set truth as the home of the happy life! Even from the few sparks of beatitude which they can gather from all these things, men can dream of living forever! And if these passing things and their passing flashes of beatitude can raise desires of eternal life, shall we, we who have traveled up to the eternity and immutability of truth, hesitate to find beatitude in the light of truth?<sup>128</sup> Our heart's desire is here. What did we desire? *Truth, beatitude, certitude*. They are here, we can possess them, and we shall at last be free. "For this is our liberty, to be subject to truth itself . . ."<sup>129</sup>

(e) *Number and Form*

But let us give our understanding the opportunity to catch up with this joyous exaltation in the possibility of liberation through truth. Let us, in fact, return to Evodius and his resoluteness, especially since we have allowed his words to bear a message that he did not know. He had held Augustine to this issue: if Augustine could prove that a reality existed above the mind, *that* reality was God if there existed nothing still higher. We know now that truth is *above* our minds. Hence, if there is nothing more perfect than truth, then truth itself is God. It is not difficult now to resolve the problem of Evodius. How is the *higher-than-the-mind* of Augustine identical with the *highest* of Evodius? Clearly, what Augustine has reached is eternal Wisdom, and since Wisdom, though born of the Father, is equal to Him, Augustine and Evodius are united. But what we ought to notice is the *method itself* of Augustine. If only Evodius had been as resolute on *this* issue! It is a Platonic method, and it consists in seeing and exploring a world of intelligible being present to the mind, and in disengaging its truth, its eternity and its immutability. It is a world of principles which rule our minds. It is an intelligible world, and it is a real world; and it is immediately and intimately present to our minds. How often did Plato and Plotinus find such a world of intelligible Forms and Ideas! Augustine is their disciple—at least in method. For the terminus of his journey is not the Intelligence of Plotinus, but the second Person of the Trinity. There can be no question as to this point. The only question is concerned with the method and the problems which it raises. Following the suggestion of Augustine, let us call such a method an *interiorism*; and since the interiorism is that of the mind, let us call it also a *mentalism*. We must now consider these points.

But first as to the Christian character of the God Whom Augustine has reached. Here we meet a truly famous Augustinian doctrine, echoing a corrected Platonism to be sure, but coming from St. Matthew. Who teaches us truth? Not he who speaks through words. Words can mean different things to different people, and even supposing that a teacher and student use the same words in the same way, it is not the teacher who teaches. The teacher does not put into the mind of the pupil what is not already there: what he does is to help the pupil to *recognize* what the pupil already knows, to make him capable of seeing the truth within himself. This is to say that whatever teaching may accomplish, men learn truth only within themselves. Earthly teachers bring us to doors that we can enter *only* by ourselves and within ourselves. Who is our teacher? It is the *inner master*, truth that presides over our minds; it is Christ, Who is said to dwell in the inner man—Christ, "that is, the immutable power and the eternal Wisdom of God". Let us not call any one on earth our teacher, for One is our teacher, Christ; and we are pupils together in the same school under a common teacher and master in heaven.<sup>130</sup>

<sup>128</sup> *De Libero Arbitrio*, *ibid*.

<sup>129</sup> *Op. cit.* II, 13, 36-37; PL 32, 1260-1261.

<sup>130</sup> *De Magistro* XI, 38; XIV, 46. *Sermo*

CCXC, I (quoted by E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, p. 100). St. Paul, *Ephes.* iii, 16-17. *Matt.* xxiii, 10. For the whole paragraph, cf. *De Magistro*

Once again, therefore, we arrive at the light of Truth that illumines every man coming into this world. Once again, however, we arrive also at both St. John's Gospel and Plotinus. We know from the *Confessions* how much in accord with the prologue of this Gospel Plotinus was—according to St. Augustine. We can verify this agreement of Plotinus with St. John from *The City of God*.<sup>131</sup> Hence, it cannot be denied that Augustine thought to find his doctrine of truth and light in St. Matthew, St. Paul and St. John. Plato and Plotinus are eminent philosophers by their very agreement with the Apostles. They too live in a world of truth shining forth and illumining the minds of men.

But this meeting of illuminations is richer in obscurities than in clearness. Without intending to enter here into the enormous controversies on the meaning of Augustinian illumination,<sup>132</sup> we may at least observe that the comparison usually made between this Augustinian theory and the Thomistic theory of abstraction inevitably implies that the problem at issue is one of explaining the nature and origin of knowledge. It is said, for example, that the two metaphysics of St. Augustine and of St. Thomas are essentially in agreement, and therefore should arrive at the same theory of knowledge.<sup>133</sup> But this agreement can be neither affirmed nor denied, for the comparison itself cannot be made; and it cannot be made because the thought of Augustine is caught in an ambiguity: it is clear enough in its assertions to be Christian, and even deeply Christian, but it is not adequate enough in its explanations of what it asserts, to escape being Greek. Here we are, therefore, in the presence of the serious charge, made recently by an eminent interpreter, that, though Augustine is an unsurpassed exponent of Christian wisdom, his philosophy does not measure up to his theology. Why not? Because it is too Greek to be suitable to the Christian purposes to which Augustine puts it in his explanation of the nature of God, man and the universe.<sup>134</sup>

The public world of truth in which Augustine finally proved to Evodius the existence of God is, naturally, at the very center of this charge. Let us first eliminate some unnecessary difficulties. Let us, in fact, clarify several points at one and the same time. Everyone remembers the story of the young and untutored slave boy in Plato's *Meno* who by being subjected to judicious questioning proved the theorem concerning the square on the hypotenuse. This, Plato's argument ran, proved the pre-existence of the soul, for where did this youth come to know what he had not yet learned in this life? But let Augustine tell the story:

Hence it is that that famous philosopher Plato has tried to persuade us that the souls of men had lived here even before putting on these bodies. This is the reason why the things we learn are already-known-things in the process of being remembered. For he related how a certain boy, when asked about some geometrical subject, answered as though he were an expert in this science. The point is that by gradual and

X, 29 ff; PL 32, 1212 ff. As Professor Gilson points out (*ibid.*) in eliminating a Platonic reminiscence, based on pre-existence, as the explanation of the origin of ideas, St. Augustine is substituting a doctrine of the *memory of the present* for the Platonic *memory of the past*. The *present* is God present to the soul. How this presence is to be understood is one of the notorious difficulties of Augustinianism.

<sup>131</sup> *De Civitate Dei* X, 2; PL 41, 279-280.

<sup>132</sup> For an introduction to the discussion of Augustinian illumination, cf. Martin Grab-

mann, *Der göttliche Grund menschlicher Wahrheitserkenntnis nach Augustinus und Thomas von Aquin* (Münster, Aschendorff, 1924), pp. 5-29, 83-94; for an interpretation of the issues involved in this question, cf. E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 103-125.

<sup>133</sup> Ch. Boyer, *L'Idée de vérité dans la philosophie de saint Augustin*, p. 213.

<sup>134</sup> E. Gilson, *God and Philosophy*, Powell Lectures on Philosophy at Indiana University (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1941), pp. 53-62.

skillful questioning he continued to see what he was intended to see, and he continued to give in his answers what he had seen. Now, if this were a recollection of knowledge acquired in a previous existence, very few would have been able to answer such questions. For not everyone was a geometrician in a previous existence: geometricians are so rare among men, that hardly one of them can be found.

No, that is not the explanation. We must rather hold that the nature of the intellectual mind was so made that, by being naturally subject to intelligible realities, according to the arrangement of the Creator, it sees these truths [i.e., of geometry] in a certain incorporeal light of a unique kind; just as the eye of the body sees the things that are found all around it in this corporeal light, and has been created with a capacity to receive it and with a suitability for it".<sup>135</sup>

Let us observe: we are parting company with Platonic pre-existence and reminiscence, but we are solving Platonic problems by a theory of the nature of the human mind and of the intelligible world in which it naturally needs to live in order to know truth. In a word, this is a theory of the *nature* of mind and of the *natural conditions* of its activity: there is nothing supernatural about this illumination. On the contrary, it is, as we shall see, part of the soul's meaning as a *creature*. The mind of man lives as naturally in a world of intelligible light, as does his eye in a world of physical light. By being somehow subject to the light of the divine ideas, we see the intelligibility of the truths of sciences such as mathematics. A God Who is light and Who illumines; a world of intelligible truth, which is illumined by God; a mind which knows this truth, under the illumination of God, and which by the experience of the immutability of truth is led to God Himself as the source and the place of light:—such seems to be the thought of Augustine.

Only, whereas the Augustine who read Plotinus found it simple to locate himself and Evodius in this world of truth, we are not going to find it simple to locate this world itself. That the truths which St. Augustine reports as truths are true we cannot doubt; that they are real, in the sense that our minds do not make them to be true or pass judgment on them, is again not to be doubted. The problem is rather to know *what realities we know* when we see and recognize these laws of number, wisdom etc. Seven and three are ten. Look at it: it is the scandal in our midst. It is, says Augustine, an eternal and immutable truth. Is it God or a divine idea? Clearly, neither the one nor the other, for we see it, but we don't see God or the divine ideas.<sup>136</sup> Does it, then, come from the mutable beings of the world of sense? Here is the rub: how could it, if, as Augustine supposes, it is eternal and immutable, and "nothing mutable is eternal"?<sup>137</sup> Now what is a world of truth which is neither God nor creature? And who are we thus to be prisoners of such a dilemma? Why are

<sup>135</sup> *De Trinitate* XII, 13, 24; PL 42, 1011. There is a notorious difficulty raised by the phrase which I have translated "in a certain incorporeal light of a unique kind". St. Thomas has interpreted it otherwise: cf. *De Spiritualibus Creaturis* X, *Sed contra*; ed. L. Keeler, p. 123. For modern disagreements on this text of St. Augustine, cf. Ch. Boyer, *op. cit.*, p. 199, note, and E. Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin*, p. 107, note.

For Plato, cf. *Meno*, pp. 82B ff., and the discussion of A. E. Taylor, *Plato the Man and his Works* (2nd ed., New York, Dial

Press, 1927), pp. 136-138; Paul Shorey, *What Plato Said* (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1933), pp. 514-514.

<sup>136</sup> Augustine does not intend our vision of truth in the divine ideas to mean a vision of the divine ideas themselves; cf. E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 110-113. However, at times he does intend to speak of our seeing the divine ideas, but the vision in question is mystical: cf. *De Diversis Quaestionibus* LXXXIII, 46, 2; PL 40, 30-31, where the Christian "wise man" again makes his appearance.

<sup>137</sup> *Confessions* XII, 15, 18; PL 32, 832.

we so *strangely* perfect that the truths we know do not come from creatures and yet are not God?

This is the Augustinian dilemma. We must not make the dilemma more desperate than it is, however, by trying to find in it answers to questions which Augustine never asked. Hence, let us observe that the doctrine of illumination is intended by Augustine to explain our experience of the necessity of truth rather than any problem of the origin of knowledge. In the sixth book of the dialogue *On Music*, where Augustine treats, among other things, of sensation, he has an excellent opportunity to discuss the collaboration of intellect and sense in the production of knowledge. But we are plunged, instead, into a world of numbers in which what most interests him is to insist on the *proper ordering* of these numbers and on the *eminence* of the higher over the lower. What he really intends is (of course!) to free the minds of men from the world of sense so that "through the love of immutable truth they might cling to the one God and Lord of all things Who, without the interposition of any reality, is present to the minds of men".<sup>138</sup>

This is the point. In this world of truth, where the mind of man is directly open to the intelligibility of reality itself, *Augustine has transcended the problem of sensation by as much as he has transcended matter in the world*. It is not only that the Augustinian man is freer of sensation than is the Thomistic man. This is certainly true, but it is not exactly the point. The point is that the world of St. Augustine is freer of matter than is the world of St. Thomas Aquinas. The Augustinian man could not behave as he does if he lived in a Thomistic world. Hence if the problem of the origin of knowledge does not appear as a serious problem in St. Augustine, the reason is not that St. Augustine did not think of it; the reason is that the problem is simply not a problem in his world. His world is too purely intelligible, even as his man is too purely a *mind*. In defeating Manichaeism and skepticism by means of Platonic philosophy, Augustine finds not only a new man within himself but also a new world around him—a world of spiritual truth, a world of intelligibility, a world of forms and numbers holding the formlessness of creation in check. In brief, rather than a problem of knowledge, the Augustinian doctrine of illumination is a problem of being: it is a problem of what created being is and of what man is.

For what is the world of Augustine? That it is *created* we must grant. In the *Confessions* it fairly shouts its createdness to Augustine.<sup>139</sup> But how does Augustine recognize this *createdness*? The world is *mutable* and *imperfect*, and, as it has well been said, "just as immutability has directed us to the recognition of the divine nature, so change enables us to know imperfect natures".<sup>140</sup> The experience of imperfection, of only *participated perfection*, leads Augustine to the recognition that the reality of things, their goodness, their truth, their unity, could not possibly either be God or be without God. In a word, the very same ascending experience which led Augustine to the God above his reason reveals to him his own imperfections and those of the world around and below him.<sup>141</sup>

It is not for nothing that the world presents itself to us as a ladder of numbers leading to God: this world reflects the perfections in which it shares imperfectly, mutably, and in a piecemeal way; but the soul which experiences the necessity of truth can perceive such perfections for what they are. And what are they? They are the fashioned works of an Artist which could not be without being fashioned and which could not be fashioned without revealing their

<sup>138</sup> *De Musica* VI, 1, 1; PL 32, 1161.

<sup>139</sup> *Confessions* XI, 4, 6; PL 32, 811.

<sup>140</sup> Ch. Boyer, *op. cit.*, p. 113. Cf. *Confessions*

XII, 19, 28; PL 32, 836.

<sup>141</sup> Reference in Ch. Boyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 110-115.



Artist. Such is the lesson that Evodius learned from Augustine immediately after that moment when we left them finally in agreement. This is to say—and the point has a decisive significance—that *we experience the imperfections and the instability of things in a world of number and truth*; we explain the meaning of their *createdness* in the same world of number and truth; and we look upon what they *are* in terms of *number*: the heavens and the earth and the sea, and whatever is in them, “have being in so far as they share in number”.<sup>142</sup> What does this mean?

At this point the scriptural exegete and the Platonist in Augustine meet one another. To the exegete of *Genesis* the problem of *time*, *succession* and *mutability* was always an issue in a world which was created *all at once*;<sup>143</sup> to the Platonist, the problem of *order* and *stability* in a mutable world was the classic, if embarrassing, legacy of Plato himself. The Augustinian notion of creation is an answer to both of these issues. For Augustine saw in creatures pits of *formlessness* which required to be flooded with the light of the divine ideas.

When we sing, Augustine has said, we both *utter* sound and *form* words: that is the *matter* and the *form* of our song. So too, when God creates, He *makes* things and He *fashions* them. He must bring them out of nothing and He must keep them out of the nothingness to which they tend. But perhaps the Augustinian song of creation, both sound and words, can explain itself:

Sound is the matter of words, while words disclose sound that has been formed. Now he who speaks does not first utter formless [inarticulate] sound, which he later can gather together and form into words. So too in the case of God the Creator. He did not first make formless matter which He then at a later time, as though on further thought, formed into the distinct natures of different things. That is to say, what God created was *formed matter*.<sup>144</sup>

It may help our understanding at this point to bear in mind that Augustine's concern with *formless matter* in the problem of creation comes from the book of *Wisdom*, where it is said that the almighty hand of God “*made the world of matter without form*”.<sup>145</sup> It will help also to observe that this *matter* is not, as such, to be connected with *corporeal* matter. By it Augustine wants to express a characteristic which belongs to all created beings, both spiritual and corporeal: *mutability*. Matter is thus to be understood, not as the *principle of corruptibility*,

<sup>142</sup> *De Libero Arbitrio* II, 16, 42; PL 32, 1263. Cf. *Confessions* XI, 8, 10; PL 32, 813.

<sup>143</sup> For the Augustinian exegesis of *Genesis*, with which I am not here concerned, cf. J. Martin, *Saint Augustine*, pp. 281-316; E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 253-267. For the present purposes, the first book of the important *Literal Commentary on Genesis* and the twelfth book of the *Confessions* are particularly noteworthy. Not only do they clarify the meaning of *matter* and *formlessness* in St. Augustine, but they show how the ideas of *formation* and *illumination* are inseparable parts of the Augustinian notion of *creation*. That is why I have said that illumination is a question of being: *for God to illumine the soul is as much a part of the creation of the soul as for Him to form the formless matter He has created*. For such is the nature of creatures. (I recognize that this is a Platonic conception of the nature of created being, but since Augustine is everywhere conscious that it is created

being which he is explaining, he makes Platonism to mean creationism, and hence the notion of creature is saved, however inadequately.)

Since all things were created together in the beginning by God, Augustine must account for the new forms of plant and animal life which were to appear in the course of the world's history. This he does by means of his famous doctrine of *seminal principles* or, as they are usually called, *seminal reasons*. On this doctrine, cf. M. J. McKeough, *The Meaning of the Rationes Seminales in St. Augustine* (Washington, The Catholic University of America, 1926), pp. 17-95. This Augustinian doctrine of seminal principles is destined to be given considerable notoriety by mediaeval controversies.

<sup>144</sup> *De Genesi ad Litteram*, I, 15, 29; PL 34, 257.

<sup>145</sup> *Wisdom* xi, 18.



but as the more radical *principle of mutability*. Mutability is, in fact, a characteristic of all creatures, angels included,<sup>146</sup> to which Augustine attaches particular importance and which has called forth his whole doctrine of illumination. To be made is the deepest mark of creatures; but, since creatures are mutable by nature, for them to be made *completely* in their distinct natures is for them also to be *formed*. Like a work of human art, their being consists in being fashioned; unlike such a work, their whole being comes from their Artist. But, in any case, *formation* or *information* is a decisive moment in creation.

The heavens and the earth which were made in the beginning, therefore, must be understood as having been, at one and the same time, produced *and* formed. Now, while in this production-formation doctrine St. Augustine's main concern is to show that God, in creating both the matter and the form of things, is their total cause,<sup>147</sup> nevertheless, what is most striking in the doctrine is the meaning of the *formation* of creatures. For here we meet not only the divine ideas,<sup>148</sup> but also the light of the Word—that very Word Who is our inner teacher, Who by teaching *forms* us and completes our creation, even as He forms and completes the creation of corporeal substances. God made the world in His Wisdom, and that Wisdom, Who forms and perfects things in their distinct natures,<sup>149</sup> is the same Wisdom Who will move over the dark waters of Augustine's formless soul and finally perfect and complete his nature.<sup>150</sup> And what is this to say except that the Augustinian search for beatitude is now moving within the universal search for *formation* by the Word, and that this formation is the *completion* of the work of creation?

It is this doctrine of formation, within the concept of creation, which lends to the thought of Augustine its distinctive colors. This doctrine is not only a theory of exemplary divine ideas. Of course, it is this. There are in the Word of God the ideas or forms of things. These ideas Augustine defines as "certain originating forms or stable and immutable principles of things, which exist without having been formed (hence, their eternity and immutability), and which are found in the divine intelligence. They themselves neither come to be nor perish, but everything that does come to be and perishes is said to be formed according to these ideas". All things have been produced and are governed according to them, for God creates all things according to these principles or forms. Indeed, "each individual thing was created according to its own form". Since they exist in God, the divine ideas are eternal and immutable. Not only, therefore, do the forms which Plato called *Ideas* exist, they are also true, eternal and immutable being; and whatever exists, in whatever way it exists, exists through participation in them.<sup>151</sup>

But there is more. For the story of *Genesis* is the story of the *formation* of things by the divine ideas. As it has well been said, "the constant view of Augustine is that this formation of things by their divine ideas constitutes precisely the work which *Genesis* describes, by means of images, in the story of the work of the six days".<sup>152</sup> But because *Genesis* thus describes how the world was *formed*, and because this formation is the completion of the work

<sup>146</sup> *De Civitate Dei* XII, 16; PL 41, 365; *Confessions* XII, 9, 9; 11, 12; 13, 16; PL 32, 829, 830, 831-832. Both angels and souls are mutable by nature, but the mutability of angels was "controlled" by the beatific vision (*Confessions* XII, 9, 9; PL 32, 829).

<sup>147</sup> Ch. Boyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 115-119; E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, p. 258, note 3 (p. 259).

<sup>148</sup> While Augustine recognizes that "Plato is said to be the first to speak of Ideas", he adds that the realities to which this term *idea* refers must certainly have been known before Plato. Is it likely that there were

not wise men before Plato? Now precisely, these *ideas* are so important "that no one can be wise unless he perceives them" (*De Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII* 46, 1; PL 40, 29). Cp. *De Civitate Dei* VII, 28; PL 41, 218.

<sup>149</sup> *De Genesi ad Litteram* I, 4, 9; PL 34, 249-250.

<sup>150</sup> *Confessions* XI, 9, 11; PL 32, 813-814.

<sup>151</sup> *De Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII* 46, 2; PL 40, 30.

<sup>152</sup> E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, p. 258.

of creation, we must look at things from the standpoint of their *formation* in order to understand the constitution of their being. When we adopt this standpoint, however, we are in the presence of a world of light and number, a world which we see from *within* the intelligible harmony and composition of each reality, a world which *practices* that intelligible interiorism which it preaches to Augustine. The more Augustine learns to listen to the *intelligible* voice of things, the more he approaches the inner center of the world; and the more he approaches this inner center, the more he is reaching Him Who gives to things a center. For the center of the world is participation in the light of the Word, and this light descends from Wisdom as from a radiating fire.<sup>153</sup> And what message does man hear in such a world? Listen:

Wherever you turn Wisdom speaks to you by certain traces of Himself which He has impressed on His work; and if you should wander towards external things, He calls you back within yourself by the very forms of external things. You are thus driven to see that whatever pleases you in the body and attracts you through the senses of the body is full of number. You then ask whence it is, and you return to yourself and come to understand that whatever you reach with the senses of the body you cannot find attractive or repellent unless you possess within yourself certain laws of beauty to which you refer whatever beauty in things you perceive outside yourself.<sup>154</sup>

Almost the whole Augustine, the man and the thinker, is in these words. We can only read them and reread them, and we can but remember, as we read, the spiritual voyage of the *Confessions*, no less than the deepest and most constant aims of the Augustinian soul. The inner history of the world is that the light of heaven covers the earth; the inner history of desire is that we are seeking the light of heaven which makes itself known to us irresistibly on earth; the inner history of Augustine is that he was seeking heaven even when, in that day of his spiritual infirmity, he wallowed in the abyss of lust. These are precious lessons of Augustinianism, and it is entirely proper that we see them in the heart of Augustine himself. It was not lust which alone overpowered Augustine: it was love which made lust desirable until, as on the day of creation, "the light of love" was distinguished from "the darkness of lust".<sup>155</sup>

But these lessons are really one lesson: the lesson of the formation of things by the light of the Word—the formation which gives to the world its reality, to desire its substance, and to Augustine his Rachel. At the moment when the heart of Augustine was composed and the formless chaos of desire illumined by the God to Whom he finally turned, Augustine entered *within* himself. Where is this *within*—if not at that point where he hears Wisdom speaking to him through the forms of things? If the great message of the world is thus interiorism, Augustine, in heeding it, opens himself to the light of Wisdom which he is so long misread. When Augustine ceased to wander in the darkness of passion, he found also that the world was not dark. To enter within himself meant for him to discover the intelligible light that really floods both him and the world. This interiorism, be it noted, is the discovery of an intelligible world: it is not a withdrawal into a prison of abstractions. Augustine found a world of form and number. He found Wisdom—and he also found Plato and Plotinus. Therein lies the difficulty, for it would seem that Wisdom has created a Platonic world.

<sup>153</sup> *De Libero Arbitrio* II, 11, 32; PL 32, 1258.

<sup>154</sup> *Op. cit.* II, 16, 41; PL 32, 1263.

<sup>155</sup> Cf. *Confessions* II, 2, 2; PL 32, 675.

All the attributes which Augustine sees in his world of number are marks of *stability, order, unity, organization, harmony, proportion*. Without number, he says, *things would not be*; but when we consider the effects of number, we might be inclined rather to think that *without number things would not be harmoniously arranged*. Now, of course, it is quite clear that the delight with which Augustine follows the effects of number in the world can reach lyrical heights. He finds beauty and measure in bodies and in their movements, he appreciates the art and formation which such beauty implies, and he rises to the divine ideas as to the source of this light in the world which has given him such aesthetic joy. "Transcend therefore also the soul of the artist and look upon eternal number. Wisdom will illumine you from the inner throne and the inner dwelling place itself of Truth. And if Wisdom repel your vision (for your vision may still be too weak), turn the eye of your mind to that highway where Wisdom does not cease to show 'herself to them cheerfully'. And be sure to remember: you have put off to another time a vision which you can seek again when you have grown stronger and healthier".<sup>156</sup> As I said, this is an aesthetic and even a mystical view of the world, for it is nothing less than the pursuit of the vision of Wisdom. In this sense, Augustine is admonished by the world not merely to seek and to find God, but to seek and to find the very vision of God. Hence, one necessary result of the examination of the world *from the standpoint of number and intelligible formation* is the search for contemplative wisdom, for Rachel herself: this is an interioristic world, for it is turned to Wisdom; its only message to Augustine must be that he, too, should seek the Wisdom Who formed the world: and the only conclusion of such a search is mystical union with the Word. Augustine has himself said as much.<sup>157</sup>

But, however attractive and joyous the vision of Rachel may be, let us stop a moment on this highway to God, and let us look at the world itself as a reality in itself. What does Augustine see in it? He sees a world whose reality consists in *enacting orderly and measured movement*; he sees an eternal and immutable Form which will prevent 'this orderly movement of the world from ceasing. In a word, Augustine discovers the divine providence and the divine government ruling and maintaining the world, and he takes joy.<sup>158</sup> But could not Augustine have made such a discovery from the *Timaeus* and the *Laus* (Book X) of Plato? or from the *Enneads* of Plotinus? What is he saying here except that time is the moving image of eternity, as Plato said? The world of Augustine is surely a *creature*, but his examination of it tends to show that it is a *rhythmic whole*. Permanence is the bedrock of being. Changing things *tend* towards being, i.e., seek performance, in the sense that they seek *order and unity*. For them to seek order and unity is to "imitate unity through a harmony of their parts"; and "they are to the extent that they achieve this".<sup>159</sup> But what other doctrine of unity and composition, of being as permanence, of an essential integration of parts as the meaning of the being of a thing, did Plotinus teach?<sup>160</sup>

Now without a single doubt, it is *created being* that Augustine is here examining; and this fact is sufficient to separate him from Plotinus and from the difficulties which beset Plotinus. But precisely, as we have seen, "Augustine understands creation as the divine gift of that sort of existence which consists in rhythm, numbers, forms, beauty, order, and unity".<sup>161</sup> If, therefore, Augustine,

<sup>156</sup> *De Libero Arbitrio* II, 16, 42; PL 32, 1264. Cf. *Wisdom* vi, 17. The highway is, of course, the created world itself: cf. *De Libero Arbitrio* II, 16, 41; PL 32, 1263 (quoted above in the text).

<sup>157</sup> *De Diversis Quaestionibus* LXXXIII 46, 2, ad fin.; PL 40, 30-31; *De Genesi ad Litteram*

I, 4, 9-5, 10; PL 43, 249-250.

<sup>158</sup> *De Libero Arbitrio* II, 16, 44-17, 45; PL 32, 1264-1265.

<sup>159</sup> *De Moribus Manichaeorum* II, 6, 8; PL 32, 1348. An important text.

<sup>160</sup> Plotinus, *Enneads* VI, 9, 1.

<sup>161</sup> E. Gilson, *God and Philosophy*, pp. 60-61.

unlike the Greeks, knows that to create means to *make a thing to be*, yet "what still remains Greek in Augustine's thought is his very notion of what it is to be. His ontology, or science of being, is an 'essential' rather than an 'existential' one. In other words, it exhibits a marked tendency to reduce the existence of a thing to its essence, and to answer the question: what is it for a thing to be? by saying: It is to be that which it is".<sup>162</sup> That is to say, "Augustine had a clear idea of what it is to create, but he never reached a wholly existential notion of being".<sup>163</sup>

There are several things which such a conclusion explains in the thought of Augustine. What Augustine is doing is describing a created world as though it were simply the world of Plotinus, and he distinguishes the mutable from the immutable after the manner of Plotinus and Plato. The intelligible forms are for Plato and Plotinus true and divine being, and they are distinguished from the passing and corruptible being of the world of sense. For them, too, the necessary is the permanent, and is distinguished from the mutable. When Augustine discovers truth *above* his mind and calls it eternal, he is simply discovering the true being of Plato; when he refuses to find necessary truth in a mutable world, he is refusing to find truth where Plato before him had refused. To say that necessary truth cannot come from a mutable world is to know only a Platonic world and a Platonic mutability.

Perhaps this is the essential point of Augustine's borrowing from the Platonists. But it is far from the whole story, for what Augustine did not take from them leaves what he did take hanging in mid-air. To Plotinus this world of truth is a world of being—the world of forms in the divine Intelligence. Plotinus himself can see them because he himself is, as he argues, divine. Now Augustine is not a Plotinian god, and he does not see the divine ideas. Because he is a *creature*, he has not the privileges of a Plotinian god. But does not this mean that he has lost the passport to the world of truth? For, having still a Plotinian notion of the divinity of truth, Augustine cannot seek truth in a *created* world. This, therefore, is the dilemma of Augustine, that he is too Christian to say that when he makes immutable judgments he *sees* the divine ideas, and he is too Greek to say that creatures can cause such judgments. Deeply Christian motives close for him the gates of a Plotinian heaven. He is a created soul, not an eternal divinity. But the Platonic habit of divinizing and eternalizing whatever is intelligible is closing for Augustine the gates of a created world. Where—where did Augustine learn these necessary truths? Not in a Plotinian heaven, nor in a Christian world. And yet who is the Augustinian man to stand between God and matter, hugging a secret that he is too humble a Christian to see in heaven and too proud a Greek to see on earth? Perhaps the Augustinian man himself will reveal something of this extraordinary secret.

#### IV. MAN

##### (a) *Between God and Matter*

The Augustinian man, however, simply verifies in himself the lessons which we have just experienced in the world. *Interiorism*, as Augustine has been slowly revealing to us, is a journey to the intelligible nature of being. It is not *within* us in the sense that it implies a flight from the world: it is rather *within* in the sense that we reach more intimately the reality and the truth of the beings around us. We must bear this point in mind, for the interiorism of modern philosophy, established by Descartes, is not at all that of Augustine.

<sup>162</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 61.

<sup>163</sup> *Ibid.*, note 12.

Augustine went within himself and experienced and discovered a world of truth: if his interiorism means anything, it means that he never left the world of being in going within himself. But Descartes went within himself never to return to the world. He *intended* to return, and he *tried*, which ought to mean at least that he knew he had *left* the world; but he did not succeed in building a way from his mind to the world.

But that is another story. Here let us notice only that Augustinian interiorism contains within itself a Platonic vision of the world, and a Platonic way of experiencing its truth. It is Plato who saves Augustine from the prison within which Descartes, unknowingly, locked himself; though I ought to add in all fairness that to accept Plato was not an unmixed blessing for Augustine, just as to reject him was at least a partial good. The only question is whether, in going to his solitary prison, Descartes was not being a victim rather than a liberator. But again, this, too, is another story. In any case, the Augustinian notion of man is the counterpart of Augustine's Platonic conception of the world. *Interiorism* led us to intelligibility in the world: it will lead us to *mind* as the center of man, and to *mentalism* as our focus on this center. And while such an experience with the mentalism of Augustine will illustrate how far removed we are from the closed self of Descartes, what is more immediately pertinent is that it will show us how near we are to the divine self of Plotinus. More important than this, we shall see how St. Augustine, however near he may be to Plotinus, is enormously far from him; for St. Paul stands between them.

When Augustine proved to Navigius and Evodius that they were living, thinking beings, he was implicitly proving not only the substantiality of the soul within itself, but also its transcendence over the body. Furthermore, in proving such an independence of the soul over the body, he was thereby raising a tremendous difficulty for himself. This difficulty concerns the relations between soul and body, and it is brought out with particular gravity in the problem of sensation. We must now briefly consider this cycle of ideas.

As the defeat of the skeptics has indicated, the soul *knows* it is a thinking being. This is a basic experience. Whatever we may *think*, there are some things we *know*. Does the mind, for example, *think* it is made of air? Then, says St. Augustine, when the mind thinks that it is air, it *thinks* that air has understanding, but it *knows* that it itself has understanding. "It does not know itself to be air, it only thinks so. Let it remove what it *thinks* it is, and let it perceive what it *knows* it is. There will then be left to the mind what could not be doubted even by those who thought that the mind was this or that body".<sup>164</sup> Exactly. When the mind seeks to know itself, it is not seeking a stranger: it is there all the time, it *grasps its own reality* at the moment it hears the injunction: *know thyself*.<sup>165</sup> But for the mind to grasp itself immediately is for it to know not only that it lives, but also that its life is the life of *understanding*. For it grasps its own understanding.<sup>166</sup> Hence, be it noted, the same immediacy of thought to itself which refuted skepticism will now be used to discover the nature of mind. When I am *certain* of myself, it is not only a certitude I grasp: I grasp myself as the *mind* that I am, and I grasp myself with an immediacy which is as unique as I am to myself. I am as immediately aware of my *nature* as of my existence. In knowing that I know, I necessarily know that I am a knower. If I cannot doubt that I think, I cannot doubt that I am a thinking being: we are beyond not only skepticism but also materialism. We know that mind is not a body or a modification of a body, for we know that mind grasps its own thinking substance.<sup>167</sup>

<sup>164</sup> *De Trinitate* X, 10, 13; PL 42, 980.

<sup>165</sup> *Op. cit.* X, 9, 12; PL 42, 980.

<sup>166</sup> *Op. cit.* X, 10, 13; PL 42, 980.

<sup>167</sup> *Op. cit.* X, 10, 13-16; PL 42, 980-982. For the Augustinian proof of the immortality of the soul as founded on this initial and

The significance and the decisiveness of this self-possession of the mind by itself can be felt immediately. We have thus far been speaking of *I*, *soul* and *mind* somewhat indiscriminately: we must now consider *man* in a more orderly way. What is man? Let us plunge into the midst of some interesting reflections for an answer. The setting of these reflections is entirely familiar: Augustine is seeking the highest good, immediately present to us, cause of our beatitude and therefore above us in perfection.<sup>108</sup> We are already veterans in going *above* ourselves. Hence, let us come to the point without comment:

Let us therefore seek what is more perfect than man. Now it is extremely difficult to discover this unless we first examine and discuss what man is. We are agreed that man is composed of soul and body. The question is: what is man? Of these two, is he the soul alone, or the body alone? For, although soul and body are two realities, and neither one of them would be called *man* unless the other were present (the body would not be man without the soul, and the soul would not be man if the body were not animated by it), yet it is quite possible that one of them may be considered to be man, and be so called.

Well, which of them do we call man? (i) Is man soul-and-body, as in the case of a *team* of horses or a centaur? (ii) Or is man the body alone, which is in the service of the soul that rules it? An analogy would be a lantern. We call a lantern, not the flame-and-vessel together, but simply the vessel, though we mean a vessel for the purpose of carrying a flame. (iii) Or is man nothing other than what we call the *soul*, though we so call it because of the body that it rules? For example, when we speak of a *rider*, the reference is not to a man-and-a-horse together, but to the man alone, even though it is true that we call him a rider because he is suited to the task of ruling a horse.

It is difficult to come to a conclusion in the foregoing discussion. And even if the reason could settle it easily, it would involve us in a lengthy discourse. We do not here need to undertake and to undergo the delay of such a labor. For whether the pair together or the soul alone appropriates the name *man*, man's highest good is not whatever is the highest good of the body. The highest good of man is whatever is the highest good for body-and-soul together or for the soul alone.<sup>109</sup>

It is clear that Augustine knows the answer to these questions. He is not at all in doubt as to whether *man*, when it applies to soul and body, means the team together, or only the vessel which is the body, or even only the rider which is the soul. These questions, we might observe in passing, are not intended to argue that if we say that man is a soul *with* a body, we are implying that soul and body add up to man *plus* another reality, the body. Soul and body are together *one man*. Nor are we intending to place the whole essence of man in the soul alone. Augustine has declared caustically that "anyone who wishes to separate the body from human nature is stupid!"<sup>110</sup> (Let us not allow thirteenth

radical experience of thought and truth, cf. E. Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin*, pp. 65-70.

<sup>108</sup> *De Moribus Ecclesiae* I, 3, 4-5; PL 32, 1312. It is scarcely necessary to remark on the parallel between this text and the second book of the *De Libero Arbitrio* already analyzed. But it will help our interpretation of St. Anselm, and especially his famous proof for the existence of God, to bear in

mind these discussions, as well as the similar discussions of the first book of the *De Doctrina Christiana*. These works reveal a world within which the method of Anselm begins to make remarkable sense.

<sup>109</sup> *De Moribus Ecclesiae* I, 4, 6; PL 32, 1313.

<sup>110</sup> *De Anima et ejus Origine* IV, 2, 3; PL 44, 525.

century disputes to rear their heads here. How two substances can be added together and make one substance, will always remain an extremely awkward question for St. Thomas' contemporaries and successors; and St. Thomas Aquinas will always retain on this problem a uniqueness which is as decisive as it is triumphant. In the presence of this question, however, Augustine is innocent rather than wrong: he does not even know the meaning of this thirteenth century problem.) Augustine's point refers to the center of gravity in the human composite. What interests him is the question of questions: to discover what is highest and most perfect within himself in order—can we doubt it?—to pursue the higher-highest good above him. Hence, be it noted, the Augustinian definition of man undertakes to answer the question, not *what is man?* but *how is man ordered and governed?* As we shall see, this is a decisive point, for it enables us at length to understand Augustine.

To this last question the Augustinian answers have been invariable. "*Man, therefore, according to his own understanding of himself, is a rational soul using a mortal and earthly body.*"<sup>171</sup> During the same time (in 388) we hear the following: "*The soul, as it seems to me, is a certain substance, sharing in reason and suited to the task of ruling the body.*"<sup>172</sup> Note well: the first defines *man*, the second defines the *soul*. This should not be surprising, for Augustine's point is simply that fundamentally and primarily man is what is best in himself. But we must not think that, Platonic as they are, these definitions are destined to be discarded.<sup>173</sup> For their purpose is not to exclude the body from membership in the human composite; *it is to find the true and central man in the composite*. If, therefore, late in the treatise *On the Trinity*, Augustine is content to say with the tradition of the philosophers that "man is a rational, mortal animal" or that "man is a rational substance composed of soul and body",<sup>174</sup> he is not saying anything which he had earlier denied, nor have his interests changed. Without denying that man is the composite of soul and body, he is, as ever, seeking what is best in man,—and this at the very moment when he cites these rather neutral philosophical definitions of man. He finds a trinity of mind, knowledge and love in man and he says, "these are not man; *they are what is noblest in him*". He then finds that this trinity resides in what is best in the soul, and he adds, "therefore, it is not the soul, *but what is noblest in the soul which is called mind*".<sup>175</sup> In *The City of God* Augustine even gives us the formula of such a search and discovery when, speaking of Varro, he says: "He rightly feels that there are two realities in the nature of man, namely soul and body, and he does not in the least doubt that of the two *the soul is the better and, by far, the more excellent reality* . . ."<sup>176</sup>

It is in this direction that Augustine develops his conception of the relations between soul and body. For *how* the soul is related to the body is an expression of its very excellence. The soul is present to the body, not locally or spatially, but by a certain *vital attention*. That is to say, it is present in its entirety to all parts of the body: it is the whole soul which perceives an impression even in the smallest point of the body; and, what is more, whatever is perceived is perceived only in that part of the body where it takes place:<sup>177</sup>

The whole soul perceives what is going on in *one* part of the body, but it does not perceive this in the *whole* body. Thus, when there is a pain in the foot, the eye sees it, the tongue reports it, and the hand

<sup>171</sup> *De Moribus Ecclesiae* I, 27, 52; PL 32, 1332.

<sup>172</sup> *De Quantitate Animae* XIII, 22; PL 32, 1048.

<sup>173</sup> Cf. E. Portalié, *art. cit.* (cf. note 21), col.

2358.

<sup>174</sup> *De Trinitate* XV, 7, 11; PL 42, 1065.

<sup>175</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>176</sup> *De Civitate Dei* XIX, 3; PL 41, 625.

<sup>177</sup> Cf. E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-61.



reaches towards it. This would not be so unless the soul were present in these parts in the same way as it senses in the foot . . . The soul is, therefore, at one and the same time as a whole in each part of the body, just as it senses as a whole in each part.<sup>178</sup>

This is really a commentary on Plotinus: we perceive *in the finger*, observes Plotinus, that we have a pain *there*.<sup>179</sup>

Two problems now present themselves. One will help to explain *why* this union takes place; the other, by illustrating *how* the union between soul and body operates, will lead us to the center of the Augustinian man. These two problems are connected, for the reason why a spiritual substance goes *below itself* to do a work which its own nature does not demand is the embarrassing *why* which an embarrassed *how* is never allowed to forget.<sup>180</sup> These embarrassments simply mean that we are near Plotinus once more; for it was Plotinus, as we may remember, who wondered why anyone who was made for heaven should come down and dwell in a body. If St. Augustine has here no intentions of following after Plotinus, he explains along Plotinian lines the reason why soul is joined to matter.

St. Augustine *does* say that the soul naturally desires to be joined to the body, and by this he means that "the soul is created with such a nature as to desire this, in the same way as it is natural to us to desire to live".<sup>181</sup> But in considering the motives in this desire, we find that the soul enters the body as a messenger of light from the divine ideas. The soul is nearer to the divine ideas than is the body; it is therefore more perfect than the body, and this priority of the soul is as it ought to be. Order and organization and life come down to the body by way of, and through the mediation of, the soul. The hierarchy of *divine ideas*, *soul* and *body* has as its fundamental motive the transmission of organization to matter, which can take place only this way.<sup>182</sup> The soul is thus a sort of intermediate nature, with the divine ideas immediately above it and the body immediately below: "There is nothing that comes between the highest life, which is immutable Wisdom and Truth, and that which is the last reality to receive life, namely, the body, except the soul".<sup>183</sup> One remark will perhaps explain the meaning of this point. Augustine is conceiving the union of soul and body on the principle that *it is the body which will be benefited by it*: there is nothing in his remarks to suggest any *need* which the soul has in its very nature and which this union with the body supplies. Centuries later, St. Thomas Aquinas, speculating on these Platonic views, will hold firmly to the principle that the soul is joined to matter for its own good: the soul *needs* the body and it is incapable of doing its work as an intellectual substance unless it is joined to it. It is not the good of the body, but that of the soul, which this union has in view. Without denying the unity of man, St. Augustine is too near Plotinus and too conscious of his own tempestuous life to seek any intellectual good in the body. The ministering angel of Plotinus, however, who still lives in the Augustinian notion of soul, ceases to exist with St. Thomas Aquinas.<sup>184</sup>

The first result of the superiority of the Augustinian soul over the body is that the body can never act on the soul. Whatever acts is superior to that on

<sup>178</sup> *De Immortalitate Animae* XVI, 25; PL 32, 1034.

<sup>179</sup> Plotinus, *Enneads* IV, 7, 8.

<sup>180</sup> Amidst many uncertainties, Augustine summarizes in one text what he holds with certainty on the soul: cf. *De Genesi ad Litteram* VII, 28, 43; PL 34, 372. On the difficulties concerning the origin of the soul, cf. E. Portalié, *art. cit.*, cols. 2359-2361.

<sup>181</sup> *De Genesi ad Litteram* VII, 27, 38; PL 34, 369.

<sup>182</sup> *De Immortalitate Animae* XV, 24; PL 32, 1033.

<sup>183</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>184</sup> Cf. A. C. Pegis, *St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth Century* (Toronto, St. Michael's College, 1934), pp. 147-168.



which it is acting; hence "we must not suppose that the body produces any effect on the soul, as though the soul, in the role of matter, is subjected to a body acting on it".<sup>185</sup> But to say that body never acts on soul is, perhaps, to say more than we realize. When I see something which I had not seen previously, does not body act on soul? Nothing of the kind. Indeed, we have scarcely observed how much the *soul itself* acts when, in sensation, we might imagine that the body acts on it. Not only does the body *not* act on the soul, but it is also true that the continued action of the soul is what makes sensation itself a *continuous* process:

Therefore, although we see a body which we had not previously seen, and its image then begins to exist in our souls (by which image we remember this body when it will no longer be present to us), nevertheless, it is not the body which impresses the image in the soul; it is the soul itself which produces it within itself with a remarkable swiftness which far outstrips the slowness of the body. Just as soon as the body appears before the eyes, its image is formed instantaneously in the soul of the one seeing it.

So too in the case of hearing. Unless the soul continued to form in itself the images of the sound perceived by the ears, and unless it retained this sound by means of memory, the second syllable [of a word] would not be known as the second syllable, since the first syllable, which had come and gone when the ear was struck, was no longer in existence. And, in general, all use of speech, all the sweetness of singing, as well as all bodily movements in our actions would be dissipated and lost, and they would have no means of maintaining themselves, if the soul did not retain through memory the already performed movements of the body, to which it would then relate the movements which take place after them. This is to say that the soul does not retain these movements unless it forms their images by itself within itself.<sup>186</sup>

Two points thus appear with considerable clearness: the radical independence of soul from body, manifested particularly by the activity of the soul in the production of sensations; and the place of memory in sensation. Both of these points are vindications of the superiority of the soul over the body, but they also illustrate how the soul operates in the body. The sixth book of the treatise *On Music* has further and celebrated elaborations of these points. And while we are particularly concerned with the problem of sensation, nevertheless, the more ultimate horizons of Augustine will interest us even more.

In discussing the experience of hearing a line of verse, St. Augustine arrives finally at the difficulty we have already met. Such an experience implies that the body acts on the soul, but we know that an inferior reality cannot act on a superior one. How then are we to explain sensation? St. Augustine's solution is quite direct:

For my part, I think that this body is animated by the soul because such was the intention of God. I think, furthermore, that the soul does not suffer anything from the body, but rather acts on it and in it as

<sup>185</sup> *De Genesi ad Litteram* XII, 16, 33; PL 34, 467. I have translated *spiritus* by *soul*. Augustine himself has indicated earlier in this same work the many meanings of *spiritus*: *op. cit.*, XII, 7, 18; PL 34, 459-460. Cp. also E. Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude*

*de saint Augustin*, p. 53, note 1, who refers to *De Fide et Symbolo* X, 23; PL 40, 193-194. On the doctrine, cp. *De Musica* VI, 5, 8; PL 32 1167-1168.

<sup>186</sup> *De Genesi ad Litteram* XII, 16, 33; PL 34, 467.

on something put under its domination by God. At times the soul acts with ease, and at other times with difficulty; it depends on its merits whether the body is subject to it more or less. Now when any other bodies from the outside affect or disturb this body, it is not in the soul but in the body that they make an impression. This impression, in turn, either disagrees or agrees with the activity of the soul in the body.

Hence it is that when the soul opposes something harmful, and with difficulty forces the material body subject to it to the performance of its work, this difficulty makes the soul to become more attentive towards its own activity. Since this difficulty does not escape the attention of the soul, it is called sensation, the kind of sensation which is called pain or anguish.<sup>187</sup>

What is sensation, then? It is the special state of tension or attention of the soul in the body. The business of the soul in the body is to animate it. How could the soul do this if it did not perceive whatever went on in the body? When sound strikes the ear, is it not striking a *living member of the body*? And does not the soul continue to animate the ear during sensation? But is its movement in the ear the same now as before the sound came. How could the soul do its work in the body properly unless it modified its attention according to the modifications of the body, accepting or resisting according as they are agreeable or harmful? But if such is the case, if the very health of the body and its organs depends on this watchfulness on the part of the soul, we have found what sensation is: when the soul senses, it does not receive the affections of the body; it puts forth actions which correspond to these affections in the body; and this concentration of attention, brought about by disturbances in the body, is what we call sensation.<sup>188</sup>

Sensations are thus intensified moments of action by the soul in the body. The intensification is an expression of the soul's guardianship and watchfulness over the body which it is animating. Since, therefore, sensations are actions of the soul in the body, "there is nothing absurd in believing that, when the soul senses, its own movements, or actions, or operations, or however else they may be conveniently described, do not escape its attention".<sup>189</sup> Furthermore, when we say that in a sensation the soul is affected by an object, we now know what we mean: we really mean, not that the soul is affected by the body, but that it is affected by its own operations in the body: "when the soul is affected in some way by its own operations, the affection comes from itself, not from the body; and this takes place when it accommodates itself to the body. *For this reason the soul is less with itself, because the body is always a lesser reality than the soul*".<sup>190</sup>

This last reflection brings us back to the main Augustinian highway as well as to familiar territory. For if sensation is thus a particular manifestation of the government of the soul over the body, it is also the symptom of a grave problem for the soul. This is, in fact, the sad burden of the soul, that though it ought to be the servant of God, its very government over the body can attract it to the point of making it the servant of the body. How well Augustine knew this! How well he knew that those who seek God are sometimes so lost as to plunge their search into the concupiscence of the flesh! This poor body of ours! It depends so much on the soul for protection, and that soul must be such a faithful servant of God in order to be a wise governor and protector! But

<sup>187</sup> *De Musica* VI, 5, 9; PL 32, 1168.

<sup>188</sup> *Op. cit.* VI, 5, 10; PL 32, 1169.

<sup>189</sup> *Op. cit.* VI, 5, 11; PL 32, 1169.

<sup>190</sup> *Op. cit.* VI, 5, 12; PL 32, 1170.

the more this body of our seeks the protection of the soul, the more the soul becomes implicated in its care; and the more the soul becomes implicated in the body, the more it stays to enjoy where it should have stayed only to rule. Had it ruled properly, had it been a perfect servant of God Who is its only superior, it would have found in the body the readiest of servants. A healthy body is no problem: it is ruled with ease; but an ailing body requires considerable attention. So, too, in the present case, the more the soul needs to attend to the body, the more it reveals that it is living in stormy times: gone are the ease and the health of order. The soul now loses itself so much in the troubles of this mortal and fragile body, that it can come to love its bonds: the soul "comes to think more of the desire of the body, because the flesh yields to its attention, than of health itself for which no attention whatever is necessary!"<sup>191</sup>

What is extraordinary about this conclusion is that we should be so near the mentalism of Plotinus and yet so completely removed from it. We are, are we not, seeking the real man in the composite of soul and body which we are? And yet, what an arduous search this is! This is no academic question, for it is not a vague *body* that we are seeking to transcend, but living flesh: it is not Plotinus, but Paul, who expressed the search of Augustine: *Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?* And it is with Paul's answer that Augustine continues: *The grace of God, by Jesus Christ our Lord.*<sup>192</sup> The interior man of Augustine is not the intelligence of Plotinus, but the man of Paul, the inward man who is renewed day by day.<sup>193</sup>

The search for deliverance is the secret of Augustine's disquietude. He is not seeking a definition, he is seeking liberty; he is not seeking Plotinian immaterialism, he is seeking liberation from servitude to the flesh whose care he finds so attractive and in whose attractiveness he has lost himself and God; he is not seeking to recall and to recapture the life of a Plotinian divinity, he is seeking the grace of God. Christian liberty: *this* is Augustine's ultimate search. Hence, in considering the Augustinian doctrine of sensation, of memory and of mind, we must see the goal to which they point. Are we, in our highest selves, *minds*? We are—and we have, as yet, not seen entirely how much we really are minds! But, then, our misery is that, being minds, we are so plunged in servitude to the flesh. Of what good is our release from matter, if we are not released from the flesh? The weight of our servitude hangs more stiflingly upon us according as we probe more and more the depth of the spiritual center of our being.

And how much we do a spiritual work even in sensation! We know now that sensation is an activity of the soul. We need to know also how much this activity makes the very sensations which we think come to us from the bodies outside us. What happens when I *hear* a line of verse? We turn, at this point, to the doctrine of Augustine, already cited, that the soul *by remembering* makes sensation possible. It is clear that a line of verse, or even a word, is never spoken or heard *all at once*: it is spread out in time; so that we may say, even in the case of a syllable, that its end is never spoken at the same moment as its beginning. There is a temporal stretch between its beginning and its end: it begins at one time and ends in another. This interval in the duration of sound forces us to *perceive together elements which we do not hear together*. It is memory which makes hearing possible even as a sensation; for it is memory which gives to sensation the simultaneity that it must have and that otherwise it would not have. Sensation straddles time, and memory gives to it a continuous canvas.<sup>194</sup> Truly how much our souls must remember in order

<sup>191</sup> *Op. cit.* VI, 5, 13-14; PL 32, 1170.

<sup>192</sup> St. Paul, *Rom.* vii, 24-25; quoted by St. Augustine, *De Musica* VI, 5, 14; PL 32, 1170-1171.

<sup>193</sup> St. Paul, *II Cor.* iv, 16; quoted by St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* IV, 3, 5; PL 42, 890.

<sup>194</sup> *De Musica* VI, 8, 21; PL 32, 1174-1175.

to have sensations! And while we may thus marvel, as Augustine never ceases to marvel, at the great power of the memory, let us notice here how much we are liberated from materialism, how much on the spiritual life of the soul the body depends, and how much we are led to the soul even by the analysis of sensation.

Having noticed how much the soul, through its power of memory, must do for the body and its fragilities, let us now notice how much there is in the memory of the soul which has nothing to do with the images of things experienced or remembered. So far we have seen how the interior man perceives external things through the ministry of the senses of the body. "I the interior man, I, I the soul, have knowledge of those things through the senses of the body."<sup>195</sup> We ought to realize, too, that because of this doctrine of the relations of soul and body, we have crossed the threshold into mind even in sensation itself. We have not met any problem of going from the sensible to the intelligible, for Augustinian sensible experience is itself mental. The whole problem of knowledge consists for Augustine in going from participated truths in things to the necessary truth which they reveal when, in the presence of intelligence, they *speak* what they are. The forms of things speak, but only to those who hear, *and to hear things is to judge of their truth*. Here is the core of the Augustinian theory of knowledge: it is nothing other and nothing less than an ascending experience of the necessity of truth revealed in reality. What is knowledge? A conversation between the soul and things in a world of truth. Here is, in fact, the real Augustinian mood on knowledge and truth:

The interior man has knowledge of these things through the ministry of the exterior man. I the interior man, I, I the soul, have knowledge of these things through the senses of my body. I have questioned the great bulk of the world concerning my God, and it has replied to me: 'I am not He, but He has made me'.

Is not this form of the world manifest to all whose senses are unimpaired? Animals, both small and large, see it, and yet they cannot ask questions of it. For there does not exist in them a reason which can preside as a judge over the messages of the senses. But men can ask questions of the world, so that they may understand and see the invisible things of God through the things that are made. However, through love they become the servants of these things and, having entered servitude, are unable to judge.

Nor do these things that are made reply to all who question them. *They reply only to those who judge*. They do not change their voice, that is, their form, so as to appear in one way to him who only sees, and to appear in another way to him who sees *and questions* them. Without changing its appearance, it [the form of each thing] is silent in the presence of one, whereas it speaks to another. Indeed, it speaks to all men, but they understand it who, receiving its voice outside themselves, compare it within themselves with truth. For truth says to me 'Your God is not the heavens and the earth or any other body whatever'. The nature of things says this. Those who understand see that the world is a body, smaller therefore in one of its parts than in the whole. O my soul, I say to you that you are clearly more perfect than a body, since you vivify the bulk of your own body by giving it life—which no body can give to another. But your God is the life even of your life.<sup>196</sup>

<sup>195</sup> *Confessions* X, 6, 9; PL 32, 783.

<sup>196</sup> *Op. cit.* X, 6, 9-10; PL 32, 783.

Once more, therefore, we are on the way to God, but this time we pass through the memory. It is true that we did so before, but did not know it. Now we are going upward through the grades of life which *I the soul*, as Augustine says, manifest. "I shall transcend that power of mine by which I cling to the body and fill its bodily structure with life."<sup>197</sup> I shall reach, but only to transcend, the power by which I give sensation to my flesh, "which my Lord has fashioned for me, commanding the eye not to hear, but to be the instrument of my seeing, and the ear not to see, but to be the instrument of my hearing, and assigning, in the case of each of the other senses, their proper seats and functions. I, one soul, perform these various functions by means of the senses."<sup>198</sup> Above life and above sense—and behold "the plains and the broad courtyard of memory". In the vastness of the memory are the images of things I have seen, heard, smelled, tasted and touched whether in other bodies or within my own. Who will say how the memory preserves these images? I can remember colors and sounds as I please; by memory I can distinguish between the odor of lilies and that of violets; and, again by memory alone, I can distinguish the taste of honey from that of wine."<sup>199</sup> All this is in my memory. And men go out of themselves to wonder at the mountains, the seas, the rivers and the stars, and they ignore the wonder of their own memory!<sup>200</sup>

But the real wonders have still to come. There are in my memory realities which I know which did not come to me by any of the senses. How did the truths of the sciences get into my memory? They are there and I was not taught them. When I hear something true, I talk like a man who already knew it. I say, "that is so, that is true".<sup>201</sup> The principles and the laws of numbers are in my memory, and they did not come by sense. There are not images of the numbers I can think, and no image can represent the line I can think.<sup>202</sup> I remember errors, and I can distinguish between truth and error. I remember that I have known these truths, and I remember that I remember them, just as in the future I shall be able to recall that I remember them.<sup>203</sup>

And now an even greater wonder. All men desire to be happy. Where did we learn this? We have seen what beatitude is: the joyous possession of truth, and not of any truth, but of God. Where did we learn this? That we know it means that it is in our memory; that we do not always discern it means that we are implicated in the life of the body. But that we cannot deny this search for beatitude means that somewhere in the deepest roots of our memory—and even beyond—we somehow *remember* God! Not indeed in the sense I once knew Him and now *recall* what I knew!<sup>204</sup> And yet there is a sense in which I cannot avoid God. Why is it that we seek so much to know ourselves? Is it ourselves we want to know—or is it our most intimate roots that we are seeking? To Augustine, self-knowledge—the return of the soul to itself as a pure mind<sup>205</sup>—is not aimed at the self but at what makes the self seek. No, self-knowledge seeks its own motives, not the seeker. In brief, at the moment we discover ourselves as minds, we are freed from the life of sense, but at this moment we discover the presence of God.

Perhaps the word *memory* is here twice transformed. For this is not a memory of the past, but, as St. Augustine himself calls it,<sup>206</sup> a *memory of the present*. Yet, even more, how can we really remember God without saying that He is *in* our memory? The difficulty is more apparent than real. What we are discovering is really the conclusion to which the dialogue *On Music* has already

<sup>197</sup> *Op. cit.* X, 7, 11; PL 32, 784.

<sup>198</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>199</sup> *Op. cit.* X, 8, 12-14; PL 32, 784-785.

<sup>200</sup> *Op. cit.* X, 8, 15; PL 32, 785.

<sup>201</sup> *Op. cit.* X, 10, 17; PL 32, 786.

<sup>202</sup> *Op. cit.* X, 12, 19; PL 32, 787.

<sup>203</sup> *Op. cit.* X, 13, 20; PL 32, 787-788.

<sup>204</sup> *De Trinitate* XIV, 15, 21; PL 42, 1052.

<sup>205</sup> *Op. cit.* X, 3, 5; PL 42, 975-966.

<sup>206</sup> *Op. cit.* XIV, 11, 14; PL 42, 1047.

pointed,<sup>207</sup> which is the constant motive of the Augustinian man, and which has been expressed by saying that it is not in ourselves but in God alone that we seek God.<sup>208</sup> And there is nothing surprising in this. Do we not recognize the theme of wisdom when we hear Augustine say that a man remembers to turn to his Lord as to a light which *touched* him, even when he turned away from it? This touch of God explains why even those who are turned away can form true judgments of praise and blame in human conduct. Now the point is this: "By what rules, then, do they judge except those in which they see how each man ought to live—even if they themselves are not so living?" Truth! And *where* do they see these rules? Not in themselves, for the *mind* which sees them is mutable, and these rules are immutable. Truth *above* us, therefore! Where are these rules written?

Where therefore are they written, except in the book of that light which is called truth? From it is every just law copied and transferred to the heart of every man who does the work of justice. This transfer does not take place by moving, but by impressing itself—as the shape of a ring is impressed on wax and yet does not leave the ring.<sup>209</sup>

This is a conclusion which has already delighted Evodius. From the standpoint of the present problem, let us note, as Augustine explains in the same reference. God is immutably present to all beings: we *are* in His sustaining power and presence, and all our experience of truth is a revelation that we are and think in His presence.

It might easily appear that in such a conclusion we have lost our original aim. How, it may be asked, does this conclusion terminate a study of man? For it would seem that we have found God rather than man. Yet it is entirely distinctive of Augustine that this conclusion should reach God and still be a study of man. The point is worth emphasizing, and the reader of the later books of the treatise *On the Trinity* can verify for himself what it is that dominates the mind of Augustine in his study of man. He is not seeking to define an essence, and from this point of view Augustine has really never given a metaphysical interpretation of human nature. One might work such an interpretation out of his texts, but in that case the purpose would already be one which Augustine never set himself. When in this work *On the Trinity* he shows how man is a mind, when he ponders on the distinction between wisdom and science, when he shows that wisdom is concerned with the contemplation of eternal truths and science with the direction of the temporal and historical life of the Christian believer in this world, he is proceeding as one who is interested in the *religious organization of life*.

The study of man in Augustine thus turns out to be a study in the ordering of the active and contemplative life. When Augustine says that just as the soul is the life of the body so God is the life of a happy soul; when he says that a soul that is not happy is dead, he points to exactly that aspect of the study of man which interests him. In this sense, the distinction between wisdom and science is not to be taken as distinction between two bodies of abstract truths. On the contrary, far from being a distinction between Plato and Aristotle, it is really a distinction between Mary and Martha. To come to this conclusion is to have defined the Augustinian man; it is also to see that at the moment of being very near to Plotinus, St. Augustine is very far from

<sup>207</sup> *De Musica* VI, 12, 36; 13, 37, 40; PL 32, 1183; 1184-1185.

<sup>208</sup> E. Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude de saint*

*Augustin*, p. 134.

<sup>209</sup> *De Trinitate* XIV, 15, 21; PL 42, 1052.

him. For this conclusion is not the discovery of an eternal Plotinian essence, since it is not the discovery of an essence at all. It is an interior search for liberty, and to give true life to the interior man within us is at one and the same time to have found man in his most intimate and ultimate nature and to have given him Christian liberty.

Only such a conclusion permits us to see clearly what it is that enables Augustine to be so perilously open to the influence of Plotinus and still not feel the full pressure of his ideas. The thought of Augustine centers around the ordering and the conduct of life; it is not concerned with essences and ideas in themselves. At the moment of setting out to define man, his secret ambition is to release man from the slavery of his subjection to the body, to reveal him to himself in his ultimate nature, to *reorder* him, or at least to point to the direction of this reorganization of the life of man. The Augustinian concept of man thus turns out to be a living journey in which we are more aware of a desire for beatitude and liberation than of the abstract analysis of the essence of man. Augustine does not change: Rachel is still his love. He still believes that man is where his heart is, and he still believes that man may fill his heart with a treasure of beatitude or with the confusion of misery according as he opens it to God or allows it to be tortured by the passions of the body.<sup>210</sup>

Is this conclusion a definition of man? Surely not. It is a lesson on love; it is a religious psychology of interior purification to which Plotinus contributes many of the signposts but whose motives Augustine found in his own trembling heart: "You have made us for Yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in You".<sup>211</sup> Peace and liberty, order and liberation from the body:—such is the religious motive that urges Augustine when he seeks the inner man. As a journey in spiritual love, this search is entirely free of Plotinus, and in his deepest desires Augustine was always free of Plotinus. If the philosophical doctrines of Plotinus leave the thought of Augustine unguardedly Greek in its intellectual content, it is love which triumphs in Augustine; and his Greek reason, already illumined by wisdom and charity, is the disciple, not the teacher, of the Christian heart of Augustine. Just when the Plotinian man, that divinity from the Platonic heaven, threatens to overpower Augustine, we realize that there never was a conflict at all: Augustine looks at the Plotinian man with the troubled eyes of one who is already in pursuit of Rachel. One can scarcely doubt that to subject the Plotinian meditations to the purpose of furthering the search of the Christian soul is to realize an astonishing paradox: here is Augustine seeking heaven with all the humility of a creature,—and yet so often he speaks the lines of a Plotinian god! This paradox is destined to become also a veritable conflict in the course of history; for the day will come when the Plotinian god will awake and claim all his divine privileges. In Augustine himself, however, the tongue is schooled by the heart, and the heart knows only the hand of the Christian God Who stilled its turmoil and increased its peace.

#### (b) *Liberty*

We arrive again, therefore, at that journey to humility which Augustine has recorded in the *Confessions* and in which he has situated his meeting with the works of Plotinus. It is inevitable that we should return to the *Confessions* at this moment, for we are now almost at the peak of the spiritual crisis which was to stamp the mind and the thought of Augustine forever after. On the eve of reading Plotinus, Augustine needed, not merely enlightenment, but also

<sup>210</sup> *De Musica* VI, 11, 29-30; PL 32, 1179-1180.

<sup>211</sup> *Confessions* I, 1, 1; PL 32, 661.



and even more a lesson in humility. For the point of the meeting with the ideas of Plotinus is not merely that Augustine read into them what was never contained by the *Enneads*. As we have seen, it is true that Augustine really did read almost the whole prologue of St. John's Gospel into the *Enneads*; and this point, no doubt, is sufficient to prove how much a Christian Augustine was in 386. But throughout the intense struggle which was going on in his mind, Augustine was subject to a derangement which became a more pressing burden as soon as he saw the truths which Plotinus taught. From the moment, indeed, that he discovered immutable truth above himself, Augustine solved the problem of physical evil. But he solved this problem only to meet with full force the anguish of the problem of moral evil.

On the problem of physical evil, which had tormented him for so long, Augustine saw at last that evil is a privation of good, for to the extent that things *are*, they are good. In his own words, this is Augustine's new appreciation of mutable and corruptible things:

And I examined the other things below You and I saw that neither were they in an absolute sense, nor were they absolutely nothing. They *are*, since they come from You; they are not, since they are not what You are. That reality truly is which remains unchangeable . . .

And it has become clear to me that the things which are corrupted are good. If they were the highest good, they could not be corrupted, nor yet could they be corrupted unless they were good; for if they were the highest good they would be incorruptible, and if they were not good at all, there would be nothing in them to be corrupted. Wherefore, either corruption does not make a thing worse in any way, and this is impossible, or, and this is most certain, all things that are corrupted are deprived of what is good. If they are corrupted of all good, they will not be at all. For to suppose that they will be and be incapable of being corrupted will mean that they will be more perfect, for they will exist incorruptibly. And what is more monstrous than to say that those things which have been deprived of every good have been made better? Hence, if they are deprived of every good, they will be not at all. Hence, as long as they *are*, they are good.

Wherefore, all things that are, are good; and evil, that besetting thing whose origin I continued to seek, is not a substance, for if it were a substance, it would be something good. For either it would be an incorruptible substance, and such a substance is certainly a great good, or it would be a corruptible substance, which would not be corruptible unless it were good.<sup>212</sup>

Yet this recognition of evil as a privation of good was only a prelude to the moral storm to follow. This storm is the real point of the *Confessions*, for it reveals to Augustine how much he is turned away from God by the deformity of his own sins and how much he needs to be released from this bondage. He is so lost and so helpless in the chains of his own servitude! What other message than this does the eighth book of the *Confessions* contain? Having a will, Augustine has not the power to answer his own impassioned question: "Why, why always tomorrow and tomorrow? How long will I put it off? Why not *now*? Why not put an end to my shamefulness at this very hour?"<sup>213</sup> At this very hour deliverance is at hand. But let us note what the hour is. The hour is not the time to read Plotinus or to seek any intellectual message from him.

<sup>212</sup> *Op. cit.* VII, 12, 18; PL 32, 743.

<sup>213</sup> *Op. cit.* VIII, 12, 28; PL 32, 762.

The hour is the time to put off the servitude of the flesh. And at this hour, having been admonished by that famous and nameless voice of a child from a neighboring house to "take and read, take and read", Augustine opens the Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans and finds there what he is seeking: "Let us walk honestly, as in the day: not in rioting and drunkenness, not in chambering and impurities, not in contention and envy: But put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make not the provision for the flesh in its concupiscences."<sup>214</sup> Augustine breaks off his reading at this point. "Further I did not wish to read, nor was there any need to do so. For just as soon as I finished that sentence, all the shadows of my hesitation fled as though through the infusion of a light of steadfastness into my heart."<sup>215</sup> Freedom, at last! But a freedom that Plotinus did not know and that Pelagius could not assail. For this is freedom through grace.

The significance of this conclusion for Augustine is both deep and decisive. Out of it is born Augustine the liberated Christian man as well as Augustine the great theologian of grace and liberty and the indefatigable opponent of the Manichaeans and the Pelagians. For the two problems of evil and of liberty are problems of *order*, and the problem of order is rooted ultimately in the constitution and nature of created things. When Augustine came to realize, as the *Confessions* has indicated, that all beings are, as beings, good, he began to search in the direction of *disorder* and *derangement* for the answer to the problem of evil. The treatise *On the Nature of the Good* helps us to see this point clearly. For if created beings are by nature good, and if for them to be good is to be *formed, ordered and harmoniously disposed*, a being is more or less a reality according as it shares more or less in these three universal perfections of all things. The more a being shares in these perfections, the more perfect it is; the less it shares, the less perfect it is; and if it does not share at all in *form, order and disposition*, then it has no reality whatever. Now precisely, this means that every nature is, as such, good, and that evil, far from being a reality, is a privation of being; for it is the privation of the very perfections of goodness which make up the nature of a being. And not only is evil a privation, but it also exists in the good as a diminution of its perfection.<sup>216</sup>

This is true of all created beings in general, and of the will of man in particular: an evil will is, as a created nature, good; what is evil in it is the privation of the good which it ought to have, and this privation cannot but reside in the nature of the will, which as a nature is good.<sup>217</sup> But to say that evil is a privation, and to accept therefore the justice of the universal order of God, is to discover with Augustine that the light of day is hateful to our eyes only because our eyes are sick. The justice of God, says Augustine, displeases the wicked. And what is wickedness? "I sought after the nature of wickedness, and I did not find a substance: I found rather the perversity of a will which had been turned away from the highest substance, the God that You are, to lower things, and which had cast out and erupted forth its innermost self."<sup>218</sup>

Remarkable result, for Augustine thus discovers that, after all, it really is God Whom he loves; but he discovers, too, the infirmities within himself produced by a life of subjection to the body. At this moment it is our lot to stand helplessly on the threshold of all those experiences which were to become classic in the future thought of Augustine. Having read Plotinus, he can see the steps of the upward ascent. He sees the presence of immutable truth to

<sup>214</sup> St. Paul, *Rom.* xiii, 13-14.

<sup>215</sup> *Confessions* VIII, 12, 29; PL 32, 762.

<sup>216</sup> *De Natura Boni* III; PL 42, 553.

<sup>217</sup> *De Civitate Dei* XIV, 11; PL 41, 418. On the continuation of universal order and

beauty in spite of physical evil, cf. *op. cit.* XII, 4-5; PL 41, 351-353; *De Natura Boni* VIII; PL 42, 554. Cp. also *Confessions* VII, 13, 19-15, 21; PL 32, 743-744.

<sup>218</sup> *Confessions* VII, 16, 22; PL 32, 744.

his mind by which he judges with immutability concerning mutable things. He sees the journey to himself as a mind, up through the life which the soul expends for sensation in the body, up through reasoning, up until the soul discovers its intelligence and then seeks to discover "by what light it was flooded, since without any hesitation it proclaimed that the immutable is to be preferred to the mutable"; up, seeking to discover whence the soul knew the immutable, "for unless it knew the immutable in some way it would not with certainty prefer it to the mutable"; up until the soul "arrives, with the flashing glance of one trembling look, at that which is".<sup>219</sup> But if Augustine thus rises to the invisible things of God, he quickly falls, defeated by his own infirmities. And here is the sequel: "And I continued to seek a way of acquiring the strength which would enable me to enjoy You, and I did not find it until I embraced the Mediator between God and men, the man Jesus Christ, who is over all things God blessed forever, calling and saying: *I am the way of truth, and life*, and uniting to flesh the food which I was unable to grasp: for the Word became flesh so that Your Wisdom, through Whom You created all things, might suitably give milk to our infancy".<sup>220</sup>

For at length there took place that rain of tears in the garden which did not subside until Augustine read Paul and put on the Lord Jesus Christ. But the moral of this dramatic episode is not the wonder and the awe of Alypius who was present nor the thanks that Monica poured forth to God. The moral is not even that Augustine returned to God. Or rather, the wonder of this return is that it is a gift to Augustine, for "*You turned me to Yourself . . .*"<sup>221</sup>; and the moral of this liberation is inscribed in the Augustinian doctrine of liberty. We are seeing, in fact, in the life of Augustine himself that very fact which dominates the thought of Augustine the theologian of grace against the Pelagians. The lesson of the life of Augustine is his helplessness to do the good he desires; the pretension of Pelagius is that all men can fulfill the commandments of God without grace. As if a simple divine pardon was all that Augustine needed—Augustine who was caught in the helplessness of his own deformity and his own impotence to do the good! That is why it has been said of the conflict with Pelagianism, that "what dominates the whole history of the controversy is that Pelagianism is the radical denial of the personal experience of Augustine, or, if you prefer, that the personal experience of Augustine was, in its essence and even in its most particular details, the very negation of Pelagianism".<sup>222</sup>

To understand this conclusion, we must observe that the problem before Augustine is not whether the will is free, but why a free will is impotent to do the good. The problem is, in reality, the strange nature of man who in order to seek beatitude above himself must be free, but who, being free, can fall—and fail. This problem is, in fact, the one which occupies the center of the stage in the dialogue *On Free Choice*. Knowing that all good things come from God, we are driven to ask how a free will is a good thing. For how can it be, if by freely exercising our wills we sin, and if by sinning we turn away from God?<sup>223</sup> And yet, how could we seek the highest good unless we were free? For we want to enjoy and to possess beatitude, and we want to share in it through powers which are our own. Now we can seek beatitude because we are free; which means also that we can turn away from God. If, therefore, we can accomplish only through freedom what the pursuit of beatitude implies and requires, our possession of freedom is indeed a responsibility, but it is not

<sup>219</sup> *Op. cit.* VII, 17, 23; PL 32, 745.

<sup>220</sup> *Op. cit.* VII, 18, 24; PL 32, 745. For Augustine's earlier Christological errors, cf. *op. cit.* VII, 18, 24-19, 25; PL 32, 745-746.

<sup>221</sup> *Op. cit.* VIII, 12, 30; PL 32, 762.

<sup>222</sup> E. Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin*, p. 200.

<sup>223</sup> *De Libero Arbitrio* II, 18, 47; PL 32, 1266.

an objection. Being mutable creatures, how could we be free without being open to the dangers to which our mutability exposes us?<sup>224</sup>

No, the possession of freedom is much more enduring than such an objection. From a historical point of view, the problem is also more complicated as well as more grave. For the sons of Adam meet the infirmities of their human nature as a consequence of the sin of Adam. Man was so created by God that through supernatural gifts he was free of bodily infirmities and possessed complete spiritual tranquility; he was subject neither to ignorance nor to error: he was perfectly ordered in soul and body, he was immortal, for he was perfectly united to God. However natural ignorance and the conflict of soul and body may be, they were not present in man as God created him; so that these infirmities appear in men as a result of Adam's voluntary transgression.<sup>225</sup> The result is that in the fall of Adam man not only forfeits the supernatural gifts which God had given to him, he also meets the weaknesses to which his nature is naturally subject. For the whole of man was not corrupted with the fall: clearly, as Augustine's discussion of evil as privation has shown, a completely corrupted nature is a contradiction in terms. Hence Augustine says that "no sin is so against nature as to destroy its least vestiges".<sup>226</sup> Far from it, and indeed Augustine has in the *City of God* an exciting chapter in which he proclaims what has fittingly been called "the eulogy of fallen man".<sup>227</sup>

Much, therefore, remains, but much has been lost, and man has a great need of God. We may see how much man needs God by considering what St. Paul says: "For to will is present with me; but to accomplish that which is good I find not. For the good which I will I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do".<sup>228</sup>

We cannot say, observes Augustine, that St. Paul is eliminating free will by those words.<sup>229</sup> Does he not say that *to will is present to him*? The point is rather that to will lies in our power, but to accomplish the good does not; and this is due to original sin. So these words of Paul are the words of a man living under the law, and not as yet under grace. "For he who is not yet under grace does not do the good which he wills; he rather does the evil that he does not will: concupiscence, strengthened not only by the bond of mortality, but also by the weight of habit, has conquered. If, therefore, he does what he does not will, it is not he who acts, but the sin which resides in him".<sup>230</sup> As the *Confessions* abundantly shows, Augustine had only to look in himself to see this reign to sin:—so much, like Paul, did he thirst for the grace which would liberate him.

With this conclusion we have already entered the Augustinian doctrine of grace and liberty. Only, there are two problems here, both celebrated in the history of Christian thought. The first is the mystery of salvation in relation to human liberty. St. Augustine has an important discussion of this question in the first book of the work which he addressed in 397 to Simplicianus, the successor to Ambrose as bishop of Milan.<sup>231</sup> In this mystery let us see here simply how much God does for man. A wheel, says St. Augustine, does not run

<sup>224</sup> *Op. cit.* II, 19, 52-53; PL 32, 1268-1269; *De Civitate Dei* XII, 8; PL 41, 355.

<sup>225</sup> Cf. E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 184 ff; E. Portalié, *art. cit.*, cols. 2392 ff.

<sup>226</sup> *De Civitate Dei* XIX, 12; PL 41, 637 ff.

<sup>227</sup> E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, p. 190, note 2. Cp. *De Civitate Dei* XXII, 24; PL 41, 788-792.

<sup>228</sup> *Rom.* vii, 18-19.

<sup>229</sup> The problem of the liberty of choice did not appear to Augustine as a serious one, and he always treated it indirectly in rela-

tion to the larger theological question of merit. Hence, I am leaving it aside from my discussion. Cf., however, J. Martin, *Saint Augustin*, pp. 174-186.

<sup>230</sup> *De Diversis Quaestionibus ad Simplicianum* I, 1, 11; PL 40, 107.

<sup>231</sup> Cf. the work in note 230. For Augustine's high estimation of this work, cf. *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum* IV, 8; PL 44, 966 (which also quotes *Retractations* II, 1, 1; PL 32, 629).

well in order to become round, *but because it is round*; so, too, man performs good and meritorious works, not in order to receive grace, *but because he has received grace*. We have entered the realm of mystery. Why did men receive grace? Because God elected them. Why did He elect them? Because He had justified them. And what is the cause of their justification? We are deep in mystery. For if "grace is before all merit",<sup>232</sup> how can the foreknowledge of merits be the cause of justification? It is the election of God alone which makes the will of the elect good. But then the question is why "many are called and few are chosen"?<sup>233</sup> The mystery is here. For God could have called all men in such a way that they would not refuse. But He did not call all men in the same way: some are called and chosen, others are called but not chosen. Yes, this is mystery, for who will say, asks Augustine, that God is lacking the power to call even as Esau? And yet; what shall man who is the debtor of God say at this point? For this mystery is rooted in justice. "God does not show mercy to those to whom, through a justice which is most hidden and removed from the eyes of men, He thinks that mercy ought not to be shown".<sup>234</sup> If the mystery of the predestination of the elect is inscrutable, it is yet a luminous mystery; for it is rooted in an infinite justice.

Having defended the complete gratuity of grace in relation to human merit, we must now consider how we must receive from God that very liberty by which we can return to Him. This liberty, as Augustine has already indicated, is concerned with the *use* of the will, not its nature. It is the Pauline problem: *who shall deliver me from the body of this death?* To this question the answer is also that of Paul: the grace of Christ: "It is not the knowledge of the divine law, it is not alone the remission of sins which is that grace which has been given to us by our Lord Jesus Christ; the effect of grace is rather the fulfillment of the law, the liberation of nature, the defeat of sin".<sup>235</sup> What is Augustine seeking? Not simply a free will, for he has this by nature even after the fall; he wants a will liberated by grace to adhere to the good.<sup>236</sup> But because man, who could fall by himself, could not restore himself to the order in which he was created by God, this liberation by grace is not simply a re-creation which only God could effect, it is also a redirection of man towards God by God.<sup>237</sup>

So much does God call us to Himself. For not only does He speak to us by the forms of things; not only does He preside over our minds; not only do we seek Him and Him alone even when we are lost; but, more than this, He precedes all our steps towards Him. And whether at Cassiciacum, at Ostia, or at Hippo, whether as a man, as a mystic or as a theologian, what did Augustine ever seek but to find liberty as the servant of such a God?

## V. THE AUGUSTINIAN HERITAGE

The influence of St. Augustine on European thought has been tremendous. Hence, the problem which we have continually experienced in understanding him will now be projected into the history of European thought. In its simplest form, the question which has dominated our examination of Augustine is this: to what extent and in what way is he the disciple of Plotinus and St. Paul? As we have seen, what St. Augustine takes from Plotinus he uses for purposes that are not strictly philosophical. Does he, for example, consider with Evodius

<sup>232</sup> *De Diversis Quaestionibus ad Simplicianum* I, 2, 7; PL 40, 115.

<sup>233</sup> *Matt.* xx, 16.

<sup>234</sup> *De Diversis Quaestionibus ad Simplicianum* I, 2, 16; PL 40, 121. For this whole paragraph, cf. *op. cit.* I, 2; PL 40, 111-128.

<sup>235</sup> *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* XIV, 27;

PL 44, 897.

<sup>236</sup> Some precisions in the terminology of Augustine will be found in E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 206-207.

<sup>237</sup> *Retractations* I, 9, 6; PL 32, 538; E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, p. 208, note.

the problem of truth? Yet his aim is to *enjoy* truth. Does he consider the question of sensation? Yet his aim is to show man how much he is a *mind* and how much therefore he must be turned toward God rather than towards matter. Does he discuss the nature of man? Yet his aim is not to define an abstract essence, but to organize, order and unify a life. For this reason we may say that all the interests of Augustine that come to him from Plotinus are entirely subordinated to all the desires that come to him from St. Paul. The philosopher is subordinated to the religious thinker.

In this way, the real and important problem in the interpretation of Augustine is to see his greatness as a disciple of Christian wisdom, the exact nature of his borrowing from Platonism, and the entire subordination of these philosophical ideas to the aims of Christian wisdom. Nothing, in this respect, is more representative of the unity of Augustine's thought than the *Confessions*. If there are philosophical ideas in this work, as there are, their purpose is to minister to a devotional effort, and even a mystical one: like Plotinus, Augustine goes from the world to his soul and then to God; but unlike Plotinus, his upward march is a contemplative prayer. To say that the thought of Augustine is thus dominantly contemplative and mystical is not to deny the presence within it of philosophical ideas. It is rather to assert that the purpose for which St. Augustine uses these ideas lies outside the nature of philosophy itself. Hence, in interpreting him, and especially in interpreting his disciples, we must be sure to see not only what sort of ideas interest them but also how they organize and unify these ideas and doctrines.

At the risk of complicating matters, however, we must go further. Of the many debts of Augustine to Platonism, there is one which must be especially noticed. The philosophy of Plotinus is, as it is known, an exciting spiritual experience. Plotinus and his master Plato have raised up for generations of European thinkers an ideal of man and of truth which is no simple concern with mere abstract ideas. For these thinkers growth in knowledge is not a deepening of our understanding of the world of sense. They may begin by speaking of everyday and common things, of the works of cobblers and weavers, but they immediately call you to another world; and they urge you to awake to this other world, as though to think and to live within it as a pure spirit, made to contemplate spiritual realities, was the true life of man. When you apply to Plato or to Plotinus the famous maxim: *Know thyself*, you mean: Know that you are by nature wholly a pure spirit, living by nature in a Platonic intellectual heaven, a heaven which you never leave, even though you may forget it by turning away from it, and even though you may thus, by not knowing your true abode, become a stranger in your own home and to your own self. According to Plotinus, whatever necessity compels you to be joined to a body, your true nature and, indeed, your entire nature as a man, is in your soul. At its worst, the body is a prison in various ways preventing the soul from recognizing its real nature and its proper way of life; at its best, the body is a burden to be borne for the good of the economy of the universe. In any case, the life of sensation in the body should not deceive you. Especially should it not deceive you on the question of knowledge and its object: the true way of knowing is entirely a spiritual voyage. The world of true being, immaterial, stable, universal, is open to the direct gaze of the soul. The soul has only to awake to its true nature as a pure intelligence in order to awake also to its true object of knowledge, pure intelligible being, the famous Platonic world of Forms—a world and a heaven, a home and an *inner* destination.

Such is the Platonic vision. It is characterized by what may be called a *spiritual interiorism*, described by Plato as a sort of reminiscence which is at

once a discovery of the true nature of the soul and of its previous existence, or at least, of *signs* of its previous existence. In its ordinary mythical dress, the Platonic theory of reminiscence involves a previous existence for the soul as well as a recollection of this previous existence. This recollection accounts for the awareness of whatever truths the soul experiences in the present life. When the doctrine of reminiscence loses its mythical colors, it becomes with Plotinus, not a recollection of a past or a *previous* existence (with which presumably we are not now connected), but a recollection of a present life of which we are not now aware because we have turned away from it. The Platonic vision consisted in saying that we were once in heaven, and that somehow we are not there now; the Plotinian vision consists in saying that we are always in heaven, but we are not always aware of it. For both Plato and Plotinus the common problem is to explain that curious *separation* from heaven that we experience in ourselves. Plotinus' contribution to this question (and it is a tremendous one) lies in showing that in an eternal and divine world there is no history and there are no beginnings. Consequently, the Plotinian man exists for all eternity as a divine being. This is to say that for Plotinus, carrying out the principles of Plato, man is a veritable god. And where does a god belong except in heaven? Hence, whatever the famous fall from the Platonic heaven may mean, it cannot mean that man ceases to be a god or to be a natural born citizen of heaven. Such a fall, however, can mean a forgetting of one's true nature, and this forgetting can be also a forgetting of one's true place in reality. *The soul forgets, not a past which has been, but an eternal present that now is and an eternal heaven in which it now is.* For the soul to discover its true nature is for it also to discover that it lives naturally in the bosom of an intelligible heaven.

Such a discovery, as I have said, is a movement and a life which is inaugurated and completed entirely *within* the soul itself. For this reason I have called it a *spiritual interiorism*. If this interiorism is a theory of knowledge, let us observe that it springs from the very divinity and eternity of the soul. All the privileges which the Plotinian soul manifests are born precisely of the enormous secret that it bears within itself: it is a god, and there is a divine world of reality which it is privileged to see. Let us, therefore, call this doctrine also a *spiritual realism*. By discovering itself, the soul discovers also a world of purely intelligible being which is as removed from the world of sense as the soul itself is from the body—indeed, more so. The object of the soul's thinking, when it discovers this intelligible world of being, is not a world of thought and abstractions, but a real and divine world which is discoverable by thought, much as the world of sense is discoverable by sensation. This world of being exists and it is intelligible; and the soul, being an intelligence, sees and understands it. I say this is a *realism*: Plotinus intends that intelligible *being* is given to thought.<sup>228</sup> The fact that intelligible being is given to thought within an order of thought and in the very depths of the soul is an indication, not that the soul is closed within its own abstractions, but that the soul is open to intelligible being in a peculiar way. And precisely, this is the lesson that Plotinus wants to teach: when the soul discovers itself, it discovers a divine intelligence gazing upon divine being. This is, in fact, a *spiritual realism*. But let us note again that as a theory of knowledge it is nothing less than the intellectual biography of an eternal god.

In the history of philosophy, the ideals of Plato and Plotinus have remained permanent possessions. And in particular, what I have called spiritual realism has entered the thought of St. Augustine in a decisive way. It is the significance of this realism which we must not forget if we are to understand the history

<sup>228</sup> Plotinus, *Enneads* VI, 7, 40.



of Augustinianism. We need reminding on this point. It is only because Plato and Plotinus are insufficiently appreciated as philosophers that the problems which they have produced are not seen in all their magnitude. Plato and Plotinus are not fanciful men, though they dream dreams and have visions. They are rigorous intellectualists even at the moment of clothing their thought with an imagery and a colorfulness that are worthy of the great artists that they are. The Platonic ascent to the Good in the *Republic* is prepared and made possible by long studies in arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and dialectic, so that the intellect may be both steeled and purified for its rigorous climb. And the flight of Plotinus to his dear country is no emotional or sentimental journey.<sup>299</sup> Plotinus holds us by his intelligence long after he has captivated us by his exciting and rich vision. At first glance, the Plotinian message captures our minds by the breadth of its horizons, as well as by the exciting vastness and the compelling amplitude of its spiritual avenues, which lead forever upward to the One who is a God and a Father. But within this delight we are captured by a still stronger desire, a desire which is written more deeply into human nature, the desire of God. God-intoxicated Plotinus may be, and long before Spinoza; but it is the intoxication of a reason which finds in its depths an intellectual message and an irresistible intellectual call; it is the intoxication of a reason seeking ecstasy through dialectic, and not, as in the case of the credulous and superstitious Julian, through oriental magic and sun-worship.

That Plotinus gave light to Augustine ought to be abundantly clear. But what ought to be seen with equal clarity is that Plotinus aided Augustine to become, not a philosopher, but a mystic. *For it is in the nature of Platonism that it should be a philosophy of interior vision*, and that the unfolding of intellectual knowledge should be essentially a return to the world of Forms. For this reason, when Christian thinkers have used Platonism as the means of their rational speculations, one of two equally extraordinary results has followed. Either they have used it fundamentally from the standpoint of Christian contemplation, and then Platonism is reduced to the role of a mere instrument; or they have allowed it to open up for them all the intellectual horizons of the Plotinian and Platonic man. Being essentially a way to heaven, and not just an abstract analysis of the nature of the world, Platonism is the natural philosophy of spiritual lovers. It contains ultimately a loving journey of the soul to God. It allows no option on this point, and for this reason the Christian thinker who uses it must be absolutely certain that he is its master. Those whom it leads, it leads only to the heaven of Plotinus. A Christian thinker who is its philosophical disciple cannot be free of the intellectual message of Plotinus, however he may dream of the heaven of St. Paul. If he uses Platonism, he can be free of it only if, *not being a philosopher at all*, he is not at all influenced by the specific aspirations of its intellectual message.

Is such a use of Platonism possible? I submit that it is, and that Augustine is an eminent example of this fact. His use of Platonism is subordinated entirely to his love of Rachel. There is no Ulysses in him, there is only a Jacob. And what does Jacob do but contemplate the world in order to increase his love of God? Have we not seen repeatedly that the search for the contemplation of God continually motivates the thought of Augustine, even as Ostia best symbolizes it? Now such a motivation frees Augustine from Platonism because it reduces what he borrows from Plotinus to the role of a devotional instrument. Such a devotional use of knowledge is the dominant characteristic not only of Augustinian thought but also of early mediaeval thought down to the thirteenth century.

<sup>299</sup> Plotinus, *op. cit.* I, 6, 8.

Because Augustine organizes his life around this ideal of the vision of God, his thought has the economy of love, not of knowledge. He is the disciple of charity, not of Plotinus. He moves with the amplitude and liberty of a soul that is living by supernatural faith and love. He is thus free not only of Plotinus, but also of strictly philosophical interests and intentions. While we must recognize, therefore, how much of Plotinus passed into the thought of Augustine, we must recognize even more how the Greek ideas of Plotinus did not exercise their proper autonomy since they ministered to a will which sought to intensify its union with God. We need not deny that there is a very real sense in which St. Augustine is a Platonist; but we must be sure to add that there is an even more important sense in which, not being a philosopher, he is entirely free of the Platonic errors to which his disciples were destined to expose themselves.

This conclusion marks the beginning of many celebrated difficulties among Augustinians. Because Augustine is eminently the disciple of the supernatural love of God, he can borrow ideas from the *Enneads* of Plotinus without meeting the full consequences of his indebtedness to Plotinus. If, however, it remains true that by not descending to the level of philosophy, St. Augustine was saved from meeting the philosophical consequences of his Platonic attachments, it is also a fact that his disciples, who did descend to the level of philosophy, slowly brought to the surface and to an autonomous philosophical life all those Platonic doctrines which were contained in Augustine himself only in a supra-philosophical way. The Greek world, which had been merely the instrument of his love of God, then became for his disciples an intellectual world within which they installed themselves as philosophers—to their own embarrassment. The result was inevitable. Instead of inaugurating a movement of the soul inflamed by supernatural love and tending towards the vision of God—*this* would have been the interiorism of faith itself—they inaugurated the paradoxical and calamitous effort to discover whether they could think within the perspective of Plotinus, give to the human soul the interioristic intellectual life described in the *Enneads*, and yet direct that soul on its way to the Christian heaven.

Dear and desperate illusion! Plotinus, the author of the *Enneads*, in preaching what I have called a spiritual realism, was ultimately setting forth the interior life of a veritable god, a being who lived in the Platonic heaven and whose very life had the ebb and flow of a divinity rooted eternally in a Platonic world of eternal Forms. What, then, to Plotinus is a soul in this life but a forgetful god, indeed a self-forgetful god? But what place have Greek gods in a Christian heaven, and what place have forgetful gods on the road to a Christian heaven? A forgetful god is surely a strange wayfarer and pilgrim! He has no journey to make, and he has no heaven to win. He does not pray, for how does a god pray? He merely turns within himself and claims, without humility, his natural inheritance.

When the Neoplatonism which was merely a latent instrument in St. Augustine's thought was precipitated out of the order of supernatural wisdom, the Christian and European soul was caught between two heavens and two lives leading to them; and the more the inner exigencies of Neoplatonism made themselves felt among the disciples of Augustine—or should I say the disciples of Plotinus *through* Augustine?—the more Hellenism stood as a philosophical barrier to a Christian heaven and as a philosophical barrier to the integral Christianization of the world. How could it be otherwise? When, with the thirteenth century Christian thinkers learned from Aristotle the meaning of science and demonstration, of a natural and rational wisdom as distinguished from the supernatural wisdom of the Christian Faith, then the

real conflict between Hellenism and Christianity began. The age of the Fathers is then over. The age of supernatural wisdom is succeeded by the age of the scientific theologians and the scientific philosophers who, in addition to being disciples of Christian wisdom, have learned from Aristotle how to develop a *human science*—for even scientific theology, though it be rooted in the light of Faith, is developed as a human science according to rational principles of demonstration.

This is the moment when Augustinianism *as a philosophy*, something unknown to Augustine himself, begins to meet within itself all the dangerous demands of its Neoplatonic inheritance. This is a story, however, which shall be told in its proper place elsewhere. I mention it here to insist on the fact that the history of philosophy from the thirteenth century and after is, in its broad movements, its persistent problems, its doctrinal unities and its fundamental directions, a Greek and Neoplatonic philosophical drama in a Christian world.

Those for whom the history of philosophy begins with a radically fresh start in the seventeenth century—after a mysterious gap of some fifteen hundred years—have scarcely understood or appreciated this fact. Indeed, only the intense interest in mediaeval philosophy which historians have shown in the last half century has made it possible for us to see the central place of Neoplatonism in the history of philosophy. This result has helped enormously not only to clarify the historical significance of mediaeval philosophy, but also to locate the history of modern philosophy. Descartes is not a new man, nor is Cartesianism a new philosophy: Descartes is, rather, far along on the Neoplatonic curve of development that is at the center of European thought.

To put the point otherwise. What the seventeenth century begins with, considered philosophically, remains an unintelligible historical phenomenon unless we look back into history to the moment when the seventeenth century began. That moment is the Neoplatonic crisis produced in the Christian world in the thirteenth century. It is not sufficient to say that that crisis produced the disasters of the fourteenth century. We must add that, for some three centuries after the thirteenth, European thought lived fundamentally on the skepticism, the pietism and the fideism which are the essential marks of Nominalism in philosophy and in theology. When the seventeenth century begins, Nominalism does not cease to exist; it rather looks for a more effective cure than had hitherto been devised. What, indeed, is Descartes but an Ockham seeking salvation in mathematics? And what is Ockham but a Christian thinker with a fear of Platonism which sticks so deep that he cannot rest until he drives every vestige of it from the Christian world? The only trouble was that Ockham bequeathed to Descartes, not a Christianity without Platonism, but a Christianity without metaphysics.

Let us clothe this conclusion in the historical garments which belong to it. Let us say that with Ockham the Greek god of Plotinus, suddenly coming to life within the Augustinian man, closed the door of his mind to all the spiritualistic dreams of Plotinus in order to remain a pilgrim on his way to a *Christian* heaven. If this was a Christian victory, it was also a violent one, and, like all violent victories, it produced, not peace, but the deep seeds of future unrest and conflict. Did a Greek god think to become a Christian so easily by the mere expedient of losing his memory? This is simply one more illusion that men have cherished and that history has shown to be an illusion. No doubt, the old Platonic spiritualism is thus gone and the inner palaces to which Plotinus awoke are forever closed. *And yet, all that the Christian soul has succeeded in doing in thus barring the door to a Platonic heaven within its depths is to close itself within the abstract isolation of its own concepts.*

Here, and only here, does Descartes begin the history of modern philosophy. Platonic interiorism remains, but it is not a *realism* and it is not a *spiritualism*: it has forgotten these dreams and therefore it has become a mind closed within its own spiritual isolation from reality. The history of Cartesianism is the story of the unsuccessful effort of the forgetful god of Neoplatonism to recover his lost divinity. And the effort *was* unsuccessful, for Nominalism had made his forgetfulness an irreparable fact by making him a prisoner of his own exile from a Platonic heaven. With Hume we see the Plotinian man sitting in all his forgetfulness by the waters of history, watching the stream of reality, which is life of his life, pass into oblivion as forgetful of any intelligibility as he is forgetful of his own divinity. And indeed, who but a remembering god can see the intelligible sun of the Platonic heaven? Was not this message the vision of Leibniz? It remained, however, for Kant to begin the real work of restoring the Platonic god to his full state of recollection. If the effort at recollection had failed in the Cartesian tradition, it was ultimately because the human intellect was turned too much and too inquiringly in the direction of matter. As if a Platonic soul ever abstracted any of its ideas from matter! With Hegel and his disciples the divinity of the soul as a natural citizen of a Platonic heaven is again an accomplished fact.

My aim in reaching this conclusion has been merely to indicate in outline form that these historical consequences of Augustine's thought are possible because of his indebtedness to Neoplatonism. But this outline will fail in its aim if it is not seen that the issue which is sketched here is a contemporary issue. In the perspective of history, the philosophy of Bergson is a reassertion, against Cartesian Nominalism, of a purer and more dynamic Platonic spiritualism. Bergson is not only the great modern representative of French spiritualism, he is the great modern Plotinian, the thinker who bears within the spiritual depths of his own soul the divine message of reality itself. He is the messenger of the great Spirit. Perhaps, perhaps he is the great Spirit. And that is why the issue of French spiritualism, as represented eminently by Bergson, is an issue which concentrates within itself, for a Catholic thinker, the fundamental conflict between Hellenism and Christianity.

But let us return to Augustine. In him, Neoplatonism remained 'dominantly submerged in Christian wisdom, and for this reason it was at worst an unsuitable vehicle for Christian ideas. Had St. Augustine met Plotinus on philosophical terms, there might have been another story to tell. As it was, the theologian of grace and liberty, as well as the disciple of mystical wisdom, triumphs in Augustine. This triumph, however, can be maintained only on the condition that the Neoplatonic tendencies in Augustine remain without an autonomous philosophical voice. When, finally, they seize such an autonomy, and when Plotinian spiritualism comes to life in Christian thought as a self-conscious philosophical doctrine and attitude, then the real conflict between Hellenism and Christianity finally begins—a conflict which, as I have already indicated, was delayed for centuries because philosophical ideas lay dormant in the minds of Christian thinkers from St. Augustine to St. Bonaventure.

It is very important for the study of the history of Christian thought to recognize the dominance of supernatural contemplation in St. Augustine, St. Anselm of Canterbury, St. Bernard of Clairvaux, Richard of St. Victor, St. Bonaventure. This is not to say that these men, and others like them, are *only* mystics, as though they are concerned purely and simply with the interior development of the life of mystical contemplation. This is rather to say that they use whatever knowledge and learning they command for purposes of admiration and devotion. They look upon the face of the world in order to justify the ways of God to man, as well as to perfect the divine

image within themselves in order to be united to their God. They live for love, and therefore they can grow only in devotion.

But it is equally important to the history of Christian thought to recognize the interplay of the *two interiorisms* to which Augustinianism invited its adherents:

*There is the explicit interiorism born of Christian wisdom*, based on the primacy and the dynamism of supernatural faith and love. Out of its very nature this interiorism impels the soul towards the vision of God. It is produced in the soul by supernatural faith, it develops through charity and the gifts of the Holy Ghost, and the vision of God can be its only terminus.

*But there is also in Augustinianism the implicit but equally real Plotinian interiorism*, born of a Platonic metaphysics and a Platonic conception of man and intended as a method by means of which the soul may discover progressively its own divinity as well as its divine prerogatives. It is from this second interiorism, *and not from the first*, that Augustinian thought has produced in the course of its history many celebrated and embattled doctrines: the doctrine of spiritual knowledge, the doctrine of sensation as an activity of the soul alone, the Anselmian proof for the existence of God, a proof which moves within the vision of a mysteriously given world of truth which refuses, however, to be a world of being, the Scotistic modification of this proof, the *cogito* of the Cartesian tradition and even the Kantian doctrine of intellectual knowledge.

All this is the history of Plotinian spiritualism. As concerns such Augustinians as St. Anselm or St. Bonaventure who, through ignorance or through preference, did not really descend to the arena of philosophical discussion, it must be said that the supernatural economy of their thought and its completely supernatural movement saved them from the turmoil of the Platonic highway which St. Albert the Great, Meister Eckhart, John Duns Scotus, Nicolas of Cusa, to speak only of mediaeval thinkers, were destined to travel. In including St. Anselm among the *religious* disciples of St. Augustine rather than among his *philosophical* disciples, I imply that the thought of St. Anselm, and this refers particularly to his famous argument for the existence of God, is a religious one. Such is, as I shall try to show, the case in St. Anselm himself: in his hands, faith seeking *understanding* is a supernatural journey to the vision of God, rather than a scientific journey to the vision of the theologian; though it is also true that there is in the Anselmian attitude and in the Anselmian exposition of Augustinian wisdom a latent Plotinian interiorism which has only to become an explicit philosophical method in order to give to the ontological argument all its embarrassing philosophical directions and consequences.

We must, therefore, recognize what is distinctively Platonic in Augustine, but we must also *locate* it properly within his thought. We must see what belongs to the supernatural interiorism of faith and we must distinguish it from that other interiorism that he learned from Plotinus. It is not at all necessary to supernatural interiorism that the soul should seek itself within itself after the manner of Plotinus. This Plotinian manner is the peculiar privilege of a Greek god. But for the soul to live *within* the supernatural economy of Faith and thus to be the throne of the living God dwelling within it,—what has *this* to do with the experiences of a Greek god waking within himself to the realization of his own divinity? Christian interiorism is the interiorism which begins in this life that possession of God, through supernatural faith, which the beatific vision will complete. Plotinian interiorism is nothing less than the return of the soul within itself in order to find its true nature, its true life and its true home,—the nature of a divine intelligence enthroned in a Platonic heaven.

Prayer is the instrument of Christian interiorism; dialectic is the instrument of Plotinian interiorism. As long as Christian wisdom speaks, the Augustinian soul is the obedient disciple of God freely present within it. It holds, with St. Matthew, that one is our master, Christ. But, what will happen to the Christian soul when Plotinianism becomes its voice and that voice utters the words of a Greek god in search of his forgotten divinity?

To understand these two interiorisms and their relations to one another, indeed, their conflicts with one another, is to understand both what is profoundly Christian and what is imperfect in the thought of St. Augustine. Such an understanding will enable us to see the virtualities present in Augustinianism. Those disciples of Augustinianism who retained the ideals of mystical wisdom remained free of Neoplatonism. But then, this is the liberty of those who, with the gentle Francis of Assisi, sought God on top of Mount Alverno. The philosophical question, however, still awaits an answer. For what happened to those who remained in the valley of philosophy? That is a story for the historian of mediaeval and modern thought to tell. Here I have tried to show that a Platonic philosophical interiorism lies at the origins of that story.

# Bonum commune melius est quam bonum unius

Eine Studie ueber den Wertvorrang des Personalen bei  
Thomas von Aquin

I. TH. ESCHMANN O.P.

*The title of this article contains a paradox—a paradox behind which lies a little observed aspect of the precise character of St. Thomas' exposition of the principle of the common good, bonum commune est melius quam bonum unius. For to refer, at one and the same time, to the primacy of the common good and to insist on Personalism,—does not this seem paradoxical? It is the purpose of the present study to inquire into this paradox and to set forth what must be called the personalist conception and use of this principle by St. Thomas Aquinas.*

*There is no complete and systematic treatment by St. Thomas of the doctrine of the common good. What we find instead is a large number of texts in which, on the occasion of dealing with widely different problems, St. Thomas meets the principle of the common good as a dictum authenticum. In this meeting he works out, by the application of recognised rules and techniques governing the use of such dicta, the efficacy and the doctrinal function of the principle as an authority, i.e., a traditional saying whose truth cannot be contested.*

*From this point of view, the problem that concerns us is not what is the Thomistic teaching on the common good, but, rather, what rôle St. Thomas gave to this authenticum in the various philosophical and theological contexts in which it appears. Hence, if his doctrine as a whole is to be characterized as personalist, this characterization must rest on the exegetical results which he achieved on these various occasions. Personalism in St. Thomas is the result of an effort which St. Albert, referring to the technique of dealing with authorities, had called determinate intelligere. It appears as the correct and precise understanding of that very saying which at first glance seems most strongly to resist a personalist view and interpretation.*

*This approach to St. Thomas' doctrine—an approach to the littera in all its concrete conditions—will immediately reveal that the Angelic Doctor did not always assign the same function to the dictum authenticum. For example, whereas, in relation to one and the same problem, it might play a constructive rôle in the Commentary on the Sentences, in the Summa theologiae it is no longer used in such a capacity, but rather appears in the argumenta in contrarium, or is replaced by another principle. The fact of this change is established in the present study by the examination of three different problems, namely (1) the problem of the dispensation from the solemn vow of celibacy; (2) the problem of the organisation of sacramental theology; (3) the problem of religious action or activism. Moreover the attempt is made to fix the date and the determining factors of this change and development.*

*To anyone who studies St. Thomas' treatment of our authenticum the most important aspect of this change is the precise light it throws on the increasing emergence of a definite kind of Personalism, i.e., the Personalism of the holy. The (personal) perfection of the saint is the intrinsic constituent of the common good. The highest in the Thomistic ladder of created goods is, to use St. Thomas' own vigorous terms, the singularis assecutio boni intellectus speculativi, which takes precedence over the communis assecutio boni intellectus practici.*



This Thomistic Personalism grew, not as a doctrinal graft inserted into the old trunk of the principle of the common good, but as its native branch and inner clarification and precision. That the notion of the common good could give growth and development to Personalism is due, in the last analysis, to the analogical nature of the common good. And so, whereas a contemporary Decretist in the *Glossa Ordinaria* felt himself obliged to reverse the relations between the common good and the personal, for the sake of making a place for the latter, St. Thomas discovered, in the analogy of the common good, the "art"—unknown to the Jurists—of uniting without confusing the terms of the dictum authenticum with the personalist idea.

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IM vorigen Band dieses Jahrbuches haben wir eine Sammlung der thomistischen Texte veröffentlicht, die das Axiom vom Vorrang eines Gemeingutes gegenüber dem in dieser Gemeingutsordnung befindlichen Einzelgut enthalten oder betreffen.<sup>1</sup> Diese Texte sollen im folgenden wenigstens zu einem Teil, jedoch, wie wir glauben, dem entscheidenden Teil untersucht werden.

Das erste, was dem aufmerksamen Leser in die Augen fällt, ist die Tatsache, dass Thomas eine Lehre vom Gemeingut und seinen Beziehungen zum Einzelgut nicht geradezu in Angriff genommen und in systematischer Vollständigkeit in einem Zuge entwickelt hat. Es geht bei ihm um etwas grundsätzlich anderes. Es handelt sich für den Aquinaten viel mehr darum, ein durch ehrwürdige Ueberlieferung empfohlenes und geschütztes *dictum authenticum* in seiner Wahrheit zu erkennen und dessen Verwendungsmöglichkeiten in einer Reihe bestimmter Probleme zu prüfen. Wenn ich Dom Odo Lottin O.S.B., den bekannten Scholastikforscher und ausgezeichneten Kenner des hl. Thomas, richtig verstehe, so hat er schon vor Jahren in mehreren seiner Buchbesprechungen auf diese Tatsache hingewiesen und sie in wohl etwas pointierter Formulierung vorgetragen: "Es ist überhaupt eine Frage, ob Thomas sich das Problem der positiven Zuordnung von Gemeingut und Einzelgut gestellt hat."<sup>2</sup> Man kann freilich nicht leugnen, dass im Ergebnis eine solche thomistische Problemstellung und Lehre vorliegt. Denn was immer auch dieser Denker angerührt hat, das hat er in Doktrin verwandelt und hat sich über dessen

<sup>1</sup> Zu den in *Mediaeval Studies* V (1943), 142 ff. angeführten Texten füge man noch die folgenden hinzu:

15a. *De perfectione vitae spiritualis*, cap. 22

(Ed. Mandonnet, p. 250).

18a. *De correctione fraterna* 2 ad 7.

25a. *Summa theol.*, I-II, 83, 1 ad 5.

82a. *In Pol.* 1, 4.

109a. *Summa theol.*, II-II, 99, 1 ad 1. —

In den Texten hat der Druckfehlerteufel leider weit über das aus den Umständen erklärliche Mass hinaus sein Unwesen getrieben. Ein empfindlicher Irrtum ist unterlaufen. Den Text 185 streiche und ersetze man durch die unten in Anm. 108 angeführte Stelle (vgl. auch unten Anm. 106). — In seinem Buch *Individuum und Gemeinschaft bei Th. v. A.* (München, 1933), S. 47 schreibt Edelbert Kurz O. F. M.: Die aristotelische Formulierung des Prinzips bringt der hl. Th. etwa 60 mal wörtlich oder in Anwendung in seinen Werken, in *Summa theol.* 21 mal, in *S. contra gent.* 7 mal, in *Sent.* 19 mal. — Da diese Zählung zuweilen übernommen wird — siehe z.B. R. Linhardt, *Die Sozialprinzipien des hl. Th. v. A.* (Freiburg i. Br., 1932), S. 151; Franz Müller, 'Person and

Society', in *Thomistic Principles in a Catholic School*, ed. Th. Brauer (New York, 1943), S. 250 — so dürfte eine Verbesserung willkommen sein. In den Werken des hl. Thomas findet sich die aristotelische Formulierung, soweit ich sehe, 74 mal; davon stehen 21 Texte im Sentenzenbuch, 12 in der *Summa contra gent.*, 24 in der *Summa theol.* Die gleichbedeutende römische Formulierung zähle ich 29 mal in allen Werken. In dieser Rechnung, bei der die Gesamtzahl 103 herauskommt, sind nur die ausdrücklichen und die als solche klar erkennbaren Zitate berücksichtigt. Das Kriterium bilden die den Vorzug oder Vorrang bezeichnenden Wörter *praefertur*, *magis amatur*, *praeponderat*, *praeeminet*, *melius*, *maius*, *divinius*, *potius* usw. Wollte man die Stellen zählen, an denen sich "das Prinzip in Anwendung findet", z.B. in der teleologischen Formulierung *bonum particulare ordinatur ad commune*, so käme man nicht leicht an ein Ende. Die ungefähre Gesamtzahl 200 wäre eher zu niedrig als zu hoch gegriffen.

<sup>2</sup> *Bulletin de théol. anc. et méd.* II (1934), n. 619; *ibid.* n. 418.

innere Wahrheit oder Unwahrheit bis ins Letzte Rechenschaft gegeben. Es ist aber etwas grundsätzlich anderes, ob ein mittelalterlicher Scholastiker zunächst und geradezu an das sachliche Problem des Inhaltes und der Ausdehnung eines Gemeinguts herantritt, oder ob er zunächst und geradezu etwa über die Weltordnung und die Vorsehung Gottes, über den Platz der Gerechtigkeit im Organismus der Tugenden usw. handelt und dabei einem *authenticum* über das Gemeingut begegnet. Alles, was wir an Lehre über Gemeinschaft und Gemeingut bei Thomas haben, kreist in irgend einem Abstand um dieses *authenticum*. Wenn man nicht dessen formale Bewandtnis als "Autorität", d.h. lehrerzeugendes Prinzip beachtet, und wenn man nicht weiss, dass ein mittelalterlicher Scholastiker gegenüber diesen "authentischen" Sätzen eine bestimmte Haltung einnimmt und ihnen ein durch genaue Regeln festgesetztes Verfahren zumisst,<sup>3</sup> so kann es leicht geschehen, dass einem der eigentliche Sinn seiner Ausführungen entgeht. Statt eines genau umschriebenen und geprägten Gebildes hält man dann leicht einen abstrakten und vagen Gemeinplatz in Händen, aus Anlass dessen man sich in mehr oder weniger zutreffenden, jedenfalls aber unverbindlichen Erörterungen ergeht. Und, wie es in unserm Thema besonders naheliegt, man lässt den mittelalterlichen Schriftsteller nicht seine eigenen Probleme, sondern die anderer und späterer Zeiten lösen. Es dürfte wohl nicht zuviel gesagt sein, wenn man behauptet, dass in der heutigen thomistischen Literatur über soziale Probleme, mehr als in irgend einem andern Zweig des lebenden Thomismus, diese grundfalsche Sicht und die Unmethode, irgendwelche Texte aus irgendwelchem Zusammenhang zu reißen und in buntem Durcheinander in ein vorgefasstes Gedankenschema einzusetzen, ein arger Missstand ist, ein methodischer Fehler, der, nebenbei gesagt, auch die schlechte Unendlichkeit unnützer Diskussionen im Gefolge hat. Es gibt eine Kunst, den hl. Thomas zu lesen und zu verwerten. Wir leugnen nicht, dass beim Aquinaten auch die Wasser zu finden sind, die manche unserer heutigen Mühlen zu treiben vermöchten. Man sehe sich aber zunächst einmal genau das Wasser und die Mühlen in den thomistischen Schriften an: das Erste ist eine methodisch saubere und gesicherte Erkenntnis und Exegese der *littera*. Erst dann kann von Interpretation, von Ausdehnung und Verlängerung der exegetischen Ergebnisse im sogenannten "grösseren Thomismus"<sup>4</sup> die Rede sein.

Nicht—wenigstens nicht in erster Linie—nach einer Lehre über das Gemeingut, sondern nach der Behandlung des *authenticum* bei Thomas von Aquin zu fragen, ist das hauptsächliche methodische Prinzip der nachfolgenden Untersuchungen.

Hans Meyer behauptet in seinem Buch *Thomas von Aquin*,<sup>5</sup> es habe keinen Sinn, die Regeln der historischen oder perspektivischen Forschungsmethode auf die Gemeingutslehre des Aquinaten anzuwenden. Die Mahnung, die chronologische Reihenfolge der Texte, deren Sonderzweck und Zusammenhang zu beachten, sei zwar an sich wertvoll, führe aber in diesem Fall zu keinem Resultat. "Thomas behandelt die Frage (des Gemeinguts) aus prinzipieller Einstellung heraus und im wesentlichen stets mit demselben Ergebnis." Was diese "Behandlung aus prinzipieller Einstellung heraus" hier bedeuten soll, kann ich mir nicht reimen. Es ist aber nach einem genauen Blick auf die Gesamtheit der Texte sofort klar, dass Thomas durchaus nicht immer zu "demselben Ergebnis" gekommen ist. Die thomistische Behandlung und Verwendung des

<sup>3</sup> Siehe darüber M. D. Chenü O. P. "Authentica" et "Magistralia". Deux lieux théologiques aux XII-XIII siècles, *Divus Thomas Placent.* XXVIII (1925), 257-285, eine grundlegende Arbeit, von der Etienne Gilson mit Recht gesagt hat, dass ihre Ergebnisse einen ganzen Wagen neuerer scholastischer Litera-

tur aufwiegen, *Revue d'histoire franciscaine* III (1926), 128.

<sup>4</sup> *Thomisme agrandi*; Ausdruck und Begriff bei M. M. Gorce, *L'essor de la pensée au moyen-âge* (Paris, 1933), S. 338.

<sup>5</sup> Bonn, 1938, S. 498, Anm. 1.

*authenticum*, vom Sentenzenkommentar an bis hinauf zu den Werken der letzten Jahre, ist nicht eine einförmige Wiederholung, sondern ein lebendiges Ganzes, in dem es webt und wächst, in dem dieses abgestossen, jenes ergänzt, dieses herabgestimmt, jenes betont wird, kurz, es ist ein Lehrgebilde, das eine fortschreitende Entwicklung und Klärung von höchster Bedeutsamkeit darstellt.

Diese Entwicklung im einzelnen durch möglichst genaue Textanalyse aufzuzeigen, ist der Inhalt der drei ersten Abschnitte der folgenden Studie.

Es handelt sich um diese drei Probleme der thomistischen Theologie, an denen der behauptete Fortschritt klar in Erscheinung tritt: *erstens* das Problem des päpstlichen Dispensrechtes in Sachen des feierlichen Zölibatsgelübdes; *zweitens* das Problem der Organisation der Sakramentstheologie, innerlich verwandt mit dem Problem der Organisation des praktischen Wissens; *drittens* das Problem des theologischen Wertes von katholischer Aktion und Nächstenliebe gegenüber dem Wert von Kontemplation und Gottesliebe, ein Problem, das während der sogenannten geraldinischen Kontroverse den hl. Thomas besonders stark beschäftigt hat.

Bei der Erörterung dieser Fragenkomplexe und in der unterschiedlichen Verwendung, die das *authenticum* darin erfährt, zeigt sich bei Thomas eine deutliche Wende zu einer personalen Interpretation des Gemeingutssatzes und einer schärferen Erkenntnis des Wertprimates des Personalen. Der ethische und soziale "Personalismus" des Aquinaten ist, wie Etienne Gilson richtig gesehen hat,<sup>6</sup> ein in gewisser Weise versteckter und für unsere modernen Augen nicht ohne weiteres erkennbarer Grundzug der thomistischen Sozialtheorie. Er steckt in der Tat hinter den obengenannten und ähnlichen Problemen und kann aus ihnen, wenn nicht ausschliesslich, so doch am leichtesten und sichersten hervorgeholt und in seiner spezifischen Eigenart erkannt werden.

In den Abschnitten IV und V werden wir auf der Grundlage des Voraufgehenden den thomistischen Begriff des Personalen und die Theorie der christlichen Gesellschaft, in der das Personale an der Spitze und in der Mitte steht, untersuchen.

## I. DAS "AUTHENTICUM" UND DAS PROBLEM DES DISPENSRECHTES IN SACHEN DES FEIERLICHEN ZOELIBATSGELUEBDES

Hat der Papst das Recht, von der "feierlichen" Verpflichtung zum Zölibat, wie sie jemand durch den Empfang der (höheren) Weihen und durch die Ordensprofess auf sich nimmt, zu entbinden? Auf diese von Kanonisten und Theologen viel erörterte Frage antwortet die Summa (II-II,<sup>8</sup> 88, 11) in einem

<sup>6</sup> *L'esprit de la philosophie médiévale*, I (Paris, 1932), p. 212; Engl. tr. (New York, 1936), p. 205.

<sup>7</sup> Ueber die Geschichte des Problems, besonders bei den Dekretisten und Dekretalisten siehe die ausgezeichnete Arbeit von J. Brys *De dispensatione in iure canonico*, Univers. cath. lovaniensis II, 14, (Brügge 1925). — Das Problem des Dispensrechtes in Sachen des Zölibates bei Thomas von Aquin wird zuweilen als ein "obskures Lehrstück" bezeichnet (*Revue thomiste* 1922, p. 404), was keineswegs der Wahrheit entspricht. Die Lehre ist vielmehr klar wie Sonnenlicht, einfach konstruiert, hinreichend begründet, und hat mannigfache Beziehungen und tiefe Wurzeln in der thomistischen Gesamtsynthese. Sie ist nur von gewissen Kommentatoren seit langem systematisch verdunkelt und vermantscht worden. Sie hat gewisse

äussere Ähnlichkeiten mit dem Problem der Unbefleckten Empfängnis. Wir müssen hier von vornherein darauf aufmerksam machen, dass uns nur die *littera s. Thomae* interessiert, nicht aber, wie sich diese *littera* mit irgendeiner späteren Theorie oder Praxis reimt. Wie Thomas seine Lehre später, etwa im 16. Jahrhundert, formuliert haben würde, hätte er die so oft angerufenen "neuen Dokumente" gekannt und genau so interpretiert, wie es damals und heute üblich ist, das ist für uns hier eine müssige Frage. Und wir weigern uns entschieden, diesen Gesichtspunkt in der Exegese der *littera* spielen zu lassen. Siehe unten Anm. 44.

<sup>8</sup> Die *Summa theologiae* wird hier und im folgenden einfach durch die kursiv gedruckten römischen Ziffern I, I-II, II-II, III bezeichnet.

sehr sorgfältig durchgearbeiteten Artikel für den Fall des Zölibatsgelübdes in der Ordensproffess mit einem runden, kategorischen Nein, für das mit der Weihe verknüpfte Gelübde mit Ja. Der Sentenzenkommentar (4 S<sup>o</sup> 38, I, 4, sol. 1 ad 3) dagegen, der die Sache nur in einer *Responsio*, d.i. einem Korollar zu der Lehre des Artikelkörpers behandelt, bleibt, ohne zwischen den beiden Gelübden der Weihe und Profess einen Unterschied zu machen, bei einem verklausulierten Ja stehen. Die Ansicht, so heisst es hier, die ein solches Dispensrecht bestreitet—Albert<sup>9</sup> und Bonaventura<sup>11</sup> sind wohl im besondern gemeint—sei nicht genügend begründet worden. Die entgegenstehende Theorie habe die grössere Wahrscheinlichkeit für sich. Für sie lasse sich ein Grund geltend machen, der wenn auch nicht eine definitive, so doch eine vorläufige Zustimmung ermögliche. Die Ausführungen des Sentenzenkommentars haben nicht die direkte Absicht, das Problem zu lösen, sondern mehr, eine Kritik der im Umlauf befindlichen Theorien zu bieten, deren einer der Verfasser dann jene halbe Zustimmung geben zu können glaubt, die er als *opinio* charakterisiert hat.<sup>12</sup>

Mit dieser Eigenart der *Responsio* des Sentenzenbuches hängt es wohl auch zusammen, dass das Argument, das die These stützen soll, nur flüchtig und in Andeutungen skizziert ist und zur Gänze nur aus dem Zusammenhang, vor allem dem *corpus articuli* und der *resp. ad 4*, erkannt werden kann.

Versuchen wir, dieses Argument zu analysieren. Es schreitet in drei Schritten voran:

(a) Es widerstreitet dem Wesen des Gelübdes, mag dies nun ein einfaches oder ein feierliches sein,<sup>13</sup> dass der Gelobende dadurch sich der Gemeinschaft und den Pflichten gegen sie entzieht und ein Präjudiz schafft gegen die Gemeinschaftsordnung, für die der Leiter (*praelatus*) verantwortlich ist. Kein Gelübde darf etwas Unerlaubtes zum Gegenstand haben. Es ist aber unerlaubt, dem Obern den Gehorsam zu entziehen, der ihm von Rechts wegen gebührt. Der Gelobende kann darum in keiner Weise sich von der Pflicht entbinden, die ihm als Glied des Gemeinwesens und mit Rücksicht auf das Gemeingut obliegt.<sup>14</sup> Allerdings darf man jener Theorie nicht Recht geben, die schon um die Jahrhundertwende bei einzelnen Kanonisten mit absolutistischen Tendenzen sich hervorwagt, z.B. bei dem englischen Dekretalisten Alanus.<sup>15</sup> Nach ihm soll jedes Gelübde von vornherein nur bedingungsweise zustande kommen: "wofern es dem Herrn Papst gefällt". Thomas findet scharfe Worte gegen diese Ansicht, die das Gelübde mit der Abhängigkeit von der oberherrlichen Gewalt des Papstes (*potestas dominativa*) belastet. Das Kind, die Gattin, der Sklave, der Mönch können zwar kein Gelübde ohne Erlaubnis des Vaters, des Gatten, des Herrn, des Abtes tun.<sup>16</sup> Was aber den Menschen als solchen angeht, so gibt es "Dinge, wie die Ehelosigkeit oder die Befolgung der andern evangelischen Räte, in denen jeder so frei ist, dass er sie auch gegen das Gebot des Papstes tun kann; er kann alles dies darum in absoluter Weise, ohne auf den Willen irgend eines Obern Rücksicht zu nehmen, zum Gegenstand eines Gelübdes

<sup>9</sup> Das Siglum für die Sentenzenkommentare Alberts, Bonaventuras und Thomas' ist hier und im folgenden ein kursiv gedrucktes S. Für Buch I-III des thomistischen Kommentars wurde die Ausgabe Paris, 1929-1933, für das IV Buch die Vivès-Ausgabe *Opera omnia*, vol. X und XI, (Paris, 1873/4), benutzt.

<sup>10</sup> 4 S 38, 16; Opp. Ed. Borgnet, vol. 30, (Paris, 1894), pp. 416-418.

<sup>11</sup> 4 S 38, 2, 3; Opp. Ed. Quaracchi, vol. 4, 1889, pp. 822-824.

<sup>12</sup> 3 S 23, II, 2, sol. 1.

<sup>13</sup> a.a.O....quantumcumque esset solemniza-

tum.

<sup>14</sup> a.a.O. Non enim per votum potest se homo deobligare ab eo, in quo tenetur alteri, ut dictum est. — Dies bezieht sich auf die folgende Stelle im *corp. art.* Quia enim votum de illicito esse non potest, non autem licet subtrahere alicui quod ei debetur, ideo per votum alicuius non potest fieri praeiudicium suo praelato, quin debeat eius mandatis parere, cum fuerit opportunum.

<sup>15</sup> Text aus der *Summa Raymundi* bei Brys a.a.O. S. 216, n. 5.

<sup>16</sup> 4 S 38, I, 1, q. 3.

machen".<sup>17</sup> Der *dominus canonum* des Gratian, ein Nachfolger des römischen *princeps legibus solutus*,<sup>18</sup> findet bei Thomas keine Gnade. Wer sich nicht in einem unfreien Stand befindet, dessen Tun oder Lassen ist an keine *potestas dominativa* gebunden. Wohl aber untersteht er der legitimen *potestas iurisdictionis* (wie man sie später nannte). Dem Leiter des Gemeinwesens kommt das Recht zu, sowohl über den Akt des Gelobens wie auch die Fortdauer seiner Wirkungen so zu verfügen, wie er in begründetem Urteil zum Nutzen seiner Untergebenen, der Einzelnen ebenso wie der Gesamtheit, für richtig hält. Liegt eine begründete Notwendigkeit vor, so kann er sowohl die Ablegung eines Zölibatsgelübdes von vornherein verbieten, wie auch von der eingegangenen Verpflichtung entbinden. In letzterem besteht die Dispens.<sup>19</sup>

(b) Welches ist nun eine solche begründete Notwendigkeit? Wie schon von alterher die Theorie und Praxis mehr oder minder klar betont hat,<sup>20</sup> kann eine private Dringlichkeit, ein *bonum privatum*, die obrigkeitliche Verfügung über den Zölibat nicht rechtfertigen. Die mittelalterliche Gelübdetheorie trägt das Gepräge feudaler Anschauungen. Das Gelübde verpflichtet zum Dienst, zur Gefolgschaft und Treue gegen den obersten Herrn der Welt.<sup>21</sup> Ein solches Verhältnis kann nicht einfach gekündigt werden. Wenn das schon geschieht, so muss eine Vergeltung (*recompensatio*) stattfinden.<sup>22</sup> Um die Möglichkeit und die Regeln dieser Rekompensation dreht sich ein grosser Teil der mittelalterlichen Kontroverse.<sup>23</sup> Heben wir hier nur die eine, für uns wichtige Regel hervor: nur ein besseres Gut (*bonum melius*) kann hier den Schaden ersetzen und den von der Gerechtigkeit geforderten Ausgleich schaffen. In dem *Respondeo ad 4* sagt Thomas, dass und warum im Verhältnis zum Zölibat das

<sup>17</sup> 4 S 38, I, 4: Quidam...dicunt, quod quolibet votum potest per praelatos Ecclesiae dispensationem habere pro libito praelati, quia, ut dicunt, in quolibet voto intelligitur conditionaliter voluntas praelati superioris, scilicet Papae, ad cuius dispensationem pertinent actus subditorum omnium. Et ideo, cum voluerit, ille summus praelatus poterit relaxare obligationem voti, ut non teneatur votum implere, quia conditio non extat. Sed hoc non videtur bene dictum, quia quaedam sunt, in quibus est homo ita liber sui, quod etiam contra praeceptum Papae potest illa facere, sicut continere et alia consilia divina. Unde absolute et sine conditione voluntatis alicuius praelati potest talia vovere.

<sup>18</sup> Brys a.a.O. S. 77.— Vgl. auch 4 S 25, III, 3 ad 2: Quamvis res Ecclesiae sint aliquo modo Papae, non sunt tamen eius omnibus modis habendi (Arist. *Categ.* 15; 15b 17), sicut illud quod ad manum habet.

<sup>19</sup> Quilibet praelatus ad hoc constituitur, quod utilitati subditorum provideat; *quaest. iunc.* 2, in 1. — Unde si praelatus videat expedire aliqua rationabili causa, vel propter ipsum qui vovit vel propter alios, quod votum non servet, potest eum ab observatione voti deobligare, qui alias de iure obligatus esset: *sol. 1, corp.* — Unde talis posset imminere necessitas, quod posset alicui iuste prohiberi ne continentiam aut religionem voveret. Et eadem necessitate manente potest etiam in voto dispensari iam facto: *ibid. ad 3.*

<sup>20</sup> In der allgemeinen Dispensentheorie hat man lange geschwankt, ob die *utilitas communis* das allein rechtfertigende Dispensmotiv sei; vgl. Brys a.a.O. 29, 49, 53, 83 ff. u. ö. Sobald aber seit dem Ende des XII Jahrh. das Problem des Dispensrechtes in Sachen des Zölibats klarer gestellt ist, wurde sehr

allgemein, soweit ein Dispensrecht überhaupt anerkannt ward, die *utilitas communis* als Grund verlangt und die blossen *utilitas privata* abgelehnt; Brys 88 ff., 116 ff., 187 ff.

<sup>21</sup> 4 S 38, I, 3 *sol. 1*: Votum est quidam promissionis contractus inter Deum et hominem. — Das Gelübde ist wie ein *homagium* gegen Gott, eine Verpflichtung auf den Dienst (*servitius*) für Ihn...qui omnia fecit et summum in omnibus obinet principatum; II-II, 81, 1 ad 3 — Wort und Begriff der *fidelitas* sind ebenfalls geläufig; *ibid.* 88, 3; 88, 10 in 3 u.ö. — Siehe unten Anm. 46.

<sup>22</sup> Der Gedanke ist am schönsten ausgedrückt durch Wilhelm von Auxerre: *Dispensatio est... quasi diversorum pensatio; pensantur enim diversa, ut sciatur quid quo utilius aut melius*; Text bei Brys a.a.O. S. 258.

<sup>23</sup> Vgl. Albert, a.a.O. S. 417b: Reddere salvatur in aequivalenti simpliciter vel secundum tempus. Dico autem aequivalentes dupliciter: scilicet in genere boni, vel in recompensatione. Aequivalens, in genere boni, voto: quando mutatur in aliud bonum aequale bonum, sicut si ieiunium mutetur in eleemosynam. Aequivalens autem, in recompensatione, voto: sicut personale maius bonum mutatur in commune minus, quod sua communitate recompensat personale bonum, sicut contemplatio unius mutatur in actionem communitatis servantem, cum tamen status contemplationis melior sit quam status actionis (Albert hat hier in bemerkenswert subtiler und genauer Form das Problem gestellt, um das es in der ganzen mittelalterlichen Kontroverse geht). Aequivalens autem secundum tempus: sicut quando votum maius in genere mutatur in id quod utilius est secundum illud tempus Ecclesiae, licet in se sit minus, sicut votum terrae sanctae mutatur in votum alterius crucis.

private Wohl des Gelobenden nie solch ein besseres Gut sein kann. Wer etwa durch die Ehelosigkeit sich körperlichem Ruin und gar Tod aussetzte—das extreme Beispiel ist in der mittelalterlichen Literatur wohlbekannt—der müsste diese Folgen heroisch tragen. Denn das Gut der Enthaltsamkeit ist wertvoller als das körperliche Wohlergehen; es ist doch sogar wertvoller als die Ehe selbst.<sup>24</sup>

(c) Wo also dieses bessere Gut suchen? Mit dieser Frage kommen wir an den Kern der Argumentation heran, an die Stelle, wo es sich zeigt, wie tief der junge Thomas durch das römisch-aristotelische *authenticum* beeindruckt worden ist. Nachdem einmal Albert der Grosse gegenüber der römischen Formel (*bonum commune est praeferendum*) die aristotelische Fassung, die auf das *bonum melius* den Nachdruck legt, ans Licht gebracht hatte,<sup>25</sup> musste sich schon aufgrund der blossen Wortassoziation die Verbindung herstellen mit dem in der mittelalterlichen Literatur so häufig gebrauchten *bonum melius*. Es ist dabei auch zu beachten, dass sowohl Albert wie Thomas hier die noch stärkere Fassung: *bonum commune est multo melius*, die auf Eustratios zurückgeht, gebrauchen.<sup>26</sup> Während aber Albert, der ja das Dispensrecht leugnet, die Autorität des Aristoteles-Eustratios sehr charakteristischer Weise glaubt mit der Erzählung apokrypher Matthäusakte schlagen zu können,<sup>27</sup> gibt sich Thomas vorbehaltlos dem Gewicht des aristotelischen Wortes hin. Ein Gemeingut ist "viel" besser—das *multo* hat hier einen exakten und prägnanten Sinn—als jedes und jegliches Privatgut. Erinnern wir hier auch an die kanonistische Terminologie, das mönchische Leben eine Privatsache zu nennen. *Monachus in clauetro ordinem suum servans privato bono (insistit), scilicet tantum suae salutis*, heisst es in dem ungefähr gleichzeitigen *Opusculum Contra impugnantes Dei cultum*,<sup>28</sup> in Gleichförmigkeit mit dem Sprachgebrauch im Kanon Urbans II, von dem später (Abschnitt IV) die Rede sein wird.—So ist es denn klar, dass das Gemeingut das gesuchte *bonum melius* ist, das die Dispens auch von dem Keuschheitsgelübde rechtfertigt. Hat nicht das Gemeingut sogar auch das Uebergewicht über die heilige Kontemplation? Der "Garten der Kontemplation" ist durch das Wort des Herrn geschützt, dass darin der *bessere Teil* gepflegt wird (Lk. 10, 42). Dennoch sind zuweilen die Umstände so beschaffen und

<sup>24</sup> *Bonum continentiae est multo dignius quam salus corporalis. Et ideo periculum corporalis mortis non est sufficiens ratio, ut in voto continentiae dispensetur. Unde etiam non peccat in tali casu existens, quod continentia videretur vergere in periculum personae, si continentiam voveat; praecipue cum talis possit illi periculo per alia remedia obviari: sicut non peccat, qui propter aliquod opus virtutis se mortis periculo exponit. — Die scholastische und übrigen gesamtkirchliche Lehre über das Wertverhältnis von Jungfräulichkeit und Ehestand ist bekannt. Albert wagt sogar die pointierte Behauptung: potius ordinatur matrimonium ad continentiam quam ad concubitum (4 S 28, 6; Ed. Borgnet 30, 195) — eine Behauptung, der Thomas die Spitze abbricht, ohne die grundsätzliche Anschauung zu verleugnen: melius est etiam coniugibus continere quam matrimonio uti (4 S 32, I, 2 in 2). Interessant ist in diesem Zusammenhang auch die folgende Bemerkung des hl. Thomas: Servire (im strikten, antiken Sinn) non est aliquid incompetens christianae religionis perfectioni, quae maxime humilitatem profitetur. Sed obligatio matrimonii aliquid derogat perfectioni vitae christianae, cuius summum statum continentes possident; 4 S 39, I, 4 ad 1. — Zu dem oben erwähnten Begriff des*

*periculum personae* ist es vielleicht heute nicht unangebracht zu bemerken, dass in der mittelalterlichen Sprache das Wort "Person" meistens nicht in dem heute üblichen qualifizierten Sinn gebraucht wird. Person bedeutet den einzelnen Menschen im Gegensatz zur menschlichen Natur oder Spezies. Siehe unter vielen andern Texten *De malo* 4, 6 ad 20: comedere significat actum personalem; II-II, 88, 11 ad 3: cibus directe ordinatur ad conservationem personae..., sed coitus... ad conservationem speciei. — I-II, 87, 8: actus peccati aliquid personale est. — Vgl. dagegen *Contra gent.* 3, 113.

<sup>25</sup> *Mediaeval Studies* V (1943), 139.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.* p. 147, n. 17. — Albert a.a.O. 416b: *Bonum commune Ecclesiae multo melius (est) quam personale.*

<sup>27</sup> a.a.O. 418a: Ad aliud (d.i. die Autorität des Aristoteles-Eustratios) dicendum quod hoc nihil esset (? est), quia non sunt facienda mala, ut eveniant bona. Unde temporibus beati Matthaei noluit Iphigenia virgo nubere regi, cui (? qui ei) se christianum cum omni populo fore promisit, ita quod etiam potius mortem sustinuit. — *Acta Sanctorum* VI, (Paris, 1887), p. 196a. Thomas gedenkt dieser Erzählung mit keinem Wort.

<sup>28</sup> Cap. 2; Ed. Mandonnet IV. 12. Vgl. damit den unten Anm. 142 zitierten Text.

dringend, dass man ihn gegen die staubige Strasse des Lebens eintauschen muss, einem "bessern Gut", d. i. dem Heil der Seelen zuliebe. Es haben also die Theologen, wie Albert und Bonaventura, Unrecht, wenn sie Argumente häufen, um zu zeigen, dass nichts den Wert des Zölibats aufwiegen könne. Das *authenticum* zeigt ein um vieles hervorragendes Gut, dem unter Umständen auch solche Opfer gebracht werden dürfen, wie der Standeszölibat, eine unter normalen Bedingungen gewiss unantastbare Institution.<sup>29</sup> Das Ermessen darüber liegt bei der obrigkeitlichen Autorität des Papstes. Thomas beschreibt den Fall, in dem die Dispens stattfinden kann, durch die Worte: *communis utilitas Ecclesiae aut unius regni vel provinciae*. Innozenz IV hat in seiner *Lectura* zum Dekretale Gregors IX den kuriosen Fall fingiert, dass das Heil der ganzen Christenheit oder auch eines Teiles ihrer davon abhängt, dass ein Mönch König werde und Weib und Eigentum besitze. Wer wird dann, so ruft der Papst nicht ohne Pathos aus, auf dem Höherwert der Kontemplation dieses Mönches, dieses einen Mannes, herumreiten? Wer wird behaupten, es könne nicht Gottes Wille sein, dass der Papst, Gottes Stellvertreter, diesem Notstand der gesamten Christenheit kräftig abhelfe? Wer wird Gott für so grausam halten?<sup>30</sup> Auch der junge Thomas würde von solcher Rhetorik nicht überzeugt worden sein. Die doktrinäre Position des zeitgenössischen Papstes, dessen Andenken zur Zeit der Niederschrift des Sentenzenkommentars noch frisch war, unterstützt er jedoch durch das aristotelische *authenticum*: *bonum commune est multo melius quam bonum privatum*.

Wer die Lehre des Sentenzenbuches kennt, dem bereitet es einen hohen Reiz, zu sehen, wie derselbe hl. Thomas etwas mehr als fünfzehn Jahre später, ohne übrigens das frühere Werk auch nur mit einem Wort zu erwähnen, die früheren Aufstellungen eine um die andere niederlegt, oder sagen wir besser: die frühere Wahrscheinlichkeit des Ja in die nunmehrige Gewissheit des Nein umwandelt.<sup>31</sup>

Als konstruktives Prinzip—um mit diesem wichtigsten Punkt zu beginnen—wird das *authenticum* aus der Erörterung ausgestossen. Alles hängt hier an einer neuen und vollständigeren Begriffsbestimmung des feierlichen Gelübdes. Worin liegt das Wesen der Feierlichkeit? In engem Anschluss an Albert und Bonaventura hat der junge Thomas<sup>32</sup> diesen Begriff in Analogie mit der

<sup>29</sup> Alii (dicunt) quod . . . votum continentiae non recipit recompensationem eo quod non est digna ponderatio animae continentis (Eccli. 26, 20). Vel ideo, quia per continentiam homo de domestico inimico (Mt. 10, 36) triumphum capit, ut quidam dicunt. Vel ideo, quia per religionem homo perfecte conformatur Christo. Unde in voto continentiae, quod in voto religionis includitur, et in aliis votis essentialibus religioni non potest dispensari, ut quidam dicunt. Sed hoc . . . non videtur sufficienter dictum, quia *bonum commune est multo melius quam bonum privatum*. Propter quod etiam homo interdum ab horto sanctae contemplationis removetur (patristische und kanonistische Texte *Mediaeval Studies* V (1943), 137 ff.), quae optima pars est iudicio Domini Lc. 10, ut communi utilitati proximorum vacet. — Zu diesen Gedanken über die katholische Aktion siehe unten Abschnitt III. — Die Identifizierung der Anonymi im obigen Text in *S. theol.* ed. Ottawa, p. 1886b.

<sup>30</sup> Text bei Brys a.a.O. 219.

<sup>31</sup> Schon im Opusc. *De perfectione vitae spiritualis* (1269/70) scheint Thomas den späteren Standpunkt der *S. theol.* thetisch erreicht zu haben; vgl. cap. 25 § *Quod vero*

*tertio*; ed. Mandonnet IV, 260; ebenso die Texte unten Anm. 32. Jedoch fehlt dort noch die nähere Begründung.

<sup>32</sup> 4S38, I, 2, sol. 3: *Votum . . . dicitur solemne ex hoc quod habet completam vim obligandi*. Ea enim ad solemnitatem rei pertinere dicuntur, quae ei completum esse tribuunt. *Votum autem, cum essentialiter sit promissio, complementum suae virtutis accipit sicut et promissio. Cuius quidem obligatio tunc completur, quando aliquis hoc quod promittit in praesenti dat, quodam modo ponens eum, cui fit promissio, in corporali possessione alicuius rei, unde habere possit quod promittit: sicut si aliquis fructus agri promitteret et, promittendo, agrum daret; et similiter si servitium aliquod promitteret et se servum daret. Et ideo tunc votum solemnizari dicitur, quando aliquis praesentialiter se dat Deo, divinis se servitiis mancipando. Quod quidem fit per ordinis sacri susceptionem et per professionem certae regulae debito modo factae (? factam), scilicet in manum eius qui debet recipere, et aliis circumstantiis servatis, quae secundum iura determinantur. Alias non esset votum solemne, quantumcumque quis profiteretur, quia ex tali professione non fieret sub potestate eorum, qui religioni*



römischen Rechtsform der *mancipatio*<sup>33</sup> konstruiert. Im alten römischen Recht lag das Wesen dieses Rechtsaktes darin, dass eine Eigentumsübertragung durch Geben und Nehmen des Körpers der Sache betätigt wurde. Der Geber und Nehmer waren zugegen, und der Nehmer ergriff die Sache mit seiner Hand. Dies musste in Gegenwart von fünf Zeugen geschehen, und der Nehmer hatte mit einem Erz- oder Geldstück an die Wage zu schlagen, die der *libripens* hielt. Es ist nun charakteristisch, dass der jüngere Thomas, gleichwie seine Gewährsmänner, nur auf den Akt des Gebens sieht, d.h. auf vollkommene, unbedingte Eigentumsübertragung, die sich in der *mancipatio* im Gegensatz zu dem *ususfructus* vollzieht. Wird daher dieser Begriff in der Gelübdetheorie verwendet, so ergibt sich, dass das feierliche Gelübde oder gar die Feierlichkeit des Gelübes in der Totalität der Verpflichtung liegt, durch die sich ein Mensch an Gott bindet. Einfaches und feierliches Gelübde unterscheiden sich wie *ususfructus* und *mancipatio*. "Ein Gelübde wird dann zu einem feierlichen, wenn der Gelobende sich selbst hier und jetzt, im Angesicht des Gelübde-Empfängers (*praesentialiter*), wie ein *mancipium* in die Hand Gottes legt".—Die Summa<sup>34</sup> geht aber mit viel wachsamem Auge an die Analyse dieses Begriffs heran. Sie hält zwar an der Analogie der *mancipatio* fest, führt diese aber tiefer durch. Der Ton liegt nun auf dem Nehmer, d.i. Gott. Gott legt durch einen Stellvertreter auf Erden die Hand auf den Ihm freiwillig angebotenen Besitz. Das geschieht durch die Konsekration oder Benediktion, deren Urheber (*causa principalis*) Gott selbst ist, und die von dem Stellvertreter Gottes nur als einem Instrument weitergeleitet wird.<sup>35</sup> Das Wesen des feierlichen Gelübes liegt daher nicht mehr einfach nur in der totalen Verpflichtung des *mancipatus*, sondern in der durch den *manceps* konsekrierten totalen Verpflichtung. Und es ist dieser genauere und in unserm Zusammenhang hochwichtige Begriff, der es nun erlaubt, in der Frage des Zölibats das *authenticum* aus dem Wege zu räumen. Es ist müßig und hat mit der Sache nichts zu tun, hier nach einem bessern Gut zu fragen, das etwa eine Kompensation dieses Gelübes ermöglichen könnte. Im Alten Bund hat man auch nicht gefragt, ob das einmal geweihte Tier durch ein anderes—von höherem oder geringerem Wert: das ist von gar keiner Bedeutung—ersetzt werden dürfte. Die Sache ist viel einfacher. Hier hat Gott einen Menschen zu Eigen genommen, sei es durch Konsekration in der heiligen Weihe zum Dienst an den Sakramenten, sei es durch Benediktion in der Ordensprofess zur totalen Knechtschaft. Diese gottgesetzte Tatsache kann durch keine menschliche Gewalt rückgängig gemacht werden. Wie ein geweihter Kelch, solange er besteht, ein geweihter Kelch bleibt, so bleibt ein Priester, solange er lebt, Priester, und ein Mönch, solange er lebt, Mönch. Die Frage, die darum richtigerweise mit Bezug auf das Zölibatsgelübde gestellt werden kann, muss lauten: In welchem Verhältnis steht der

praesunt. — Für Albert siehe a.a.O. Art. 13, S. 412 ff.; besonders 414a: (Solemnitas) accidit ad ipsum (votum) sicut perfectio confirmans et corroborans. — Für Bonaventura a.a.O. art. 2, q. 1, p. 820.

<sup>33</sup> Vgl. E. Cuq, *Manuel des institutions juridiques des Romains*, (Paris, 1928), p. 270 ff. — Die thomistische und mittelalterliche Terminologie ist beachtenswert: in susceptione ordinis *mancipatur* homo divinis (4 S 25, II, 2 sol. 1); vita...consistit in operatione, cui aliquis principaliter *mancipatur* (3 S 35, I, 2 sol. 1). Wo wir von Beschaulichkeit reden, spricht der Scholastiker gern von: contemplativae vitae *inseverire* (4 S 26, I, 2); vitae contemplativae *particeps fieri* (3 S 27, II, 2).

<sup>34</sup> II-II, 88, 7: *Votum . . . est promissio Deo facta. Unde solemnitas voti attenditur secundum aliquid spirituale, quod* (zu ergänzen

ist: *scilicet votum*) *ad Deum pertineat, i.e. secundum aliquam spirituale benedictionem vel consecrationem, quae ex institutione Apostolorum adhibetur in professione certae regulae, secundo gradu post sacri ordinis susceptionem, ut dicit Dionysius VI cap. De eccles. hier. (PG 3, 533).* Erst nachdem so das Gelübde vonseiten des göttlichen *manceps* betrachtet ist, geht der Artikel, auf die Ausführungen des Sentenzenbuches zurückgreifend, zur Erörterung dessen über, was aufseiten des *mancipatus* vor sich geht. — Thomas trägt diese neue Ansicht über die solemnitas voti schon vor in *De perf. vitae spir.* 16 (ed. cit. 232); 20 (243); 24 (257 und 259). Ebenso *Quodlib.* III (1270) 17 und 18.

<sup>35</sup> II-II, 88, 7 ad 1: *. . . habet aliquam spirituale consecrationem seu benedictionem, cuius Deus est auctor, etsi homo sit minister.*



Zölibat zum Priestertum auf der einen, und zum Mönchtum auf der andern Seite? Und hier gibt Thomas die bekannte Antwort, auf die wir hier nicht näher einzugehen brauchen: Mit dem Priestertum ist die Ehelosigkeit nur aufgrund eines kirchlichen, positiven Statuts verbunden; von der Wesensbetrachtung der Dinge her steht aber dem nichts im Wege, dass ein Priester, ohne aufzuhören, Priester zu sein, von dem Gelübde der Ehelosigkeit entbunden wird. Wesentlich gehört dagegen der Zölibat zum Stand des Religiösen, der der Welt entsagt und sich völlig der Sklavenschaft Gottes übertragen, "manzipiert" hat. Darum ist es innerlich—metaphysisch, wenn man will—unmöglich, dass die kirchliche Autorität von dem durch eine Ordensprofess solemnisierten Gelübde der Ehelosigkeit dispensiere.<sup>36</sup> Wir werden später, vor allem an der thomistischen Entscheidung des "Problems der Plebanen und Kuraten", das im Gefolge der Krisen an der Pariser Universität gestellt wurde, sehen, wie tief die vorliegende Lösung in der ganzen Theologie und Soziallehre des Aquinaten verwurzelt ist.

Nachdem die Summa so das *authenticum* aus seiner früheren beherrschenden Stellung als lehrerzeugendes Prinzip und als Eckpfeiler einer ganzen doktrinären Konstruktion verdrängt hat, ist sie bereit, ihm als einem *argumentum in contrarium* ins Auge zu sehen. Aus dem Hauptgebäude des Lehrkörpers wird das Prinzip vom Gemeingut in die dialektische Vorhalle verwiesen, und nichts kennzeichnet die thomistische Entwicklung in der Behandlung des *authenticum* so scharf wie dieser Stellungen- und Wertungswechsel. Diese Transposition ist der Beweis und zugleich in jedem Fall ein unbezweifelbares Kriterium dafür, dass eine gründliche Aenderung im Begriff und der Bewertung des Gemeingutes stattgefunden hat.

Zwei Dinge sind an der Formulierung dieses *argumentum in contrarium* der Summa auffallend.<sup>37</sup> Das *multo melius* des Eustratios, das früher einen so wichtigen Nachdruck hatte, ist zugunsten der stereotypen aristotelischen Formel: *bonum commune est divinius quam bonum unius*, aufgegeben, einer Formel, die für den Leser der Summa schon etwas abgenutzt ist. Ferner aber ist der Fall, in welchem das Uebergewicht des Gemeingutes zur Geltung kommen soll, genau beschrieben. Die *pax patriae* ist das Gemeingut, für welches das Problem gestellt wird: um des Friedens des Vaterlandes willen soll es unter Umständen erforderlich und gerechtfertigt sein, von dem feierlichen Zölibats-

<sup>36</sup> Wir zitieren den langen Passus der Summa (Ed. Ottawa 1886b 35-1887b 8) in den für uns wichtigen Auszügen: ... alius videtur quod in voto solemnī continentiae possit dispensari propter aliquam communem utilitatem seu necessitatem . . . Sed . . . dicendum quod . . . illud, quod semel sanctificatum est Domino, non potest in alios usus commutari (art. 10 ad 1). Non autem potest facere aliquis Ecclesiae praelatus, ut id, quod est sanctificatum, sanctificationem amittat, etiam in rebus inanimatis, puta quod calix consecratus desinat esse consecratus, si maneat integer. Unde multo minus potest hoc facere aliquis praelatus, ut homo Deo consecratus, quamdiu vivit, consecratus esse desistat. Solemnitas autem voti consistit in quadam consecratione seu benedictione voventis, ut dictum est (art. 7). Et ideo non potest fieri per aliquem praelatum Ecclesiae, quod ille, qui votum solenne emisit, desistat ab eo ad quod est consecratus . . . Est ergo considerandum, utrum continentia sit essentialiter annexa ei, ad quod votum solemnizatur. Non est autem essentialiter annexum debitum continentiae ordini sacro, sed ex statuto Ecclesiae. Unde videtur, quod per Ecclesiam possit dispensari in voto conti-

nentiae solemnizato per susceptionem sacri ordinis. Est autem debitum continentiae essentialē statui religionis, per quem homo abrenuntiat saeculo, totaliter Dei servitio mancipatus. Quod non potest simul stare cum matrimonio, in quo incumbit necessitas procurandae uxoris et prolis et familiae et rerum, quae ad hoc requiruntur . . . Unde nomen monachi ab unitate sumitur, per oppositionem ad divisionem praedictam. (Dies könnte eine Anspielung sein auf die Etymologie des Wortes bei Innozenz IV: *monachus* bezeichnet an sich einen *solitarius tristis*; Text bei Brys a.a.O. 219; siehe über den *Monotropos* der griechischen Komik unten Anm. 170). Et ideo in voto solemnizato per professionem religionis non potest per Ecclesiam dispensari.

<sup>37</sup> II-II 88, 11 in 1: . . . votum continentiae, etiam si sit solenne, potest esse impeditivum melioris boni. Nam *bonum commune est divinius quam bonum unius*. Potest autem per continentiam alicuius impediiri bonum totius multitudinis, puta quando per contractum matrimonii aliarum personarum, quae continentiam voverunt, posset pax patriae procurari. Ergo videtur, quod etiam in solemnī voto possit dispensari.

gelübde zu dispensieren. Hat, wie wir oben sahen, der von Innozenz IV aufgestellte Kasus ein der "Christenheit" drohendes Unheil vorgesehen, war ferner in den Diskussionen der Kanonisten vielfach von einem *bonum Ecclesiae commune* die Rede,<sup>38</sup> und hatte schliesslich Thomas selbst im Sentenzenbuch die Sache auf die *communis utilitas totius Ecclesiae aut unius regni vel provinciae* bezogen,—so muss hier der Ausdruck *pax patriae* auffallen. Dies umso mehr, als gerade in der vorhergehenden Quästion (Q. 87, *De decimis*, art. 1) eine gewisse Nüancierung der Ausdrucksweise zu bemerken ist, an der man wohl nicht achtlos vorbeigehen darf. Es heisst dort, dass auf der einen Seite die Priester dem göttlichen Kult obliegen *ad salutem (!) totius populi*, während auf der andern Seite, wo die "Fürsten, Ritter und dergleichen öffentliche Beamtete" erwähnt sind, der Ausdruck *utilitas communis* gebraucht wird. Ich weiss sehr wohl, dass man den hl. Thomas auf diese strikte Terminologie nicht festlegen kann,<sup>39</sup> und dass auch in seinen Werken *Ecclesia, civitas, regnum, provincia* oft in praktisch ungeschiedener Einheit miteinander und durcheinander leben und wirken.<sup>40</sup> Es scheint mir aber doch, zumal aufgrund des historischen Zusammenhangs unserer Frage, dass wir an dieser Stelle den Ausdruck *pax patriae* als ein wohlerwogenes Wort mit durchaus prägnanter Bedeutung lesen müssen. Es handelt sich hier um ein rein menschliches Allgemeininteresse. Es ist das Gemeingut, das unter den "menschlichen" Gütern die höchste Stelle einnimmt, so jedoch, dass ihm das "göttliche" Gut in jeder Beziehung übergeordnet ist. Wie wir sehen werden, ist es die Ueberzeugung des hl. Thomas, dass gegenüber dem *bonum Ecclesiae commune* das Problem des Dispenrechts sich überhaupt nicht stellen kann. Das wäre nicht, wie man im Mittelalter sagte, eine *bona quaestio*.

Die Antwort im *ad 1* trifft denn auch gerade die eben erwähnte wunde Stelle des Arguments. Sie ist in ihrem Nachdruck und ihrer geschliffenen Wucht unnachahmlich und unübersetzbar: *Periculis rerum humanarum est obviandum per res humanas, non autem per hoc, quod res divinae convertantur in usum hominum. Professi autem religionem mortui sunt mundo et vivunt Deo. Unde non sunt revocandi ad vitam humanam occasione cuiuscumque eventus*.

Wie verhält es sich nun mit dem Argument des Kommentars, dass in jedem Gelübde, gleich welcher Art, der rechtmässige Gehorsam gegen den Obern und die Rücksicht auf die den Gelobenden umschliessende Gemeinordnung wenigstens so mitbedeutet waren, dass das Gelübde kein "Präjudiz" dagegen schaffen durfte? Die Summa bietet eine viel subtilere Analyse und geht sogar, wie mir scheint, einen grundverschiedenen Weg zur Lösung des Problems, wie ein Dispenrecht gegenüber dem Gelübde überhaupt entsteht und was sein Gegenstand ist. "Wer ein Gelübde tut, statuiert sich selbst ein Gesetz (vgl. Röm. 2, 14 und unten Abschnitt IV), indem er sich selbst zu etwas verpflichtet, das an sich und in der Mehrheit der Fälle gut ist. Es kann aber ein Fall eintreten, wo dieses Gute entweder ein einfachhin Schlechtes, oder eine unnütze Sache, oder ein Hindernis für etwas Besseres wird. Dann aber wird das Gelübde gegenstandslos. Denn sein Gegenstand ist nur etwas Gutes, ein tugendlicher

<sup>38</sup> Brys 189.

<sup>39</sup> Vgl. z.B. II-II, 64, 3; ed. Ottawa 1758a 43; *ibid.* 87, 1 usw.

<sup>40</sup> Es ist hier weder Raum noch Anlass zu dokumentieren, dass Thomas genau auf dem augustiniischen und mittelalterlichen Standpunkt der *una omnium christianorum res publica* steht. (Text *De opere Monachorum* 25, 33; PL 40, 573 von Thomas zitiert *Contra impugn.* 5, p. 64; 7, p. 103 u.ä.), und dass er diesen Standpunkt philosophisch bestätigt gefunden hat in dem aristotelischen Begriff der *communitas perfecta* (Pol. 1, 2; 1252b 28;

I-II, 90, 2 etc.). Diese ist eine, genau so wie das letzte Ziel des Menschen eines ist. Dass die bellarminische Interpretation von *De reg. princ.* 1, 14 über den Text des hl. Thomas weit hinausschiesst, dürfte unbezweifelbar sein, wofern man nur Thomas mit historisch geschärftem Blick zu lesen versteht. Wenn die späteren Kommentatoren sich veranlasst sahen, die ethische Einheit der *communitas perfecta* durch eine juristische Zweiteit zu ergänzen (!), so bleibt ihnen das unbenommen. Die Frage ist nur, ob Thomas das schon getan hat.—Siehe unten Anm. 67.

Akt, nicht aber etwas Unerlaubtes oder auch sittlich Unbestimmtes. Es muss also in einem solchen Fall eine Bestimmung getroffen werden, dass das Gelübde nicht mehr eingehalten zu werden verdient."<sup>41</sup> Und diese Bestimmung fällt unter das obrigkeitliche Verfügungsrecht der kirchlichen Autorität, da das Gelübde eine Verpflichtung gegen Gott ist, und auf der andern Seite der Obere die Stelle Gottes hält. Der Obere wird dann entscheiden, was mit Rücksicht auf die Ehre Christi und das Heil der Kirche, d.i. des mystischen Leibes Christi, zu geschehen hat.<sup>42</sup>

An zwei Punkten unterscheidet sich hier die Summa von dem Kommentar. Zunächst wird die Jurisdiktion der Kirche mehr in den Hintergrund geschoben. Sie tritt in der Konstruktion des Argumentes um sehr vieles später auf als in dem Jugendwerk. Dort war der "Gehorsam gegen den Oberrn" und die Sorge, dagegen kein Präjudiz zu schaffen, gleich am Anfang mit dem Wesen des Gelübdes verknüpft; hier wird zunächst auf die Autonomie des Gelobenden (*quodam modo sibi statuit legem*) hingewiesen, und das Argument verbleibt zunächst einmal innerhalb dieses autonomen Rechtsgebildes, um dessen Struktur und Bedingungen herauszustellen. Erst dann kommt die Rücksicht auf die kirchliche Jurisdiktion zur Geltung. Und zwar wird diese wiederum aus dem für die Summa so charakteristischen Gedanken hervorgeholt, dass das Gelübde eine autonome Verpflichtung gegen Gott ist und *darum* dem Stellvertreter Gottes soweit zur Beurteilung unterliegt, wie es die Natur des Gelübdes zulässt. Dessen Motive sind dann—das ist der zweite Unterschied gegenüber dem Sentenzenbuch—nicht mehr das Wohl des Einzelnen und das der Gemeinschaft (*utilitas subditorum: vel ipsius qui vovit vel aliorum*), sondern "die Ehre Christi und das Heil seines mystischen Leibes, der Kirche". Man könnte sich vielleicht denken, dass in bestimmten Fällen die Dispens vom Zölibat dem "Nutzen der Untergebenen" dienlich ist. Es ist aber undenkbar, dass sie zur "Auferbauung des Leibes Christi" beiträgt. Und der Obere ist nicht zur Zerstörung, sondern zum Aufbau gesetzt, er ist nicht Herr, sondern Verwalter.<sup>43</sup> Er muss also unter allen Umständen die Güter schützen und fördern, die wesentlich zu diesem Aufbau gehören und sogar ihr definieren, d.h. dessen spezifische, formgebende Teile sind. Im Gemeingut einer christlichen Gesellschaft befindet sich das Monastische nicht irgendwo am Rand, sondern es steht, wie wir noch eingehender sehen werden, an der Spitze aller Werte, weil es die Höchstverwirklichung der christlichen Idee selbst ist. Das christliche Gemeingut enthält darum die mönchische Lebensform als spezifischen Teil. Und weil der Zölibat wesentlich mit dieser Lebensform verknüpft ist, darum ist keine Dispens möglich. Ein solches Dispensrecht würde die Fundamente untergraben,

<sup>41</sup> II-II, 88, 10: . . . ille, qui vovet, quodam modo sibi statuit legem, obligans se ad aliquid, quod est secundum se et ut in pluribus bonum. Potest tamen contingere, quod in aliquo casu sit vel simpliciter malum vel inutile vel maioris boni impeditivum. Quod est contra rationem eius quod cadit sub voto, ut ex supradictis patet (art. 2: de nullo illicito nec de aliquo indifferenti (debet) fieri votum, sed solum de aliquo actu virtutis). Et ideo necesse est, quod determinetur in tali casu votum non esse servandum... (Diese Bestimmung) in potestate Ecclesiae consistit.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid. art. 12: Votum est promissio Deo facta de aliquo, quod sit Deo acceptum. Quid sit autem in aliqua promissione acceptum ei, cui promittitur, ex eius pendet arbitrio. Praelatus autem in Ecclesia gerit vicem Dei. Et ideo in commutatione vel dispensatione

votorum requiritur praelati auctoritas, quae in persona Dei determinat, quid sit Deo acceptum, secundum illud II Cor. 2, 10: *Nam et ego quod donavi, si quid donavi, propter vos in persona Christi*. Et signanter dicit propter vos, quia omnis dispensatio petita a praelato debet fieri ad honorem Christi, in cuius persona dispensat, vel ad utilitatem Ecclesiae, quae est eius corpus.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid. ad 2: . . . cum potestas praelati spiritualis, qui non est dominus sed dispensator, in aedificationem sit data et non in destructionem, ut patet II Cor. 10, 8: sicut praelatus non potest imperare ea, quae secundum se Deo displicent, ita non potest prohibere ea, quae secundum se Deo placent, scilicet virtutis opera. Et ideo absolute potest homo vovere ea.

auf denen das Gebäude des christlichen Lebens und der christlichen Gesellschaft ruht.

\* \* \*

Der Thomisten, die noch die Kraft und den Mut ihres Meisters zu einer solchen geschlossenen Theologie und Soziologie des christlichen Lebens haben, gibt es sehr wenige. Man kann geradezu behaupten, dass die Dispenstheorie ein Kriterium ist, an dem man in der thomistischen Schule mit letzter Sicherheit erkennen kann, ob ein scholastischer Autor eine wohldurchdachte, theologisch und philosophisch haltbare Anschauung vom Gemeingut und vom Sinn der sozialen Ordnung und Autorität hat. Einige der besten Köpfe in der Schule des hl. Thomas sind der Versuchung erlegen, mit durchscheinigen Kompromissen und einem ganzen Rattenschwanz von sophistischen Ausflüchten an dieser metaphysisch geschlossenen Position der Summa herumzufficken; worin man wohl eine der tieferen Wurzeln für das Elend der Soziallehre in der Barockscholastik erkennen mag. Cajetan, der mit zweifellosem Recht als ein "Fürst der Thomisten" gilt, hilft sich mit—*sit venia verbo*—billigen Sophistereien aus einer Klemme, die ihm wahrlich nicht die *littera*, sondern hier eine gewisse methodische Unzulänglichkeit seiner eigenen Exegese bereitet hat. Sein Kommentar läuft im Endergebnis darauf hinaus, den jungen Thomas gewissermassen gegen die Marotten des älteren in Schutz zu nehmen und zu zeigen, dass der Meister der Summa doch eigentlich besser gefahren wäre, hätte er den Text des Jugendwerkes, der allerdings im 16. Jahrhundert keinen Einwänden mehr begegnet wäre, schlicht abgeschrieben. Nach Cajetan hat Thomas in der Summa nur eine interessante, aber unverbindliche Meinung geäussert.<sup>4</sup> Das ist jedoch offensichtlich falsch. Nicht nur könnte, wie ich glaube, der Grund, den Cajetan anführt, durch eine philologische Untersuchung entkräftet werden, sondern vor allem ist folgendes zu beachten: Die These der Summa hängt mit einer Reihe der wichtigsten und unerschütterlichen Grundpositionen des reifen Denkers so innig zusammen, dass es unmöglich ist, sie nicht als begründete Ueberzeugung zu werten. Wir hoffen, im Verlauf dieser Studie die Zusammenhänge im einzelnen zu zeigen.

Werfen wir hier einen Blick auf die bisher besprochenen Texte, und versuchen wir, die thomistische Lehrentwicklung mit bezug auf das *authenticum* möglichst genau zu beschreiben.

Das gottgeweihte Leben, mit dem der standesgemässe Zölibat wesentlich verbunden ist, ist die Höchstentfaltung und Höchsterfüllung des christlichen Lebens überhaupt: es ist das *summum in genere*, von dem dieses Leben in allen seinen Erscheinungen Mass und Norm erhält. Um diese Spitze des christlichen Lebens geht für Thomas der Kampf um das Dispensrecht. Viele Gelehrte, insbesondere Juristen, haben sich durch die gewaltige Autorität des römischen *dictum authenticum*, durch das Studium des römischen Rechts und des Dekrets, und durch das gründliche Römertum in ihrem eigenen Geiste dazu verleiten lassen, einer zentralistischen, "einheitsstaatlichen" Auffassung das Wort zu

<sup>4</sup> Cajetan, *In II-II*, 88, 11; Ed. Leonina IX (Rom, 1897), p. 265. Da Thomas sagt (Ed. Ottawa, p. 1887a 7): *Ideo aliter videtur (!) dicendum, müssie man folgern: est igitur ista non sententia, sed opinio Auctoris. Das videtur hat bei Thomas sehr häufig nicht diese restriktive Bedeutung. Die Interpretation Cajetans hat bei den strengen Thomisten übrigens wenig Erfolg gehabt (D. Prümmer O.P., Bulletin thom. II, (1925), p. 254).—Es*

ist richtig, wenn Cajetan und andere auf die Bedeutung der Dekretale Innozenz' III von 1202 für die Lehrentscheidung des hl. Thomas aufmerksam machen: quia (!) decretalis inducta (s.c. 2<sup>o</sup>) expresse dicit . . . Man zieht aber daraus den falschen Schluss, dass die thomistische Lehre überhaupt nur positiver Natur sei und mit seiner sonstigen Theologie keinen oder nur einen ganz losen Zusammenhang habe.

reden, welche auch die Spitze und darum die Totalität des christlichen Lebens grundsätzlich, wenn auch nur für bestimmte und extreme, fast phantastische Fälle unter die Ordnung des Gemeinguts beugte. Wir werden später den berühmten *canon Urbani Papae*<sup>45</sup> kennenlernen, der solchem Zentralismus von vornherein die Spitze abbrach, und in dessen Folgschaft eine stattliche Reihe von Juristen diese einheitsstaatlichen Tendenzen ablehnte. Der junge Thomas hat einen Augenblick geschwankt, ob er sich nicht in das fortschrittliche Lager begeben solle. Die Autorität des Aristoteles, die da auf einmal hinter dem römischen *dictum* der Juristen erschien, hat ihn offensichtlich stark beeindruckt. Seine Stellungnahme ist auch dadurch zustande gekommen, dass sein Geist durch die Beweisführungen eines Albert und Bonaventura, die beide am richtigen Ziel waren, aber den Weg dahin nicht zeigten, nicht befriedigt wurde. Bevor Thomas die *Secunda Secundae* schrieb, hatte er, worauf wir unten zurückkommen müssen, seinen grossen Kampf mit den Pariser Magistri um den Begriff des christlichen Lebens geführt. Auf dem Hintergrund dieser Kontroverse muss man, wie so viele Stücke der *Secunda Secundae*, auch den Artikel über das Dispensrecht lesen.

Im einzelnen lassen sich wohl die Verbesserungen der Summa folgendermassen deuten:

Der Begriff des Gemeingutes ist vertieft. Das Gemeingut enthält in der Tat spezifische Elemente, die es konstituieren und darum nicht *unter* seine Ordnung fallen. In den vorliegenden Texten kommt dieser Gedanke zwar deutlich, aber nicht ausdrücklich zur Geltung. Im Abschnitt IV werden wir an anderen Texten diese thomistische Auffassung zeigen.

Folgerichtig ist der Begriff von der Aufgabe der Obrigkeit vertieft. Im Sentenzenbuch protestiert Thomas zwar sehr energisch gegen den Absolutismus der als herrschaftliche Hoheit aufgefassten Gewalt des Papstes, vertritt aber selbst einen gewissen Absolutismus der obrigkeitlichen, jurisdiktionellen Gewalt. In der Summa tilgt er sorgfältig jede Spur auch dieser absolutistischen Neigungen oder Möglichkeiten seines Jugendwerkes. Die Aufgabe der Obrigkeit ist der Aufbau des Gemeingutes, in welchem sich an erster Stelle Dinge befinden, die ein Mensch aus freien Stücken tut, um Gott zu gefallen. Schutz und Förderung dieser Dinge sind die Hauptpflicht der Obrigkeit. Und zwar bilden sie eine Pflicht gegen das Gemeingut. Das Gemeingut ist nur jetzt "personalistisch" gefasst (siehe unten), während es früher eine stark kommunale Betonung hatte.

Die feudalen Anschauungen, die schon im Sentenzenkommentar, wie überhaupt in der ganzen mittelalterlichen Literatur, deutlich herauskommen, sind in der Summa in unvergleichlicher Weise stärker herausgearbeitet. Durchgängig betont Thomas, dass es sich beim Gelübde, ebenso wie beim Eid, um eine "private Verpflichtung" handelt, die ein einzelner Mensch Gott gegenüber auf sich nimmt.<sup>46</sup> Hier ist ein Privatgut, das ein autonomes Rechtsgebilde konstituiert: und die Summa ist in dieser Beziehung so ausdrücklich und eindeutig, wie man nur wünschen kann, insbesondere wenn man sich vor Augen hält, welche konkrete, durch den *canon Urbani* aufgestellte Bedeutung der Ausdruck *sibi ipsi lex* hat. Es ist ein Privat- oder vielleicht besser Einzelgut—der Ausdruck Privatgut kommt an unserer Summastelle nicht vor<sup>47</sup>—vor dem die Obrigkeit, die das Gemeingut betreut, nichts anderes mehr tun kann, als es hüten und bewahren. Nirgends sonst ist Thomas den modernen Anschauungen vom

<sup>45</sup> Unten Anm. 134.

<sup>46</sup> 4 S 38, I, 2 sol. 2 ad 1: *Votum obligat per id quod ab homine est.*—*Ibid.* art. 1, q. 3, s.c. 2<sup>o</sup>: . . . *votum, cum habeat spontaneam promissionem, libertatem requirit.*—*Quodlib.*

III, 12 ad 1: *Sic ille, qui emitit iuramentum vel votum, obligatur ex quadam privata obligatione.*

<sup>47</sup> Unten Anm. 142-144.

Rechtsstaat so nahe gekommen wie hier. Er bleibt aber natürlich in seiner feudalen und vor allem theologischen Haut. Es entspricht der feudalen Auffassung, diese Abmachungen zwischen dem einzelnen Menschen und dem obersten Herrn der Welt weder durch den Menschen selbst noch durch irgendeine menschliche Zwischeninstanz aufzulösen. Und die Theologie kommt hier zu Worte, weil das so entstandene autonome Rechtsgebilde keineswegs das Privatgesetz des blossen Menschen und seines Willens, der blossen menschlichen Person ist, sondern das "Privileg des Heiligen Geistes".<sup>48</sup>

Dies alles liegt, wie es uns scheint und wie es nach und nach deutlicher werden wird, jener Transposition des *authenticum* aus dem Artikelkörper in den dialektischen Vorraum zugrunde.

## II. DAS "AUTHENTICUM" UND DAS PROBLEM DER ORGANISATION DER SAKRAMENTSTHEOLOGIE

Eustratios hat sich am Eingang seines Kommentars zum ersten Buch der nikomachischen Ethik Gedanken über die Organisation des aristotelischen Corpus der praktischen Wissenschaften gemacht.<sup>49</sup> Man weiss, dass der griechische Kommentar des Metropolitens von Nikäa (12. Jahrhundert) und anderer zugleich mit dem vollständigen Text der Ethik durch die Uebersetzung des Robert Grosseteste dem lateinischen Abendland bekannt geworden ist und für dessen Verständnis der aristotelischen Gedanken von ausschlaggebender Bedeutung wurde. Mit der Antike<sup>50</sup> hält Eustratios daran fest, dass das aristotelische Corpus aus Schriften dreierlei Art besteht: der Ethik, der Oekonomie und der Politik.<sup>51</sup> Im einzelnen stellt sich ihm das Verhältnis dieser drei Schriftgattungen gemäss der ihnen zugrundeliegenden drei *εἰδη τοῦ πρακτικοῦ*<sup>52</sup> folgendermassen dar: Die Ethik handelt von dem Einzelmenschen und seinem ethischen Verhalten, die Oekonomie von der engeren Gemeinschaft der im Haus Zusammenwohnenden, die Politik von der weiteren Gemeinschaft "der Stadt oder der Städte oder eines ganzen Volkes und sogar mehrerer Völker, wenn diese unter einem Herrscher geeint sind."<sup>53</sup> Man muss eben den Menschen, mit dem sich die praktische Wissenschaft befasst, sowohl als einzelnen wie auch *κοινῶς* d. i. als in Gemeinschaft lebendes Wesen

<sup>48</sup> Unten Anm. 134.

<sup>49</sup> *Eustratii et Michaelis et anonyma in Ethica Nicomachaeae Commentaria*, ed. G. Heylbut; *Commentaria in Aristotelem graeca* XX (Berlin 1892), S. 1-5. Im wesentlichen habe ich den griechischen Text benutzen müssen, da mir ein Manuskript der lateinischen Uebersetzung des Robert Grosseteste nicht zur Verfügung stand. Einige uns hier interessierende Stellen dieser Uebersetzung hat jedoch A. Pelzer mitgeteilt: 'Le cours inédit d'Albert le Grand sur la Morale à Nicomaque', *Revue néoscol. de phil.* (1922), 487, n. 2.

<sup>50</sup> Stobaeus, *Eclogae* II, 7, 26; Ed. Wachsmuth (Berlin, 1884), p. 147 f.

<sup>51</sup> *Divisa enim et hac* (= philosophia practica) in tres, in ethicam, ichonomicam et politicam . . . (= Heylbut, S. 1, Z. 9). Die von dem Studenten Thomas redigierte ungedruckte Vorlesung Alberts bezieht sich auf diese Stelle mit folgenden Worten: . . . in Commento dicitur quod Philosophus tres tradidit scientias de moribus hominum, scilicet moralem, oeconomicam, politicam vel legis positivam. Et sicut istae tres diversi-

ficantur in tractatibus, sic differunt in finibus, quia moralis finis est felicitas, oeconomicae divitiae, civilis reipublicae tranquillitas. Differunt etiam in materia, quia primae humanum bonum, secundae domus, tertiae civitas (A. Pelzer, a.a.O., S. 487 f.).

<sup>52</sup> tres species practice, Pelzer a.a.O. = Heylbut, S. 1, Z. 24.

<sup>53</sup> Ex his itaque manifestum et quid horum unumquodque in vita homines iuvat bonum dirigere, hoc quidem unicuique hominum, hoc autem communiter cohabitantibus insimul, hoc vero adhuc communis in civitate vel civitatibus vel etiam in gente tota, forsitan autem et gentibus, si plures aliquando sint sub unius principis dominatione; Pelzer a.a.O. = Heylbut S. 3, Z. 31-35. — Eustratios versucht hier, wie es immer im Altertum und Mittelalter getan wurde, das römische Reich in der alten Philosophie der Polis unterzubringen. Nichts widerspricht dem klassischen Begriff der Polis mehr als diese Subsumption. Darüber aber hat sich niemand, insbesondere auch nicht Thomas v. A., Gedanken gemacht.

betrachten.<sup>54</sup> Warum aber beginnt das aristotelische Corpus mit der Ethik des Einzelnen, der "monastischen" Ethik, wie später die Scholastiker sagen? Die Antwort ergibt sich leicht aus folgendem: "Wie der Hausbegründer zunächst in sich selbst ein guter Mensch sein muss, um dann auch die Hausbewohner in gute Verfassung zu bringen, so muss—denn die Stadt baut sich ja aus Häusern auf—der Politiker und Leiter des Gemeinwesens jeden einzelnen der Hausvorstände zu einem guten, nach dem Gesetz lebenden und an der Vernunft teilnehmenden Bürger machen. Und dazu muss er selbst vor allen andern ein vollguter Mensch sein, geeignet, jene *Mitteilung von Gutheit* (*μετάδοσις τῆς ἀγαθότητος*) zu vollziehen", in der das Regierungsgeschäft recht eigentlich besteht.<sup>55</sup>—Diese Betrachtungen gehen, wie man sieht, weit über Aristoteles hinaus, und es spricht aus ihnen der unbezweifelbare platonische Geist, der dann auch die entsprechenden Partien der scholastischen Kommentare gefärbt hat.<sup>55a</sup>

Albert und Thomas machen zunächst reiche Anleihe bei Eustratios, wenn sie die Einleitungsfragen zur Ethik, die Probleme des "Subjekts" dieser Wissenschaft, seiner Einheit usw. besprechen.<sup>56</sup> Die Spuren des Eustratios finden sich aber auch da wieder, wo man sie vielleicht kaum erwartet, nämlich bei dem Problem der Organisation der Sakramentstheologie.

Hier hat Albert wohl als erster unter den mittelalterlichen Theologen die eustratianische Unterscheidung zwischen dem Einzelwesen und dem Gemeinschaftswesen zur Geltung gebracht, die Unterscheidung, die von so erheblicher Bedeutung für das scholastische-ethische Denken überhaupt geworden ist. Er hat damit wenigstens prinzipiell auch den innern Zusammenhang erkannt, in dem die beiden Probleme: das theologische der Organisation der Sakramentstheologie, und das philosophische der Organisation des praktischen Wissens, zueinander stehen. Ein Sakrament, so sagt Albert am Anfang seiner *notulae*<sup>57</sup> zur Sakramentstheologie des Petrus Lombardus, ist wesensgemäss ein Hilfsmittel gegen die Mängel und Bedürftigkeiten, die aus der Sünde stammen. Es gibt aber nun Bedürftigkeiten der Kirche, und solche des Einzelnen. Somit muss man soziale und personale Sakramente unterscheiden: Weihe und Ehe sind die sozialen, Taufe, Firmung, Eucharistie, Busse, Letzte Oelung die personalen. Womit aber soll eine wissenschaftlich korrekte Sakramentstheologie beginnen, mit den sozialen oder mit den personalen Sakramenten? Petrus Lombardus hat schon die letztern an die Spitze gestellt. Gehen wir also ruhig den gleichen Weg,<sup>58</sup> zumal diese Methode, wie sich Albert allerdings sehr viel

<sup>54</sup> Dies heben Albert-Thomas aus den eben zitierten Worten des Eustratios hervor: *Commentator graecus . . . vult, quod . . . homo dupliciter potest considerari: vel secundum se vel in comparatione ad alterum; in comparatione ad alterum dupliciter: vel ad domesticos et coniunctos vel ad omnes communiter, qui sunt sub eadem civitate, regno vel gente; Pelzer a.a.O. 490.*—Man erkennt hier die griechische Quelle für ein Prinzip, das das mittelalterliche sozialphilosophische Denken zu einem wesentlichen Teil in Gang gebracht hat. Unter einer Unzahl von thomistischen Stellen siehe I-II, 21, 3; II-II, 58, 5.

<sup>55</sup> Heylbut, S. 2, Z. 30—3, 2.

<sup>55a</sup> Unten Anm. 152, 167a.

<sup>56</sup> Siehe die von Thomas redigierte Vorlesung Alberts; Pelzer a.a.O. Ferner Thomas *In Eth.* 1, 1 n.6; Albert *In Eth.* 1, 3, 1 und 14; Ed. Borgnet 7, 29 ff., 48ff.

<sup>57</sup> So bezeichnet Albert selbst seinen Kommentar in 4 S 26, 1, ed. cit. 30, 98a.

<sup>58</sup> 4 S 1, 2; vol. 29, 8 f: Der Artikel stellt folgendes Prinzip auf: *Mihi videtur hic, quod si vera deberet tradi divisio (nämlich der Sakramente), quod oporteret eam sumi penes multiplicationem eorum quae substantialia sunt sacramento.* (Dann folgen drei nach verschiedenen Gesichtspunkten durchgeführte Einteilungen . . . Die dritte geht von dem Grundsatz aus:) *Sacramentum est contra defectum qui est ex peccato. Aut ergo contra communem defectum Ecclesiae, aut contra defectum personae . . .* Es folgt ein Schema mit den sozialen Sakramenten an der Spitze. Anders in dem nächsten Artikel 3 (p. 11a). Dort hält sich Albert an die Reihenfolge des Petrus Lombardus. Die beiden Probleme, das des sakramentalen Organismus, und das der Organisation der sakramentalen Theologie, sind bei Albert ebenso wenig wie beim jungen Thomas in ihrer grundsätzlichen Einheit gesehen. Erst III, 65, 1 schafft hier den Wandel. Vgl. unten Anm. 62.



später einmal erinnert, auch durch ein solides Prinzip gerechtfertigt werden kann: *Sicut enim Ecclesia est ex personis multis, et ideo persona est prior quam Ecclesia, ita sacramentum personae est ante sacramentum Ecclesiae.*<sup>59</sup>

Albert ist auch hier, wie so oft unter den Scholastikern, der Erfinder und Wegweiser, der Mann, der in raschem Geistesflug eine Idee auffängt, sie schnell irgendwo notiert, und die Sache auf sich beruhen lässt. Er hat hier den Eustratios im Kopf, erinnert sich indessen des Textes nur zur Hälfte, wenn ich so sagen darf. Er denkt nur an die Worte, dass "die Stadt sich aus Häusern aufbaut". Er sieht also, dass die Vielheit oder Vieleinheit der Kirche in den einen oder einzelnen Personen ihre Materialursache hat. Hätte Albert den ganzen Text sich vor Augen gehalten, so hätte es ihm nicht entgehen können, dass bei Eustratios umgekehrt das Viele aus dem Einen nach der Weise der *μεράδος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* entsteht, ein Gedanke, dem die sonstigen neuplatonischen Sympathien Alberts rasch hätten entgegenkommen müssen. Das Problem, um das es in der Sakramentstheologie geht, wäre dann nicht mit dem Prinzip der nur materialen und zeitlichen Priorität des Einzelnen gegenüber der Gemeinde, sondern mit der formalen und absoluten Priorität des Einen gegenüber dem Vielen gelöst worden. Die traditionelle Sakramentstheologie hätte damit eine neue Basis und vor allem eine neue Tiefe erhalten.

Wir haben mit diesen Bemerkungen schon die Kritik vorweggenommen, die der hl. Thomas der Summa an seinem Lehrer Albert und an seiner eigenen Stellungnahme im Sentenzenkommentar übt. Denn das Jugendwerk des Aquinaten steht sachlich genau auf dem Standpunkt des deutschen Meisters.

Sehen wir uns das genauer an. Es ist hier ein Punkt, wo wiederum die thomistische Entwicklung in der Auffassung und Behandlung des *authenticum* zum Vorschein kommt.

Folgendes ist die Lehre des Sentenzenkommentars: Fragt man in ethischen Dingen, dort also, wo es um Handel und Wandel des Menschen geht, nach dem, was früher ist und daher wissenschaftlich an erster Stelle behandelt werden muss, so ist der Sinn der Frage nicht: was absolut gesprochen früher ist, sondern was der Zeit, dem Entstehen, dem Werden nach früher ist. In dieser Hinsicht nun geht das Privatgut dem Gemeingut voran, genau so wie der einzelne Mensch früher ist als das Haus, und das Haus früher als die Stadt. Denn das Gemeingut baut sich ja auf aus den Privatgütern: *bonum commune consurgit<sup>60</sup> ex bonis singulorum*. In dieser zeitlichen Priorität des Privatguts

<sup>59</sup> 4 S 23, 5 (30, 12b). Vgl. auch 4 S 24, 1 (30, 31a): *In veritate personalia sacramenta sunt ante ea, quae deserviunt communiter Ecclesiae.*—*Ibid.* macht Albert auch noch geltend: *aliter non disponuntur ministri sacramentorum nisi per sacramenta personalia, quae contra defectus personales ordinantur.*—Die Lehre Bonaventuras ist hier von Interesse. Erst im späteren Teil seiner Sakramentstheologie spricht der seraphische Lehrer wie auch Albert: siehe 4 S 23, dub. 1 (Ed. Quaracchi IV, 601) und *ibid.* 24, dub. 1 (p. 619). Am Anfang des Kommentars aber (4 S 2, dub. 1; p. 59) sagt er: *Magister bene ordinat. Et ratio sui ordinis patet sic: Sacramenta enim quaedam respiciunt communiter omnes . . . aut aliquos specialiter . . . scilicet ordo et coniugium. Et sicut commune ante speciale, sic prima quinque ante duo ultima.*—Die Stelle kennzeichnet sehr gut, wie man damals um die Mitte des Jahrhunderts in den Schulen nach einem Prinzip für den Aufbau der Sakra-

mentstheologie suchte. Bonaventura glaubt, es in der Logik des Aristoteles gefunden zu haben: *commune ante speciale*, wie das Genus vor der Species (*Categ.* 13; 15a 5). Thomas hat wohl eine solche Ansicht vor Augen, wenn er am Anfang seines Artikels (unten Anm. 61) darauf hinweist, dass es sich nicht um Logik, sondern um Ethik handelt.

<sup>60</sup> Ist dieses *consurgit* vielleicht die lateinische Uebersetzung des *synesteke* bei Eustratios (Heylbut S. 2, Z. 31)? Ausser an dieser und der unten in Anm. 61 zitierten Stelle hat Thomas das Wort und die Idee, soweit ich sehe, nur noch zwei- oder dreimal verwendet: *De veritate* 2,2: . . . (*tota perfectio*) universi, quae consurgit ex singularum rerum perfectionibus invicem congregatis; *Contra gent.* 3, 71: . . . (*perfectio*) universi, cuius pulchritudo ex ordinata malorum et bonorum adunatione consurgit; ferner 2 S 29, I, 3 ad 4, in welchem Text das *consistit* der Ausgabe



vor dem Gemeingut erhält somit die Methode des Sentenzenmeisters ihre wissenschaftliche Rechtfertigung. Die absolute Wertpriorität gehört allerdings dem Gemeingut, nicht dem Privatgut. Jedoch tritt hier der absolute Wertvergleich gegenüber dem relativen zurück. So hat auch das aristotelische Corpus der praktischen Wissenschaften die "monastische", d.i. Einzelgutsethik an erster Stelle, und dann erst die politische oder Gemeingutsethik dargestellt.<sup>61</sup>

Setzen wir neben diesen Text einfach den der Summa: Das Organisationsprinzip der Sakramentstheologie muss in folgendem Axiom gesehen werden: Das Eine ist absolut gesprochen früher als die Vielheit. So gehen auch ihrem Wesen nach, und folglich in der wissenschaftlichen Darstellung, die personalen Sakramente den sozialen voran. Die ersteren sind ja auf die Vollkommenheit einer Person, die letzteren auf die Vollkommenheit der Vielheit, d.i. der Kirche hingeordnet. Aufgrund dieser Ueberlegung muss darum jenes Verfahren der Sakramentstheologie, das von Petrus Lombardus begründet und nun Allgemeinlehre geworden ist, als wissenschaftlich richtig anerkannt werden.<sup>62</sup>

In dem *Resp. ad 2* präzisiert Thomas: Ist nicht die Weihe, so fragt er dialektisch, das eigentlich erste Sakrament? Gibt sie nicht die Macht zur sakramentalen Aktion, von der doch alles in der sakramentalen Ordnung abhängt? Muss man nicht den Pragmatisten Recht geben?—Es ist richtig, lautet die Antwort, dass die Weihe die sakramentale Aktion begründet. Dazu aber, dass jemand ein *agens* wird, ist vorausgesetzt, dass er in sich selbst fertig, vollkommen sei: nur wer hat, kann geben. (Thomas hätte auch sagen können: dazu, dass eine Vielheit wird, ist vorausgesetzt, dass die Einheit ist.) Somit sind die personalen Sakramente, durch die ein Mensch in sich selbst vervollkommen wird, früher als die sozialen, die einen Menschen zum *perfector* der andern, zur Ursache von Vollkommenheit für andere machen.<sup>63</sup>—Eustratios ist

Mandonnet, Paris 1929, S. 748 wohl in *con-surgit* geändert werden muss: . . . universon, cuius pulchritudo *con-surgit* ex hoc quod mala esse sinuntur (*consistit* wäre doch wohl zu stark). Vgl. auch *In Met.* 7, 2, n. 1303: . . . ad victoriam totius exercitus, quae est quoddam bonum commune ex singularibus victoriis huius vel illius. Es ist aber in der thomistischen Philosophie klar, dass dieses *con-surgere* ex, als materiale Ursächlichkeit gefasst, die Ganzheit eines Ganzen durchaus nicht vollständig erklärt; vgl. z.B. *In Met.* 8, 5, n. 1755 u. ö.

<sup>61</sup> 4 S 2, I, 3: Videtur, quod sacramenta inconvenienter a Magistro hic ordinantur . . . (*Arg.* 3) Bonum commune est divinius quam bonum personae, ut dicitur in I *Eth.* Sed matrimonium et ordo ordinantur in remedium commune, alia autem in remedium unius personae . . . (Albert). Ergo illa duo sacramenta ante alia poni debent . . . (*Corp. art.*) Respondeo. Dicendum quod prius et posterius multipliciter dicitur. Sed in his, quae ad actiones pertinent (vgl. Bonaventura, oben Anm. 59), prius quoad nos est illud quod est prius in via generationis. Et ideo secundum hanc viam Magister sacramenta, quae sanctificationes quaedam sunt, ordinat. Prius enim in via generationis est bonum privatum quam commune, quod *con-surgit* ex bonis singularibus, sicut homo est prior domo et domus civitate. Et ideo sacramenta, quae in remedium unius personae ordinantur, prius ponuntur . . . (Deinde) quae ad remedium totius Ecclesiae deputantur. — *Ad tertium.* Dicendum quod, quamvis bonum commune sit *divinius*, tamen bonum singulare est prius in via generationis. Et ideo etiam Philosophus monasticam

politicae praemisit, ut patet in X *Eth.* (1181b 13 ff; vgl. Eustratios, oben Anm. 55). — Ebenso 4 S 23, exp. text.: Alia duo quae sequuntur (i.e. ordo et matrim.) ordinantur ad bonum commune Ecclesiae vel totius humanae speciei. Bonum autem unius est prius quam bonum multorum, quod ex singularibus bonis *con-surgit*. — Ferner 4 S 24, exp. text.: Bonum commune, ad quod ordinatur hoc sacramentum (ordinis), praesupponit bonum personae, ad quod ordinantur praecedentia. Ideo de hoc non debuit (*Magister*) prius determinare.

<sup>62</sup> III, 65, 2: Ratio ordinis sacramentorum apparet ex his quae supra dicta sunt (Art. 1. Mit andern Worten: die Organisation der Sakramentstheologie muss sich stützen auf den aus der Idee des Sakramentes erkannten Organismus der Sakramente. Im Gegensatz zu 4 S 2, I, 2 hat dieser Artikel mit einem volleren Sakramentsbegriff die auf der eustratianischen Unterscheidung, oben Anm. 54, beruhende Einteilung der Sakramente als die einzig richtige aufgestellt; so übrigens auch schon *Contra gent.* 4, 58 und *Opusc. De art. fid.*, Ed. Mandonnet III, 12). Nam sicut unum est prius quam multitudo, ita sacramenta, quae ordinantur ad perfectionem unius personae, naturaliter praecedunt ea, quae ordinantur ad perfectionem multitudinis. Et ideo ultimo inter sacramenta ponuntur ordo et matrimonium, quae ordinantur ad multitudinis perfectionem (i.e. Ecclesiae multiplicationem, wie das *Opusc. l. c.* erklärt).

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.* Videtur quod inconvenienter sacramenta ordinantur secundum modum praedictum (art. 1) . . . (*Arg.* 2) Per sacramentum ordinis aliquis accipit potestatem agendi actiones sacramentales. Sed *agens* est

hier zweifellos zu Ende gelesen worden, wenn man schon annehmen will, dass Thomas einen Eustratios braucht, um ein tragfähiges metaphysisches Fundament für eine Lehre zu finden.

Dies ist aber noch nicht die ganze hierher gehörende Lehre der Summa. Der Artikel 2, aus dem wir eben zitiert haben, erwähnt mit keinem Wort mehr das *authenticum*, das in dem früheren Werk noch im Vordergrund stand. In der Summa ist aber die Auseinandersetzung mit dem Axiom nicht vermieden, sondern nur verschoben. Unter den personalen Sakramenten ragt die Eucharistie hervor, das "Sakrament der Sakramente", wie sie die Väter nannten. Gegen diesen Vorrang wird nun gleich am Anfang des folgenden Artikels 3 das *authenticum* dialektisch ausgespielt. Die Eucharistie, in der Ordnung der personalen Sakramente das erste, wird mit der Ehe verglichen. An spirituellem Gehalt ist zwar die Ehe das geringste aller Sakramente.<sup>64</sup> Sie ist jedoch ein soziales Sakrament, verordnet für das Gemeingut, d. i. die Erhaltung der menschlichen Gattung, den körperlichen Fortbestand der Kirche. Hat darum das *authenticum* noch einen Sinn, so scheint die Ehe trotz allem dennoch auf einer höheren sakramentalen Rangstufe zu stehen als die Eucharistie.<sup>65</sup>

Die Antwort, die Thomas hier gibt, ist das letzte Wort zu unserm Thema, welches wir aus seiner Feder besitzen: *Dicendum quod matrimonium ordinatur ad commune bonum corporaliter. Sed bonum commune spirituale totius Ecclesiae continetur substantialiter in ipso Eucharistiae sacramento.*

Wenn wir diese ungemein knappen Sätze, in denen jedes Wort gewogen sein will, richtig deuten, so besagen sie folgendes: Das Sentenzenbuch hatte es, wenn nicht geradezu behauptet, so doch als offene Frage zurückgelassen, ob nicht die absolute Seins- und Wertpriorität den sozialen Sakramenten, weil dem Sozialen überhaupt, zustünde. Demgegenüber wird nun hier an der Eucharistie, dem höchsten personalen Sakrament, die schon im vorigen Artikel festgestellte absolute Seins- und Wertpriorität des Personalen noch einmal kräftig unterstrichen. Grundsätzlich vollzieht sich, wie der 2. Artikel gelehrt hat, der Uebergang ins Soziale vom Personalen her, nicht umgekehrt. An der Eucharistie zeigt es sich, wie dieser Uebergang vor sich geht. Denn die Eucharistie ist selbst das personale Eine und absolut Frühere, aus dem das Soziale, d. i. die Vieleinheit der Kirche hervowächst. Als personales Sakrament ist die Eucharistie zugleich in eminenter, kausaler und analoger Weise ein soziales, und gar das soziale Sakrament. In ihr zeigt sich, wie das Personale das Soziale umschliesst, verursacht, formt—nicht umgekehrt. Es ist nicht nur so, dass dieses Sakrament Christus in substantieller Gegenwart enthält, also die Person, die als Quelle alles mystischen Lebens der (*principalis*) *perfector*, der Stifter und Erbauer der Kirche im Sinne von Art. 2 *ad* 2 ist.<sup>66</sup> Wir müssen vielmehr auch

prior sua actione. Ergo ordo debet praecedere et baptismum et alia sacramenta (Eine gute Formulierung des theologischen Pragmatismus! Siehe unten Abschnitt III) . . . Ad secundum. Dicendum quod ad hoc quod aliquid sit agens, praesupponitur quod sit in se perfectum (vgl. 4 S 49, I, 1 sol. 3 ad 2). Et ideo priora sunt sacramenta, quibus aliquis in seipso perficitur quam sacramentum ordinis, quo aliquis constituitur *perfector* aliorum (Dionysius, *De eccl. hier.* 6, 1, 3; PG 3, 532D; II-II, 184, 7). — Hier wie überall ist wohl zu beachten, dass Thomas nicht etwa neue, im Sentenzenbuch und den Frühschriften unbekannte Prinzipien erfindet (vgl. ausser der angeführten Stelle auch noch 4 S 32, I, 1; *contra gent.* 3, 21 usw.), sondern die längst bekannten nun anwendet. Früher hat offenbar das *authenticum* in gewisser Weise im Weg gestanden und die

Sicht versperrt. Das ist die "Entwicklung", die Thomas durchgemacht hat.

<sup>64</sup> *Matrimonium . . . minus participat de ratione spiritualis vitae; III, 65, 2.*

<sup>65</sup> *III, 65, 3 in 1: Videtur quod sacramentum Eucharistiae non sit potissimum inter sacramenta. Bonum enim commune potius est quam bonum unius, ut dicitur I Eth. Sed matrimonium ordinatur ad bonum commune speciei humanae per viam generationis. sacramentum autem Eucharistiae ordinatur ad bonum proprium sumentis. Ergo non est potissimum sacramentorum.*

<sup>66</sup> 3 S 32, 5 sol. 4 corp. et ad 2: *Deus Christum diligit non solum plus quam homines, sed etiam plus quam totam creaturam. Quamvis sit singularis persona Christi, tamen est universalis causa salutis humani generis: et causa praestantior est causato. Vgl. I, 20, 4 ad 1.*

bedenken, dass in der Kommunion mit dem eucharistischen Leib des Herrn das Prinzip liegt, das alle *perfectio* in der Kirche begründet und damit auch, wenigstens potentiell, alle *perfectores* konstituiert. Die Ehe ist ihrer Wesensintention nach nichts als soziales Sakrament: sie hat erstwesentlich nur die Aufgabe, das Gemeingut der Kirche in körperlicher Hinsicht sicherzustellen.<sup>67</sup> Die Eucharistie hingegen ist als die substantielle Ursache aller Vollkommenheit in der Kirche zugleich in eminenter und analoger Weise "das" soziale Sakrament — *communio vel synaxis*<sup>68</sup> — da das Soziale sich durch "Mitteilung von Gutheit" aufbaut und in jedem Guten oder Vollkommenen übrigens die Tendenz zur Mitteilung und Verbreitung angelegt ist: *bonum est diffusivum sui*.<sup>69</sup>

Das letzte Wort, das der hl. Thomas in Sachen des *authenticum* geschrieben hat, ist eine Deutung und Vertiefung des Prinzips im personalen Sinne.

\* \* \*

Zusammenfassend lassen sich in der Behandlung des *authenticum* bei Gelegenheit dieses Problems der Sakramentstheologie folgende Unterschiede feststellen:

Das Sentenzenbuch des hl. Thomas kennt nur ein "Privatgut", das als Materialursache des Gemeingutes gefasst und dessen Teil-Sein ausschliesslich als Teil-Sein des materialen Teiles erklärt wird. Zwischen dem Sentenzenbuch und der Summa liegen, worauf wir später hinweisen werden, die Untersuchungen über das Teil-Sein in den Kommentaren zur Metaphysik und Politik. Die Summa erkennt in der personalen Vollkommenheit die formale, (effektive und finale) Ursache des Gemeingutes. Die soziale Vollkommenheit (*perfectio multitudinis*) ist ihr ein Ausfluss und Nachbild der personalen Vollkommenheit (*perfectio unius*). Man könnte versucht sein, zu sagen: nicht das Personale ist ein Teil des Sozialen, sondern umgekehrt das Soziale ist ein Teil des Personalen. Dies würde zweifellos einen guten thomistischen Sinn haben können, insbesondere wenn etwa die Person Christi und das soziale Ganze der Kirche miteinander verglichen werden.<sup>70</sup> Thomas bleibt jedoch, wie sich später zeigen wird,<sup>71</sup> in der Diskussion des *authenticum* bei der These, dass das Personale der formale und spezifische Teil des Sozialen ist.

In dem Sentenzenbuch ist das "Privatgut" ein Prius dem Werden, nicht dem Sein nach (*prius tempore et generatione*). In der Summa ist das personale Gut, nämlich die Vollkommenheit des Einzelnen — der Ausdruck "Privatgut" fehlt hier wiederum — ein Prius dem Sein und absoluten Wert nach (*prius naturaliter*): es ist das Eine, das seinsmässig dem Vielen vorausgeht.

Die Summa zeichnet sich hier vor allem dadurch aus, dass sie eine personale Deutung in das *authenticum* selbst hineinträgt, das ein so unpersonales oder gar widerpersonales Gesicht zur Schau stellt. Thomas hat offenbar früher diese personale Profil des *authenticum* nicht mit solcher Entschiedenheit und Schnelligkeit gesehen wie später. Das Eine und Personale, wenn es als ursäch-

<sup>67</sup> Die Ehe ist verordnet für die *perfectio*, d. i. *multiplicatio der Kirche* (*De art. fid. l. c.* Anm. 62). Und zwar gemäss dem hochmittelalterlichen Begriff von "Kirche", in qua congregantur diversi populi et nationes (4 S 19, I, 3 sol. 1 ad 3). Aus vielen Stellen führe ich hier einige thomistische Zeugnisse für diesen Kirchenbegriff an. In I Cor. 12, 3: In Ecclesia sine officio aliquarum abiectionum personarum, puta agricultorum, vita transiri non posset. *De carit.* 8 ad 10: (aliquando) aliquorum temporalis prosperitas est in detrimentum alicuius multitudinis vel etiam totius Ecclesiae. II-II, 108, 4 ad 2: Quod aliqua ecclesia habeat episcopum, pertinet ad

bonum totius civitatis, non autem ad bonum clericorum tantum; etc. etc. — Thomas weiss jedoch auch, dass die Ehe nach der Verschiedenheit ihrer wesentlichen Beziehungen dem zivilen oder kirchlichen Gesetz untersteht: bester Text *contra gent.* 4, 78. — Siehe oben Anm. 40.

<sup>68</sup> III, 73, 4.

<sup>69</sup> Unten Anm. 165.

<sup>70</sup> Vgl. In *Metaph.* 5, 20: n. 1084: Modus . . . secundum quod aliquid dicitur esse in aliquo ut in efficiente vel movente, sicut quae sunt regni in rege . . .

<sup>71</sup> Abschnitt IV, insbesondere Anm. 172.

liche Vollkommenheit auftritt und erkannt wird, begründet die Vielheit und das Soziale. Das Eine wird damit zu einem Gemeingut für die Vielen. Und auf dieses Gemeingut trifft wiederum, freilich in analogem Sinne, das *authenticum* von der Wertpriorität des Gemeinen zu.

Als Kuriosum mag auch hier gebucht werden, dass z.B. die Salmantizenser, sonst achtenswerte Thomisten, die tiefen Unterschiede zwischen dem Erstlingswerk und der Summa nicht erkennen.<sup>72</sup> Sie "erklären" den Artikel der Summa ganz einfach mit dem Sentenzenkommentar, indem sie das *naturaliter prius*, das so deutlich gegen das *prius secundum generationem* steht, schlicht in ein *prius secundum naturam et generationem*<sup>73</sup> umwandeln. Der handgreifliche und tief bedeutsame Fortschritt, den inzwischen die Soziallehre des hl. Thomas gemacht hat, bleibt ihrem völligen Mangel an perspektivischer und historischer Sicht versperrt.

### III. DAS "AUTHENTICUM" IN DER AUSEINANDERSETZUNG MIT DEM RELIGIOESEN PRAGMATISMUS DER GERALDINER

Noch einen dritten Fall müssen wir untersuchen, der nunmehr die Unterschiede in der thomistischen Beurteilung und Behandlung des *authenticum* von ihrer Wurzel her erkennen lässt und zugleich es erlaubt, den Wendepunkt im Denken des Aquinaten ziemlich genau zu datieren. Wir müssen aber hier betonen, dass es sich nicht um ausgesprochene Lehrdifferenzen handelt. Der hl. Thomas hat es für nötig gehalten, gewisse Formulierungen seiner Frühwerke zu retouchieren, gewisse Unebenheiten auszugleichen, die wohl Anlass zu Missdeutungen geben mochten. Je näher man beim Aquinaten an die systemtragenden Prinzipien herankommt, umso deutlicher wird die oft und mit Recht bewunderte Sicherheit und Festigkeit, die dieser Denker schon auf den ersten Seiten seiner Schriften kennt.

Wir sind dem Problem, das wir nun zur Erörterung stellen, schon oben wenigstens flüchtig begegnet. Um des Gemeinguts willen, so sagte Thomas,<sup>74</sup> wird einer zuweilen aus dem "Garten der heiligen Kontemplation" auf die staubige Strasse des Lebens gesetzt. Das Bild des Gartens hat hier nichts mit dem Paradies zu tun, aus dem unsere Stammeltern vertrieben worden sind. Es steht vielmehr für die Ruhe und Ergötzlichkeit des kontemplativen Lebens, an der einer in gewissermassen quietistischer Haltung hängen mag. In der mittelalterlichen Literatur, bei Theologen sowohl wie im kanonischen Recht, wird der Fall erörtert, dass der Papst jemand zur Annahme eines Bischofssitzes oder zum Verbleib im Amte zwingen muss.<sup>75</sup> Dieses Recht des Papstes stützt

<sup>72</sup> *Cursus theol.* XVII, (Paris 1881), p. 632.

<sup>73</sup> Für die Kombination *secundum naturam et generationem* könnten sich die Salmantizenser auf ein paar Stellen berufen, die wie I, 85, 3 ad 1 eine weniger genaue Sprache sprechen. Die weitaus grössere Zahl der Stellen (*Contra gent.* 2, 23; I, 77, 4; I-II, 20, 1 ad 3; II-II, 17, 8; II-II, 182, 4; III, 1, 5 ad 3 usw.) würde ihnen aber Unrecht geben. Die betreffende thomistische Lehre beruht insbesondere auf *In Metaph.* 5, 13; 7, 1; 9, 7, und hat ihre gründlichste Synthese im *Quodlibet.* 5, 19 (a. 1271) gefunden. Dort sagt Thomas ausdrücklich: *quia forma est magis natura quam materia . . . convenientius dicitur esse prius natura actus . . . quam potentia.*

<sup>74</sup> 4 S 38, I, 4, sol. 1 ad 3; siehe oben Anm. 29.

<sup>75</sup> Vgl. Bonaventura, 4 S 29, 3; Ed. Quaracchi, IV, S. 702 f.; Thomas, 4 S 29, 4 ad 4; II-II, 185, 2.—*Decretal. Gregor.* IX, Lib. I, Tit. IX, c. 10; Ed. Friedberg, col. 107-112. Dieses, "Extra, De renuntiatione, c. Nisi, cum pridem" bei Thomas zitierte Capitulum (z.B. *De perfectione vitae spiritualis*, 22, Ed. Mandonnet IV, S. 249 u.ö.) ist für den in unserm Text besprochenen Fragekomplex von grösster Wichtigkeit. Es enthält einen Brief Innozenz' III "Episcopo Calaritano" vom 1. März 1206 (Potthast, *Regesta* 2698). — Die Dokumente der Ueberlieferung, die für die vorliegenden Probleme den mittelalterlichen Schriftstellern vor Augen stehen und aus denen sie ihre Fragen stellen, setzen sich zusammen a) aus der Schriftexegese zu Röm. 9, 3 und Phil. 1, 21-24 (vgl. z. B. die Glossen, von Thomas zitiert in II-II, 27, 8 u.ö.; Ed.

man gern durch den Hinweis auf die Notwendigkeiten des aktiven Lebens, die Pflichten gegen Gemeinschaft und Gemeingut, für die der christliche Römer und der römische Christ ein so geschärftes Ohr haben. Im philosophischen Hintergrund dieses Falles erkennt man leicht die uralte platonische Auseinandersetzung zwischen Philosophen und Königen. Nur ist dieses analoge Problem nun im christlichen Gedanken mit einem sehr starken Akzent auf die Praxis versehen. Denn, wie Thomas einmal bemerkt, da, wo der Grieche seinen Intellektualismus nur gegen die rein menschliche, zivilisatorische Aktion für die *civitas* zu verteidigen hat, muss die christliche Kontemplation ihr Recht gegenüber der apostolischen Aktion für das Heil der Seelen sichern.<sup>76</sup> Auch liebt der Philosoph an der Kontemplation nicht den kontemplierten Gegenstand — wie sollte einer die platonische Idee des Guten oder die aristotelischen getrennten Substanzen lieben? — sondern den Akt des Kontemplierens, der eine Vollkommenheit des Erkennenden ist. Die heidnische Kontemplation gründet sich auf Selbstliebe. Die "Kontemplation der Heiligen" hingegen geht hervor aus der Liebe des kontemplierten Gegenstandes, d.i. Gottes, von dem der Heide keine hinreichend deutliche Vorstellung hat.<sup>77</sup> Wie verhalten sich also christliche Kontemplation und christliche Aktion, Gottes- und Nächstenliebe? Und was muss man von hier aus zu dem Fall sagen, wo jemand aus quietistischer Neigung sich dem Ruf zur apostolischen Praxis verweigert? Dies sind die Fragen, die den jungen Gelehrten im Sentenzenbuch beschäftigen.

Im Laufe der spätern Jahre hat sich aber dasselbe Grundproblem merklich erweitert und zugespitzt. Mit Gerald (Gerhard) von Abbéville<sup>78</sup> tritt in den sechziger Jahren ein Mann auf, der auf der einen Seite es versucht, die Welt- und Seelsorgspriester überhaupt als Halb- oder Viertelsbischöfe auszugeben, so dass er jedenfalls für sie die ganze alte Theologie des Bischofsamtes mit Beschlag belegen kann,<sup>79</sup> und der auf der andern Seite die Mönche — man denke an die Predigerbrüder — auf den Quietismus festlegen möchte, sodass er gegen sie alle Trümpfe in der Hand hat, die ihm das *authenticum* liefert:<sup>80</sup> ein uralter Trick der Politiker! Wie dieser naive Gerald alle Mönche ins Kloster schickt, so schicken einige Jahre später die französischen Kronjuristen Pierre Flote, Guillaume de Nogaret usw. alle Priester in die Sakristei, worin sich dann bald gemäss dem abendländischen Geschichtsgesetz der Verbreiterung und Säkularisierung aller theologischen Sätze das ganze Christenvolk und schliesslich —

Ottawa, Anm. zu S. 1572b 41); und b) aus den von Gratian im Dekret kompilierten Vätertexten über das Verhältnis von Kontemplation und Aktion (siehe *Mediaeval Studies* V, 1943, 137 ff.) Wer in der thomistischen Gemeingutslehre diese Dokumente nicht beachtet, ergeht sich in unverbindlichen Spekulationen über abstrakte Gemeinplätze und hat von den konkreten Problemen, die Thomas stellt, keine Ahnung.

<sup>76</sup> 3 S 35, I, 4, sol. 2 ad 3: Philosophus loquitur de contemplativa vita per comparationem ad activam, quae in rebus humanis negotiatur, non autem respectu illius, quae proximorum salutis insitit.

<sup>77</sup> 3 S 35, I, 2, sol. 1: "... ex duplici parte potest operatio cognitivae affectari. Uno modo, inquantum est perfectio cognoscentis: et talis affectio operationis cognitivae procedit ex amore sui. Et sic erat affectio in vita philosophorum. Alio modo, inquantum terminatur ad obiectum: et sic contemplationis desiderium procedit ex amore obiecti, quia: ubi amor, ibi oculus (cf. Augustin, *En. in Ps.* 118, 12; 2; PL 37, 1532 f.; *Contra Iulian. Pel.* IV, 3, 33; PL 44, 755) et Matth. 6, 21: Ubi est thesaurus tuus, ibi est cor tuum. Et sic habet

affectuonem vita contemplativa sanctorum. — *Contra gent.* 3, 63: "... philosophi, qui de felicitate ultima plenam notitiam habere non potuerunt. — "Selbstliebe" (*amor sui*) ist bei Thomas noch keineswegs Egoismus. Sondern das ist nur "ungeordnete Selbstliebe" (*amor sui inordinatus*). Man darf den Aquinaten nicht so verstehen, als habe er die grossen Griechen in Bausch und Bogen als stolze Egoisten abtun wollen. Nichts liegt einem Manne vom Format des hl. Thomas ferner als solch billige Traktätchenapologetik.

<sup>78</sup> Siehe hierzu und zum folgenden P. Glorieux, "Pour qu'on lise le "De perfectione", *Vie spirituelle*, XXIII (1930), Supplément (98) - (226); ders., "Les polémiques "Contra Geraldinos". Les pièces du dossier", *Rech. de théol. anc. et méd.*, VI (1934), 1-41; "Contra Geraldinos". L'enchaînement des polémiques", *ibid.*, VII (1935), 129-155.

<sup>79</sup> Vgl. z.B. *De perfectione vitae spir.* 21, § Item. Dicunt quod tempore Hieronymi; ed. cit. p. 246; § Item. Sicut Patriarcha, p. 247 u.ö.

<sup>80</sup> Opusc. *Contra retrahentes*, 7, § Item vero quod septimo; ed. Mandonnet, IV, p. 284 f. u.ö. Siehe unten Anm. 107.

in einer Art säkularisierter Sakristei—alle Welt befindet, mit Ausnahme der Politiker, die allein wissen, was dem "Gemeingut" nottut und aus der "Sakristei" nur Geld und Blut saugen. Die Position des Gerald von Abbéville und der Geraldiner ist ein grobkörniger religiöser Pragmatismus, dem ein paar Tropfen Gallikanismus *ante litteram*—die Mendikantenprediger waren ja direkt dem Papst unterstellt—und ein guter Schuss "realpolitischen" Brotneides beigemischt waren.<sup>81</sup> Im Kampf des hl. Thomas gegen diesen Pragmatismus sehen wir, wie der Aquinate einige seiner früheren Formulierungen überarbeitet und klärt und den früheren Fragestellungen noch die folgenden anfügt: Welches ist das Verhältnis zwischen dem Vollkommenheitsstand des Bischofs und dem des Ordensmannes? Wie steht, theologisch gesehen, der einfache Weltpriester (*decani, plebani, archidiaconi, presbyteri curati*) zum Ordensmann? und: Welches ist der theologische Ort eines kirchlichen Ordens wie des der Predigerbrüder?

Das Dossier dieser unter dem Gesichtspunkt des *authenticum* ausserordentlich wichtigen Kontroverse besteht zunächst aus den beiden 1269 und 1270 geschriebenen Opuscula des hl. Thomas: *De perfectione vitae spiritualis contra magistrum Geraldum*<sup>82</sup> und *Contra doctrinam retrahentium a religione contra Geraldos* (oder, nach einem andern Titel: *Contra doctrinam Geraldinorum et retrahentium a religione*<sup>83</sup>). Schon im Jahre 1256 hat der Aquinate sich veranlasst gesehen, so wie übrigens auch der Franziskaner Thomas von York, gegen den ordensfeindlichen Weltklerus eine Schrift zu verfassen: *Contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem; contra magistrum Guilelmum de Sancto Amore*.<sup>84</sup> Gegen die Grobheiten Wilhelms von St. Amour in seiner Schrift *De periculis temporum novissimorum* brauchte die Polemik noch nicht sehr tief zu gehen; denn es war ja klar, dass dieser Magister die Dogmatik des religiösen Lebens bei den Haaren herbeigezogen hatte, um damit ganz andere Interessen zu stützen, nämlich den Kampf der Pariser Professoren um die Autonomie ihrer Universität.<sup>85</sup> Die Diskussion um das Wesen des von den Mendikanten vertretenen Ordens- und Lebensideals war in diesem Stadium nur eine Nebenintrigue. Nachdem aber die Regularen 1257 wenigstens technisch den Sieg davongetragen hatten, spitzte sich der Streit immer mehr auf den Hauptpunkt zu: was ist überhaupt Sinn und Recht des Ordenslebens? Auf einer im Dezember 1267 gehaltenen Provinzialsynode zu Reims<sup>86</sup> findet die religiösenfeindliche Stimmung des Weltklerus sogar eine Art offiziellen Ausdrucks. Im Sommer 1269 erscheint die Streitschrift des Gerald gegen Thomas von York: *Contra adversarium perfectionis christianae, maxime praelatorum facultatumque ecclesiasticarum inimicum*. Das Pamphlet enthüllt mit bemerkenswertem Scharfsinn den theologischen Hintergrund der alten Kontroverse. In Wahrheit handelt es sich um die Idee des christlichen Lebens und die Wesensstruktur der christlichen Gesellschaft. Ein so wichtiges und zentrales Thema ruft den Aquinaten, der seit Beginn 1269 wieder in Paris war, auf den Plan, und Thomas zögert nicht, auch seinerseits die Problematik von ihrem theologischen Kern her aufzurollen. Das geschieht in dem vor Dezember 1269 geschriebenen Hauptteil (Kap. 1-20, 26) des Opusculums *De perfectione vitae spiritualis*; und es ist von der grössten Bedeutung, dass Thomas von der *perfectio vitae spiritualis*

<sup>81</sup> *De perf. vitae spir.* 23, p. 256 f. § Quod vero quartodecimo (. . . mundanam gloriam ambientes).

<sup>82</sup> Titel des Opusculums im offiziellen Katalog und bei Nikolaus Trivet; Grabmann, 'Die Werke des hl. Th. v. A.'; *Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Phil. u. Theol. d. MA*, XII, 1-2, (Münster, 1931), S. 293.

<sup>83</sup> Titel bei Bartholomäus von Capua und Nikolaus Trivet; Grabmann, a.a.O.

<sup>84</sup> Titel in den Katalogen des Bartholomäus von Capua, Nikolaus Trivet, Tolomeo von Lucca und Bernard Guidonis; Grabmann a.a.O.

<sup>85</sup> Vgl. Hastings Rashdall, *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*, ed. Powicke-Emden, I (Oxford, 1936), p. 370 ff.

<sup>86</sup> P. Glorieux, 'Un synode provincial inconnu: Reims 1267' *Rev. Sc. rel.*, VIII (1928), 230-256.

her den Pragmatismus der Geraldiner, der sich an entscheidender Stelle auf das römisch-christliche *authenticum*<sup>87</sup> stützt, untergräbt. Das Opusculum ist keineswegs nur eine erbauliche Schrift, sondern, wie die alten Kataloge noch festgehalten haben, eine Polemik mit ganz bestimmter Richtung und von gewaltiger Wucht: gegen eine listige Missdeutung des *authenticum*, die zu jenem untragbaren Pragmatismus und Aktivismus geführt hat, sollen das Wesen und der innere Aufbau des christlichen Lebens dargestellt werden, in dem das *authenticum* wohl einen Platz hat, aber nicht den, den die Geraldiner vermeinten.—Im Dezember 1269 rafft nun Gerald, der Archidiakon von Le Ponthieu, in einer aufsehenerregenden quodlibetalen Disputation achtundzwanzig Argumente gegen die Religiösen zusammen. Thomas von Aquin setzt sich sofort hin, um wahrscheinlich noch am Ende desselben Monats oder am Anfang 1270 seinem schon fertigen Opusculum einen Anhang beizugeben (Kap. 21-25), ein wahres Meisterstück kräftiger und wachsamer Polemik. Die Argumente des Gerald werden im einzelnen angeführt und sogar sachlich so geordnet, dass sie ihre ganze Stärke entfalten können.<sup>88</sup> Thomas hat dann gleich in dem an Ostern 1270 gehaltenen *Quodlibetum III*, insbesondere im Artikel 17, seinen Standpunkt wiederum in gedrängter und systematisierter Form entwickelt. Hiermit waren die Vorarbeiten getan, die dann zu der grossartig geschlossenen christlichen Lebens- und Ständelehre am Ende der *Secunda Secundae* führen. Dieser Abschnitt ist, historisch gesehen, die letzte Antwort des Aquinaten an die Saintamouristen und Geraldiner. Sie ist der Höhepunkt der thomistischen Lehre über das *authenticum*, soweit dessen richtige und genaue Auffassung für eine Theorie des christlichen Lebens von Bedeutung ist.

Wir müssen nun die thomistische Dokumentation im einzelnen untersuchen. Es sollen hier Texte aus dem Sentenzenkommentar (1), dem Opusculum *De perfectione* (2), dem *Quodlibetum III* (3) und der *Summa theologiae* (4) vorgeführt werden. Dies sind die Haupttexte, in denen der Unterschied der thomistischen Formulierungen am klarsten in die Erscheinung tritt. Auf andere, für uns weniger aufschlussreiche Stellen in andern Schriften soll in den Anmerkungen hingewiesen werden.

1. *Kontemplation und Aktion, Gottes- und Nächstenliebe im Sentenzenkommentar.* Das Problem ist ein doppeltes: Erstens: Ist das kontemplative Leben vornehmer (*nobilior, dignior*) als das aktive? und zweitens: Ist es auch verdienstlicher (*magis meritoria*)? Diese Doppelschichtigkeit entspricht einer mehr abstrakten und mehr konkreten Betrachtung der Dinge. Man richtet sein Augenmerk sowohl auf das, was den formalen Inhalt der beiden Lebensarten oder Betätigungen ausmacht, wie auch auf deren konkrete Verumständung und Motivation, d.h. auf die Caritas, die im christlichen Leben die Triebkraft in beiden Lebensarten bildet. Die verhältnismässige Würde des kontemplativen und aktiven Lebens bemisst sich nach der formalen Natur und Bewandnis der Akte, die Verdienstlichkeit jedoch nach dem Wesen und Grad der Caritas, die jeweils wirksam wird. Denn Wurzel der Verdienstlichkeit, des theologischen Wertes, ist die Caritas.<sup>89</sup>

Was nun das erste Problem angeht, so lautet die Entscheidung des hl. Thomas, dass das kontemplative Leben das aktive an absoluter Würde überragt. Die Kontemplation ist Ziel an sich, die Aktion ist Mittel zu diesem Ziel. Dem

<sup>87</sup> Siehe unten Anm. 99.

<sup>88</sup> Haec igitur sunt, quae ex eorum scriptis colligi possunt, quamvis non eodem ordine ponantur ibidem; *De perf.* 21, p. 248.

<sup>89</sup> 3 S 35, I, 4, qu. et sol. 1, 2. Die Fragestellungen sind aus den beiden Initia der

Quästionculae zu erkennen: Videtur, quod activa vita sit nobilior quam contemplativa . . . Videtur quod etiam vita contemplativa sit maioris meriti quam activa.—Meritum pendet ex radice caritatis; sol. 2.



absoluten Ziel-sein der Kontemplation widerspricht es jedoch nicht, dass auch sie als ein Gut aufgefasst wird, welches sowohl ein Einzelgut als auch ein Gemeingut sein kann, sodass dann auf die Kontemplation das *authenticum* zutrifft: *secundum quod contingit multitudinem contemplationi vacare*, ein soziologischer Begriff, den Thomas leider nicht näher beschreibt. Die Kontemplation eines Einzelnen wird aber Gemeingut, indem sie, d.h. ihr Inhalt, auf dem Wege der Belehrung (*doctrina*) andern mitgeteilt wird. Diese Belehrung gehört zum aktiven Leben. Auch dadurch wirkt man an der Verbreitung des kontemplativen Gutes unter den Menschen, dass man an deren moralischem und zivilisatorischem Fortschritt arbeitet. Denn durch diese moralische Erziehung, die der Beruf des "Politikers", d.h. des regierenden Obern, und des Predigers ist, werden die Menschen zur Kontemplation disponiert. Es ergibt sich also daraus, dass das aktive Leben einen bedeutenden Nützlichkeitswert im Hinblick auf die Kontemplation besitzt. Ja, während die Kontemplation an sich un-nützlich ist (wie die Metaphysik bei Aristoteles), wird ein Nutzwert überhaupt erstmalig in der Aktion verwirklicht; und zwar, gemäss dem Grundgedanken des *authenticum*, ein höherer Nutzwert in der am Heile der Mitmenschen (*bonum commune*) wirkenden Aktion als in der Aktion, durch die ich selbst für meinen eigenen moralischen Fortschritt (*bonum unius hominis*) tätig bin. In diesem Sinne ist die Aktion in und an der Gemeinschaft "nützlicher", d.h. sie verwirklicht nicht nur einen einfachen, sondern einen höhern Nutzwert; die Aktion, die in meiner eigenen ethischen Vervollkommenung besteht, ist einfachhin "nützlich", während auf der andern Seite, wie gesagt, das kontemplative Leben an absoluter, in sich selbst ruhender Würde die gesamte Aktivität überragt.<sup>90</sup>

Wie aber steht es um das Verdienst, d.h. den in der Caritas begründeten theologischen Wert von Kontemplation im Verhältnis zu Aktion? Die Frage bezieht sich nicht auf die subjektive Qualität der Caritas in diesem Kontemplierenden und jenem Agierenden, sondern auf die objektive Bewandnis (*ratio*) und Intensität der Caritas, die jeweils in den beiden Lebensarten notwendig wird. Das aktive Leben hat zunächst mehr satisfaktorischen, die Sündenschuld tilgenden Wert, weil es mühsamer ist als die Kontemplation.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.* sol. 1: Dicendum ad primam quaestionem, quod duplex est ratio boni. Aliquid enim dicitur bonum quod propter seipsum est desiderandum. Et sic vita contemplativa simpliciter melior est quam activa, in quantum magis assimilatur illi vitae, ad quam per activam et contemplativam nitimur pervenire. Unde et contemplativa est finis activae et fini ultimo vicinior. Aliquid vero dicitur bonum quasi propter aliud eligendum. Et in hac via vita activa praeminet contemplativae. Vita enim contemplativa non ordinatur ad aliud aliud in ipso in quo est, quia vita aeterna non est nisi quaedam consummatio contemplativae vitae, quae per vitam contemplativam in praesenti quodam modo praeiatur. Unde non restat, quod ordinetur ad aliud, nisi secundum quod bonum unius hominis ordinatur ad bonum multorum, ad quod propinquius se habet vita activa quam contemplativa (cf. 4 S 49, I, 2, sol. 5). Unde activa quantum ad hanc partem, quae salutem proximorum studet, est utilior quam contemplativa; sed contemplativa est dignior, quia dignitas significat bonitatem alicuius propter seipsum, utilitas vero propter aliud. Sed vita activa, quae non ad alium, sed ad seipsum tantum ordinatur, neque dignior neque utilior est quam contemplativa, immo comparatur ad contemplativam sicut

utile ad id ad quod est utile.—Ad 2: . . . sicut bonum unius consistit in actione et contemplatione, ita et bonum multitudinis, secundum quod contingit multitudinem contemplationi vacare.—Wie sich der hl. Thomas diese "kontemplierende Gemeinde", die natürlich nicht die sogen. Meditation als Gemeinübung ist, vorgestellt haben mag, ist mir nicht klar. (Denkt er an die Kontemplation als Ziel des Gemeinschaftslebens, wie etwa in *Contra gent.* 3, 37 § Ad hanc etiam omnes; *ibid.*, 136, § Unde etiam patet solutio ad tertium; *In Eth.* 10, 11; Ed. Pirota, n° 2101?). Am Ende des 4. Sentenzenbuches (4 S 49, I, 1, sol. 3 ad 1) findet sich jedoch die folgende bemerkenswerte Stelle, die von dieser *communis contemplatio* nichts mehr zu wissen scheint: Assecutio finis quem intellectus practicus intendit, potest esse propria et communis, in quantum per intellectum practicum aliquis se et alios dirigit in finem, ut patet in rectore multitudinis. Sed aliquis ex hoc quod speculatur, ipse solus dirigitur in speculationis finem. Ipse autem finis intellectus speculativi tantum praeeminet bono intellectus practici, quantum singularis assecutio eius excedit communem assecutionem boni intellectus practici.



Blickt man aber auf die Verdienstlichkeit für das ewige Leben, so muss man sagen, dass die in der Kontemplation geübte reine und unmittelbar um Gott kreisende Caritas wertvoller ist, weil sie schon den Anfang dieses Lebens verwirklicht und sich ihr weniger der Staub der irdischen Strasse beimischt. Wo findet sich schliesslich die intensivere Liebe? Hier muss man wiederum auf das *authenticum* Rücksicht nehmen. Die Aktion im Interesse meines eigenen moralischen Fortschritts (*quae circa sui moderationem studet*) erfordert eine an Intensität schwächere Caritas als die Kontemplation. Anders jedoch die apostolische Aktion. "Denn das scheint doch eine objektiv stärkere Liebe (*fortior caritas secundum genus*) zu beweisen, dass jemand die Tröstungen der Beschauung bei Seite stellt, um sich der Ehre Gottes im Werk der Bekehrung anderer zu widmen. So bedeutet es auch in der Freundschaft unter Menschen mehr, das Gut des Freundes zu wirken, als sich seiner Gegenwart zu erfreuen."<sup>91</sup> In diesem Sinne bewahrheitet sich ein Wort aus einer Ezechielhomilie des hl. Gregor: das Opfer des apostolischen Seeleneifers ist das Gott genehmste. Derselbe Gregor hat zwar in der gleichen Schrift auch gesagt, dass das kontemplative Leben (schlechthin und in jeder Beziehung) verdienstlicher sei als das aktive. Wägt man aber diese beiden Autoritäten, so verdient die erstere den Vorzug—was gemäss der literarischen Technik des thomistischen Artikels dadurch klar zum Ausdruck kommt, dass der ersteren der konstruktive Platz im *sed contra* gegeben ist, während die andere in die dialektische Vorhalle verwiesen wird.<sup>92</sup>

Diese Ausführungen des hl. Thomas greifen ausdrücklich<sup>93</sup> auf früher Gesagtes zurück. Wie verhalten sich in der Tat ganz grundsätzlich Gottes- und Nächstenliebe mit bezug auf ihre Verdienstlichkeit? Selbstverständlich ist "der Akt, in dem die Liebe eines Menschen auf Gott tendiert, besser und verdienstlicher als der Akt der Liebe, der sich auf den Nächsten richtet. Jedoch mit einer Ausnahme: nämlich dann nicht, wenn die Nächstenliebe aus einer grössern Gottesliebe hervorgeht als die Gottesliebe ist, die in einem Akt unmittelbar sich auf Gott richtet. Das ist allerdings kein Normalfall, denn an

<sup>91</sup> 3 S 35, I, 4, sol. 2: Ad secundam quaestionem dicendum quod meritum dependet ex radice caritatis. Unde contingit quandoque, quod in activa quis plus mereatur quam in contemplativa, vel e converso, secundum quod maiorem habet caritatem vel minorem. Nihilominus tamen, cum quaeritur de duobus in genere (über diesen Begriff siehe O. Lottin, 'Le problème de la moralité intrinsèque d'Abélard à S. Thomas', *Revue thomiste*, n.s. 1934, S. 477 ff.), quid sit maioris meriti, intelligendum est, quantum pertinet ad rationem ipsorum actuum, non quantum ad ipsos operantes.—Est ergo duplex meritum, scilicet dimissionis culpa, et consecutionis gloriae. Quantum ad *primum*, maioris meriti dicitur (X, I, 9, 10, § 10; Ed. Friedberg, col. 111) activa quam contemplativa, inquantum *laboriosior*: unde habet plus de ratione satisfactionis. Quantum autem ad meritum consecutionis gloriae, sic contemplativa vita est maioris meriti quam activa quantum ad puritatem, quia non admiscetur ei tantum de *pulvere terrenorum*, sicut fit in activa vita. Sed quantum ad intensionem meriti videtur contemplativa iterum maioris meriti illa parte activae, quae circa sui moderationem studet; minoris autem quantum ad illam partem, quae profectui aliorum invigilat, quia hoc ipsum videtur esse fortioris caritatis secundum genus, quod homo praetermissa consolatione, qua in Dei

contemplatione reficitur, gloriam Dei in aliorum conversione quaerat; quia etiam in humana amicitia amicus quaerit magis bonum amici quam de eius praesentia delectari.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid. arg. 1 in contr.: Gregorius enim dicit in *Moralibus* (? *Hom. in Ezech.* III, 9; PL 76, 809): "Contemplativa maior est merito quam activa, quia activa in usu praesentis operis laborat, contemplativa vero in sapore intimo venturam iam requiem degustat."—Sed contra. Totum meritum hominis consistit in acceptione divina. Sed Gregorius dicit *Super Ezech.* (*Hom.* XII, 30; PL 76, 932): Nullum sacrificium est Deo magis acceptum quam regimen animarum.—Gemeint sind hier die Worte des hl. Gregor: "Nullum quippe omnipotenti Deo tale est sacrificium, quale est zelus animarum". Die Aenderung, die Thomas hier anbringt, ist ebenso bewusst wie charakteristisch. Später (siehe unten Anm. 99, 107, 116) hält sich Thomas an den gregorianischen Wortlaut.

<sup>93</sup> 3 S 30, 4 ad 2: . . . supposito, quod actus activae vitae sit magis meritorius quam actus contemplativae, quod forte non est verum, ut infra dicitur. . . —Man sieht hier förmlich, wie es im Geist des hl. Thomas arbeitet! Trotz dieses ausdrücklichen Protests kommt an der Stelle, auf die hier offenbar hingewiesen wird (vorige Anmerkungen), das *meritum activae vitae* doch sehr gut weg.

sich genügt auch der geringste Akt der Gottesliebe, um unsern Affekt auf den Nächsten auszudehnen.<sup>74</sup> Die *dilectio quae fertur in Deum immediate in aliquo actu* ist offenbar rechte und reine Mystik. Diese wird hier in einen möglichen Gegensatz gebracht zu einer Gottesliebe, die grösser ist, weil sie nicht nur an Gott hängt, sondern auf den Nächsten überfließt. Solche überfließende Gottesliebe ist dann jene *fortior caritas secundum genus*, von der Thomas in dem oben zitierten Text spricht. Wie aber wäre ein solcher Fall möglich? Dass quietistische und eigensüchtige Mystik, der die Ruhe und Ergötzlichkeit im Garten der Kontemplation über alles geht, dieses wesensmässige Ueberfließen der Gottesliebe künstlich aufhält, ist wohlverständlich. Wie aber sollte rechte Mystik, d.i. Mystik schlechthin, der nicht alles an den Tröstungen, sondern das meiste an der Substanz der Kontemplation liegt, an eine solche unnatürliche Verkürzung auch nur denken? Und was ist dann der theologische Wert der Gottesliebe des rechten und reinen Mystikers im Verhältnis zu der des Apostels?—Man sieht, wie hier der junge Thomas hinter dem Problem doch wohl zurückbleibt, oder jedenfalls, wie Unklarheiten bestehen bleiben, die denn auch aufzuklären der reife Denker nicht versäumt hat. Die Formulierungen des Sentenzenbuches werden einer Revision unterworfen, die sich auf die ganze, von dem Gedanken des *authenticum* so stark beherrschte Lehre des Sentenzenkommentars ausdehnt.<sup>75</sup>

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.* in corp.: . . . Et ideo motus dilectionis in Deum est melior et magis meritorius quam motus dilectionis in proximum, nisi dilectio proximi procedat ex maiore dilectione Dei quam sit dilectio, quae fertur in Deum immediate in aliquo actu: quod quidem aliquando contingit, sed non semper, quia minima dilectio caritatis in Deum sufficit, ut extendat affectum in proximum. —Der hier gemeinte Fall ist offenbar der paulinische, Röm. 9, 3. Es ist dessen Exegese, die dem jungen Thomas solche Schwierigkeiten macht, dass er um ihretwillen von dem geraden Weg, auf dem sich seine Lehre schon befindet, abweicht. Das Wort des hl. Paulus ist aber nichts anderes als der christlich-apostolische Ausdruck des *authenticum*. Dieses steht darum hier wieder über allem im Weg.

<sup>75</sup> Man vergleiche noch folgende Texte: *In Phil.*, 1, 3—eine *Lectura*, d.h. von Reginald von Piperno reportierte Vorlesung, die Mandonnet, 'Chronologie des écrits scripturaires de s. Th.', *Revue thomiste*, 1928, 34 in den italienischen Aufenthalt 1259 — Nov. 1268 verlegt: (Text: *Mihi enim vivere Christus est, et mori lucrum. Quod si vivere in carne hic mihi fructus operis est, et quid eligam ignoro. Coarctor autem e duobus, desiderium habens dissolvi et esse cum Christo, multo magis melius, permanere autem in carne, necessarium propter vos.*) Sed hoc non videtur dubitabile. Quinimo videtur etiam Apostolus in peiorem partem declinare. Primum enim desiderium in nobis excitat dilectio Dei, secundum dilectio proximi. Maius autem et melius est desiderium primum. Igitur etc. Respondeo. Dicendum est quod duplex est dilectio Dei, scilicet dilectio concupiscentiae, qua quis vult frui Deo et delectari in Ipso: et haec est bonum hominis. Item est dilectio amicitiae, qua homo praeponebat honorem Dei etiam huic delectationi, qua fruitur Deo: et haec est

perfecta caritas. Unde Rom. 8, 38-39: *Neque mors neque vita . . . neque creatura alia poterit nos separare a caritate Dei, quae est in Christo Iesu Domino nostro.* Et subdit 9, 3: *Optabam ego anathema fieri pro fratribus meis.* Et hoc dixit, ut ostendat se esse perfectioris caritatis: quasi sit paratus propter amorem Dei et gloriam carere delectatione visionis Dei. Et ideo hoc elegit: et bene, tamquam magis perfectum.—*Quodlibetum* I, Art. 14 (al. Q. 7, A. 2) ad 2: . . . Alio vero modo aliquid est annexum perfectioni caritatis ut effectus: ut scilicet aliquis curam animarum suscipiat. Est enim perfectae caritatis, ut aliquis propter Dei amorem praetermittat dulcedinem contemplativae vitae, quam magis amaret, et accipiat activae vitae occupationes ad procurandum proximorum salutem. —Das *Quodlibet* I wird von Mandonnet, Synave und Lottin auf Ostern 1269 angesetzt (cf. *Bulletin thom.* VII, 3-4, 1930, nn. 89 und 93).—*Qu. disp. De virtutibus in communi* Art. 7 ad 4: Intellectus speculativus non ordinatur ad aliquid extra se, ordinatur autem ad proprium actum sicut ad finem. Felicitas autem ultima, scilicet contemplativa, in eius actu consistit. Unde actus speculativi intellectus sunt propinquiores felicitati ultimae per modum similitudinis quam habitus practici intellectus. Licet habitus intellectus practici fortasse (!) sint propinquiores per modum praeparationis, vel per modum meriti.—Wie sich aus einem Vergleich dieser Stelle mit *De perf. v. sp.* und besonders dem *Quodl. III*, 17 ad 4 ergibt, ist wohl die Datierung dieser *Quaestio disp.* auf 1269 (P. Glorieux, *Rech. de théol. anc. et méd.* IV, 1932, 27 f.) die einzig richtige.—Zu dieser Gruppe gehört auch ein 1256 geschriebener Text des *Opusculum Contra impugnantes* . . . Kap. 19, Ed. Mandonnet IV, S. 172, der kein neues Element bietet.

2. Im *Opusculum De perfectione vitae spiritualis* ist eine solche Revision deutlich wahrzunehmen.

Zunächst wird allerdings die Caritas dessen, der um des Apostolats willen die "Tröstungen der Kontemplation beiseitestellt", mit fast denselben Worten beschrieben wie im Sentenzenbuch. "Wenn im Dienst an den Mitmenschen, aufgrund der nach aussen gewandten Tätigkeit, der Bischof—der übrigens gerade in der Kontemplation hervorrangen muss, damit er dort aus Gott schöpfe, was er, ein Mittler zwischen Gott und den Menschen, seiner Herde mitteilen soll—von der mystischen Wonne etwas einzubüssen bereit ist, so beweist das die Vollkommenheit seiner Gottesliebe. Denn wer aus Liebe zu einem Freund die Ergötzlichkeit seiner Gegenwart für eine Weile sogar zu entbehren verlangt, um in dessen Dienst zu werken, der liebt den Freund mehr, als wenn er immer nur um ihn herum sein möchte. Sagt doch der Apostel: *Ich wünschte ja verflucht zu sein, ich selbst, von Christus, für meine Brüder*; Röm. 9, 3. (Man braucht dieses Wort nicht von der Zeit vor Pauli Bekehrung zu verstehen, wie die Glosse tut. Denn) einige Zeilen vorher spricht St. Paulus: *Weder Tod noch Leben vermag mich von der Liebe Gottes zu scheiden*; Röm. 8, 38. Und Chrysostomus erklärt: So stark hielt die Liebe zu Christus diesen Geist gefesselt, dass er bekennt, mit Christus zu sein sei ihm über alles erwünscht, und er dennoch auch dies für gering hält, weil es so Christo gefalle."<sup>96</sup>—Wir werden sehen, dass auch diese Exegese der Apostelworte später noch einmal überarbeitet und überholt wird.

Von der dem Sentenzenbuch eigentümlichen Dialektik der Gottes- und Nächstenliebe ist aber in dem *Opusculum* nichts mehr zu spüren. "Die Gottesliebe ist in der Brust mancher Menschen so stark, dass sie nicht nur Gott geniessen und ihm allein dienen möchten, sondern auch dem Nächsten Gott zuliebe. . . . Das ist aber ein offenkundiges Zeichen grösserer Liebe, dass einer dem Freund zuliebe auch um dessen Freund sich müht, statt ausschliesslich ihm dienen zu wollen:"<sup>97</sup> *Manifestum est autem, quod maioris dilectionis signum est, ut homo propter amicum etiam alii serviat, quam si soli amico servire velit.*" Die Worte sind merklich verschieden von denen des Sentenzenbuches: . . . *quia etiam in humana amicitia verus amicus quaerit magis bonum amici quam de eius praesentia delectari.* Das *soli amico* geht über den früheren Satz hinaus. Der Gegensatz ist nun nicht mehr zwischen wahrer Mystik und Apostolat, sondern zwischen falscher Mystik und Apostolat, wie es die Summa noch schärfer herausbringt. Aus der spiritualistischen und quietistischen Mystik hatten die Geraldiner Kapital gemacht. *Quandoque bonus dormitat Homerus.* Es braucht aber nur einen Geraldiner am fernen Horizont, um ihn wieder auf den Plan zu stellen.

Im Appendix des *Opusculums* steht zum erstenmal, soweit ich sehe, das

<sup>96</sup> *De perf.* 18; ed. cit. p. 235: Cum . . . episcopus mediator inter Deum et homines constituitur, oportet ipsum et in actione praecellere, inquantum minister hominum constituitur, et in contemplatione praecipuum esse, ut ex Deo hauriat, quod hominibus tradat . . . Sed etsi detrimentum aliquod in dulcedine contemplationis patiuntur propter exteriorum occupationem, quia proximis serviunt, hoc ipsum perfectionem divinae dilectionis attestatur. Magis enim aliquem amare convincitur, qui propter eius amorem iucunditate praesentiae eius ad tempus carere desiderat, in eius servitiis occupatus, quam si eius praesentia semper frui vellet. Unde Apostolus ad Rom. 9, 3, postquam dixerat: *Neque mors neque vita separabit me a caritate Dei*, postmodum

subiungit: *Optabam, ego ipse, anathema esse, a Christo, pro fratribus meis.* Quod exponens Chrysostomus dicit in *Libro De compunctione cordis* (I, 7; PG 47, 405): "Ita enim totam eius mentem devinxit amor Christi, ut etiam hoc, quod ei prae ceteris omnibus amabilius erat: *esse cum Christo* (Phil. 1, 23), rursus id ipsum, quia ita placeret Christo, contemneret."—Siehe auch *ibid.* 23, § Quod vero quinto propositum; p. 253.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.* p. 234 ff.: Perfectio enim dilectionis proximi . . . ex perfectione divinae dilectionis derivatur, quae quidem tantum in cordibus aliquorum praevallet, ut non solum Deo frui velint et ei servire, sed etiam proximis propter Deum . . . Manifestum est autem etc., wie oben im Text zitiert.

gregorianische Wort vom Seeleneifer—das *authenticum* in christlich-apostolischer Formulierung—auf der Seite der *argumenta in contrarium*, auf der es sich von nun an an den kritischen Stellen hält.<sup>98</sup> Die Geraldiner hatten sich auf diese Autorität für ihren Pragmatismus berufen.<sup>99</sup> Thomas antwortet: "Wir zögern nicht, die Autorität anzuerkennen, dass *kein Opfer gottgefälliger ist als der Seeleneifer*. Man wisse aber, dass dieses Wort nicht die Ordnung der Seelen (*ordo animarum*) verkehrt, der gemäss der Mensch zuerst für seine eigene Seele eifere, sie von aller Neigung zu irdischen Dingen reinigend. wie geschrieben steht im Buch des Weisen, Eccli. 30, 24: *Erbarme dich deiner Seele und mache sie gottgefällig*, und wie Augustinus zeigt im XXI Buch *Von der Stadt Gottes*. Es verachte also einer zunächst sich selbst und die irdischen Dinge. Schreitet er dann weiter und nimmt auch noch anderer Seelen Sorge auf sich, so wird sein Opfer vollkommener. Und dann wird es ganz vollkommen werden, wenn er durch Gelübde oder Profess zum *Eifer für die Seelen* (seine eigene eingeschlossen) verbunden wird, gleich wie der Bischof und die Religiösen."<sup>100</sup>—Dieser *ordo animarum*, von Thomas nun immer und immer wieder der geraldinischen Missdeutung des *authenticum* entgegengehalten, ist ein zu wichtiges Stück der thomistischen Gemeingutslehre, als dass man achtlos daran vorübergehen dürfte. Im Sentenzenbuch ist diese Ordnung, sonst *ordo caritatis* genannt, ein altes Erbgut patristischer, und in einem gewissen Sinne sogar schon stoischer Lebensweisheit, natürlich auch bekannt.<sup>101</sup> Sieht man aber genauer hin, so ist es das Charakteristische an den oben angeführten Stellen, dass die "Sorge für das Heil anderer Seelen", also das apostolische Gemeingut, mit jenem Teil des aktiven Lebens kontrastiert wurde, *quae circa sui moderationem (!) studet*. *Moderatio* ist ein technischer Terminus der Ethik. Dieses Einzelgut, die Arbeit an meinem eigenen moralischen Fortschritt, ist aber noch lange nicht das christliche "Heil meiner Seele", das eben in der Kontemplation, jener *singularis assecutio boni intellectus speculativi*,<sup>102</sup> besteht. Die Ausführungen des Sentenzenkommentars waren, so scheint es, auch hier zu kurz geraten. Im Opusculum geht nun Thomas, seiner Sache völlig sicher, von vornherein der richtigen Verlängerung schon früher bekannter Prinzipien zu.

Ich möchte diesen Gedanken-Gang, der für das Opusculum so charakteristisch und für unser Thema so wichtig ist, innerhalb eines kurzen Aufrisses seines ganzen Inhaltes darstellen.

Wesen und Wurzel, Mass und Gesetz der christlichen Spiritualität ist die Caritas (Kap. 1). Deren erster und erstlicher Gegenstand ist Gott, zweiter und untergeordneter Gegenstand ist der Nächste (2). Die christliche, d. i. religiöse Vollkommenheit besteht darum, erstlich und schlechthin, in der Gottesliebe, welche die Nächstenliebe in sich begreift (3-5). Es müssen also zunächst das Wesen und die Bedingungen der Gottesliebe, die ihrer ursprünglichen Kraft nach schon Nächstenliebe ist, aufgewiesen werden. Gott ist der Eine, die Welt und alles, was ihrer ist, auch das weltliche Ich, das Viele. "Es ist aber offenbar, dass das Herz des Menschen umso gerader und kräftiger dem Einen

<sup>98</sup> Es kommt jedoch auch als dekoratives Zitat im Fluss der Erörterungen vor, z. B. *De perf.* 17, p. 234.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.* 21, p. 247: Item (die Argumente der Geraldiner werden zitiert) Gregorius dicit quod nullum sacrificium est quod ita placeat Deo sicut zelus animarum.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.* 23, p. 256: Quod vero duodecimo proponitur, quod nullum sacrificium est Deo magis acceptum quam zelus animarum, absque dubitatione concedimus. Sed animarum hic ordo servandus est, ut primo homo zelum animae suae habeat, eam ab omni affectu terrenorum absolvens, secun-

dum illud sapientis, Eccli. 30, 24: *Miserere animae tuae placens Deo, ut patet per Augustinum XXI De civitate Dei* (27, 2; PL 41, 747). Sic ergo si aliquis, post contemptum terrenorum et suipsius, in hoc procedat ulterius, ut etiam aliarum animarum zelum habeat, erit perfectius sacrificium. Sed tunc perfectissimum est, quando ad zelum animarum habendum voto seu professione obligatur, sicut episcopus vel etiam religiosi ad hoc per votum obligati.

<sup>101</sup> 3 S 29, 1 ff.

<sup>102</sup> 4 S 49, I, 1, sol. 3 ad 1. Text oben in Anm. 90.

sich zukehrt, je gründlicher es sich von dem Vielen abkehrt" (6). Die Grundbedingung vollkommener Gottesliebe ist darum Weltentsagung. Indem Thomas diesen uralten Satz christlicher Mystik zugrunde legt, kommt er auf einfachem Wege dazu, das katholische Ordenswesen, das auf die evangelischen Räte aufgebaut ist, als die schlechthinnige Höchstform christlichen Lebens auf Erden anzuerkennen. Denn darin ist die Abkehr von der Welt am reinsten dargestellt und institutionell, als "Stand", befestigt (6-12). Wie aber verhält es sich nun mit der Nächstenliebe, durch die ganz prinzipiell Welt, Irdisches und Zeitliches, ob man will oder nicht, in die Gottesliebe hineinkommt: denn "der Nächste wird unter die temporalen Dinge gerechnet"? Diese Temporalia sind weder Sünde noch an sich Anlass zur Sünde. Sie sind aber mindestens nach dem Grundgesetz christlicher Mystik wie ein Staub, der die Reinheit und Vollständigkeit der mystischen Abkehr und Hinkehr befleckt und behindert.<sup>103</sup> Gleich am Anfang der Erörterungen steht der schwerwiegende, missverständliche, missverstandene und doch so lichtvolle Satz: *Proximus autem noster non est universale bonum supra nos existens, sed particulare infra nos constitutum*. Wir werden auf diesen Satz, der den *ordo animarum et caritatis* wiederum ausspricht, weiter unten zurückkommen.<sup>104</sup>—Die Vollkommenheit der Nächstenliebe, d.h. der auf den Nächsten überfließenden Gottesliebe, zeigt sich darin, dass wir dem Nächsten um Gottes willen Gutes tun (13-15). Gemäss dem Guten, das wir dem Bruder erweisen, ergeben sich gewisse Unterschiede und Abstufungen der Nächstenliebe. Eine dieser Abstufungen gründet sich auf das *authenticum*, das so einen wohlumrissenen Platz in der Theorie des christlichen Lebens erhält. Die Mitteilung von Gutem—man erinnere sich an das platonische *μεταδιδόναι τῆς ἀγαθότητος* — kann nämlich zunächst an einen einzelnen Menschen geschehen, indem man, christlich gesprochen, diesen näher zu Gott führt. Thomas spricht mit bezug auf diese Wirkung oder Wirksamkeit der Nächstenliebe von einer *singularis quaedam perfectio fraternae dilectionis*. Dieser einzelheitlichen Vollkommenheit wird aber noch etwas hinzugefügt (*additur*), wenn das spirituelle Gute nicht nur einem oder zwei Menschen, sondern einer ganzen Gemeinde getan wird. So ist ja auch nach dem Philosophen das Gut eines Volkes vollkommener und göttlicher als das

<sup>103</sup> 3 S 35, I, 3, sol. 1: (res temporales) inter quae (quas) proximus computatur.— Ueber den Staub des Irdischen siehe Text oben Anm. 91.

<sup>104</sup> In der thomistischen Gemeingutslehre kommt alles darauf an, dass man der Realität und dem Wert des Gemeingutes den richtigen Platz anweist. Cajetan hat einmal gesagt, dass das Gemeingut wesentlich zur Kategorie der Nützlichkeitswerte gehört (und darum sein Primat nur innerhalb dieser Kategorie festgestellt und diskutiert werden kann): *Illud bonum in quo fit comparatio (zwischen Gemein- und Einzelgut) non est bonum honestum . . . sed est bonum utile vel delectabile: in hoc enim genere communitas est totum, et civis pars* (In II-II, 26, 3, n. II; Ed. Leon. VIII, S. 212). Zum Verständnis dieses Satzes gehört natürlich eine genaue Auffassung der metaphysischen Gut-Kategorien: *bonum honestum* etc. So hat dieser Satz aber auch für alle diejenigen klingen mag, die auf einer primitiven Auffassung des *bonum honestum* fussend den Primat des Gemeingutes immer innerhalb der Kategorie des *bonum honestum* diskutieren, er spricht eine profunde thomistische Wahrheit sehr exakt aus. Vgl. etwa II-II, 89, 5: *Id quod non quaeritur nisi ad subveniendum alicui*

*defectui, non numeratur inter ea, quae sunt per se appetenda, sed inter ea, quae sunt necessaria; oder II-II, 179, 2 ad 3: Omnia studia humanarum actionum, si ordinentur ad necessitatem praesentis vitae secundum rationem rectam, pertinent ad vitam activam, quae per ordinatas actiones consulit necessitati vitae praesentis. Von dieser Auffassung ist Thomas nie abgewichen, auch nicht an der bekannten Stelle des Politikkommentars (3, 5): . . . homo naturaliter est animal civile. Et ideo homines appetunt ad invicem vivere et non esse solitarii, etiam si in nullo unus alio indigeret ad hoc quod ducerent vitam civilem. Sed tamen magna utilitas est communis in communione vitae socialis. Ich halte es durchaus mit Et. Huguency (*Mélanges thomistes; Bibliothèque thomiste* III, 1923, p. 352 ff.): *Le bien commun, l'utilité commune, est moyen vis-à-vis du bien final de l'individu, du plein développement de sa personnalité morale dans l'épanouissement de sa vie intérieure de divine charité; mais il est fin vis-à-vis des utilités individuelles, de tous les actes des vertus morales et des biens utiles, des moyens de perfectionnement qui sont le fruit de cette activité.**

eines Einen. Und der Apostel spricht (Eph. 4, 11 ff.) von den Hirten und Lehrern, die der Herr gab zum Werk des Dienstes an der Zurüstung der Heiligen, der Erbauung des Leibes Christi, d.i. der ganzen Kirche (14).<sup>105</sup>—Nichts beleuchtet die endgültige thomistische Auffassung des *authenticum* schärfer als diese im Rahmen einer Gesamttheorie des christlichen Lebens auftretende Zusammenstellung von Aristoteles und Paulus. Das Erste im christlichen Leben ist die personale, spirituale Vollkommenheit der Heiligen in der totalen Gottesliebe. Erst nachdem so das Wertprius des Personalen in der Ordnung der Gottesliebe fest verankert ist, steigt die wertwägende Betrachtung in die Ordnung der Nächstenliebe hinab, die sich von Gott her öffnet. Und innerhalb dieser ist das Erste und Werthöchste—gemäss dem Grundgedanken des *authenticum*—das Gemeingutsapostolat, der Dienst an der Zurüstung der Heiligen und der Erbauung des mystischen Leibes Christi, und das Zweite ist die werktätige Caritas, die jeder jedem erweist. Diese Herausstellung des absoluten Wertprius des Personalen bedeutet die grosse thomistische Tat, die nicht nur den geraldinischen Pragmatismus—und jeglichen politischen Aktivismus—aus den Angeln hebt, sondern auch die Grundlage schafft für eine Theorie der christlichen Gesellschaft von feinsten Ausmassen und wunderbarer Tiefe.—Hiernach wendet sich die Darstellung des *Opusculums* naturgemäss dem Wirken für das Gemeingut zu, dessen göttlich verordnete Organe die Bischöfe sind (16-20).

3. Das *Quodlibetum III* (Art. 17 oder nach anderer Zählung Qu. 6, Art. 3) ist für unser Thema von grosser, ja ausschlaggebender Bedeutung. In einem *argumentum in contrarium* (4) und der dazu gehörenden<sup>106</sup> *responsio* hat Thomas den Problemkomplex, der uns hier beschäftigt, mit Beziehung auf das *authenticum* in einer Vollständigkeit definiert und entschieden, wie sie auf so gedrängtem Raum sonst nie mehr in seinen Werken zu finden ist.

Das Argument beginnt mit einer interessanten Zusammenstellung von drei Autoritäten: erstens, dem *authenticum* in römischer Formulierung, das in diesem Zusammenhang auf einen von Gerald von Abbéville gebrauchten Kanon des Dekrets zurückgeht: *bonum publicum praeferendum est bono privato*. An zweiter Stelle steht, durch das charakteristische Wort *fructuosa* sofort kenntlich, die Autorität Ciceros, der lateinischen Patristik und des kanonischen Rechts: *vita activa est magis fructuosa quam contemplativa*. Die grössere Fruchtbarkeit des Werkens, ein typisch römischer Gedanke, findet auch beim Apostel Paulus (Phil. 1, 22: *fructus operis*) einen oft hervorgehobenen Ausdruck. Das dritte Zitat ist das gregorianische Wort vom Seeleneifer: *Nullum sacrificium est Deo acceptius quam zelus animarum*. Man muss die Geschichte des Problems

<sup>105</sup> *De perfectione* 13, p. 228 f.: . . . consideratur fraternae dilectionis perfectio ex effectu. Quanto enim maiora bona proximis impendimus, tanto perfectior dilectio videtur. (Es ist dann die Rede von körperlichen, von geistigen—*spiritualia bona* quae non excedunt conditionem humanam—und geistlichen Wohltaten—*spiritualia bona supra naturam et rationem existentia*—) . . . Huius modi autem bonorum collatio (ad) singularem quandam perfectionem pertinet fraternae dilectionis, quia per haec bona homo ultimo fini coniungitur, in quo summa hominis perfectio consistit . . . Additur autem ad hanc perfectionem, si huius modi *spiritualia bona* non uni tantum vel duobus, sed toti multitudini exhibeantur, quia etiam secundum philosophos *bonum gentis perfectius est et divinius quam bonum unius*. Unde et Apostolus dicit Eph. 4: *Alios*

*autem pastores et doctores ad consummationem sanctorum in opus ministerii, in aedificationem corporis Christi, scilicet totius Ecclesiae.*

<sup>106</sup> Dies ist nicht die in allen mir bekannten Ausgaben als *Ad quartum*, sondern die als *Ad sextum* gezählte *Responsio*. Der Irrtum ist daraus entstanden, dass man die Dreiteilung des *Ad primum* in die Gesamtrechnung aufgenommen und so den 5 Gegenargumenten 7 Lösungen gegenübergestellt hat. In der Angabe der Parallelstellen zu 3 S 35, I, 4, q. 2 (Ed. Moos, Paris, 1933, p. 1187) und zu II-II 182, 2 (Ed. Leonina usw.) schliessen sich die Herausgeber dieser irrtümlichen Zählung an. Der Text 185, *Mediaeval Studies*, V (1943), 162 muss demnach gestrichen und durch den in Anm. 108 abgedruckten Text ersetzt werden.

und die literarische Technik des Scholastikers kennen, um diesen Text überhaupt lesen, und erst recht, um seinen konkreten Inhalt würdigen zu können. Es wird hier ein Obersatz konstruiert, der nicht nur einem mittelalterlichen Studenten ohne weiteres verständlich ist, da er die Zitate auch ohne Angabe der Fundstellen kennt, sondern der für ihn auch eine unvergleichlich starke Ueberredungskraft hat, da er an ein noch lebendiges römisch-christliches Reichs- und Gemeindebewusstsein appelliert. — Nun ist es aber—so unterstellt das Argument—das Amt der einfachen Seelsorgspriester, der "Archidiaconen und Plebanen", dem gemeinen Nutzen zu dienen und im Werken am Heil der Seelen Frucht zu bringen. Also verdienen diese den Vorzug vor den Ordensleuten, die im kontemplativen Dienst an Gott allein nur ihrer eigenen Seele Sorge tragen.<sup>107</sup> So ist das Problem der beschaulichen Gottes- und der wirkenden Nächstenliebe, das Problem Marias und Marthas, im Hinblick auf das *authenticum* und den darin behaupteten Primat des Gemeingutes mit aller nur wünschenswerten Klarheit gestellt.

Die Antwort holt weit aus:

Wenn zwei Tätigkeiten—und die Kontemplation ist im analogen Sinn eine Tätigkeit, wenn auch kein "Werken"—miteinander verglichen und nach ihrem jeweiligen Wert gemessen werden sollen, so kommen drei Vergleichspunkte in Frage: erstens, der objektive Aktinhalt (*genus*); zweitens, die konkrete Akterumständerung (*ordo ad alium actum*); drittens, die Verfassung des tätigen Subjekts (*voluntas facientis*).

Man vergleiche z.B. nach der ersten Vergleichsweise den Aktinhalt von "jungfräulicher Enthaltensamkeit" und "Witwen-Enthaltensamkeit." Der erstere ist werthöher als der letztere. Oder man vergleiche auch, im Unsittlichen, "Mord" und "Diebstahl". Als sittlicher Unwert übertrifft Mord Diebstahl. Gleichermassen halte man "aktives Leben" gegen "kontemplatives Leben". Das erstere ist zwar, wie die Tradition hervorhebt, "fruchtbarer", d.i. an Nützlichkeitswert überlegen, jedoch ist der theologische Wert, die Verdienstlichkeit von Kontemplation schlechthin höher als die von Aktion, (entgegen der Entscheidung im Sentenzenbuch). Für diese Höherwertigkeit lässt sich übrigens auch der Traditionsnachweis erbringen. Papst Gregor der Grosse sagt dies in seinem Jobkommentar. Wenn derselbe Papst in der Ezechielhomilie den "Seeleneifer" so stark betont, (worauf das Sentenzenbuch sozusagen etwas hereingefallen ist), so will er doch nicht den Eifer für das Heil der eigenen Seele ausschliessen. Dieser geht jedenfalls (gemäss dem mystischen *ordo animarum*) allem andern vor. Denn was hülfe es dem Menschen, so er die ganze Welt gewönne, und nähme doch Schaden an seiner Seele? Matth. 16, 26.

Nach der zweiten Vergleichsweise halte man, um auch hier Beispiele zu geben, einen Akt des Fastens gegen den Akt: Essen; oder auch im Unsittlichen: einen Ehebruch gegen einen Diebstahl. Aktinhaltlich ist Fasten wertvoller als Essen, und Ehebruch ist wertwridriger als Diebstahl. Unter gewissen Umständen aber, in welche die konkreten Akte etwa eingebettet sein mögen, liegt das Wertverhältnis umgekehrt. Sich (etwa vom König von Frankreich) zum Mahl einladen zu lassen und dann den strengen Asketen herauszukehren, ist unwertig. Wertvoll dagegen ist es, unter solchen Umständen zu tun, was die

<sup>107</sup> Videtur quod presbyteri parochiales et archidiaconi sint maioris perfectionis quam religiosi . . . Praeterea (4<sup>a</sup>). Bonum publicum praefendum est bono privato (C. 7, Q. 1, c. 35; Friedberg 579 f.; zitiert von Thomas nach Gerald v. A.: *De perfectione* 22, p. 250; *Mediaeval Studies*, V, 1943, p. 137) et vita activa est magis fructuosa quam contemplativa (X, 1, 9, 10, § 11; Friedberg 111; von Thomas wiederum nach G. v. A.

zitiert *De perf.* 21, p. 246; Cicero *De off.* I, 21, 70; Gregor d. G. *Moral.* 6, 61; PL 75, 764 u.ö.) nullumque sacrificium est Deo acceptius quam zelus animarum (Gregor a.a.O.; vgl. Anm. 92). Sed archidiaconi et plebani intendunt utilitati communi multitudinis, zelo salutis animarum in activa vita fructificantes. Ergo praefendi sunt religiosi, qui salutis propriae student, in vita contemplativa Deo servientes.



Liebe erheischt. Oder im Unsittlichen: wenn man nach dem bekannten Beispiel der stoischen Ethik, das auch Augustinus verwendet, "einen Dolch stiehlt, um damit einen Mord zu begehen", so steht dieser Diebstahl sittlich tiefer als ein Ehebruch.

Nach der dritten Vergleichsweise endlich betrachtet man, wie gesagt, die subjektive Verfassung der Tätigen. Was z.B. mit grösserer Bereitwilligkeit getan wird, ist unter diesem Gesichtspunkt im Sittlichen wertvoller, im Unsittlichen unwertiger als das, was etwa nur mit innern Hemmungen geschieht.

Gehen wir nach diesen einleitenden Bemerkungen, (die etwas unverhältnismässig lang ausgefallen sind, weil die Korrektur an den Ansichten des Sentenzenbuches vorzunehmen war), auf das Problem ein, und vergleichen wir seelsorgliches Werken und mönchisches Beschauen nach diesen drei Gesichtspunkten.

Fangen wir beim dritten an. Hier ist ein wissenschaftliches Urteil unmöglich. Eine Tätigkeit, die aus grösserer subjektiver Glut der Caritas hervorgeht, ist unter dem subjektiven Gesichtspunkt wertvoller als eine andere, die einer kälteren Motivation entspringt. Das aber entzieht sich der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis. Darüber streiten wir nicht.

Die konkrete Verumständung eines Aktes, insbesondere seine konkrete Zielhaftigkeit, ist hingegen schon ein objektives und wissenschaftlich erfassbares Ding. Unter dieser Rücksicht ergibt sich, dass die beschauliche Tätigkeit des Ordensmannes dem Werken des einfachen Seelsorgspriesters an theologischem Wert unvergleichlich überlegen ist. Denn was auch immer der Mönch tut, erwächst aus jenem *Holocaustum*, durch welches die Ganzheit eines Menschenlebens vorbehaltlos Gott zum Opfer gebracht wird. Man darf hier nicht wägen, was im einzelnen getan wird, sondern entscheidend ist das Ganzheitsopfer, das allen Einzelakten des Mönches seinen gewissermassen unbegrenzten Wert mitgibt. Was immer ein Mönch Gutes tut, verhält sich zu dem, was andere tun, wie Unbegrenztes zu Begrenztem. Denn wer die Ganzheit seines Lebens bedingungslos Gott weiht, gibt etwas Unbegrenztes hin und unendlich mehr, als wer sich nur für einen bestimmten und begrenzten Gottesdienst zur Verfügung stellt. Setzen wir voraus, dass ein Mönch im Gehorsam gegen seine Regel etwas an sich sehr Geringfügiges tut. Dieses Kleine erhält aber eine unbegrenzte Wertfülle durch seine Beziehung zu dem *Holocaustum*.

Was aber nun mit bezug auf den ersten Vergleichspunkt, den der objektiven Aktinhalte? Hier müssen wir festhalten, dass *erstens* ohne Zweifel *dieses* bestimmte Einzeltun des Seelsorgspriesters im Werte höher steht als *dieses* bestimmte Einzeltun des Mönches: Seelsorge ist an sich wertvoller als Fasten oder monastisches Schweigen oder dergleichen. Stellen wir aber *zweitens* das objektive Ganze des Seelsorgewerkes dem objektiven Ganzen des Mönchslebens gegenüber, so fällt die Wertbetonung wiederum auf das letztere. Als Ganzes ist die monastische Kontemplation um vieles wertvoller als das Seelsorgewerke, auch wenn man hier an das *authenticum* denkt und Gemeingut gegen Einzelgut wägt. Zwar ist und bleibt es richtig, dass ein Gemeingut (Ziel des Seelsorgers) wertgrösser (*maius*) ist als ein Einzelgut (Ziel des monastischen Lebens), und dass darum die entsprechenden Tätigkeiten als solche, aktinhalten und abstrakt betrachtet (*in genere*), nach demselben Wertverhältnis geordnet werden müssen. (Der Fehler, den man aber hier begeht, ist, dass man die Dinge zu ausschliesslich in der Ordnung der Nächstenliebe betrachtet, ohne Acht zu haben auf die darüber gebaute Ordnung der Gottesliebe, in der das Personale als absolutes Wertprius aufscheint, gemäss dem oben angeführten Wort der Schrift, Matth. 16, 26. Denn) nicht "Seelsorgewerke um jeden Preis" verdient den Wertvorzug vor "Sorge für das eigene Heil um jeden Preis". Wenn jemand, wie der Mönch, in dem oben beschriebenen vollen-



deten *Holocaustum* sich seiner eigenen Seele widmet, so ist das um vieles grösser (*multo maius*), als wenn der einfache Seelsorgspriester auch noch so zahlreiche apostolische Einzelwerke anhäuft. (Die Dialektik des Allgemeinen und Einzelnen, des Ganzen und des Teiles, von den Geraldinern so schlaue ausgespielt, kann auch gegen sie gewendet werden, was auf dem analogen Charakter des *authenticum* beruht!) Wir leugnen natürlich nicht, dass dieser Seelsorger heilsnotwendig genügend Sorge für sein eigenes Seelenheil trägt. Wir betonen aber, dass er sich nicht in totaler und vollkommener Weise darum bemüht, wie es die Verpflichtung des Ordensmannes ist.<sup>108</sup>

Nie ist eine tiefere Apologie des Mönchtums, nie eine gründlichere Zurechtweisung auch des subtilsten Pragmatismus, nie eine genauere Erklärung (*determinata intelligentia*<sup>109</sup>) des *authenticum* geschrieben worden als in diesem Abschnitt des Quodibetum. Wir sind in unserer Uebersetzung oder Paraphrasierung genau dem Text gefolgt und haben uns nur hie und da die Freiheit genommen, die Akzente des Originals möglichst scharf herauszubringen. An der die Proportionen etwas störenden langen Einleitung ist es, so scheint mir, besonders deutlich, wie Thomas hier noch genauer als in dem Opusculum sich an die subtilen pragmatistischen Sympathien seines Sentenzenbuches erinnert.

#### 4. Aus der *Summa theologiae* brauchen wir nur einige Ergänzungen zu dem

<sup>108</sup> Ad quartum (nicht: sextum). Dicendum, quod aliqua duo opera vel in bono vel in malo possunt multipliciter ad invicem comparari. Uno modo secundum suum genus: sicut dicimus continentiam virginalem praeeminere, in bono, continentiae viduali; in malo vero, homicidium furto. Et hoc modo vita activa est fructuosior quam contemplativa, sed contemplativa merito maior est quam activa, ut Gregorius dicit in VII Moralium (? VI, 61; PL 75, 764 C). Zelus etiam animarum est sacrificium Deo acceptissimum, si tamen ordinate fiat, ut scilicet primo homo habeat curam salutis suae et postmodum aliorum. Alioquin nihil prodest homini, si universum mundum lucretur, animae vero suae detrimentum patiatur, ut dicitur Matth. XVI.—Alio modo potest opus operi comparari, in bono vel in malo, non secundum se, sed in ordine ad alium actum. Sicut abstinentia praefertur, in bono, sumptioni cibi; tamen assumere cibum cum aliquo propter caritatem praefertur abstinentiae. Et in malo: adulterium praefertur furto; tamen furari gladium ad occidendum (Cicero, De off. I, 10, 32; Augustinus, En. in Ps. 5, 7; PL 36, 86) est gravius quam adulterium.—Tertio praefertur opus operi, in bono vel malo, ex voluntate facientis. Quod enim promptiore voluntate fit, melius, vel peius, iudicatur.—Si ergo comparemus opera plebani vel archidiaconi operibus religiosorum tertio modo comparationis vel secundum promptitudinem voluntatis, tunc incertum iudicium est, quia ille, qui ex ferventiori caritate operatur, opera magis meritoria habet.—Si vero comparentur secunda comparatione, per ordinem ad aliquod aliud opus, sic opera religiosi sunt incomparabiliter eminentiora operibus archidiaconi vel plebani. Ea enim, quae religiosi agunt, ad illam radicem referuntur, qua totam vitam suam Deo devoverunt. Unde non est pensandum quid faciant, sed magis

quod ad quaelibet facienda se devoverunt. Et sic quodam modo comparantur ad eos, qui aliquod singulare bonum opus faciunt, sicut infinitum ad finitum. Qui enim dat se alicui ad faciendum omnia quae iubet, in infinitum magis se dat ei quam ille, qui dat se ei ad aliquod opus faciendum. Unde, supposito quod religiosus secundum exigentiam suae religionis faciat aliquod opus, quod sit parvum secundum se, tamen recipit magnam intensionem ex ordine ad primam obligationem, qua se totum Deo vovit.—Si vero comparentur ipsa opera secundum se, secundum primum modum comparationis, sic aliqua particularia opera, quae plebani faciunt vel archidiaconi, sunt maiora aliquibus particularibus operibus, quae religiosi faciunt. Sicut maius est intendere salutem animarum quam ieiunare vel silentium tenere vel aliqua huius modi. Si tamen omnia omnibus comparentur, multo maiora sunt opera religiosorum. Etsi enim procurare salutem aliorum sit maius quam intendere sibi soli, loquendo in genere, tamen non: quocumque modo intendere salutem aliorum praefertur ei quod est: quocumque modo intendere suae salutem. Si enim aliquis totaliter et perfecte intendit suae salutem, multo maius est quam si aliquis multa particularia opera agat ad salutem aliorum, si salutem propriae, etsi sufficienter, non tamen perfecte intendat.—Ist der Priester aber nicht als Priester dem Mönch als Laien übergeordnet? Das Ad quintum klärt diesen Punkt kurz auf, der in II-II 184, 8 eine stärkere Beachtung findet: . . . Quamvis autem habenti curam animarum sit plus commissum quantum ad dignitatem, quia tamen religiosus maiora opera facit, ut dictum est, magis meretur.

<sup>109</sup> Von diesem cum determinatione intelligere spricht mit bezug auf die authentica Albert, 1 S 46, 2; Text zitiert von Chenu, "Authentica" et "Magistralia," loc. cit., S. 279.

bisher Gesagten anzuführen. Ueberall ist der Standpunkt des Opusculums und des Quodlibet eingehalten. Die Kritik aber am Sentenzenkommentar ist viel deutlicher, schon darum auch, weil es sich hier wieder, wie in dem frühern Werk, um theologisches System und Synthese handelt.

In der II-II, 27, 8 stellt Thomas im Zusammenhang seiner endgültigen Synthese der Caritas-Lehre die Frage, was verdienstlicher sei, die Gottes- oder die Nächstenliebe. Die Caritas ist ein einiger Habitus mit einem spezifisch einen Objekt, Gott. Den Nächsten umfasst sie um Gottes willen.<sup>110</sup> Man kann aber dennoch Gottes- und Nächstenliebe im Geiste trennen und dann ihren jeweiligen Wert gegeneinander abwägen. Dann gehört zweifellos der höhere Wert der Gottesliebe. Fügt man aber das Getrennte wieder zusammen, fasst man den Habitus, wie er in Wirklichkeit ist, so hat offenbar das Problem eines Wertvergleichs keinen rechten Sinn mehr. Denn in der rechten Gottesliebe, der rechten und reinen Mystik, ist die Nächstenliebe eingeschlossen. Es wäre nur etwa möglich, eine solche Gottesliebe zu konstruieren—wie sie manche Schriftexegeten zu Röm. 9, 3 und Phil. 1, 21-24 herausgeklaut haben, und wie sie in gewissen etwas verwirrenden Texten der Väter und des kanonischen Rechtes vorausgesetzt zu sein scheint, woraus das ganze "Problem" überhaupt entstanden ist—die sich "allein" mit Gott befassen möchte, in dem Sinne, dass sie sich weigert, ihrer wesensmässigen Tendenz zum Ueberfließen auf den Nächsten zu folgen. Diese Konstruktion vorausgesetzt, ist freilich "die Nächstenliebe verdienstlicher als die Gottesliebe." Solche Gottesliebe ist jedoch unzulängliche und unvollkommene, spiritualistische Mystik.<sup>111</sup> Was aber das berühmte, dunkle Apostelwort Röm. 9, 3 angeht—*Ich wünschte ja verflucht zu sein, ich selbst, von Christus, für meine Brüder*—so mag die Glosse mit ihrer etwas verschrobenen Erklärung doch nicht ganz Unrecht haben. Das Wort bedeutet aber jedenfalls nicht, dass Paulus den Nächsten mehr als Gott geliebt hat. (Es besagt auch nichts gegen den mystischen *ordo animarum*, wonach wir Gott über alles und unser eigenes Seelenheil mehr als das der andern lieben müssen.<sup>112</sup>) Sondern es gibt zu erkennen—das ist schliesslich auch der Sinn der Erklärung des Chrysostomus—dass der Apostel Gott mehr liebt als sich selbst. Er war bereit, für eine Weile auf das Geniessen Gottes im ewigen Leben noch zu verzichten (vgl. Phil. 1, 21-24), das zur Selbstliebe gehört, um so für die Ehre Gottes in den Nächsten Frucht zu schaffen, was zur Gottesliebe gehört.<sup>113</sup> Denn dieses aus der kontemplativen Gottesliebe erfließende Werken—*contemplata aliis tradere*—hängt, obwohl es formell gesprochen Aktivität ist, so innig mit der Kon-

<sup>110</sup> II-II, 25, 1.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.* 27, 8: Comparatio ista potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, ut seorsum consideretur utraque dilectio. Et tunc non est dubium, quod dilectio Dei est magis meritoria: debetur enim ei merces propter seipsam, quia ultima merces est frui Deo, in quem tendit divinae dilectionis motus . . . Alio modo potest attendi ista comparatio, ut dilectio Dei accipiat secundum quod solus diligitur, dilectio autem proximi accipiat secundum quod proximus diligitur propter Deum. Et sic dilectio proximi includit dilectionem Dei, sed dilectio Dei non includit dilectionem proximi. Unde erit comparatio dilectionis Dei perfectae, quae extendit se etiam ad proximum, ad dilectionem Dei insufficientem et imperfectam . . . Et in hoc sensu dilectio proximi praeminet.

<sup>112</sup> In Rom. 9, 1 (bei Besprechung dessel-

ben Problems) . . . Est enim hoc contra ordinem caritatis, quo quis tenetur Deum super omnia diligere et salutem suam plus quam salutem aliorum, ut dicitur 2 Cor. 12.

<sup>113</sup> II-II, 27, 8 ad 1: Secundum unam Glossae expositionem (Verifikation in der Ed. Ottawa) hoc Apostolus tunc non optabat, quando erat in statu gratiae . . . ut scilicet separaretur a Christo pro fratribus suis. Sed hoc optaverat, quando erat in statu infidelitatis. Unde in hoc non est imitandum.—Vel potest dici, sicut dicit Chrysostomus in *Libro de compunctione* (Text oben Anm. 96) quod per hoc non ostenditur quod Apostolus plus diligeret proximum quam Deum, sed quod plus diligeret Deum quam seipsum. Volebat enim ad tempus privari fruitione divina, quod pertinet ad dilectionem sui, ad hoc quod honor Dei procuraretur in proximis, quod pertinet ad dilectionem Dei.

templation zusammen, dass es in gewisser Weise in die Species des kontemplativen Lebens übergeht.<sup>114</sup>

Nichts beleuchtet den Unterschied zwischen dem Sentenzenkommentar und den spätern Werken so scharf, wie die Tatsache, dass im Art. 2 der II-II, 182 die frühere Technik, die verschiedenartigen Autoritäten Gregors des Grossen in der Lehrkonstruktion zu verwenden, völlig und endgültig auf den Kopf gestellt ist; und wer von dem literarischen Verfahren eines Thomasartikels auch nur eine Ahnung hat, wird sich dem Eindruck dieser Tatsache nicht entziehen können. Das Wort vom "Seeleneifer" aus der Ezechielhomilie steht jetzt wieder, wie schon im Opusculum und dem Quodlibet, auf der Seite der Gegenargumente, während im *sed contra* der Text des Jobkommentars figuriert. Dieser Text ist gleichbedeutend einem andern der Ezechielhomilie, der früher ein Gegenargument bildete und nun in die ideelle Mitte des *Corpus* gerückt wird. So kann es nicht ausbleiben, dass hier jene *fortior caritas secundum genus* des Sentenzenbuches eine zwar nicht ausdrückliche—Thomas pflegt nicht ausdrücklich zu retraktieren—aber recht deutliche Zurückweisung erfährt: *Ex suo genere contemplativa vita est maioris meriti quam activa*. Mit Rücksicht wiederum auf Röm. 9, 3 wird dann der Aktion eine Ueberlegenheit faktischer Art zugestanden, in bezug nicht auf die Kontemplation als solche, sondern die Lust und Wonne der Kontemplation.<sup>115</sup> Für die Römerstelle, die früher als Eckpfeiler der ganzen Synthese verwendet war, ist nunmehr nur noch eine Nische im Lehrbau übrig geblieben. Als ein rein individuelles und schwer erklärbares Faktum wird sie an den Artikelkörper angehängt, der sich in seinem Hauptteil mit dem befasst, was *per se* gültig ist.

Zitieren wir auch hier die für unsern Zusammenhang wichtigste *responsio ad tertium*, die noch einmal mit charakteristischen Wendungen die geraldinische Missdeutung des "Seeleneifers" durch den Hinweis auf die mystische Ordnung der Seelen entkräftet. "Ein geistliches Opfer Gott darbringen bedeutet Ihm etwas zur Verfügung stellen. Unter allen menschlichen Gütern ist nun das gottgenehmste das Gut der menschlichen Seele, Ihm zum Opfer dargebracht. An erster Stelle muss man aber seine eigene Seele Gott hingeben, wie geschrieben steht, Eccli. 30, 24: *Erbarme dich deiner Seele und mache sie gottgefällig*. Erst an zweiter Stelle stehen die Seelen anderer, gemäss dem Wort der Offenbarung 22, 17: *(Und der Geist und die Braut sprechen: Komm) Und wer es höret, der spreche: Komm*. Und je näher wir unsere Seele oder die des Nächsten zu Gott bringen, umso mehr wird unser Opfer Gefallen finden. Wer darum seine eigene oder anderer Seelen dem kontemplativen Leben weiht oder zuführt, bringt ein wertvolleres Opfer, als wer sich selbst oder andere der Aktion widmet oder verschreibt. In das gregorianische Wort vom Seeleneifer darf man also nicht einen theologischen Wertvorzug der Aktion vor der Kontemplation hineinlesen. Die Autorität muss vielmehr dahin verstanden werden, dass das Opfer von *Seelen*, meiner eigenen sowohl wie der des andern, dem Opfer äusserer Güter entgegengehalten und für gewichtiger befunden wird.<sup>116</sup>"—Damit ist diese Autorität endgültig "richtig und genau

<sup>114</sup> Vgl. II-II 181, 1, ad 3.

<sup>115</sup> II-II, 182, 2: "... Potest tamen contingere, quod aliquis in operibus vitae activae plus mereatur, quam alius in operibus vitae contemplativae, puta si propter abundantiam divini amoris, ut eius voluntas impleatur propter ipsius gloriam, interdum sustinet a dulcedine divinae contemplationis ad tempus separari. Sicut Apostolus dicebat Ad Rom. 9, 3: "... Quod exponens Chrysostomus in Libro De compunctione dicit: ... (Das Zitat mit fast denselben Worten wie oben Anm. 96).

<sup>116</sup> Ibid. ad 3: *Sacrificium spiritualiter Deo offertur, cum aliquid ei exhibetur. Inter omnia autem bona hominis Deus maxime acceptat bonum humanae animae, ut hoc sibi in sacrificium offeratur. Offerre autem debet aliquis Deo primo animam suam, secundum illud Eccli. 30, 24: Miserere animae tuae placens Deo. Secundo autem animas aliorum, secundum illud Apocalypsis ultimo: Qui audit, dicat: Veni. Quanto autem homo animam suam vel alterius propinquius Deo coniungit, tanto sacrificium est Deo magis acceptum. Unde magis ac-*

verstanden". In typisch scholastischer Weise ist jene "wächserne Nase", die nach der witzigen Bemerkung des Alanus von Lille<sup>117</sup> jede Autorität hat, in die Richtung gedreht worden, wohin man sie nun haben wollte, und wohin sie in einer wohlausgewogenen theologischen Synthese auch zeigen muss.

\* \* \*

Am Problem des Pragmatismus und der "katholischen Aktion" hat sich wieder dieselbe Entwicklung im thomistischen Gedanken gezeigt, wie sie auch oben festgestellt werden konnte. Das *authenticum*, das früher die Problemlösung zu ermöglichen versprach, wird später durch andere Prinzipien ersetzt, und diese neuen Prinzipien—in Wahrheit sind es alte, auch in dem Frühwerk schon bekannte—betonen das Personale im Gegensatz zu dem früher herrschenden Akzent auf das Kommunale. Im Lichte der gereiften thomistischen Lehren hat man den Eindruck, dass der Aquinate früher sich von einer Art Entdeckerfreude hat hinreissen lassen. Waren es doch Albert und mehr noch Thomas, die das *authenticum* in der aristotelischen Formulierung in die Literatur eingeführt und zum ersten Mal in einer stattlichen Fülle theologischer und philosophischer Diskussionen zur Geltung gebracht hatten. Man denke z.B. an das Problem der "Gottesliebe über alles", das Thomas nach anfänglichen Schwankungen schon im Sentenzenbuch und dann immer wieder mit dem analogisch verstandenen *authenticum* bewältigt hat, wonach das "Gemeingut" Gott, und Gott ein und das transzendente Gemeingut ist.<sup>118</sup> Ebenso behauptet dasselbe Axiom in der thomistischen Kosmologie, besonders in der *Summa contra gentiles*, aber auch späterhin, seinen konstruktiven Platz. Es wird dort zur Stütze des christlichen Schöpfer- und Schöpfungsbegriffs gegen die griechisch-arabischen Verirrungen gebraucht, die die Einheit des Weltalls zersplittern und damit die grossen christlichen Wahrheiten vom Wissen und der Vorsehung Gottes in Gefahr bringen.<sup>119</sup> Sobald es aber um Probleme der Gesellschaft geht, hat Thomas ohne Zweifel sich zur Erkenntnis des absoluten Wertprimates des Personalen durchgearbeitet.

In diesem Problem der katholischen Aktion, oder sagen wir besser: des katholischen Aktivismus kommt bei Thomas alles zurück auf den *ordo animarum*: *Proximus autem noster non est universale bonum supra nos existens, sed particulare bonum infra nos constitutum*. Diese mystische Ordnung hat selbstverständlich mit dem "Einzigem und seinem Eigentum" nicht das geringste zu tun. An ihrer Spitze ist sie nichts anderes als die Ordnung Gottes. Gott aber kann ich nur—nicht: nur ich! ich allein!—als das höchste Intelligible in einem intellektuellen Akt personaler Natur erfassen, gleichsam zu eigen nehmen, begreifen. Wir sind oben im Sentenzenkommentar<sup>120</sup> der eigenartigen soziologischen Kategorie einer "gemeinsamen Kontemplation" begegnet. Was immer auch Thomas unter diesem Begriff verstanden haben mag, am Ende desselben Kommentars<sup>121</sup> stellt er jedenfalls die *singularis assecutio boni intellectus speculativi* der *communis assecutio boni intellectus practici* gegenüber und wertet die erstere höher als die letztere. Wenn eine "Gemeinde kon-

ceptum est Deo quod aliquis animam suam et aliorum applicet contemplationi quam actioni. Per hoc ergo quod dicitur (Gregor d. G.) *nullum sacrificium est Deo magis acceptum quam zelus animarum*, non praefertur meritum vitae activae merito vitae contemplativae, sed ostenditur magis esse meritum, si quis offerat Deo animam suam et aliorum, quam quaecumque alia exteriora dona.

<sup>117</sup> Auctoritas caereum habet nasum, id est in diversum potest flecti sensum; Alanus

v. Lille, *De fide catholica* 1, 30; PL 210, 333; zitiert von Chenu a.a.O., S. 276, Anm. 46.

<sup>118</sup> Vgl. 2 S 3, IV mit den in den Ausgaben angegebenen Parallelstellen zu I, 60, 5; I-II, 109, 3; II-II, 26, 3.

<sup>119</sup> Siehe die Texte in *Mediaeval Studies*, V (1943), 142 ff. Auf Einzelheiten hier einzugehen würde zu weit führen, da das Material ungemein reich und vielgestaltig ist.

<sup>120</sup> Text in Anm. 90.

<sup>121</sup> Text in Anm. 90.

templiert", so ist das jedenfalls etwas begrifflich und in jeder Beziehung gründlich anderes, als wenn eine Gemeinde das ethische Gemeingut verwirklicht, d.h. ihre Einheit und Ordnung, ihr moralisches Gut-Leben. Die *singularis assecutio boni intellectus speculativi*, mit einfachern Worten: die ewige Gottanschauung, ein singulärer Akt, steht im absoluten Mittelpunkt des christlichen Lebens, womit nicht ich in diesen Mittelpunkt gerückt werde, sondern Gott. In der Glückseligkeit intellektueller Wesen, d.i. in der (gnadenhaften) Geformtheit des geschaffenen Intellekts durch das höchste Intelligible,<sup>122</sup> und in allen Heilsveranstaltungen, die zu diesem Ende getroffen sind, sieht Thomas mit Augustinus das grösste Werk Gottes, ein Werk gewaltiger, schöner als die Erschaffung und Erhaltung der Himmel, der Sterne, der Erde und aller Dinge, die leibliche Augen je zu sehen vermöchten.<sup>123</sup>

Cajetan hat mit Recht darauf aufmerksam gemacht, dass "Glückseligkeit als glückseligmachender Gegenstand" und "Glückseligkeit als subjektives Ergreifen dieses Gegenstandes" bei Thomas nie gezählt werden: *numquam in numerum ponuntur*.<sup>124</sup> Das wäre in der Tat nicht nur schlechte Theologie, sondern noch schlechtere Philosophie, eine Philosophie nämlich, die die eigentümliche Einheit zwischen erkanntem Objekt und erkennendem Subjekt und das "ein-Anderswerden" des Intellekts noch nicht begriffen hätte. Der mystische *ordo animarum* ist darum zentriert im *ordo Dei*, ohne dass dabei der Gottesbegriff irgend Schaden nähme.

An dem eben genannten Satz des Opusculums sieht man aber auch deutlich, wie schliesslich durch einen weitausholenden Griff der Analogie, wodurch Gott als das *bonum universale* i.e. *bonum commune* erkannt wird, das *authenticum* auch hier wieder in einem guten Sinn zur Geltung kommt. Wenn und weil Gott das universale Gute, das "Gute alles Guten"<sup>125</sup>, die Quelle alles Guten ist, darum ist Er das "gemeine Gute", das alles und jegliches geschaffene Gute an Wert unendlich überragt: *bonum commune melius est quam bonum particulare*. Es zeigt sich hier nicht nur eine zum Teil schon von der Stoa vorbereitete, von Augustinus klar gesehene Interpretation des alten politischen Axioms,<sup>126</sup> sondern auch die typisch scholastische Behandlung des *authenticum* bei Thomas von Aquin, der in einem solchen Wort von ehrwürdigster Ueberlieferung Wahrheit und immer wieder Wahrheit sucht und sieht. Auch die Wahrheit des Wertprimats des Personalen kann noch, wie wir später sehen werden, durch das *authenticum* ausgedrückt werden. Jedenfalls aber handelt es sich dann um eine Analogie.

Schon im 14. Jahrhundert hat der Dominikaner und Lehrer Dantes, Fra Remigio de' Girolami, ein glühender und nicht ganz diskreter Florentiner Patriot, in seinem Traktat über den Primat des Gemeingutes es versäumt, auf die Gesetze der Analogie zu achten, soweit sich das aus den von R. Egenter mitgeteilten Texten erkennen lässt.<sup>127</sup> Es ist selbstverständlich wahr, dass gegenüber dem "Gemeingut", welches Gott ist, alle geschaffenen Werte ins Geringfügige gleiten. Daraus folgt aber nicht, dass der Stadt Florenz, die auch ein Gemeingut ist, der absolute Wertprimat gebührt. Und über den Wertprimat des Gemeingutes, das Florenz heisst und die Sorgen und Nöte dieser Stadt umfasst, lässt sich aus dem Wertprimat Gottes gegenüber der Kreatur nur dann

<sup>122</sup> I-II, 3, 5 ad 1: Similitudo . . . intellectus practici ad Deum est secundum proportionalitatem, quia scilicet habet se ad suum cognitum sicut Deus ad suum. Sed assimilatio intellectus speculativi ad Deum est secundum unionem vel informationem. Quae est multo maior assimilatio.

<sup>123</sup> Für Augustinus siehe *Mediaeval Studies*, 1943, p. 134 (In Ioan. Ev. 72, 3). Für Thomas I-II, 113, 9; III, 43, 4 ad 2 u.ö.

<sup>124</sup> Numquam in numerum invenitur ponere finis ut res contra finem ut adeptio; In I-II, 1, 1, n. XIII.

<sup>125</sup> Augustinus, *De Trinitate* 8, 3; PL 42, 949; Thomas, *Contra gent.* 1, 41; 3, 17; et alibi.

<sup>126</sup> *Mediaeval Studies*, 1943, p. 123, 132 ff.

<sup>127</sup> 'Gemeinnutz vor Eigennutz', *Scholastik* IX (1934), 79-92.

etwas folgern, wenn man nicht vergisst, dass Florenz eben nicht Gott ist, so sehr es sich auch als Gott aufspielt. Dann aber schiebt sich zwischen Florenz und Gott der Wertprimat des Personalen, der mit dem Wertprimat des Göttlichen nicht "in Zählung gebracht wird". Fra Remigio war zu stark an einer neuen florentinischen Ordnung, wie er sie sah, interessiert, um noch Aufmerksamkeit für die Feinheiten der Analogiegesetze übrig zu haben. Er hat die eigentliche Tiefe und den Geist des hl. Thomas nicht erkannt; nur

*wie er sich räuspert und wie er spuckt,  
das hat er ihm glücklich abgeguckt.*<sup>129</sup>

#### IV. DAS "PRIVILEG DES HEILIGEN GEISTES" UND DER THOMISTISCHE BEGRIFF DES PERSONALEN

Die schärfste Antithese, die das Mittelalter gegen das *authenticum* aufgestellt hat, ist ein Kanon des gratianischen Dekrets, C. 19, Q. 2, c. 2.<sup>130</sup> Wir müssen diesen Kanon und seine Verwendung im Schrifttum des hl. Thomas untersuchen, um dadurch den thomistischen Begriff des Personalen und dessen Beziehungen zum Sozialen noch genauer zu beschreiben als es aufgrund der bisher mitgeteilten Texte möglich war.

Der Kanon geht unter dem Namen Urbans II (1088-1099), des zweiten Nachfolgers Gregors VII und eines begeisterten Freundes und Schülers des Stifters der Karthäuser, Bruno von Köln. Jedoch ist diese Zuteilung zweifelhaft, da das Dokument sich schon in der Kollektion des Anselm von Lucca (1081-1086) nachweisen lässt.<sup>130</sup> Es betrifft das alte disziplinarische Problem der vagierenden Kleriker. Ohne die Erlaubnis seines eigenen Bischofs ist es keinem Kleriker gestattet, in einer fremden Diözese zu amtieren oder auch dorthin überzusiedeln. Diese Disziplin hat schon Leo I (440-461) festgelegt.<sup>131</sup> Wie aber verhält es sich mit den Klerikern und Priestern, die Mönch werden wollen und damit der Jurisdiktion ihres Bischofs sich entziehen? Das IV Konzil von Toledo (633) hat bestimmt, dass dieser "Vorsatz bessern Lebens" (*propositum melioris vitae*) der bischöflichen Autorität nicht untersteht. *Liberi ab episcopo* können die Kleriker den Eintritt in ein Kloster suchen.<sup>132</sup> Hier nun setzt der sogen. urbanische Kanon mit einer gründlichen theologisch-juristischen Erörterung des Falles ein. Gratian gibt ihm den Titel: *Qui monachorum propositum appetit, etiam invito episcopo recipiendus est*.

Es gibt zwei Arten von Gesetz, das öffentliche und das private. Öffentliches

<sup>129</sup> Eine These des Fra Remigio lautet: *Secundum ordinem caritatis est, ut quis praeamet Deum, secundo civitatem Dei tam militantem quam triumphantem . . . tertio seipsum, quarto quemlibet concivem in se* (Ms. Florenz, Bibl. Naz. Cod. 940 C4, Conv. Soppressi, f. 105<sup>rb</sup>; Egenter a.a.O. S. 88, Anm. 21).—Der folgende Einwand wird erhoben: *Nono sic: Dicitur Mt. 16: Quid prodest homini, si mundum universum lucretur, animae autem suae detrimentum patiatur. Et simile habetur Mc. 8 et Lc. 9. Ex quo verbo videtur, quod bonum unius singularis animae sit praeferendum bono totius mundi. —Et dicendum quod Dominus loquitur de lucro rerum terrenarum . . . Certum est autem, quod bonum animae praeferendum est omni bono terreni lucris. Si autem Dominus loqueretur de lucro hominum quantum ad salvationem, . . . sic dicendum est, quod istud tale lucrum totius mundi factum per verbum vel exemplum alicuius*

*hominis non (? sic Egenter) potest esse cum vero amore illius hominis ad totum* (Vom mystischen "Staub der irdischen Dinge" hat der gute Frate kaum eine Ahnung.) *Amor enim partis ad totum includit amorem partis ad se, et bonum totius includit bonum partis, sicut patet ex dictis. Et ideo nullus homo peccando verbo vel exemplo, puta per hypocrisim, potest amare suum commune, quia per peccatum malum verum animae suae facit et se vero odio odit. (f. 104<sup>rb</sup>; Egenter, S. 90, Anm. 25.)*

<sup>130</sup> *Corpus Iuris Canonici*, Ed. Lipsiens. secunda, Richter-Friedberg, 1879, col. 839 f.

<sup>131</sup> Siehe Ed. Lips. l.c., in der Fussnote; ebenso p. LII, col. b. Ueber Anselm von Lucca und das Datum seiner Kollektion. Fournier-Le Bras, *Histoire des collections canoniques en Occident*, II (Paris, 1932), p. 25 ff.

<sup>132</sup> C. 19, Q. 2, c. 1; loco cit.

<sup>133</sup> C. 19, Q. 1, c. 1; loco cit.

Gesetz sind die aus den Schriften der heiligen Väter ausgezogenen authentischen Kanones. Mit einem Hinweis auf Gal. 3, 19 und einer deutlichen Anspielung auf die alte patristische Gesetzestheorie<sup>133</sup> wird der koerzitive oder Strafcharakter dieses öffentlichen Gesetzes hervorgehoben. Die Kanones sind wegen der Uebertretungen und der Uebertreter aufgestellt. Auch der Kanon Leos I ist von solcher Art. Er will das Treiben vagabundierender Kleriker in fremden Diözesen, wo sie nicht bekannt sind, unter Strafe nehmen.—Privatgesetz ist hingegen das Gesetz, das einem einzelnen Menschen und für ihn durch den Heiligen Geist ins Herz geschrieben wird. Dieses ist vom Apostel anerkannt; Röm. 2, 15: *Die das Gesetz Gottes geschrieben tragen in ihren Herzen*; und Röm. 2, 14: *Wenn die Heiden, die das Gesetz nicht haben, von Natur tun, was des Gesetzes ist, sind sie sich selbst Gesetz*. Wenn also ein Weltkleriker auf Antrieb des Heiligen Geistes in einem Kloster oder Haus regularer Kanoniker seine Seele retten will, so wird er von diesem Privatgesetz (Privileg) geleitet, und es ist kein Grund, warum er von der koerzitiven Gewalt des öffentlichen Gesetzes gehindert werden sollte. Denn das private Gesetz steht an Würde über dem öffentlichen. Der Geist ist Gottes Gesetz. *„Welche der Geist Gottes treibt“* (Röm. 8, 14), die werden vom Gesetz Gottes geleitet; und wer vermässe sich, *„dem Heiligen Geist zu widerstehen“* (Act. 7, 51)? Wer immer darum von diesem Geist geleitet wird, der gehe frei seinen Weg, mit Unserer Guttheissung, mag sein Bischof auch widersprechen, wie immer er wolle. Denn *„dem Gerechten ist kein Gesetz gegeben“* (I Tim. 1, 9), sondern *„wo der Geist Gottes, da ist Freiheit“* (II Kor. 3, 17), und *„regieret euch der Geist Gottes, so seid ihr nicht unter dem Gesetz“* (Gal. 5, 18).<sup>134</sup>

Die *„Freiheit des Christenmenschen“*, die durch einen langen und peinvollen geschichtlichen Prozess zur Freiheit der Person wird—wo die Alten sagten: wer vermässe sich, dem Heiligen Geist zu widerstehen! da sagt man später: wer vermässe sich, der Freiheit und den Rechten der Person zu widerstehen!—ist im Mittelalter nie mehr so bestimmt und konkret ausgesprochen worden wie in diesem Dokument. Der *„Vorsatz besseren Lebens“*, eine personale und private Angelegenheit, fordert die normale öffentliche Ordnung heraus, da er sich ihr überlegen weiss. Der Satz *„Das Privatgesetz steht an Würde über dem öffentlichen“* stellt, besonders wenn er einmal aus dem Zusammenhang herausgezogen würde, das *authenticum* auf den Kopf. Und dieses steht doch sonst so in der Mitte des ganzen kanonischen Rechts, dass in einer oft zitierten kanonischen Regel Papst Pelagius II (578–590) sagen kann, an ihm hänge das Verständnis des kirchlichen Gesetzes.<sup>135</sup> Es ist die typische Reaktion eines mittelalterlichen Juristen,

<sup>133</sup> Vgl. Carlyle, *History of Mediaeval Political Thought* (Edinburgh and London, 1903–1936), I, 125 ff., 195 ff.; II, 143 ff.; III, 87 ff. u.ö.

<sup>134</sup> Text des Kanons nach Ed. Lips.: *Duae sunt, inquit (i.e. Urbanus Papa), leges: una publica, altera priuata. Publica lex est, que a sanctis Patribus scriptis est confirmata, ut lex est canonum, que quidem propter transgressionem est tradita. Verbi gratia: Decretum est in canonibus, clericum non debere de suo episcopatu ad alium transire sine commendatitii litteris sui episcopi, quod propter criminosos constitutum est, ne uidelicet infames ab aliquo episcopo suscipiantur personae. Solebant enim officia sua, cum non in suo episcopatu poterant, in alio celebrare, quod iure preceptis et scriptis detestatum est. § 1. Lex uero priuata est, que instinctu S. Spiritus in corde scribitur, sicut de quibusdam dicit Apostolus: „Qui habent legem Dei scriptam in cordibus suis,“*

et alibi: *„Cum gentes legem non habeant, si naturaliter ea, que legis sunt, faciunt, ipsi sibi sunt lex.“* Si quis horum in ecclesia sua sub episcopo populum retinet, et seculariter uiuit, si afflatus Spiritu sancto in aliquo monasterio uel regulari canonica salvare se (Variante: saluari se) uoluerit, quia (Variante: qui enim) lege priuata ducitur, nulla ratio exigit, ut a publica lege constringatur. Dignior est enim lex priuata quam publica. Spiritus quidem Dei lex est, et qui Spiritu Dei aguntur lege Dei ducuntur; et quis est, qui possit sancto Spiritui digne resistere? Quisquis igitur hoc Spiritu ducitur, etiam episcopo suo contradicente, eat liber nostra auctoritate. Iusto enim lex non est posita, sed ubi Spiritus Dei, ibi libertas, et si Spiritu Dei ducimini, non estis sub lege.

<sup>135</sup> C. 7, Q. 1, c. 35; ed. cit. col. 579 ff. Text *Mediaeval Studies*, 1943, p. 137.



wenn Johannes Teutonicus in seiner vor 1215 geschriebenen Glosse zu dem urbanischen Dekret mahnt, es brauche ein gutes Mass Einsicht, um sich durch diese Regel nicht irreführen zu lassen: *non fallit regula intelligentes*.<sup>138</sup> Der Dekretist, den wir an anderer Stelle ausführlich zitiert haben<sup>137</sup>, gelangt mit ihr zu einer im Hochmittelalter einzig dastehenden, ausdrücklichen und formalen Umkehrung des altehrwürdigen *authenticum*. Er sagt mit bezug auf den Kanon Urbans: *cum ergo detrimentum quis patitur* (Mt. 16, 26) *pro publica utilitate, potest suam praeponere utilitatem*. Man muss wissen, welche Macht ein authentisches Wort über die mittelalterlichen Geister hatte, um die erstaunliche formale Kühnheit dieses Dekretisten ermessen zu können.

Wie aber steht nun Thomas von Aquin zu dem urbanischen Gesetz? Wir werden im folgenden zunächst durch genaue Textanalyse die thomistische Stellungnahme herauszufinden suchen (1), um dann, auf den weitem Zusammenhang der Dinge eingehend, dem Begriff des Personalen beim Aquinaten nachzuspüren (2).

1. Was die hierhergehörende Dokumentation angeht, so kenne ich in den Werken des hl. Thomas sechs Stellen, an denen der Kanon Urbans zitiert ist.

(a) *De perfectione vitae spiritualis* 25, § Quod vero quinto; *ed. cit.*, p. 261: (Die Geraldiner stellen ein mit Zitaten des kanonischen Rechts vollgespicktes Argument auf, um darzutun: sic ergo non videtur verum quod status religionis sit perfectior propter hoc quod curati presbyteri possunt religionem intrare; 22, p. 250. Thomas weist darauf hin, dass aus den zitierten Kanones) non plus habetur, nisi quod presbyteri curati non possunt dimittere ecclesias episcopo inconsulto; et si dimiserint, puniri possunt. Sed hoc generale imprudenter applicant ad speciale, ut non possint sine licentia episcopi dimissa cura religionem intrare. Dicitur enim expresse C. 19, Q. 2, c. *Duae*, quod etiam contradicente episcopo possunt clerici saeculares ecclesiis suis dimissis religionem intrare.

(b) *Ibid. loc cit.*, § Quod vero sexto: (Das geraldinische Argument lautet: Item etiam e converso monachus pro necessitate ecclesiae et cura animarum potest transire de religione ad ecclesiam saecularem cum cura, ut habetur C. 16, Q. 1, c. *Vos autem* -30- et c. *Monachos* -29-. Nam unius utilitati praeferenda est utilitas plurimorum, ut habetur C. 7, Q. 1, c. *Scias* -35-. Thomas antwortet:) . . . non est simile, quia (monachi) non transeunt statu religionis dimisso . . . Sed archidiaconus vel curatus dimissa cura potest religionem intrare tamquam transiens de statu imperfectiori ad perfectiorem, Spiritu Dei ductus, ut habetur C. 19, Q. 2, c. *Duae*.

(c) *Quodlibetum III*, 17, s.c.: (Es handelt sich, wie bekannt, wieder um das Problem der Plebanen und Kuraten.) Sed contra est quod dicitur C. 19, Q. 2, c. *Duae*: Si quis in ecclesia sua sub episcopo populum retinet et saeculariter vivit, si afflatus Spiritu Sancto in aliquo monasterio vel regulari canonica salvare se voluerit, qui enim<sup>139</sup> a lege privata ducitur, nulla ratio exigit, ut publica constringatur.—Sed lex privata, quae est lex Spiritus, ut ibidem sumitur, numquam ducit hominem de statu perfecto ad statum minus perfectum, sed facit hominem *ascensiones in corde suo disponere*, ut in Ps. 83, 6 dicitur. Ergo status religiosorum est perfectior quam status plebanorum.

(d) *I-II*, 96, 5: Videtur quod non omnes legi subiciantur . . . Praeterea (2). Urbanus Papa dicit et habetur in Decretis, C. 19, Q. 2: Qui lege

<sup>138</sup> *Glossa ordinaria*, Ed. Lyon 1560, col. 1189. Ueber Joh. Teut. s. F. v. Schulte, *Gesch. d. Quellen u. Lit. d. Can. Rechts* I (Stuttgart, 1875), S. 172 ff.

<sup>137</sup> *Mediaeval Studies*, 1943, p. 138 f.

<sup>139</sup> Siehe den Variantenapparat bei Friedberg a.a.O. Oben Anm. 134.



privata ducitur, nulla ratio exigit ut publica constringatur.—Lege autem privata Spiritus Sancti ducuntur omnes viri spirituales, qui sunt filii Dei, secundum illud Rom. 8, 14: *Qui Spiritu Dei aguntur, hi filii Dei sunt*. Ergo non omnes homines legi humanae subiciuntur.

(e) *Contra retrahentes homines a religionis ingressu* 11; ed. cit., p. 219: (Die Geraldiner wenden gegen die Idee des Gelübdes ein, dass es eine Notwendigkeit mit sich bringe, die dem Geist und der Freiheit des religiösen Lebens widerspräche.) Inducunt etiam decretum Urbani Papae, quod habetur C. 19, Q. 2, c. *Duae sunt*, ubi dicitur, quod illi qui religionem ingrediuntur, ducuntur lege privata, quae est lex Spiritus Sancti. *Ubi autem Spiritus Domini, ibi libertas*, secundum Apostolum II Cor. 3, 17.

(f) *II-II*, 189, 7: Videtur quod presbyteri curati non possint licite religionem ingredi . . . Sed contra est quod in Decretis, C. 19, Q. 2, c. *Duae sunt leges*, dicitur. Si quis clericorum in ecclesia sua sub episcopo populum retinet et saeculariter vivit, si afflatus Spiritu Sancto in aliquo monasterio vel regulari canonica salvari se<sup>139</sup> voluerit . . . etiam episcopo contradicente, eat liber Nostra auctoritate.

Vergleichen wir diese Texte und die ihnen zugrundeliegenden Lehren.

Der Kanon *Duae* erscheint in den Werken des hl. Thomas erst im Zusammenhang mit der geraldinischen Kontroverse und dann, mit nur einer Ausnahme, immer in Verbindung mit dem Problem der Plebanen und Kuraten. In der *Prima Secundae* handelt es sich um die "Freiheit des Christenmenschen", über die Thomas schon früher häufig berichtet hat, ohne jedoch das Dekret zu erwähnen.<sup>140</sup>

Der Satz des Kanons: *Dignior est lex privata quam publica*—dieser mit so unabsehbaren Möglichkeiten erfüllte Satz ist von Thomas übergangen worden. Nur im *Quodlibetum III* findet sich die Bemerkung, die durch ein vergleichendes Studium in ihrem eigentlichen Sinn und ihrer Prägnanz sichtbar wird: Privatgesetz ist das Gesetz des Geistes, *ut ibidem sumitur*. Wenn nicht alles täuscht, so enthält dieser Zusatz die leise Andeutung eines Zweifels, ob die kanonistische Terminologie, die das Geistesgesetz ein Privatgesetz nennt, richtig sei. Wir haben oben schon<sup>141</sup> den Text des *Opusculum Contra impugnantes* angeführt, worin die Sorge für das Heil der eigenen Seele ein "Privatgut" genannt wird. Diese Benennung ist, soweit ich sehe, einzig dastehend in den Werken des Aquinaten. Ich kann mich dem Eindruck nicht entziehen, dass Thomas sie später bewusst vermieden und durch den Ausdruck "Eigengut" ersetzt hat.<sup>142</sup> Vielerlei Zeugnisse und Gründe lassen sich dafür finden.<sup>143</sup> Vor

<sup>139</sup> Siehe die Variante a.a.O. und Anm. 134.  
<sup>140</sup> 2 S 44, II, 2; 3 S 34, II, 2. sol. 1; 3 S 37, 1 ad 5; 4 S 15, III, 2, sol. 2 ad 1; 4 S 25, II, 2, sol. 1 ad 3; *Contra gent.* 4, 22; *In II Cor.* 3, 3 (ed. Marietti I, 438); *In I Tim.* 1, 3 (ed. cit. II, 187); *In Tit.* 2, 2 (II, 271); *ibid.* 3, 1 (II, 274). Aus der Summa, wo die Stellen mit Hilfe der im Sentenzenbuch besprochenen Probleme leicht zu finden sind, notiere ich nur: *I-II*, 93, 6 ad 1; *Ibid.* 108 p. tot.; *II-II*, 104 p. tot. Ebenso *Ad Rom.* 2, 3 (ed. Marietti I, 89); *ibid.* 13, 1 (I, 180).—Die Stellen aus den Schriftkommentaren sind darum von besonders hohem Interesse, weil dort das Problem historisch situiert wird.

<sup>141</sup> Anm. 28.

<sup>142</sup> Siehe *II-II*, 185, 4 ad 1: ad perfectionem religionis pertinet studium quod quis adhibet ad propriam salutem. Ebenso *Quodl.* III, 17 in 4 et ad 4; oben Anm. 107 und 108.

<sup>143</sup> Man darf, so scheint mir, nicht über-

sehen, dass an dem Ausdruck "bonum privatum" ein mittelalterlicher Scholastiker wohl kaum die Konnotation überhören kann, die sich durch die Definition des *malum* als einer *privatio boni* ergibt (vgl. insbes. I, 48, 5). Thomas kennt jedenfalls einen Begriff des *bonum privatum*, der ganz aus diesem Zusammenhang geschöpft ist; *De malo* 5, 1 ad 4: Cum beatitudo nihil sit aliud quam adeptio boni perfecti, quodcumque aliud bonum superaddatur . . . non faciet magis beatum . . . (Andererseits aber) quodlibet bonum privatum facit magis miserum, licet non quodlibet bonum additum faciat magis beatum.—Der Ausdruck "bonum proprium" enthält diese Konnotation nicht. "Kein Gutes ist einem Guten konträr, wie es in den Prädikamenten heisst (*Cat.* 11; 13b 36 ff; 3 S 26, II, 1 in 4; *II-II*, 101, 4 u.ö.)—Man kann den hl. Thomas natürlich nicht auf eine strenge Terminologie bezüglich des *bonum privatum*

allen aber widersteht es der thomistischen Theorie vom Gesetz im allgemeinen und vom Privatrecht im besondern<sup>144</sup>, das Wertverhältnis der beiden so zu ordnen, wie es im Dekret geschehen ist. Wir werden auf diesen Punkt weiter unten zurückkommen.

Die Problematik des Kanon *Duae*, wie Thomas sie sieht, besteht in folgendem.

Wird der Kanon von der Freiheit des Christenmenschen schlechthin verstanden und aus ihm eine Freiheit wider die menschliche oder gar die göttliche Ordnung konstruiert, so muss dem widersprochen werden. Solche Freiheit ist gefährliches revolutionäres Dynamit. Wie der Aquinate aus den Briefen des hl. Paulus weiss,<sup>145</sup> haben die Juden die Freiheit des Geistes zu einem politischen und sozialen Programm umgeschmiedet: Freiheit von allen weltlichen Mächten, Freiheit insbesondere der Sklaven gegen die Herren. Von den Juden ist dieser alte Irrtum zu den Gnostikern in der Urkirche gewandert; und wenn Thomas diese Dinge berichtet, mag er wohl auch an das ewige Gnostikertum denken, den ewigen Manichäismus, wie er auch in den spiritualistischen Verirrungen seiner Zeit Ausdruck fand.<sup>146</sup> Die thomistische Kritik ist hier fest und unbeirrt. Ich führe zwei besonders schöne und weniger bekannte Stellen aus den Frühwerken an, deren Lehre sachlich genau mit der Summa, insbesondere I-II, 96, 5, übereinstimmt. Im Anschluss an II Kor. 3, 17: *Wo der Geist des Herrn, da ist Freiheit* sagt die der italienischen Periode angehörende *Lectura*: "Man hat behauptet, dass der geistliche Mensch vom Gesetz Gottes frei sei. Das ist falsch. Denn Gottes Vorschriften sind die Regel für den menschlichen Willen. Kein geschaffener Wille aber, weder des Menschen noch des Engels, mag sich der Regierung und Leitung durch das göttliche Gesetz entziehen, und es ist unmöglich, dass ein Mensch, wer immer er auch sei, von diesem Gesetz frei ist. Wenn der Apostel sagt: *Einem Gerechten ist kein Gesetz gegeben (sondern den Gesetzlosen und Unbotmässigen)*; I Tim. 1, 9), so wird das folgendermassen erklärt: Das Gesetz ist nicht der Gerechten, sondern der Ungerechten wegen gesetzt, so jedoch, dass die Gerechten aus dem inneren und lebendigen Prinzip eines Habitus tun, was des Gesetzes ist. Sie bleiben daher unter demselben Gesetz, das auch den Ungerechten gegeben ist. Und gleicherweise, wenn es hier heisst: *Wo der Geist des Herrn, da ist Freiheit*, muss man dies so verstehen: *Der Freie ist Ursache seiner selbst*, der Sklave ist um des Herrn willen. Wer also aus sich selbst handelt, handelt frei; und wer durch den Antrieb eines andern handelt, handelt unfrei. Wer darum das Böse meidet, nicht weil es böse, sondern weil es verboten ist, handelt wie ein Sklave; und wer das Böse meidet, weil es böse ist, handelt wie ein Freier. Diese Freiheit aber gibt uns der Geist Gottes, der unsern Geist von innen her durch den (eingegossenen) Habitus formt und festigt, sodass wir aus freier Liebe meiden, was das Gesetz verbietet. Wir handeln dann so, als ob das

und *bonum proprium* festlegen; vgl. insbesondere I-II, 19, 10 und III, 18, 6.

<sup>144</sup> I-II, 90, 2; *ibid.* 96, 1 ad 1: *Quaedam vero (iura legalia) sunt, quae sunt communia quantum ad aliquid, et singularia quantum ad aliud. Et huius modi dicuntur privilegia, quasi leges privatae, quia respiciunt singulares personas, et tamen potestas eorum extenditur ad multa negotia.* —Vgl. unten Anm. 166.

<sup>145</sup> Es mag auch folgende Stelle des Flavius Josephus, *Antiq. Iud.* 18, 1, 6; *Opera*, ed. Oxford, 1720, II, p. 794a et b, die Quelle der Kenntnisse des hl. Thomas sein: *Iudas ille Galilaeus quartam (sectam) introduxit hominum, qui ceteroquin cum Phariseis sentiunt, sed libertatem sic amant, ut eam mordicus tueantur, Deum unum pro rectore*

et Domino habentes. Varias etiam mortes subeundas, cognatorumque supplicia et amicorum nihil faciunt, dummodo hominum neminem dominum appellent . . . Hinc et ista ex amentia aegrotare coepit gens, Gessio Flore praeside, dum potestate sua abutitur, eos ex desperatione adigente ad defectionem a Romanis. Atque ita philosophatum est a Iudaesis.—Für Thomas siehe die Texte in den Kommentaren zum I Timotheus- und Titusbrieft.

<sup>146</sup> *Errores ex Introductorio in Evangelium aeternum excerpti*, Denifle, *Cart. Univ. Par.* I, 273: *Prop. 4 II libri: Viri spirituales non tenentur Romanae ecclesiae obedire, nec acquiescere eius iudiciis in hiis que Dei sunt.*

Gesetz nicht bestünde, und sind doch unter dem Gesetz.<sup>147</sup>—Warum, fragt Thomas in der *Lectura* zum Titusbrief aus der gleichen Periode, hat Paulus so oft und eindringlich die Unterwürfigkeit der Sklaven betont? „Aus gutem Grund. Denn es ging die jüdische Häresie um, die auch ins Christenvolk gedrungen war: wie sollten noch die Knechte Gottes Knechte von Menschen sein? Indessen ist Christus, und ist der christliche Glaube nicht gekommen, die menschliche Ordnung und Gerechtigkeit aufzuheben. Der christliche Glaube bewahrt, was zur Menschenordnung gehört. Und das ist, dass der eine dem andern unterworfen sei. Man muss freilich bedenken, dass solche menschliche Sklavenschaft sich nur auf den Körper bezieht. Durch Christus ist die innere Knechtschaft der Seele gebrochen, jedoch nicht die äussere Knechtschaft des Leibes, gleichwie auch nicht die Verweslichkeit des Fleisches.“<sup>148</sup>

Auch die normale Sorge des gewöhnlichen Christenmenschen für das Heil seiner eigenen Seele (*“sufficienter salutis propriae intendere”*) geht innerhalb der menschlichen Ordnungen vor sich, von ihnen gefördert, geschützt, und ihnen unterworfen. Thomas kann dies umso leichteren Sinnes halten, als er glaubt, dass in seiner Zeit dem Leviathan, der früher einmal sein Haupt gegen die Christen erhoben hatte, nun endgültig der Nacken gebrochen ist. Die politische Ordnung des Hochmittelalters—das ist eines der seltenen konkreten Geschichtsurteile in den Werken dieses so konsequent abstrakten Denkers—bietet genügend Garantien, um den Leviathan in Schach zu halten.<sup>149</sup> Wie aber

<sup>147</sup> *In II Cor. 3, 3*: Sciendum autem quod occasione istorum verborum, scilicet *Ubi Spiritus Domini, ibi libertas*, et illorum, scilicet *Iusto lex non est posita*, aliqui erronee dixerunt, quod viri spirituales non obligantur praeceptis legis divinae. Sed hoc est falsum. Nam praecepta Dei sunt regula voluntatis humanae. Nullus autem homo est, nec etiam angelus, cuius voluntatem non oporteat regulari et dirigi lege divina. Unde impossibile est aliquem hominem praeceptis Dei non subdi. Hoc autem quod dicitur: *Iusto lex non est posita* exponitur, i.e. propter iustos, qui interiori habitu moventur ad ea quae lex Dei praecipit, lex non est posita, sed propter iniustos: non quin etiam iusti ad eam teneantur. Et similiter: *Ubi Spiritus Domini, ibi libertas*, intelligitur, quia *liber est qui est causa sui* (*Metaph. A; 982b 26*), servus autem est causa domini. Quicumque ergo agit ex seipso, libere agit; qui vero ex alio motus, non agit libere. Ille ergo, qui vitat mala, non quia mala, sed propter mandatum Domini, non est liber. Sed qui vitat mala, quia mala, est liber. Hoc autem facit Spiritus Sanctus, qui mentem interius perficit per bonum habitum, ut sic ex amore caveat, ac si praeciperet (? non praeciperet) lex divina. Et ideo dicitur liber, non quin subdatur legi divinae, sed quia ex bono habitu inclinatur ad hoc faciendum, quod lex divina ordinat.

<sup>148</sup> *In Tit. 2, 2*: Et quare monet hoc tam frequenter Apostolus? Respondeo. Non sine causa. Haeresis enim incepit apud Iudaeos, quod servi Dei non deberent servire hominibus (*oben Anm. 145*); et ex hoc etiam derivatum est in populo christiano quod dixerunt, quod per Christum filii Dei facti non deberent esse servi hominum (*oben Anm. 146*). Sed Christus per fidem non venit tollere ordinem iustitiae, immo per fidem Christi iustitia servatur. Iustitia autem facit alios aliis subdi. Sed servitus huius modi est quantum ad corpus. Nam

per Christum nunc liberamur a servitute quantum ad animam, sed non a servitute nec a corruptione corporis.—Es gehört die ganze Hypokrisie unserer Tage dazu, um, wie es zuweilen auch „Thomisten“ tun, auf diese Anerkennung der Sklaverei *quantum ad corpus* bei den Vätern und Thomas von Aquin wie auf einen Rückstand aus barbarischen Zeiten hinunterzublicken. Man bejaht in weitem Ausmasse den servilen Staat und die servile Wirtschaft mit ihrer ungeheuren Seelenveräußerung, und meint doch, die Alten seien nachgiebige Schwächlinge gewesen. Dabei weiss Thomas sehr wohl und spricht es mit einer Kühnheit und Folgerichtigkeit aus, die nachzuahmen kaum irgendwer den Mut gefunden hat: dass jeder, in jeglicher Art von Gehorsam gesetzte Akt von der absoluten und idealen Reinheit des *agere ex seipso* abfällt und einen Flecken des *agere ab altero* aufnimmt, das an sich zu den irrationalen Wesen gehört; *I-II, 1, 2 ad 1*. Aber Gehorsam ist nötig, weil der Mensch eben auf der „Grenze“ zwischen intellektuellen und körperlichen Wesen existiert.

<sup>149</sup> *Quodlib. XII* (aus den letzten Lebensjahren) Art. 19 (al. 13, 1) ad 2: (utrum sit una Ecclesia, quae fuit in principio tempore Apostolorum, et quae est modo) . . . Augustinus respondet in *Epistola* contra Donatistas (*Ep. 185, 5, 19; PL 33, 801*), et habetur super illud Ps. 2, 1: *Quare fremuerunt gentes* (welche Glosse?). Fuit enim tempus, quando *astiterunt reges adversus Christum*. Et in illo tempore non solum non dabant fidelibus, sed eos occidebant. Aliud vero tempus est nunc, quo reges „intelligunt“ et „eruditi serviunt Domino“ Iesu Christo „in timore“ etc. Et ideo in isto tempore reges sunt vassalli Ecclesiae. Et ideo est alius status Ecclesiae nunc et tunc, non tamen est alia Ecclesia.—Wie Thomas dieses Urteil begründet haben würde, weiss ich nicht. In seiner Allgemeinheit, und von strikter

steht es um die Freiheit der Heiligen, die in totaler und vollkommener Weise ihrem Seelenheil obliegen (*"totaliter et perfecte suae saluti intendere"*; *Quodlib. III, 17 ad 4*)? Es ist an dieser, so gestellten Frage, dass sich die thomistische Lehre vom Wertprimat des Personalen und zugleich der Begriff dieses Personalen entscheiden. Hier, und nirgendwo anders, ist der Punkt, an dem Thomas das Privatgesetz, oder sagen wir vielleicht besser: Personalgesetz des Heiligen Geistes als das Prinzip einer personalen Ordnung, die das Soziale überragt, zur Geltung bringt. Das Personale ist nicht die Person von Hinz und Kunz, sondern die des "heiligen Johannes des Täufers, und des heiligen Antonius des Einsiedlers, und des heiligen Benedikt, des Vaters der abendländischen Mönche"—um die von Thomas selbst gebrauchten Beispiele anzuführen.<sup>150</sup>

Wir haben oben in genügender Breite über den Text des *Quodlib. III, 17* berichtet, in dem schliesslich das Letzte steht, was man vom thomistischen Standpunkt über all diese Dinge sagen kann. Fügen wir hier eine Stelle aus dem Sentenzenbuch hinzu—eine Stelle übrigens, die auch zeigt, wie verschlungen eigentlich die Pfade der thomistischen Lehrentwicklung sein können. Es handelt sich um das Problem der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen. Gegen die revolutionären gnostischen Bestrebungen und Theorien wird zunächst wiederum geltend gemacht, dass ein wahres Regiment unter Menschen die Freiheit der Untergebenen ja nicht antastet. Denn die Regierung, die das Wohl der Untertanen im Auge behält, hat mit Sklavenhalterei so wenig zu tun, dass sie auch im Paradies bestanden haben würde. Warum sollte sich darum unter einer solchen Regierung die Freiheit der Kinder Gottes, die Freiheit zum Guttun, nicht voll ausbreiten können?—Thomas aber ist mit dieser Antwort nicht zufrieden. Er fügt eine alternative Lösung (*vel dicendum*) bei, die, wie so oft, das Problem auf einer tieferen Ebene anschnidet und die bessere ist: "Freie Kinder Gottes sind im Sinne der Schrift nicht alle Christenmenschen, sondern nur Christus und seine Jünger, die nicht unfreien Standes waren, und die auch kein irdisches Gut besaßen, das sie in eine irdische, politische Ordnung hätte einfügen können. Denn diese politische Ordnung baut sich auf dem Privateigentum auf, aus dem z.B. Steuern gezahlt werden. Infolgedessen lässt sich das Problem der Freiheit des Christenmenschen auch so lösen, dass man nicht jeden Christen an der Freiheit des Geistes teilhaben lässt, sondern nur diejenigen, die wie Christus und die Apostel nichts in dieser Welt besitzen und in jeder Weise 'freien Standes' sind."<sup>151</sup>—Das sind die Bischöfe, die nicht für

Vassallität verstanden, entspricht es nicht den Tatsachen. Es kommt aber hier darauf an zu erkennen, wie Thomas den Leviathan für endgültig gebunden hält. Welches Urteil auch sonst die thomistische Lehre nicht unerheblich färbt. Wenn immer Thomas von "ungerechten Gesetzen", von "Tyrannei" usw. spricht, so berührt er Dinge, die er eigentlich nur aus Büchern weiss. G. v. Hertling hat sich darüber beklagt, dass bei Thomas "gegenüber der Wertschätzung des Gemeinwesens das Recht (! subjektives Recht) und die Freiheit des Individuums hier und da stärker betont werden könnte"; *Th. v. A. u. die Probleme des Naturrechts; Historische Beiträge* (München, 1914), S. 29. Die eigentümliche abstrakte Ruhe und, man möchte fast sagen: farblose Blässe der thomistischen Haltung wird immer von den neueren Darstellungen verfehlt, die alle vom Kampfeslärm gegen die Tyrannen und für die Freiheit und die Rechte des Individuums und der Person erfüllt sind.

<sup>150</sup> *In Pol. I. 1; II-II, 188, 8.*

<sup>151</sup> 2 S 44, II, 2: *Videtur quod christiani*

*non teneantur saecularibus potestatibus obedire, et praecipue tyrannis. Mt. 17, 25 dicitur: Ergo liberi sunt filii. "Si enim in quolibet regno filii illius regis, qui regno illi praefertur, liberi sunt, tunc filii Regis, cui omnia regna subduntur, in quolibet regno liberi esse debent". (Dies ist der Glosse entnommen, wie II-II, 104, 6 in I zeigt; siehe die Verifikation in der Ed. Ottawa, 1970b 2). Sed christiani effecti sunt filii Dei . . . Ergo ubique sunt liberi, et ita saecularibus potestatibus obedire non tenentur . . . Ad primum ergo. Dicendum, quod illa praelatio, quae ad utilitatem subditorum ordinatur, libertatem subditorum non tollit. Et ideo non est inconveniens, quod tali praelationi subiaceant, qui per Spiritum Sanctum filii Dei effecti sunt. Vel. Dicendum, quod Christus loquitur de se et suis discipulis, qui nec servilis conditionis erant, nec res temporales habebant, quibus suis dominis obligarentur ad tributa solvenda. Et ideo non sequitur quod omnis christianus huius modi libertatis sit participes, sed solum illi, qui sequuntur apos-*

sich, sondern für ihre Herde besitzen, und die Mönche und Mendikanten. Sie alle sind schon auf Erden die wahren "Söhne des Königs", die nach der Schriftglosse in jedem Reich frei sind und denen alles Gut im Reich unterworfen ist. Die "Freiheit der Kinder Gottes" hat noch einen anderen, tieferen Sinn als den revolutionär-gnostischen, und dieser Sinn bewahrheitet sich in Christus und seinen Jüngern, die mit dem Herrn bis ans Voll-Ende der mystischen Weltentsagung gehen.—Mit diesem Stück franziskanischer und dominikanischer Prägung sind wir schon mitten in der Sache des Kanon *Duae*, im Personalgesetz des Heiligen Geistes, das alle soziale Ordnung überragt, nicht indem es sie zerstört, sondern weil es sie formt.

2. Der Gedanke der Formung des Sozialen durch das Personale—oder anders gesagt: der Begriff des Personalen als des formalen, spezifischen und darum erstrangigen Teils des Sozialen hat bei Thomas einen so reichen und vielgestaltigen Ausdruck gefunden, dass man gegenüber der Fülle von Texten in Verlegenheit ist, welche auszuwählen und voranzustellen. Beschränken wir uns auf einen kurzen Hinweis auf drei Textgruppen, deren Hauptstücke wir den Kommentaren zur Ethik (a), zur Politik und Metaphysik (b) und der Theologie der Prädestination und Reprobation entnehmen (c).

(a) Es ist eine auffällige Tatsache, dass Thomas an der einzigen Stelle, wo er *ex professo* eine Begründung für das aristotelische *authenticum* gibt, diesen Satz personalistisch versteht und ihm eine personalistische Fundierung unterlegt. Dies ist *In Eth.* 1, 2; ed. Pirotta, n. 30. Warum ist in der Tat ein allgemeines Gut das bessere und mehr gottähnliche? Mit Eustratios, dem der Gedankengang hier nachgebildet ist, stützt sich Thomas auf ein "platonisches" Prinzip. "Wie jede Ursache umso früher und wertvoller ist, je mehr Wirkungen sie umfasst, so ist auch dasjenige Gut besser und werthöher, das mehr Güter in seiner finalursächlichen Ordnung umgreift und auf sich bezieht . . . Es ist zwar gut und gehört zu der Liebe, die unter den Menschen herrschen muss, dass man einem einzelnen Menschen Gutes tut. Indessen ist es 'viel besser und gottähnlicher', dass man, um den aristotelischen Wortlaut zu benutzen, dies dem 'ganzen Volk und den Städten darin' . . . tut. Und dass dies 'gottähnlicher' ist, erhellt daraus, weil Gott die erste Ursache alles Guten und aller Gutmitteilung ist."<sup>152</sup>—So wird das *authenticum* hier klar auf die Gutmitteilung, d.h. einen personalen Akt gestellt.<sup>153</sup> Es ist ein personaler Akt, dem das Universum Sein und Bestand, Einheit und Ordnung verdankt.<sup>154</sup> Durch personale Akte werden auch im menschlichen Raum die Gemeinschaften gegründet und erhalten,<sup>155</sup> und in personalen Akten vollzieht sich das Leben in diesen

tolicam vitam, nihil in hoc mundo possidentes et a conditione servili immunes.—In der Parallelstelle *II-II* l.c. wagt sich Thomas nicht mehr so weit vor.

<sup>152</sup> Manifestum est . . . quod unaquaque causa tanto prior est et potior, quanto ad plura se extendit. Unde et bonum quod habet rationem causae finalis, tanto potius est, quanto ad plura se extendit . . . Pertinet quidem ad amorem, qui debet esse inter homines, quod homo conservet bonum etiam uni soli homini. Sed "multo melius et divinius" est quod hoc exhibeatur "toti genti et civitatibus" . . . Dicitur autem hoc esse "divinius", eo quod magis pertinet ad similitudinem Dei, qui est ultima causa omnium bonorum.—Siehe Eustratios, *op. cit.*, p. 17<sup>10</sup>-18<sup>4</sup>.—Dass es sich in dem Obersatz dieses Argumentes um ein "platonisches" Prinzip handelt, darüber ist sich Thomas klar, wie aus *De div. nom.* 4, 2 (Ed. Man-

donnet II, 342) hervorgeht: Considerandum est, secundum platonicos, quod quanto aliqua causa est altior, tanto ad plura se extendit eius causalitas.—Ueber die platonische Quelle mag uns Albert belehren: Quanto aliquid est magis propinquum primo, tanto pluribus donis et officiis et potestatibus participat bonitatem eius. Scribitur per sensum in *Libro De causis*, quia est correlativum cuiusdam propositionis (4 S 24, 2; ed. cit. 30, 32).—Siehe auch Albert, *In Eth.* 1, 3, 14; Ed. Borgnet 7, 49: . . . Dicit Eustratius, quod politicus maxime Deo assimilatur.—Siehe unten Anm. 167a.

<sup>153</sup> Bonum unius fit multis commune, si ab uno in alia derivatur, quod non potest esse, nisi inquantum diffundit ipsum in alia per propriam actionem; *Contra gent.* 3, 69.

<sup>154</sup> Divina bonitas est primum principium communicationis totius; 4 S 46, I, 1, sol. 2.

<sup>155</sup> *In Politica* 1, 1; *De regim. princ.* 1, 13.

Gemeinden,<sup>156</sup> das nichts anderes ist als Mitteilung von Gut und Gütern, ein umso kräftiger pulsierendes Leben, je mehr ein Gut sich zur Mitteilung eignet und je weiter es ausgeteilt wird. Jedes Gut ist als solches mitteilungs-fähig.<sup>157</sup> Die geistigen Güter aber ragen in dieser Beziehung hervor,<sup>158</sup> und an seiner Spitze ist Gemeinschaftsleben die Kommunikation geistiger Güte und Güter.<sup>159</sup> Im Prinzip ist es das körperliche Privatgut oder -eigentum—ein geistiges Privateigentum gibt es nicht—das die Sozialität des Menschen behindert.<sup>160</sup> Privateigentum verbindet nicht, sondern trennt. Es bildet besten Falles jene Konglomeration, von der Aristoteles sagt, dass darin "jeder wie in seiner eigenen Stadt lebt",<sup>161</sup> sein Eigen mit einem Zaun umgebend, aus dem er hervorsticht, nicht um Gemeinschaft mit dem andern zu pflegen, sondern um ihn aus seinem Gehege herauszuhalten. Es muss darum auch, soll Gemeinschaft unter Privateigentümern sich bilden—und das ist die abendländische christliche Gemeinschaft—der Privatbesitz durch Mittelsamkeit,<sup>162</sup> das Privatgut durch Gemeingut, die Gerechtigkeit durch Liebe<sup>163</sup> überhöht werden, die die einzige gemeinschaftsbildende Kraft ist.<sup>164</sup>

Die letzte metaphysische Reduktion von Gemeingut und Gemeinschaft ist bei Thomas das Prinzip des Dionysios: *bonum est diffusivum sui*<sup>165</sup>; ein personales Prinzip, da das Ausfliessen des Guten als nichtpersonaler Akt überhaupt nicht denkbar ist. Und die letzte ethische Reduktion von Gemeingut und Gemeinschaft ist die Liebe: eine personale Eigenschaft und Tat. Man versteht es nun, wie auf der einen Seite das thomistische Personale nicht etwa die nackte ontologische Form von Personalität ist, sondern die ethisch erfüllte Vollkommenheit von Persönlichkeit. Denn nur wer hat, kann geben. Und auf der andern Seite sieht man, warum Thomas nicht, wie es der zeitgenössische Glossator des Dekrets tut, das *authenticum* auf den Kopf stellt, sondern es durchhält. Thomas braucht dieses drastische Auskunftsmittel nicht, er kann

<sup>156</sup> Dass das soziale Ganze eine Tätigkeit hat, die nicht die Eigentätigkeit der Teile ist (Habet nihilominus et ipsum totum aliquam operationem, quae non est propria alicuius partium; In Eth. 1, 1) erschüttert jedenfalls nicht das andere Prinzip: Actiones sunt suppositorum. Die soziale Aktion ist nach Thomas die auf ein spezifisch eines Ziel gerichtete Vielzahl von physisch verschiedenen Einzelaktionen mit physisch verschiedenen Trägern, so jedoch, dass diese Vielzahl nicht eine bloss Zusammenfassung, sondern einen moralischen Organismus bildet. Das Ziel ist aber ein personales, durch personale Bestimmungen konstituiertes. In diesem Sinne sprechen wir hier von personalen Akten, durch die das Leben einer Gemeinschaft aufgebaut wird.  
<sup>157</sup> Pertinet ad rationem boni, ut se aliis communicet, ut patet per Dionysium; III, 1, 1; I, 106, 4; De div. nom. 1, 1 (ed. cit. p. 235).

<sup>158</sup> Quod plus habet de ratione bonitatis, plus habet de ratione diffusionis; De verit. 27, 3 in 3.—Bona spiritualia sunt magis multiplicabilia; 4 S 42, I, 3, q. 2, s.c.

<sup>159</sup> Ein sehr schönes und weniger bekanntes Zeugnis hierfür ist In II ad Thessal. 3, 2: Homines non uniuntur inter se nisi in eo quod est commune inter eos; et hoc est maxime Deus.—Ebenso 4 S 13, II, 1: Prima congregatio, quae est in hominibus, est per viam cognitionis.

<sup>160</sup> "Quod dat aliquis, iam non habet": patet esse falsum in spiritualibus, quae communicantur non per translationem

alicuius domini, sicut accidit in rebus corporalibus, sed magis per modum emanationis cuiusdam effectus a sua causa: sicut qui communicat alii scientiam, non propter hoc scientiam amittit. . . . Unde et de communicatione rerum spiritualium dicit Augustinus in I De doctrina christiana (cap. 1): "Omnis res, quae dando non deficit, dum habetur et non datur, nondum habetur quomodo habenda est;" Contra imp. Dei cult. 4 (ed. cit. p. 54)—Spiritualia bona simul a pluribus integre possideri possunt 3 S 27, I, 1 (ibid. 30, 1 ad 4; In I Cor. 3, 1; I-II, 28, 4 u.ö.)—Bona corporalia se invicem impediunt in diversis; 3 S 30, 1 ad 4.—Ueber diese für die patristische und scholastische Sozialtheorie so ungemein wichtige Güterlehre, die wohl in Dante (*Purgatorio* 4, 49-72) ihren herrlichsten Ausdruck gefunden hat, siehe F. Kern, *Humana civitas*, (Leipzig, 1913), S. 169 ff.

<sup>161</sup> Pol. 3, 9; 1280b 25.

<sup>162</sup> II-II, 66, 2.

<sup>163</sup> Siehe insbesondere das *Caput anecdotum* in *Contra gent.* III; Ed. Leonina XIV, Appendix, p. 47<sup>a</sup>.

<sup>164</sup> Dicit Dionysius in IV cap. De divin. nom. quod amor quilibet est virtus unitiva; I-II, 28, 1, s.c.

<sup>165</sup> Die vielen Texte sind zusammengestellt bei J. Péghaire, 'L'axiome: *bonum est diffusivum sui* dans le néoplatonisme et le thomisme'; *Revue de l'Univ. d'Ottawa* II (1932), Sect. spéc., 5 ff. Dazu die Ergänzungen im *Bulletin thomiste* IX, 2 (1932), 522.

gelassenen Geistes an dem altherwürdigen Satz festhalten. Denn im Grunde ist dieser Satz, der mit dem transzendentalen Begriff von Gut das freie Spiel der Analogie erlaubt, ein personales Prinzip. Es findet seine erste Bewahrheitung in der höchsten Person, in Gott, der das erste Gemeingut ist und die Quelle aller Mitteilung von Güte und Gütern. Der thomistische fundamentale Begriff des Gemeinguts ist ein personaler: *bonum quod . . . ad unum aliquem pertinet secundum seipsum, non tamen uni soli utilia (sic), sed multis*.<sup>166</sup> Und die Skepsis, die der Aquinate gegen den Namen "Privatgesetz", dem Gesetz des Heiligen Geistes beigelegt, zeigt, erklärt sich einfach und folgerichtig daraus, dass in dem angegebenen Fall man ebensogut von personalem Gemeingut wie von kommunalem Eigengut sprechen kann. Auch ist, wie bekannt, der Begriff des Privatgesetzes oder Privilegs bei Thomas in der gleichen Art interpretiert.<sup>167</sup>

Die Verbindung des Dionysios mit Aristoteles an dieser Stelle des Ethikkommentars ist historisch von höchstem Interesse. Sie zeigt den gewaltigen Einfluss, den der spätantike Platonismus auf Thomas ausgeübt hat. Nach ihm bestand das Regierungsgeschäft im wesentlichen in jener *μετάδοσις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*, die den Herrscher gottähnlich machte, so dass er in der "Stadt" wie Gott im Komos stand und wirkte, als ihr Gründer und Erhalter. Die Zeugen dieses Platonismus, wie sie dem Aquinaten erreichbar waren, sind nicht nur die beiden genannten Griechen, Dionysios und Eustratios, sondern auch lateinische und patristische Dokumente. Wie in der griechischen Antike der Plato der *Politeia* das Uebergewicht des Gemeinen bis ins Unerträgliche gesteigert, so hat dieser Platonismus der Spätantike dazu beigetragen, genau derselben Unerträglichkeit die Spitze zu nehmen. Es musste dazu "nur" die platonische Gutmitteilung als personale Tat erkannt werden, und zwar letztlich als personale Tat Gottes. Dann war es auch möglich, und hatte sogar einen guten und tiefen Sinn, diejenigen, die unter den Menschen als Austeiler von Güte und Gütern anzusehen waren—ist nicht der Gründer einer "Stadt" der grösste Wohltäter der Menschen?—für "gottähnlich" zu erklären. Das grosse geschichtliche Verdienst des hl. Thomas besteht darin, durch diese Interpretation des *authenticum* dessen Wahrheit auf das christenmögliche Mass beschränkt und so gerettet zu haben. Damit hat er sich recht eigentlich den Weg zu einer christlichen Sozialphilosophie gebahnt.<sup>167a</sup>

<sup>166</sup> *Contra gent.* 3. 80. Der Text steht im Zusammenhang mit dem bekannten Stück der Engellehre, wonach die Ordnung der "Dritten Hierarchie" mit der Ordnung der menschlichen Güter bestimmt wird. Vgl. 2 S 9, 1, 1; I, 108, 6; 113. 3.—Wie diese Lehre im einzelnen zu erklären sei, bleibe hier dahingestellt. Jedenfalls ist der in der Engellehre und für deren Zwecke an zweiter Stelle gebrauchte Begriff des Gemeinguts—der erste ist: *bonum commune, quod in communitate consistit*—in Wahrheit der erste und fundamentale, wie sich aus *In Eth. loc. cit.* klar ergibt. Auch darf man nicht vergessen, dass in der Engellehre der Summa Thomas scharf hervorgehoben hat: *quilibet homo vel angelus, inquantum adhaerendo Deo fit unus spiritus cum eo, est superior omni creaturae*; I, 112, 1 ad 4. Vgl. Albert, *Summa theol.*, Text zitiert in *Mediaeval Studies*, 1943, p. 142, n. 8.

<sup>167</sup> Oben Anm. 144.

<sup>167a</sup> Siehe Anm. 55 und 152. Dionysios ist bei Eustratios als "der grosse Dionysios" zitiert (Heylbut, 4. 38).—Ueber den spätantiken politischen Platonismus unterrichtet am besten die ergebnisreiche Studie von Erwin R. Goodenough, "The Political Philosophy of Hellenistic Kingship", Yale

*Classical Studies*, I (1928), 55–102.—*De reg. princ.* 1, 12 (vgl. auch 1, 9) sagt Thomas: *Hoc igitur officium rex suscepisse cognoscat, ut sit in regno, sicut in corpore anima et sicut Deus in mundo*. Das stimmt wörtlich überein mit dem bei Stobaeus (*Anthol.* IV, 7, 61; Ed. Hense II, Berlin 1909, p. 265, 6) überlieferten Fragment des Diotogenes, des "Pythagoräers": *echei de kai hos theos poti kosmon basileus poti polin*.—Man vergleiche auch die *institutio und gubernatio civitatis* (*De reg. pr.* 1, 13) mit dem *ktistes* (Goodenough, p. 98 f).—Für Dionysios siehe *De div. nom.*, cap. 12: PG 3, 959 (Komm. d. hl. Th., *Opusc.* Ed. Mandonnet II, 627 ff.).—Lateinisch-patristische Zeuge für die oben erwähnte Lehre ist vor allem Ps.-Augustinus (Ambrosiaster), *Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti*, PL 35, 2236 und 2288: *Dei enim imaginem habet rex, sicut et episcopus Christi*.—*Rex adoratur in terris quasi vicarius Dei*.—Wir wählen hier den Ausdruck "politischer Platonismus" in Anlehnung an Thomas, der das fundamentale Prinzip seiner Lehre selbst auf die "Platoniker" zurückführt (oben Anm. 152 und 165). Damit soll nicht gesagt sein, dass der Aquinate hier ein echtes platonisches



(b) Ganz grundsätzlich hat Thomas die Frage nach dem Verhältnis zwischen einem sozialen Ganzen und seinen Teilen in dem Kommentar zur aristotelischen Politik behandelt. Er knüpft dort an den bekannten aristotelischen Satz von der Priorität des Ganzen vor den Teilen an, einem Satz, der das metaphysische Fundament der so oft missverstandenen sogen. "organischen" Gesellschaftstheorie abgibt.<sup>168</sup> Wenn der Stagirite sagt, das Ganze sei der Natur und Vollkommenheit nach, an Wert und Würde, früher und besser als die Teile, so warnt Thomas ausdrücklich, dass dies nur von den materialen, nicht aber den spezifischen oder formalen Teilen verstanden werden muss. Diese letzteren gehen in der Tat dem Ganzen in jeder Beziehung voran. Und mit Recht weist der Aquinate hier auf die aristotelische Metaphysik hin, in der diese Priorität eine so lichtvolle und energische Beachtung gefunden hat.<sup>169</sup> Bei dieser Metaphysik der Sache brauchen wir uns hier nicht aufzuhalten. Welches aber sind die spezifischen oder formalen Teile im Gesellschaftsganzen? Thomas macht sich eine Bemerkung des Aristoteles zunutze, in der dieser vielleicht nur die Selbstgenügsamkeit des kynischen Einsiedlers und Einspänners geisseln will<sup>170</sup>: Der Mensch ist von Natur ein "politisches" Wesen, und wer nicht in und aus der Polis lebt, ist entweder schlechter oder besser als ein Mensch, entweder Unter- oder Uebermensch, entweder Tier oder Gott.<sup>171</sup> Diese Bemerkung des Stagiriten nimmt Thomas ernst und verbindet sie mühelos mit jenem "göttlichen Menschen" der aristotelischen Ethik, d.h. dem Philosophen, der den Intellekt, den göttlichen Funken in sich, hegt und schürt und der autarken, allem anderen vorgeordneten *Theoria* obliegt.<sup>172</sup> Hiermit ist der Aquinate dann wieder bei seiner, der christlichen Idee der Kontemplation angelangt, und aus dem Diogenes im Fass oder auch dem Plato und Aristoteles werden Johannes der Täufer und Antonius der Einsiedler. Diese sind Heilige der christlichen Kirche, deren einer, der Täufer, Vorbild nicht nur der abgetrennten Kontemplation, sondern auch der auf die Aktion und das Leben einwirkenden

Stück in seine Lehre aufgenommen hat. Es handelt sich vielmehr um einen "verifizierten" Platonismus—um einen Ausdruck zu gebrauchen, den Et. Gilson in einem anderen Zusammenhang geprägt hat (*Rev. de Philos.*, 1930, 713).

<sup>168</sup> Pol. 1, 2; 1253a 19.

<sup>169</sup> In Pol. 1, 1: Necessesse est totum esse prius parte, ordine scilicet naturae et perfectionis. Sed hoc intelligendum est de parte materiae, non de parte speciei, ut ostenditur in VII *Metaph.* Die Stellen sind bei Aristoteles Z 10; 1035b 4 ff.; insbesondere 1035b 14-25; 11; 1036b 30 ff. und 16; 1040b 5 ff. Im Kommentar des hl. Thomas: VII, lect. 9-11; vgl. auch V, 21, n. 1089.

<sup>170</sup> Aristoteles hat vielleicht den *Monotropos* der griechischen Komik im Sinn: "Nomen fabulae inditum ab homine tristi et moroso, qui Timonis instar solitariam vitam sequeretur et lucem adspicere hominum fugeret". Meineke, *Historia Critica Comicorum Graecorum*, p. 156; zitiert in W. L. Newman, *The Politics of Aristotle*, II, (Oxford 1887), S. 120.—Vgl. oben Anm. 36.—Es können aber auch die Kyniker gemeint sein, wofür Newman, a.a.O. eine Reihe von Zeugnissen erbringt.

<sup>171</sup> Pol. 1, 2; 1253a 3-4, 28-29.

<sup>172</sup> In Pol. 1, 1: Singuli homines comparantur ad totam civitatem sicut partes hominis ad hominem; quia sicut manus aut pes non potest esse sine homine, ita nec unus homo est per se sibi sufficiens ad vivendum separatus a civitate. Si autem contingat,

quod aliquis non possit communicare societate civitatis propter suam pravitatem, est peior quam homo et quasi bestia. Si vero nullo indigeat et quasi habens per se sufficientiam, et propter hoc non sit pars civitatis, est melior quam homo. Est enim quasi quidam deus.—*Ibid.*: . . . aut est melior quam homo, inquantum scilicet habet naturam perfectiorem aliis hominibus communiter, ita quod per se sibi possit sufficere absque hominum societate, sicut fuit in Ioanne Baptista et beato Antonio Eremita.—Ich habe früher (*Bulletin thomiste* XIII, 1936, p. 717, n. 2) behauptet, dass diese Lehre im eigentlichen System der thomistischen Sozialphilosophie, soweit davon die Rede sein kann, nicht mehr hervortrete. Das ist falsch. Sie bildet in Wahrheit Ausgangs- und Endpunkt aller thomistischen Gedanken über das Soziale. Mit andern Worten: dass der "gewöhnliche" Mensch materialer Teil des sozialen Ganzen ist, der "ungewöhnliche", "göttliche" hingegen draussen lebt und dennoch in bestimmter Weise, nämlich als formaler und spezifischer Teil und als konstitutives Prinzip drinnen ist (siehe unten Abschnitt V) ist in Wahrheit die fundamentale Erkenntnis der thomistischen Soziallehre, die allergenauestens den Personalismus des Aquinaten beschreibt und beweist.—Ueber den "göttlichen Menschen" und die *felicitas speculativa*, ihr Verhältnis zum Sozialen usw. siehe bei Aristoteles *Eth.* 10, 7; 1177a 12 ff.; bei Thomas *In Eth.* 10, 10-11.



Kontemplation ist. So weitet sich bei Thomas die Bemerkung des Aristoteles zu einer Theorie der christlichen Gesellschaft aus, die in dem grundsätzlichen Verhältnis von Kontemplation und Aktion wenigstens eine ihrer Fundierungen findet. Wenn man nämlich das spezifische Wesen von Gesellschaft und Gemeinschaft mit dem Begriff der Tugend definiert—*ad hoc enim homines congregantur, ut simul bene vivant . . . ; bona autem vita est secundum virtutem: virtuosa igitur vita est congregationis humanae finis*<sup>173</sup>—so sind die Tugendhaften der formale Teil dieser Gesellschaft; und was Tugend sei, lässt sich letztlich nur im Bereich des Kontemplativen ausmachen. In einer Gesellschaft von Krämer und Händlern sind die Krämer und Händler der formale, tonangebende Teil.<sup>174</sup> Das ist Individualismus und hat mit dem thomistischen Begriff des Personalen nichts zu tun. Die thomistische Gesellschaft ist im Natürlichen eine ethische Aristokratie. Und im Uebernatürlichen beruht sie in bestimmter Weise auf Theokratie und Hagiokratie, die nicht „in Zählung gebracht werden dürfen“. Denn das Göttliche und Heilige, personale Werte, sind hier das *ἀπρόνο* welches die Form und den Sinn, Ton und Gehalt des gesellschaftlichen Ganzen bestimmt. Wie die auf einer ethischen Ueberzeugung gegründete Stadt<sup>175</sup> des Aristoteles der Person der *φρόνιμοι* die Formung dieses Ethos überlässt,<sup>176</sup> wie ferner selbst die Römer den *prudentes, seniores* usw. in ihrer legislativen Struktur die „tonangebende“ Rolle einräumen,<sup>177</sup> so ruht die thomistische christliche Gesellschaft auf den Heiligen. Dieser Primat des Personalen bedeutet aber nicht physische Herrschaft oder „politische“ Macht, d.i. das Uebergewicht einer blossen *causa effectiva*, sondern metaphysische Priorität, d.i. den Vorrang einer *causa formalis*.

(c) Thomas hat den Begriff des formalen Teiles eines gesellschaftlichen Ganzen noch in folgender Weise zum Ausdruck gebracht: *vita iustorum est conservativa et promotiva boni communis, quia ipsi sunt principalior pars multitudinis*.<sup>178</sup> Diesem Teil, der in wesentlicher Weise (*per se, propter se, principaliter, essentialiter, formaliter*<sup>179</sup>) zum Ganzen gehört, steht der andere Teil gegenüber, der nur in unwesentlicher Weise (*per aliud, propter aliud, secundario, accidentaliter, materialiter*) darinnen ist. Wie der antike Haushalt die Söhne auf der einen, und Sklaven und Tiere auf der andern Seite umfasst,<sup>180</sup> so enthält auch die Oekonomie des Heiles Herren und Knechte. Die Knechte aber sind die Sünder, die im Bösen verharren. Der Sünder ist keine „Person“ in dem Sinne, wie Thomas hier von Person und Personalem spricht.<sup>181</sup> „Der Sünder fällt von der Würde des Menschen ab, wonach dieser natürlicherweise frei und seiner selbst wegen ist, und teilt in ganz bestimmter Weise das Los der Tiere, die nicht sich selbst zu ihrem eigenen Gut bestimmen, sondern über die zum Nutzen anderer bestimmt wird; wie geschrieben steht Ps. 48, 21: Wenn ein Mensch in der Würde ist, und hat keinen Verstand, so fährt er davon wie das Vieh; und im Buch der Sprüche 11, 29: Wer töricht ist, sei

<sup>173</sup> *De regimine princ.* 1, 14.

<sup>174</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>175</sup> *Pol.* 7, 8; 1328a 40; *ibid.* 13; 1331b 26 ff.

<sup>176</sup> *Eth.* 2, 6; 1107a 1; ebenso 6, 11; 1143b

11. Thomas *In Eth.* 2, 7, n. 323; 6, 9, n. 1254; I-II, 1, 7 u.ö.

<sup>177</sup> Vgl. für Thomas I-II, 95, 1 ad 2; 2 ad 4; 4 (Ed. Ottawa p. 1234b 30); *ibid.* 100, 11 (p. 1272b 38) u.ö.

<sup>178</sup> II-II, 64, 6.

<sup>179</sup> Die Begriffe und Worte sind der thomistischen Kosmologie entnommen, da wo von den wesentlichen Teilen des Kosmos (immaterielle Substanzen, darunter die menschlichen Seelen, Himmelssphären und

Gestirne, die Elemente der sublunaren Dinge, deren Species) und den unwesentlichen Teilen (die materiellen und vergänglichen sublunaren Substanzen, die Individuen derselben) die Rede ist. Grundlegende Stelle *In Metaph.* 12, 12, n. 2633-2637. Eine Auswahl aus andern Werken des hl. Thomas: 2 S 3, 1, 4 ad 3; 2 S 20, 1, 1 ad 3; *Contra gent.* 2, 32; 2, 45; 2, 93; 3, 75; 3, 112; *De verit.* 5, 3; *De potentia* 5, 4-7; *De spirit. creat.* 8; I, 23, 7; 85, 3 ad 4; 98, 1; *In Job* 7, 3 und 4; u.ö.

<sup>180</sup> *In Metaph.* 12, 12, nn. 2633-2634.

<sup>181</sup> II-II, 64, 2 ad 3: Homo peccando ab ordine rationis recedit. Et ideo decedit a

*Sklave dem Weisen.*—Nach der thomistischen Theorie ist die Strafe—gemeint ist die endgültige, irreparable Strafe, wie die der Reprobierten und die Todesstrafe—eine Vernetzung des Menschen, wie man eine Sache und ein Tier vernutzt, und kann nur darin ihre Rechtfertigung finden, dass der Bestrafte in einem realen Sinn vorher eine Sache oder ein Tier geworden ist. Wir brauchen auf diese bekannten Dinge nicht einzugehen. Nur sei auf folgenden Text des Römerkommentars aufmerksam gemacht, der aus derselben Lehre nach der andern Seite hin die Konsequenzen zieht: „Unter allen Teilen des Universums gebührt die absolute Wertpriorität den Heiligen Gottes, sodass auf jeden einzelnen (!) von ihnen passt, was Mt. 24, 27 gesagt wird: *Er wird ihn über alle seine Güter setzen*. Was immer darum geschieht, sei es im Umkreis der Heiligen selbst, oder anderswo, das fällt ganz ihnen zugute . . . Darum heisst es auch, dass Gott ihrer besondere Sorge trägt, Ps. 33, 16: *Die Augen des Herrn sind über den Gerechten*. Denn Er nimmt sich ihrer so an, dass Er auch nichts Böses um sie herum geschehen lässt, das Er nicht in Gutes für sie umwandelt.“<sup>152</sup>—Hier ist der christliche Personalismus der hl. Thomas auf seine Höhe gelangt. Das Ganze des Universums und aller geschaffenen Ordnungen, und alles was darin geschieht und geschehen ist und geschehen wird, ist um jedes einzelnen Heiligen willen da. Das *authenticum* in seiner landläufigen, univoken Bedeutung ist hier völlig umgekehrt und durch das Personalgesetz des Heiligen Geistes ersetzt. Es ist nicht mehr wahr, dass das Gut eines einzelnen und jedes einzelnen um dieses oder „des“ Gemeinguts willen da ist—sei es auch das Gemeingut des ganzen Universums. Sondern wahr ist, dass dieses Gemeingut für jeden einzelnen der Prädestinierten bestimmt und verordnet ist, so wie es für Gott bestimmt und verordnet ist. Nicht die singuläre, ontologische Vollkommenheit der Personalität (*perfectio prima*), sondern die singuläre, aktive und kontemplative Vollkommenheit der Persönlichkeit (*perfectio secunda*) hat diese Revolution des antiken Gedankens vollzogen. In analogischer und wiederum personaler Bedeutung kehrt aber dennoch das *authenticum* wieder, weil die Gerechtigkeit der Gerechten und die Heiligkeit der Heiligen nur durch deren *communicantia ad totum*<sup>153</sup> definiert zu werden vermag. Die Heiligen sind eben wie die Söhne des antiken Haushaltes, von dem die aristotelische Metaphysik sagt, dass sie unbeirrt und unbeirrbar das tun, was die Ordnung, das Gemeingut des Hauses verlangt.<sup>154</sup> In der Oekonomie des

dignitate humana, prout scilicet homo est naturaliter liber et propter seipsum existens, et incidit quodam modo in servitutem bestiarum, ut scilicet de ipso ordinetur, secundum quod est utile aliis, secundum illud Ps. 48: *Homo, cum in honore esset, non intellexit; comparatus est iumentis insipientibus et similis factus est illis*; et Prov. 11: *Qui stultus est, serviet sapienti*.—Parallelstellen: *De verit.* 5, 7; I, 23, 7; In Job 40, 2; In Rom. 8, 6.—Ich mache noch auf folgenden interessanten Text des hl. Albert aufmerksam: Sicut dicitur Sap. 4, 3: *Multigena impiorum multitudo non erit utilis; et ideo numquam voluit Deus iniquorum multiplicationem, sicut eis voluit religionis propagationem et multiplicationem*. Et ideo (!) praecepit, ut crescerent; 4 S 31, 10; Ed. Borgnet 30, 239.

<sup>152</sup> In Rom. 8, 6: *Inter omnes partes universi excellunt sancti Dei, ad quorum quemlibet (!) pertinet quod dicitur Mt. 24, 47: Super omnia bona sua constituit eum*. Et ideo quidquid accidit, vel circa ipsos vel alias res, totum in bonum eorum cedit, ita quod verificatur quod dicitur Prov. 11, 29: *Qui stultus est, serviet sapienti*; quia

scilicet etiam mala peccatorum in bonum iustorum cedunt. Unde et Deus specialem curam de iustis habere dicitur, secundum illud Ps. 33, 16: *Oculi Domini super iustos*, inquantum scilicet sic de eis curat, quod nihil mali circa eos esse permittit, quod non in eorum bonum convertat.—Vgl. *Contra gent.* 3, 111–113.—Gegen den „Personalismus“ macht G. de Broglie (*Recherches de science religieuse* XXV, 1935, 37 f.) geltend, dass unter seiner Voraussetzung alle Handlungen „doivent être calculées pour servir simultanément le bien de chacune d'entre (les personnes)“. Ebenso müsse es dann unter allen Personen geben „une rigoureuse concordance d'intérêts spirituels concrets“. Beides trifft indessen gemäss der Lehre des hl. Thomas offenbar zu, gilt allerdings nicht ohne weiteres von den „Personen“, sondern von den heiligen Personen.

<sup>153</sup> Das aristotelische *koinonein hapanta eis to holon*; *Met.* 1075a 24; bei Thomas 12, 12, 2653f.—Der substantivische Gebrauch des Wortes *communicantia* (wie *convenientia*) findet sich in 4 S 45, II, 1, sol. 1.

<sup>154</sup> In *Metaph.* 12, 12, n. 2633 ff.

Heiles werden sie aber gerade dadurch zu den Kindern Gottes, deren jedem einzelnen die Ordnung, das Gemeingut des Ganzen zu Füßen liegt.

\* \* \*

Jacques Maritain, der bedeutendste der heutigen Vertreter der personalistischen Interpretation in der Thomistenschule, hat in einem glänzenden Essay aus dem Jahre 1933, *Une philosophie de la liberté*<sup>185</sup>, den gleichen Begriff vom Personalen entwickelt. Leider kann man nicht sagen, dass dieser Begriff sonst unter den Thomisten eine geprägte Münze ist. Mit ihrem Bemühen, einen fertigen Personalismus schon innerhalb der Ontologie der Person zu finden, und mit dem Eifer, mit dem sie den Satz des hl. Thomas: *persona significat id quod est perfectissimum in tota natura*, rein ontologisch verstanden, als ein sozialphilosophisches Prinzip erster Ordnung erklären, leisten sie dem echten Thomismus keine guten Dienste.<sup>186</sup> Denn die Sozialphilosophie, die von Thomas immer als eine streng ethische Disziplin erkannt wird, beginnt erst, nachdem die Ontologie der Person aufgehört hat, und was das Vollkommenste in der Seinsordnung in dem Sinne ist, dass es über die ganze sichtbare Natur hinausragt, mag sehr wohl in der Tätigkeitsordnung das Unvollkommenste sein, d.i. etwas Noch-nicht-Fertiges oder gar etwas Nie-fertig-werdendes. Keine noch so phantasievolle Darstellung der Abgeschlossenheit und Ganzheit, des Nicht-Teil-sein-könnens der Person *in linea essendi* vermag auch nur das geringste Ergebnis zu zeitigen für eine gleiche oder ähnliche Abgeschlossenheit und Ganzheit und das Nicht-Teil-sein-können der Person *in linea operandi*. Im Gegenteil ist die noch auf ihrem Wege befindliche Person fort und fort Teil des oder eines gemeinschaftlichen Ganzen, das ihrer Unbeholfenheit, ihrem Ungenügen und Versagen kräftig nachhilft.<sup>187</sup> Sonst hätte Gemeinschaft überhaupt keinen Sinn und kein Recht. Auch ist die Person, solange und sofern sie auf dem Wege ist, dem Gemeingut oder den vielfachen Gemeingütern in einem jeweils verschiedenen Bereich untergeordnet. Diese Gesichtspunkte kommen bei Thomas immer dann sehr scharf und klar zur Geltung, wenn vom aktiven Leben, das ja wesentlich ein Fortschreiten zur Vollendung der Person bedeutet, die Rede ist. Der Personalismus des hl. Thomas hat nichts zu tun mit

<sup>185</sup> *Du régime temporel et de la liberté* (Paris o.J.). Vgl. insbesondere S. 39 ff. (*Ainsi c'est avec la sainteté que la parfaite liberté d'autonomie coïncide*). Der zunächst überraschende Begriff der Autonomie hat seine vollgültige thomistische Grundlage in dem *Sibi ipsi lex*. Auch Aristoteles hat schon bemerkt, dass ein hervorragend tugendhafter sich selbst Gesetz ist; *Pol.* 3, 13; 1284a 3-11; *Eth.* 4, 14; 1128a 32 (Plato, *Gesetze* 875 C)—G. B. Phelan macht sehr richtig darauf aufmerksam, dass man nicht von dem Wert der Person, sondern dem der Persönlichkeit und des Personalen sprechen solle, um den Personalismus des hl. Thomas richtig zu kennzeichnen; *The American Catholic Philosophical Association, Proceedings XVI* (1940), 55 f.

<sup>186</sup> Man versäumt es dabei noch, auf diejenige thomistische Dokumentation hinzuweisen, die wenigstens in etwa beweiskräftig sein oder werden könnte, und die in *Mediaeval Studies* 1943, p. 142 ff. (Texte 110, 111, 117, 19, 124 und 164, 165, 175, 183, 203) angegeben ist. (Man achte aber wiederum auf das *Vel dicendum*, I, 93, 2 ad 3, das eine leise, aber deutliche thomistische

Korrektur des hl. Bonaventura bedeutet; *Med. Stud.* p. 161, n. 30.) Jedoch hat auch dies bei Thomas mit der Frage im Grunde nichts zu tun. Denn es handelt sich bei ihm darum, gegenüber der griechisch-arabischen Vergötterung eines von physischer Determination durchaus beherrschten Kosmos die Freiheit Gottes und des Menschen zu betonen. Erst wenn man den Staat und die moderne Technokratie an die Stelle dieses Kosmos setzt, bekommen diese und ähnliche Texte auch einen sozialphilosophischen Sinn. Dass aber der Staat, ein Menschengebilde, einmal so werden könnte wie der Kosmos der Astrologen, ist weder der Antike noch dem Mittelalter je eingefallen. Thomas kennt auch nicht die Staatsvergötterung, sondern die Herrschervergötterung, der er übrigens sogar noch einen guten Sinn abzugewinnen weiss: *De reg. princ.* 1, 9; *De causis* 3 (Ed. Mandonnet I, p. 208); II-II, 99, 1 ad 1.—Man täte gut daran, den hl. Thomas immer hübsch und zunächst seine eigenen Probleme stellen zu lassen!

<sup>187</sup> Vgl. den nächsten Abschnitt V.

der modernen "Person als philosophischem Prinzip", welches Prinzip im Grunde nichts anderes ist als das säkularisierte Privatgesetz des Heiligen Geistes. Nur wenn hierüber Klarheit geschaffen ist, kann man von dem Wertprimat des Personalen beim Aquinaten reden. Es kommt wohl vor, dass Thomas gegenüber der griechisch-arabischen Kosmologie den Höherrang der intellektuellen Kreatur und ihre "Fähigkeit zur Glückseligkeit" betont.<sup>188</sup> Schliesslich aber handelt es sich bei ihm nicht so sehr darum, dass diese Potenz überhaupt vorhanden ist, sondern vielmehr, was mit ihr geschieht. Das Mittelalter hat eben von Freiheit und Persönlichkeit durchaus nicht die modernen Begriffe.<sup>189</sup>

Wie das Individuum nur mit der Materie, so kann auch Individualismus nur mit dem materiellen Gut und seinem Privateigentum definiert werden. Mit bezug auf das Mittelalter und insbesondere Thomas von Aquin Personalismus mit Individualismus zu verwechseln, ist wohl eines der ärgsten Missverständnisse, das einem Denker und Historiker unterlaufen kann.<sup>190</sup> Individualismus darf nicht einfach mit den Begriffen "Eigentum" und "Eigenliebe" bestimmt werden, sondern mit den Begriffen "Privatbesitz" und "Perversion von Eigenliebe". Wobei es dann selbstverständlich ist, dass in gewisser Weise auch der "Besitz" geistiger Güter materialisiert und der Perversion durch private und privative Ausschliesslichkeit unterworfen werden kann. An sich ist aber der Begriff des Privatbesitzes den geistigen Gütern gegenüber innerlich und völlig widerspruchsvoll.<sup>191</sup> Denn an sich sind geistige Güter personale

<sup>188</sup> Z.B. *De caritate* 7 ad 5: In bono universi sicut principium continetur rationalis natura, quae est capax beatitudinis, ad quam omnes aliae creaturae ordinantur.

<sup>189</sup> Nichts kennzeichnet diesen Begriff genauer als das Wort des hl. Augustinus, das im kanonischen Recht sanktioniert worden ist (C. 23, Q. 6, c. 3; ed. cit. col. 948: . . . non esse considerandum, quod quis cogitur, sed quale sit illud, quo cogitur, utrum bonum an malum). Wenn auch Thomas zweifellos gewissen harten Konsequenzen dieser Regel die Spitze abgebrochen hat (vgl. I-II, 19, 5 und 6; II-II, 10, 12), so steht er doch grundsätzlich auf demselben Standpunkt, wie sich in seiner Freiheitslehre immer wieder zeigt (vgl. z.B. III, 8, 7).—Der bekannte Witz Chestertons wäre im Mittelalter ein Uding gewesen, das kein Mensch auch nur von ferne begriffen hätte: The democratic contention is that government is a thing analogous to writing one's own love letters or blowing one's own nose. These things we want a man to do for himself even if he does them badly.—Vgl. zum Ganzen G. Tellenbach, *Libertas* (Stuttgart, 1936).

<sup>190</sup> Das krassste Beispiel ist wohl M. de Wulf, *L'individu et le groupe dans la scolastique du XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle*, *Revue néoscholastique* (1920), p. 341-357 (in englischer Uebersetzung *Civilization in the Middle Ages*, chap. 10: *Individualism and Social Philosophy*, 1922, pp. 220-241.) De Wulfs historisch und sachlich durchaus unhaltbare Behauptung eines mittelalterlichen und gar thomistischen Individualismus hat noch jüngst wieder einen Apologeten gefunden in E. Lewis, 'Organic Tendencies in Mediaeval Political Thought', *The American Political Science Review* XXXII (5 Oct. 1938). Vgl. auch A. Passerin d'Entrèves, *The Mediaeval Contribution to Political Thought* (Oxford Univ. Press, 1939), pp. 27-29, 144.—Gegen die Windmühlen einer solchen individualistischen Interpretation, die

ohne weiteres mit dem Personalismus in einen Topf gesteckt wird, kämpft auch Charles De Koninck, *De la primauté du bien commun contre les personnalistes* (Québec, 1943).

<sup>191</sup> Oben Anm. 160. Ferner *De spirit. creaturis* 8 ad 5: Cum affectio sequatur cognitionem, quanto cognitio est universalior, tanto affectio eam sequens magis respicit commune bonum. Et quanto cognitio est magis particularis, tanto affectio ipsam sequens magis respicit privatum bonum. Unde et in nobis privata dilectio ex cognitione sensitiva oritur; dilectio vero communis et absoluti boni ex cognitione intellectiva (Vgl. Texte des hl. Augustinus, *Mediaeval Studies* 1943, p. 132.)—I-II, 77, 4: Omnis actus peccati procedit ex aliquo inordinato appetitu alicuius temporalis boni. Quod autem aliquis appetat inordinate aliquod temporale bonum, procedit ex hoc quod inordinate amat seipsum . . . Amor sui ordinatus est debitus et naturalis, ita scilicet, quod velit sibi bonum quod congruit. Sed amor sui inordinatus . . . ponitur esse causa peccati, secundum Augustinum.—Wenn De Koninck a.a.O. S. 181, n. 58 sich vornimmt, gegen die pelagianische Vergötzung des Menschen und der Freiheit die Schriften des hl. Augustinus zu verbreiten, so ist dagegen nichts einzuwenden. Der Personalismus steht aber vom Individualismus genau so weit ab, wie die geordnete Selbstliebe von der ungeordneten und wie der mystische *ordo animarum* des hl. Thomas von dem "Einzigsten und seinem Eigentum" des Max Stirner. Und es ist zu hoffen, dass De K. bei der Ausführung seines oben genannten guten Vorsatzes nicht mehr jenes Tröpflein Wasser vergisst, das Thomas in den augustianischen Wein gegossen hat. Den Personalismus etwa Jacques Maritains auch nur andeutungsweise mit dem Semipelagianismus in Verbindung zu bringen, erscheint mir nicht als "pure sagesse".

Gemeingüter, oder umgekehrt: gemeinnützige Personalwerte: *bonum quod ad unum aliquem pertinet secundum seipsum, non tamen uni soli utilia, sed multis*. Es gibt einen Individualismus der Krämer und Händler, und nur Krämer und Händler können überhaupt Individualisten sein. Es gibt aber keinen Individualismus des Personalen.

## V. DIE WESENSSTRUKTUR DER CHRISTLICHEN GESELLSCHAFT

Die beste Synthese seines Personalismus hat Thomas selbst geschrieben. Es ist der Art. 8, qu. 188 der *Secunda Secundae*. Wie so oft, ist es ein Problem besonderer Art, das die Gelegenheit gibt zu einer weitausholenden Uebersicht und Zusammenfassung. Hier handelt es sich innerhalb der Lehre von den kirchlichen Orden um das Wertverhältnis zwischen Mönchtum und Cönobitenum. Diese Frage wird dem Aquinaten Anlass, in ein paar meisterhaften Strichen das Verhältnis von Abgeschiedenheit und Gemeinschaft, von Eigengut und Gemeingut, und damit das Wesen und die Struktur von Gemeinschaft überhaupt zu behandeln. Wir müssen zum Abschluss dieser Studie den Inhalt dieses Artikels kurz darstellen. Der absolute Wertprimat des Personalen tritt nirgends in so vollständigem Umriss hervor, weil er nirgends sonst mit dem relativen Wertprimat des Sozialen so scharf kontrastiert worden ist. In diesem Kontrast erhält das *authenticum*, das allerdings hier nicht ausdrücklich erwähnt wird, seinen genauen Platz und das Problem des Gemeinguts seine endgültige Lösung.

Mit der gesamten Antike, der heidnischen wie der christlichen, hält Thomas daran fest, dass der eigentliche und definitive Sinn von Gemeinschaft und von allen sozialen Einrichtungen und Veranstaltungen die Erziehung des Menschen ist. Werner Jaeger hat in seinem reichen Werk die "Paideia" mit so bewundernswertem Ergebnis im Mittelpunkt der griechischen Antike und ihrer Weisheit gesehen. Wenn die christlichen Schriftsteller und Väter an diese Paideia dachten, so stand ihnen ohne weiteres das Wort des hl. Paulus vom Gesetz, dem Pädagogen für Christus (Gal. 3, 24), vor Augen. Die thomistische Lehre vom Gesetz, d.i. der hauptsächlichen sozialen Institution, ist auch ganz und in allen Einzelheiten auf den Gedanken dieser Pädagogie, und auf nichts anderes, angelegt.<sup>192</sup> Alle Gemeinschaft und alle gemeinschaftlichen Ordnungen und Verordnungen sind, jede entsprechend ihrem spezifischen Eigenwesen, letztlich durch das allgemeine, pädagogische Ziel zusammengebunden und gerechtfertigt, dass sie nämlich den Menschen für Christus zurüsten und in ihm die Fähigkeit wecken, die grosse Gnade Gottes zu empfangen. Auch die "politische" Gemeinschaft bildet hier trotz der relativen Eigenständigkeit ihres besonderen Wesens und Zieles durchaus keine Ausnahme.<sup>193</sup> Wobei dann noch zu beachten ist, dass der Inhalt des "politischen" Lebens für Thomas sich zur Gänze mit dem "aktiven" Leben deckt, d.i. der Pflege der Tugenden.<sup>194</sup> Im

<sup>192</sup> weil der ganze Traktat seinen Höhepunkt nicht in den allgemeinen Ausführungen der Qq 90-97, sondern in den besonderen der Qq 98-105 (das Alte Gesetz) und zumal 106-108 (das Neue Gesetz) hat. Sind es doch vornehmlich diese beiden Gesetze, durch die Gott *nos instruit per legem* (qu. 90, Prol.) Es ist zu bedauern, dass die Thomisten den Traktat *De legibus* entweder überhaupt nicht lesen—vgl. die Salmantizenser, *Curs. theol.* IX (Paris, 1878) S. 1: der Traktat sei nicht "scholastisch" (!?)—oder ihn nur mit den Augen des Philosophen oder Juristen betrachten.

<sup>193</sup> Der Gedanke kommt besonders klar zum Ausdruck an verschiedenen Stellen des Römerkommentars: 5, 6 (Ed. Marietti, p. 81a); 8, 1 (105b); 10, 1 (145b). Es ist auch zu beachten, dass der ideale Staatsentwurf des hl. Thomas sich innerhalb des Traktates über den Alten Bund befindet, d.h. an der einzig richtigen Stelle in einer Summe der *Theologie: I-II, 105.—De reg. princ.* 1, 15: . . . *ut rex ea praecipiat, quae ad caelestem beatitudinem ducunt, et eorum contraria, secundum quod fuerit possibile, interdicat.*

<sup>194</sup> 3 S 36, 1; I-II, 65, 1.

Mittelalter werden durchgängig die Kardinaltugenden, Klugheit, Gerechtigkeit, Tapferkeit, Mässigkeit, "politische" oder "zivile" oder "philosophische" Tugenden genannt, während für die theologalen Tugenden, Glaube, Hoffnung und Liebe, geradezu der Ausdruck "katholische Tugenden" vorkommt.<sup>195</sup> Auch die Pflege der Nächstenliebe und selbstverständlich die der "eingegossenen" moralischen Tugenden gehört zum aktiven, d. i. im weitesten Sinne "politischen" Leben.<sup>196</sup> Dass die politische Ordnung auf die natürlichen Tugenden und gar auf den *ordo iuris et debiti*<sup>197</sup> eingeschränkt werden muss, ist eine formale Präzision, die sich des realen Zusammenhangs der Dinge bewusst bleibt und stets innerhalb des Ganzen sich bewegt.

Das Prinzip der pädagogischen Natur und Funktion des Gemeinschaftslebens führt von selbst die Krise herauf, die in ihm von vornherein angelegt ist. Denn Erziehung betrifft das Kind, und nicht den erwachsenen, reifen Menschen. Für diesen verliert Pädagogie ihren Sinn und wird überflüssig. Die alte griechische Form des Individualismus hat sich denn auch um diesen kritischen Punkt der antiken Gesellschaftslehre herum gebildet. Sie mag etwa durch das Wort des Antisthenes, des Kynikers, dargestellt werden: Der Weise kann nicht nach den Gesetzen der Polis leben, sondern nur nach denen der Tugend<sup>198</sup> (die er sich selbst setzt: Privatgesetze zwar nicht des Heiligen Geistes, aber des Geistes überhaupt!); oder durch das Wort des Antiphon, des Sophisten: Die positiven und allgemeinen Gesetze in der Polis sind Fesseln für die Natur; die Gesetze der Natur allein sind und machen frei;<sup>199</sup> oder durch den Satz des Lykophron, des Sophisten, das Staatsgesetz solle sich auf den Schutz der individuellen Rechtsordnung beschränken und nicht von Tugend und Erziehung sprechen.<sup>200</sup> Mit allen diesen Ansichten appelliert man an den reifen und aufgeklärten Menschen, der die altgriechische Idee des Gemeinschaftslebens *ad absurdum* führt. Selbst Aristoteles kann sich der Wucht der sophistischen Einwände nicht ganz entziehen: Wenn ein Staat die Erziehung vernachlässigt—und ausser in Sparta ist dies überall der Fall—so nehme jeder die Sache selbst in die Hand.<sup>201</sup>

Thomas von Aquin hat an *diesen* kritischen Punkt des antiken Gedankens nicht gerührt. Seine Christenheit mit dem gebändigten Leviathan und den Königen als Vassallen der Kirche lässt ihn keine "Fesseln der Natur" durch irgendwelche positiven Gesetze empfinden. Und sein gesundes, christliches Urteil über die Menschen, wie sie sind, bewahrt ihn von vornherein vor einer Ueberschätzung des "reifen und aufgeklärten" Menschen. In der Mehrzahl sind wir schlecht und Sklaven unserer Leidenschaften; und je mehr man den Menschen in der Masse, den Menschen der Masse betrachtet, umso schlechter kommt er in dieser Beziehung weg: eines der wenigen soziologischen Urteile des hl. Thomas.<sup>202</sup>

Der Aquinate kennt aber das Privatgesetz des Heiligen Geistes, das ja auch es in sich hatte, die irdischen Ordnungen in die Krise zu bringen. Er hat, wie wir oben gesehen haben, in Anerkennung der grundsätzlichen Wahrheit dieses Privilegs die in solcher Weise Privilegierten nicht aus der Gemeinschaft heraus-, sondern ihr übergesetzt und sie zu deren formalen Teilen erklärt.

<sup>195</sup> bei Petrus Cantor; Text zitiert von Lottin, *La connexion des vertus*, *Rech. de théol. anc. et méd.* (1930), p. 29, n. 37.

<sup>196</sup> II-II, 181, 1 und 2.

<sup>197</sup> Albert, 3 S 33, 1 (*Ed. cit.* 28, 608): *Ordo cadens sub ratione civilitatis est ordo iuris et debiti. Ibid. p. 606: virtus civilis est quae pertinet ad bonum statum civitatis.* Für Thomas siehe insbes. I-II 96, 2 und 3.

<sup>198</sup> Diog. Laert. 6, 11.

<sup>199</sup> Grenfell-Hunt, *Oxyrhincus Papyri; Egypt Expl. Fund., Graeco-Roman Branch,*

P. XI (London 1915), fragm. 1364, col. 4, 100-107, p. 97.

<sup>200</sup> Arist. *Pol.* 3, 9; 1280b 10.

<sup>201</sup> *Eth.* 10, 10; 1180a 24-32.

<sup>202</sup> II-II 95, 5 ad 2: *Plures hominum passionibus corporales sequuntur . . . pauci autem sunt, id est soli sapientes, qui huius modi inclinationes moderantur. Et ideo astrologi in multis vera pronuntiant, et praecipue in communibus eventibus, qui dependent ex multitudine.*

Und dies ist wiederum der Punkt, von dem aus er nun die Konstruktion der Gemeinschaft mit dem Personal an der Spitze unternimmt.

Vergleichen wir Abgeschiedenheit und Gemeinschaft:<sup>203</sup> eine Theorie des Sozialen und des Gemeingutes beweist seit den Tagen der Griechen dadurch ihre Wahrheit, dass sie dem Eigengut der Abgeschiedenheit Beachtung schenkt und es an richtiger Stelle integriert. Die Abgeschiedenheit gehört zum kontemplativen Leben, die Gemeinschaft zum aktiven. Denn in der Kontemplation kommt einer um so weiter, je mehr er einsam bei sich selbst verbleibt. In der Aktion aber, dem nach draussen gerichteten Werken, wird der Erfolg umso grösser sein, je inniger dieses in das Geflecht der sozialen Beziehungen verwoben, und je kräftiger es durch soziale Arbeitsteilung unterstützt wird.<sup>204</sup> Wie aber die Kontemplation die Aktion überragt und ihr als Ziel vorschwebt, so überragt die kontemplative Abgeschiedenheit die Gemeinschaft. Ziel des menschlichen Lebens überhaupt ist die Abgeschiedenheit in Gott. Man muss sich von "Kontemplation" hier den richtigen Begriff machen. Jeder Christ, der im Stand der Gnade ist, muss an der Kontemplation Anteil haben. Ist doch allen befohlen: *Seid stille und erkennet, dass ich Gott bin*; Ps. 45, 11; das ist auch der Inhalt des dritten der Zehn Gebote.<sup>205</sup> Und die von der Erkenntnis, dem Schauen Gottes erfüllte ewige Stille ist unser aller letztes Ziel. Kontemplative Abgeschiedenheit bedeutet darum nicht eine im eigenen Ich verkrampfte Einsamkeit, die zur Verkümmern führt, sondern, im Gegenteil Fülle und Vollkommenheit des Lebens. Der einsame Kontemplator muss, wie die Griechen sagten, "autark" sein, sich selbst durch sich selbst genügen. Er muss stark sein; und wer nicht stark ist, dem wird die Einsamkeit zur schlimmen Gefahr. Autarkie bezeichnet nicht eine untere, minimale Grenze der Lebensgüter, sondern im Gegenteil deren runde und sogar unbegrenzte Fülle. Autarkie ist darum gleichbedeutend mit Vollkommenheit, und so muss der einsame Kontemplator ein vollkommener Mensch sein. Das aber setzt voraus, dass er diese Vollkommenheit entweder durch Geschenk der Gnade empfangen, oder in der Schule des Lebens gelernt und erworben hat. Beispiel des ersten ist Johannes der Täufer, der *noch in der Mutter Leib erfüllt ward mit dem Heiligen Geist* und schon als Knabe *in der Wüste lebte*; Lc. 1, 5; 3, 2. Die Schule des Lebens aber ist die menschliche Gemeinschaft mit ihren Ordnungen, deren eigentlicher Sinn es ist, die Menschen zur Tugend zu erziehen und anzuhalten und sie so zur Kontemplation zu rüsten. Alle Veranstaltungen des

<sup>203</sup> Im folgenden wird II-II, 188, 8 mit parallelen Äusserungen des hl. Th. in der Darstellung verwoben. Die Hauptlinien dieses Artikels sind: Manifestum est . . . quod solitudo non est instrumentum congruum actioni, sed contemplationi . . . Considerandum est tamen, quod id quod est solitudo debet esse sibi per se sufficiens (Eth. 1, 5; 1097b 14; 9, 9; 1169b 5; 10, 7; 1177b 1; bei Thom. bes. In Eth. 1, 9; n. 112 ff.; 10, 10, n. 2093). Hoc autem est, cui nihil deest, quod pertinet ad rationem perfecti. Et ideo solitudo competit contemplanti, qui iam ad perfectum pervenit. Quod quidem contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, ex solo divino munere, sicut patet de Ioanne Baptista, qui fuit repletus Spiritu Sancto adhuc ex utero matris suae; unde cum adhuc puer esset, erat in desertis, ut dicitur Lc. 3, 2. Alio modo, per exercitium virtuosi actus . . . Ad exercitium autem huius modi iuvatur homo ex aliorum societate dupliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad intellectum, ut instruat in his, quae sunt contemplanda . . . Secundo, quantum ad affectum, ut scilicet noxiae affectiones

hominis reprimantur exemplo et correctione aliorum . . . Sicut ergo id quod iam perfectum est, praeeminet ei quod ad perfectionem exercetur, ita vita solitatorum, si debite assumatur, praeeminet vitae sociali. Si autem absque praecedenti exercitio talis vita assumatur, est periculosissima, nisi per divinam gratiam suppleatur quod in aliis per exercitium acquiritur, sicut patet de beatis Antonio et Benedicto.

<sup>204</sup> Super Boëtium De hebdomadibus, Prol. (Opusc. Ed. Mandonnet I, 165): Habet hoc privilegium sapientiae studium, quod operi suo proseguendo magis ipsa sibi sufficiat. In exterioribus enim operibus indiget homo plurimorum auxilio. Sed in contemplatione sapientiae tanto aliquis efficacius operatur, quanto magis solitarius secum commoratur.

<sup>205</sup> 3 S 36, 3 ad 4: Omnis christianus, qui in statu salutis est, oportet quod aliquid de contemplatione participet, cum praeceptum sit omnibus: *Vacate et videte quoniam ego sum Dominus*; Ps. 45, 11; ad quod etiam est tertium praeceptum Legis.



sozialen Lebens haben letztlich diesen Zweck, und wenn man es recht betrachtet, so sieht man, dass das ganze Regiment des zivilen Lebens und alle Aemter und Verrichtungen schliesslich nur denen dienen wollen, die die Wahrheit kontemplieren.<sup>206</sup> Anders gesagt: menschliche Zivilisation, in der *civitas*, der umgreifenden politischen Gemeinschaft, verwirklicht, steht im Dienst des christlichen, allgemeinen Berufes zur Kontemplation, das Soziale ist ein Durchgang zum Personalen, das Gemeinschaftsleben eine Strasse zur Stille und Abgeschiedenheit mit Gott. Was auf dieser Strasse und in dieser Schule geschieht, ist aber im wesentlichen zweierlei: Bildung des Intellekts und Erziehung des Willens und der Affekte. Es muss zunächst die christliche Wahrheit unter den Menschen gelehrt und verbreitet werden. Denn diese ist der Gegenstand und somit das Grundprinzip der Kontemplation. Es muss also in der christlichen Gesellschaft an erster Stelle Menschen und Institutionen geben, die das *Contemplata aliis tradere*<sup>207</sup> sich zur Aufgabe setzen. Angesichts der tatsächlichen Verhältnisse des menschlichen Lebens ist diese Tätigkeit mehr und grösser als das bloss Kontemplieren, (nicht etwa, weil das Gemeingut den absoluten Vorrang hätte: das *authenticum* lässt man hier besser aus dem Spiel, sondern) weil es "mehr" ist, eine Leuchte als bloss Licht zu sein.<sup>208</sup> —Und zweitens müssen die Affekte der Menschen erzogen, d.h. in die Gefolgschaft des Geistes gebracht und ihm untergeordnet werden. Gegenüber vernunftwidrigen Affekten ist es geboten, sie zu stützen, zu verbessern, und unter Umständen zu unterdrücken. Das ist die Aufgabe der menschlichen Gesetze und der ihnen wesentlichen Strafgewalt.

So sieht die thomistische Sozialtheorie aus, die in diesem Artikel der *Secunda Secundae* zweifellos ihre letzte und umfassendste Synthese gefunden hat. Alles ist, wie man sieht, vom Spirituellen und Personalen her konstruiert. Wenn Plato und Aristoteles an dem Problem zerbrochen sind,<sup>209</sup> wie den "Philosophen" in die menschliche Gemeinschaft zu integrieren, so findet der christliche Denker eine glatte und zusammenhängende Lösung. Denn an die Stelle der Philosophen-Elite, die Erkenntnis um der Erkenntnis und nicht um des Gegenstandes willen betreibt, sind die christlichen Auserwählten getreten, die in der Erkenntnis, einer personalen Tat, Gott umfassen und von Gott erfüllt werden. In diesem singulären Akt besteht die Summe des Lebens. Das "Spiel der Kontemplation" verwirklicht in höchstem Masse alles, was Leben ist und will: Geistigkeit, Innerlichkeit, Spontaneität, Freiheit und Freude.<sup>210</sup> Von unten her gesehen, beruht die ganze Konstruktion auf dem Prinzip, dass Gemeinschaft den Bedürftigkeiten des menschlichen Lebens, vor allem der Notwendigkeit intellektueller Belehrung und moralischer Erziehung Dasein und Formen verdankt. Wo aber Erziehung sein soll, da müssen Erzieher sein, die durch personales Beispiel und personales Wirken den Ton der Gemeinschaft angeben. In der univoken, irdischen Weise wird es in der ewigen Heimat keine Gemeinschaften und kein Gemeingut mehr geben; denn dort erhalten alle von Gott ihrer Bedürftigkeiten Erfüllung und Genügen. Wegen der Unzulänglich-

<sup>206</sup> *Contra gent.* 3, 37: . . . ut sic, si recte considerentur, omnia humana officia servire videantur contemplantibus veritatem.—In *Eth.* 10, 11, n. 2101: . . . felicitas speculativa, ad quam tota vita politica videtur ordinata, dum per pacem, quae per ordinationem vitae politicae statuitur et conservatur, datur hominibus facultas contemplandi veritatem.

<sup>207</sup> 3 S 35, I, 3, q. 1 in 3; II-II, 188, 6.

<sup>208</sup> II-II, 188, 6: sicut enim maius est illuminare quam lucere solum, ita maius est contemplata aliis tradere quam solum contemplari.

<sup>209</sup> Siehe A. J. Festugière, *Contemplation et vie contemplative selon Platon* (Paris, 1936), p. 373 ff., 381 ff.; Werner Jaeger, *Aristoteles* (Berlin, 1923), S. 425 ff. (Engl. tr. Oxford, 1934, p. 397 ff.).

<sup>210</sup> In *Boëtium De hebdom.* 1.c.: Sapientiae contemplatio convenienter ludo comparatur propter duo, quae est in ludo invenire: primo, quia ludus delectabilis est . . . secundo, quia operationes ludi non ordinantur ad aliud, sed propter se quaeruntur.—II-II, 182, 1 ad 2: Vita contemplativa in quadam animi libertate consistit . . .



keiten aber des einzelnen Menschen in sich selbst sind unsere irdischen Gemeinschaften entstanden, wie durch Aristoteles im V Buche der Ethik klar wird.<sup>211</sup>

Endet nun die thomistische Gemeinschaftslehre in dem grossen Aufhören und Dahinfallen alles Irdischen vor Gott (*evacuabuntur*, 1 Kor. 13, 8)? Bleibt nur noch der *solus cum solo*:<sup>212</sup> der einzelne und einzige Gott mit dem einzelnen und einzigen Menschen? Es ist tief zu bedauern, dass der Tod dem hl. Thomas die Feder entrissen hat, ehe er diese letzte Frage der Gemeinschaftsmetaphysik und -theologie, die in dem ungeschriebenen Traktat der *Tertia* "Ueber die letzten Dinge" ihren Platz hätte finden sollen, behandeln konnte. Wir müssen uns mit der Antwort des Sentenzenkommentars begnügen und haben wahrlich keinen Grund, deren fundamentale Richtigkeit zu bezweifeln. Wie verhalten sich das ewige Reich Gottes und die personale Glückseligkeit? Die Antwort lautet: wie Gemeingut und Einzelgut, deren Wertordnung das *authenticum* bestimmt.<sup>213</sup> In der analogischen Bedeutung behält eben das *authenticum* bei Thomas schliesslich immer die Oberhand, was nichts gegen, sondern alles für den absoluten Wertprimat des Personalien besagt.

\* \* \*

Fassen wir die Ergebnisse unserer Untersuchung zusammen.

*Erstens.* Die Tatsache der Entwicklung der thomistischen Gemeingutslehre steht fest. Die Soziallehre des hl. Thomas ist vornehmlich an das *dictum authenticum* vom Gemeingut geknüpft, und es handelt sich für den Scholastiker darum, dessen genauen Sinn und Verwendungsmöglichkeiten festzustellen. Hier aber gelangt der Aquinate nicht immer "wesentlich zu demselben Ergebnis" (Hans Meyer). Der Standpunktwechsel zeigt sich am deutlichsten darin, dass in einer Reihe bestimmter Probleme das *authenticum* aus dem konstruktiven Teil der Lehre in den dialektischen hinübergetragen wird.

*Zweitens.* Das Ergebnis der thomistischen Entwicklung ist nicht die Leugnung und Umkehrung, sondern die "genauere Erfassung" (*determinata intelligentia*) des *authenticum*. Deutlicher und umfassender wird bei Thomas die Erkenntnis, dass das alte politische Axiom ein absolutes und analoges Prinzip mit erstlich

<sup>211</sup> 3 S 34, III, 2, q. 3 in 1: Communicationes non erunt in patria, quia omnes sufficientiam ibi a Deo accipient. Propter insufficientiam enim uniuscuiusque in se introductae sunt communicationes, ut patet per Philosophum in V Eth. (1134a 27).—Wenn man das "Soziale" in einem sehr weiten und grundlegenden Sinn fasst, so kommt bei Thomas dennoch auch ein anderes Fundament vor, nämlich die *similitudo*, die der Grund von Freundschaft ist (I-II 27, 3; 28, 1). Thomas kennt zwei von vornherein grundverschiedene Formen sozialer Beziehungen: die organisierbare und organisierungsbedürftige des Zusammenwirkens, und die diffuse des Zusammenseins. Beide sind in der Wirklichkeit vielfältig verschlungen. Es ist m.E. falsch, wie es immer wieder geschieht, nur von einer Form, der des Zusammenwirkens, auszugehen und darauf nicht nur eine Lehre von der Familie, dem Staat usw. aufzubauen, sondern geradezu die gesamte Sozialmetaphysik. Für den Typus Freundschaft würde das obige Argument nicht, oder nicht in gleicher Weise gelten.—Siehe die sehr gute Arbeit von P. Philippe O.P., *Le rôle de l'amitié dans la*

*vie chrétienne selon s. Th.* (Rom. 1938). Philippe macht indes auch nicht eine klare Unterscheidung zwischen den beiden Grundformen des Sozialen.

<sup>212</sup> F. von Hügel, *Eternal Life* (Edinburgh, 1913): *Non-Social and Social Currents in Aquinas*, pp. 106-109; R. Newton Flew, *The Idea of Perfection in Christian Theology* (Oxford, 1934), pp. 241-243; zitiert von R. C. Petry, 'The Social Character of Heavenly Beatitude', *The Thomist* VII (1944), p. 67, n. 7. R. C. Petry scheint den Haupttext (siehe folgende Anm.) nicht zu kennen.

<sup>213</sup> 4 S 49, I, 2 sol. 5: Regnum Dei quasi antonomastice dupliciter dicitur. Quandoque congregatio eorum, qui per fidem ambulant: et sic Ecclesia militans Regnum Dei dicitur. Quandoque autem illorum collegium, qui iam in fine stabiliti sunt: et sic ipsa Ecclesia triumphans Regnum Dei dicitur. Et hoc modo esse in Regno Dei idem est quod esse in beatitudine. Nec differt, secundum hoc, Regnum Dei a beatitudine, nisi sicut differt bonum commune totius multitudinis a bono singulari uniuscuiusque.—Man mag eine Andeutung derselben Zusammenhänge auch in I-II, 90, 2 erblicken.

personalen Bedeutung ist. Weit entfernt also, den Primat des Personalen in Frage zu stellen, bestätigt das *authenticum* vielmehr gerade diesen Primat.

*Drittens. Die bestimmenden Faktoren dieser Entwicklung* sind (a) die geraldinische Kontroverse, welche die Gefahren und letzten Folgerungen eines auf das *authenticum* gestützten religiösen Pragmatismus sichtbar machte; (b) das Studium der griechischen Philosophie. Hier ist der Einfluss des politischen Platonismus besonders zu erwähnen. Von der weiteren patristischen Literatur abgesehen wurde dieser Platonismus zumal durch Dionysios den Pseudo-Areopagiten, und durch Eustratios dem hl. Thomas überliefert. Er ist in dem Gedanken der "Mitteilung des Guten" (*μετάδοσις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*) inbegriffen.

*Viertens. Das Datum der Wende der thomistischen Anschauungen* ist darum schwer zu ermitteln, weil das Problem so weitschichtig ist und eine grosse Zahl philosophischer und theologischer Gesichtspunkte dabei mitspielen. Immerhin lässt sich die geraldinische Kontroverse der Jahre 1269/70 als der Zeitpunkt angeben, an dem das Problem bis in seine letzten theologischen Verzweigungen dem hl. Thomas deutlich geworden ist.

*Fünftens. Der thomistische Personalismus* besagt nicht den Wertprimat der "Person" von Hinz und Kunz, sondern den der "Heiligen Johannes, Benedikt" usw. Das Personale ist hier das Heilige. Thomistischer Personalismus ist nicht neutraler, säkularisierter Personalismus, der sich damit begnügt, dass eine Person im ontologischen Sinn da ist, ohne zu fragen, was einer damit anfängt. Thomistischer Personalismus ist der geprägte, theologische Personalismus des *Canon Urbani Papae*, der das Personalgesetz des Heiligen Geistes zum formalen und konstitutiven Teil des christlichen Gemeinwesens und Gemeinguts erhebt und es somit über den sozialen Wert setzt. Nicht dass man der "Person", sondern dass man dem Heiligen Geist nicht widerstehen darf, ist das Wichtige. Thomistischer Personalismus hat nur dann seine Geltung, wenn die ontologische personale Anlage aktualisiert und zu ihrem ethischen und theologischen Voll-Ende gebracht ist. Dieser theologische Personalismus ist letztthin fundiert im absoluten Wertprimat des Göttlichen, mit dem das Heilige nicht in Zählung gesetzt wird.

# The Moment of Consecration and the Elevation of the Host

V. L. KENNEDY C.S.B.

## I. INTRODUCTION

IN this article we intend to trace the history of the controversy on the moment of consecration in the Mass and the relation of that controversy to the origin of the elevation of the Host. By the middle of the twelfth century western theologians were agreed that the bread and wine were changed into the Body and Blood of Christ by virtue of His words: *Hoc est corpus meum* and *Hic est calix sanguinis mei etc.*<sup>1</sup> The question then arose whether the two forms were effective separately or only in conjunction with one another; in other words: was the bread consecrated at the moment when the words: *Hoc est corpus meum* had been said or only at the conclusion of the second form: *Hic est calix sanguinis mei etc.*? The controversy on this point of eucharistic theology engaged the attention of theologians, liturgists and canonists from approximately 1160 until the early years of the following century. It is intimately connected with the problem of the origin of the elevation of the Host; for it is reasonably obvious that no bishop would decree the elevation of the Host immediately after the pronouncement of the words: *Hoc est corpus meum* unless he were convinced that the transubstantiation of the bread had taken place at that moment.

Scholars who have written on the origin of the elevation have produced ample evidence to show that it was a common practice during the course of the twelfth century, and even later, to raise the Host aloft while pronouncing over it the words of consecration.<sup>2</sup> The desire to imitate precisely the words and actions of Christ undoubtedly was the basis for this; the words of the Canon: *accepit panem . . . benedixit*, invited the lifting of the Host in the left hand and the making of the sign of the cross over it with the right. The height to which the Host was raised during this action probably varied a great deal, but it is clear from the accounts of certain miraculous visions at the moment of consecration that the Host must have been visible to the people in these cases.<sup>3</sup> The inconveniences which might result from this practice—e.g. the danger of material idolatry before the moment of transubstantiation—do not seem to have

<sup>1</sup> See, for example, the *Summa Sententiarum* VI, 4; PL 176, 140: *Forma huius sacramenti est commemoratio illorum verborum quae in coena Christus dixit quando discipulis corpus et sanguinem dedit dicens: Accipite, hoc est corpus meum etc. Et sicut tunc panem illum et calicem in verum corpus et in verum sanguinem verbo suo commutavit ita indubitanter credimus verba illa a sacerdote eo ordine et ea intentione dicta panem et vinum in verum corpus et in verum sanguinem commutare.*

The author of the *Summa Sententiarum* is Otto of Lucca who composed it between 1140 and 1146 according to H. Weisweiler, 'La "Summa Sententiarum" source de Pierre Lombard', *Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale*, VI (1934), 143 ff; or possibly before 1138 according to P. Bliemetzrieder,

*ibid.* pp. 411-412. On the general question of the form of consecration in the twelfth century, cf. J. deGhellinck, 'Eucharistie au xii<sup>e</sup> siècle en occident', *Dict. Théol. Cath.* V, col. 1281; and J. R. Geiselmann, *Die Abendmahlslehre an der Wende der christlichen Spätantike zum Frühmittelalter* (Munich, 1933), pp. 125 ff; also H. Weisweiler, *Maître Simon et son groupe De Sacramentis* (Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense 17, Louvain 1937), p. cxxx ff.

<sup>2</sup> H. Thurston, 'Lifting the Host', *The Tablet*, (1907), 603 ff; E. Dumoutet, *Le désir de voir l'hostie* (Paris, 1926), pp. 42-44; P. Browe, *Die Verehrung der Eucharistie in Mittelalter* (Munich, 1933), pp. 29-30.

<sup>3</sup> See the examples given by Dumoutet, *op. cit.* p. 42; Browe, *op. cit.* p. 30.

caused any immediate concern. However we do find at the turn of the century a synod, presided over by Odo of Sully, bishop of Paris (1196-1208), regulating the correct procedure in this matter. Priests are commanded to keep the Host concealed before their breast until they have said the words: *Hoc est corpus meum* and then they are to raise it aloft so that it can be seen by all.<sup>4</sup>

It is apparent that this decree eliminates the danger of material idolatry inherent in the previous practice, but it goes further. It gives the people an opportunity to see and to adore the Host once the consecratory formula has been pronounced over it. It is likewise apparent that this legislation is based on the assumption that the transubstantiation of the bread is completed once the words: *Hoc est corpus meum* have been said; the synod is taking a definite stand on the moment of consecration.

Another statute of the same synod is based on exactly the same theological position. "Should the priest discover, after he has said the Canon and completed the consecration, that, through inadvertence, he has neglected to put wine and water in the chalice, he shall immediately remedy the defect and repeat the Canon from the words: *Simili modo postquam coenatum est*".<sup>5</sup> This means that the priest is not to repeat the *form* over the bread; the synod holds for the separate consecration of the two elements. These are facts beyond dispute. The uncertainty arises when we ask the question: why did the Parisian synod command the elevation of the Host? If the sole aim had been to correct any abuse in lifting the Host before the consecration, the synod could have attained its purpose by a simple prohibition. What further object did it have in view when it ordered the priests to raise the consecrated Host aloft so that it might be seen by all?

Two theories have been proposed. The late Father Herbert Thurston maintained that the legislation of Odo of Sully was a protest against the teaching of Peter Cantor (d.1197) who held that the bread was not transubstantiated until the whole formula of consecration (i.e. both *Hoc est corpus meum* and *Hic est calix sanguinis mei etc.*) had been pronounced over the elements.<sup>6</sup> The second theory is that of Professor E. Dumoutet of Paris. Tracing the history of the devotion to the Blessed Sacrament in the thirteenth century, he finds evidence of a widespread desire on the part of the people to look upon the Host at the time of the consecration; to satisfy this devotion and to safeguard it against abuses was the object of the legislation of the Parisian synod.<sup>7</sup> The wording of the decree seems to bear out this explanation, as do similar statutes

<sup>4</sup> *Fraecipitur presbyteris, ut cum in canone inceperint qui pridie tenentes hostiam ne elevent eam statim nimis alte, ita quod possit videri a populo sed quasi ante pectus detineant donec dixerint Hoc est corpus meum et tunc elevent eam ita quod possit videri ab omnibus*; Paris B.N. *Ms Lat.* 14,443, fol. 291<sup>ra</sup>. This thirteenth century manuscript contains a better text of this decree than either the edition of Mansi, *Concilia* vol. XXII, 682, or PL 212, 65. The text as given by Dumoutet, *op. cit.* p. 37 (from *Statuta ecclesiae Parisiensis*, Paris, 1777, p. 11) is not capable of translation.

<sup>5</sup> *Si per negligentiam evenerit ut perlecto canone et peracta consecratione nec vinum nec aqua recipiatur (reperiatur-Migne) in calice, debet statim refundi (infundi-Migne) utrumque et sacerdos reiterabit consecrationem ab illo canonis loco: Simili modo postquam coenatum est usque ad finem, ita tamen ut illas duas cruces omittat quas singulariter fecit super panem*; Paris B.N. *Ms Lat.* 14,443, fol. 291<sup>ra</sup>. PL 212, 64-65.

<sup>6</sup> 'Showing the Host', *The Tablet*, Oct. 26,

1907; 'Seeing the Host', *ibid.* Nov. 2, 1907; 'Elevation of the Host', *Catholic Encyclopedia* V, 380. After the appearance of Dumoutet's thesis, Father Thurston modified his views somewhat: 'The Origin of the Elevation', *Month*, 148 (1926), 254-258; cf. p. 256: 'Let us grant Dr. Dumoutet this much, that it may perhaps be an exaggeration to say that the elevation was introduced simply as a protest against the teachings of Peter Cantor. But the introduction of this conspicuous feature of our liturgy was nevertheless, we submit, the direct consequence of that teaching'.

<sup>7</sup> *Le désir de voir l'hostie* (Paris, 1926), pp. 37 ff. The thesis of Dumoutet has been generally accepted by liturgists; cf. P. Batifol, *Leçons sur la messe* (9th. ed. Paris, 1927), pp. xxviii-xxix; P. Browe, *Die Verehrung der Eucharistie in Mittelalter* (Munich, 1933), p. 33; and with some reserves by Dom A. Wilmart, *Auteurs spirituels et textes dévots du moyen âge latin* (Paris, 1932), p. 371, n. 2.

of other early thirteenth century councils and synods; almost invariably they contain the phrase: *ut ab omnibus possit videri*. One weakness in Professor Dumoutet's theory—and he is quite conscious of it—is the fact that all the evidence adduced by him for the devotion of seeing the Host is posterior to the synod of Paris; the earliest document is the *Summa Aurea* (1215-1220) of William of Auxerre. It may well be, as Dumoutet claims, that the devotion antedates by some time the appearance of any written evidence for it.<sup>8</sup>

In denying the validity of Father Thurston's thesis, Dumoutet points out that there is no contemporary evidence that the Parisian synod was actuated by the motive alleged, *viz.* to protest against the teaching of Peter Cantor.<sup>9</sup> Moreover he claims that there was no need for the bishop of Paris to intervene in the dispute since it had already been settled by the theologians.<sup>10</sup> Here we are at the crux of the question. Was the controversy over the moment of consecration a dead issue when the Parisian synod decreed the elevation, or was it still a subject of dispute in the schools? If the former is true, we are quite ready to accept completely the thesis of Dumoutet; if the latter is true, then we must insist that the synod in enacting such legislation could not but be conscious of the fact that it was intervening in and settling a problem of the schools. It would seem then that a study on the history of the controversy on the moment of consecration is needed to clarify this question.

Before we make an analysis of the opinions of the theologians, liturgists and canonists on this point, it is well to state that the question of the moment of consecration makes its first appearance in mediaeval writings far from the schools. In one of the letters of St. Bernard (d.1153) we learn that a practical problem on this point had been submitted to him by his friend Guy, Abbot of Trois-Fontaines.<sup>11</sup> Through distraction, the Abbot had one day failed to put wine in the chalice and had discovered this omission only after the recital of the Canon; he solved the problem according to his lights; he added wine to the chalice and then put therein a particle of the consecrated Host, believing, as many did in his day, that the wine would be consecrated by contact with the Host.<sup>12</sup> Having a scruple on the validity of this solution, he wrote to St. Bernard for his opinion. The saint reassures him and states that in like circumstances he would either have done the same or he would have repeated the Canon from the words: *Simili modo postquam coenatum est*. This case becomes one of the classical examples of the schools and is solved by each master according to the principles he holds on this point; we shall see it again.

## II. THE FIRST APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF THE MOMENT OF CONSECRATION

Peter of Troyes, surnamed Comestor or Manducator, was teaching at Paris in the sixth decade of the twelfth century.<sup>13</sup> In neither his *Historia Scholastica*

<sup>8</sup> *Le désir de voir l'hostie* p. 26: 'Pour établir l'existence du désir de voir l'hostie au moyen âge, nous ne sommes appuyés sur aucun texte antérieur au xiii<sup>e</sup> siècle . . . Nous croyons, au contraire, que les éléments principaux de cette doctrine existaient déjà, avec une moindre précision, dans l'esprit des théologiens du xii<sup>e</sup> siècle.'

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.* p. 41.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 51-53.

<sup>11</sup> *Epist.* 69; PL 182, 181: Deinde quod comperita, sero licet, negligentia, vinum fudisti in calicem super hostiae sacratae particulam, laudamus nec sub tanto articulo melius fieri potuisse putamus, arbitantes liquorem, etsi non ex consecratione propria atque

solemni in sanguinem Christi mutatum, sacrum tamen fuisse ex contactu corporis sacri . . . Ego autem pro meo fatuo sensu, si mihi idem contigisset, vellem ad remedium mali unum ex duobus egisse: aut ipsum quod fecisti, aut certe ab illo loco ubi dicitur: *Simili modo* verba sancta iterasse . . .

<sup>12</sup> On the theory of consecration by contact formulated by Amalarius of Metz in his *Liber officialis* about 820, and the influence of this theory on liturgical documents, cf. M. Andrieu, *Immixtio et Consecratio. La consécration par contact dans les documents liturgiques du moyen âge* (Paris, 1924).

<sup>13</sup> On Peter's career and works, cf. R. M. Martin, 'Notes sur l'oeuvre littéraire de

nor in his *Sententiae de sacramentis* does he treat the problem of the moment of consecration, although he does give the doctrine of his day on the consecratory power of the words of Christ:

*Historia Scholastica in Evangelium c. clii.*

Et nota quia in canone cum proferuntur haec verba: *Hoc est corpus meum, hic est sanguis meus*, ex virtute horum verborum fit transsubstantiatio; unde credibile est cum dominus eadem verba dixit mutasse panem et vinum in carnem et sanguinem et tunc eandem vim contulit dominus verbis illis in posterum.<sup>14</sup> *Sententiae de sacramentis: De sacramento corporis et sanguinis domini. De forma.* Forma huius sacramenti est quam ipse Christus ibidem edidit dicens: *Accipite et comedite, hoc est corpus meum.* Et post: *Bibite ex hoc omnes, hic est sanguis meus.* Cum enim hec verba proferuntur a sacerdote, fit conversio panis et vini in corpus et sanguinem Christi.<sup>15</sup>

We do know, however, from citations by contemporary and later writers, that Peter Comestor did deal with the problem of the moment of consecration. Gerald of Wales gives us this information in his *Gemma Ecclesiastica* (cir. 1203):

Item quaeritur si hoc prolato: "Hoc est corpus meum" facta sit transsubstantiatio panis in carnem antequam hoc proferatur "Hic est sanguis meus". Respondendum diversae sunt opiniones. Quidam aiunt utrumque verbum ad utriusque transsubstantiationem necessarium, nec panem transsubstantiari in corpus nisi verbis his prolatis "Hic est sanguis meus" etc. sed completis utrisque verbis completam esse conversionem; et in hac opinione fuit Manducator . . .<sup>16</sup>

A number of early glosses on the Sentences of Peter Lombard quote the opinion of Manducator on this point:

*Glose super sententias*, Kings Library, Ms. 7F XIII, fol. 44<sup>v</sup>.

Et nota quod secundum Manducatorem nulla fit ibi mutacio nisi his verbis prius prolatis ex integro: hoc est corpus meum, hoc (sic) est sanguis meus. Sed tunc fit utriusque conversio.<sup>17</sup>

De forma verborum que confectioni huius sacramenti desideratur et de materia eciam agit in hoc capitulo. Forma hec est: hoc est corpus meum. Ad cuius prolationem panis mutatur in carnem. Ad prolationem istorum verborum hic est sanguis meus, vinum mutatur in sanguinem . . . Ad quod dicit Manducator non prius fieri mutationem aliquam quam ille due clause proferantur.<sup>18</sup>

A gloss on the *Sentences* in Ms Munich Clm 22,288 fol. 86<sup>v</sup>.

Ideo dixit manducator nullam fieri transsubstantiationem antequam utraque clausula sit prolata; et tunc cum totum dictum est, totum factum est.<sup>19</sup>

Peter of Capua, professor at Paris, in his *Summa* written 1201-1202<sup>20</sup> is another witness to the teaching of Peter Comestor:

Pierre le Mangeur', *Rech. Théol. Anc. Méd.*, III (1931), 54-66; A. Landgraf, 'Recherches sur les écrits de Pierre le Mangeur', *ibid.*, 292-306; 340-372; R. M. Martin, *Pierre le Mangeur, De Sacramentis* (Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense 17, Louvain, 1937), pp. i-viii (appendice).

<sup>14</sup> PL 198, 1618.

<sup>15</sup> Martin, *op. cit.* p. 33<sup>a</sup>.

<sup>16</sup> *Giraldi Cambrensis Gemma Ecclesiastica*, ed. J. S. Brower (Rerum Britannicarum Medii Aevi Scriptores 21, London, 1862), pp. 27-28.

<sup>17</sup> Quoted from: R. M. Martin, 'Note sur

l'oeuvre littéraire de Pierre le Mangeur'. *Rech. Théol. Anc. Méd.*, III (1931), 64. The same text is found in a gloss in Paris B.N. Ms Lat. 14,423, fol. 99<sup>v</sup>; cf. H. Weisweiler, 'Eine neue frühe Glosse zum vierten Buch der Sentenzen des Petrus Lombardus' (*Aus der Geisteswelt des Mittelalters: Beiträge Suppl.* III, 1, Münster i. W., 1935), p. 396.

<sup>18</sup> Martin, 'Note sur l'oeuvre etc.' p. 65.

<sup>19</sup> H. Weisweiler, 'Eine neue frühe glosse etc.' p. 364.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. P. Glorieux, *Repertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle I* (Paris, 1938), no. 108, p. 265.

Item ex virtute horum verborum: Hoc est corpus meum, fit conversio panis in corpus, et ex virtute horum: Hic est sanguis meus, fit conversio vini in sanguinem . . . R: Manducator dicebat quod, quando totum dictum est, totum factum est, et ita non prius fit conversio panis in corpus quam vinum in sanguinem. Nos dicimus . . .<sup>21</sup>

Apparently some of these witnesses make Peter Comestor say more than he intended. Stephen Langton, who, as we shall see, was an avowed opponent of the theory of a single consecration, is quite explicit in maintaining that Comestor refused to go further than the statement: *quando totum dictum est, totum factum est*:

*Comm. in Epist. I Cor.*

Comestor dicebat quod quando totum dictum est, totum factum est, nec aliud volebat ibi determinare.<sup>22</sup>

*Quaestiones theologicae.*

Sed utrum Christus secundum hanc opinionem prius transsubstantiavit sub una forma et deinde sub alia, similiter et nostri sacerdotes, duplex est opinio. Dicebat enim Manducator quod quando totum dictum est, totum factum est, nec aliud ibi dicere volebat; sed eius sequaces dicebant quod non prius fit transsubstantiatio panis quam vini . . .<sup>23</sup>

We see no reason to reject this critical testimony of Stephen Langton; in fact we have some confirmation of Langton's statement in the *De sacro altaris mysterio* of Cardinal Lotario (Innocent III). Writing about 1190, he tells us that there were various opinions among the theologians of his day on the moment of consecration; some say that when everything is said, everything is done; others say that the bread is first changed into the Body and afterwards the wine is changed into the Blood:

Porro cum inter theologos de tempore consecrationis sit diversa sententia, quibusdam dicentibus, quod cum totum est dictum, totum est factum; aliis dicentibus, quod panis ante mutatur in corpus, et postea vinum mutatur in sanguinem.<sup>24</sup>

Furthermore in dealing with the question: *Quando fiat transsubstantiatio*, he again gives these two opinions; the first of them he states in this fashion:

dicitur a quibusdam, quod cum totum est dictum, totum est factum, nolentes vel non valentes ipsius conversationis determinare momentum.<sup>25</sup>

We may assume that the anonymous *quidam* is Peter Comestor and we can now state with exactness his teaching on the moment of consecration. When asked whether the bread was changed into the Body of Christ—by virtue of the words: *Hoc est corpus meum*—before the wine was changed into the Blood of Christ—by virtue of the words: *Hic est sanguis meus*—, he refused to commit himself on the exact moment of the change of either, but took refuge in the rather ambiguous statement: *quando totum dictum est, totum factum est*. Later writers who quote him interpret his teaching to mean that the consecration of the two species is not completed until the two *formulae* have been pronounced; but we have the formal testimony of Stephen Langton that this latter doctrine is not Peter Comestor's but that of his followers.

This conservative attitude towards the determination of the moment of

<sup>21</sup> Munich Ms Clm 14,508, fol. 60<sup>r</sup>; quoted from: J. R. Geiselmann, *Die Abendmahlslehre an der Wende etc.*, p. 148, n. 86k.

<sup>22</sup> Paris B.N. Ms Lat. 14,443, fol. 312<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>23</sup> Cambridge St. John's College, Ms 57, fol. 206<sup>v</sup>; Paris B.N. Ms Lat. 16,385, fol. 46<sup>v</sup>; Paris B.N. 14,526, fol. 199<sup>ra</sup>. The importance of this testimony of Stephen Langton has been already pointed out by Dom O. Lottin in *Bulletin de Théologie Ancienne et Médi-*

*évale*, III (1939), no. 1074: this is a review of the article: E. Dumoutet, 'La non-réitération des sacrements et le problème du moment précis de la transsubstantiation à propos du *De Sacramentis* attribué à Pierre le Mangeur', *Recherches de Science Religieuse*, XXVIII (1938), 580-585.

<sup>24</sup> Lib. IV, c. xxii; PL 217, 872.

<sup>25</sup> Lib. IV, c. xviii; PL 217, 868.



consecration is echoed by Simon of Tournai (d.1201) whose *Summa* and *Disputationes* are probably to be dated about 1165-1170.<sup>28</sup> The *Summa* is the earlier work and does not deal with this problem.<sup>27</sup> In his *Disputatio* LXXI, Simon states that he does not know, only God knows, whether the transubstantiation takes place at the beginning, the middle or the end of the consecration prayer;<sup>28</sup> he believes, however, that, when everything has been done and said, transubstantiation has taken place.

Credo tamen, omnibus peractis et prolatis, factam esse transsubstantiationem in verum corpus Christi et in verum sanguinem.<sup>29</sup>

On the other hand, in his *Disputatio* XC, Simon argues that the bread is transubstantiated before the wine;<sup>30</sup> he does not appear to be consistent in his teaching on this point.

This careful and non-committal approach to the problem of the moment of consecration was not to satisfy the inquiring spirit of the day. It was not long before theologians, canonists and liturgists were divided into two camps: (A) Those who held to the theory of a separate and distinct consecration of the bread and the wine, i.e. they teach that the bread is immediately changed into the Body of Christ at the moment when the words: *Hoc est corpus meum* have been pronounced, and the wine into the Blood of Christ at the moment when the words: *Hic est calix sanguinis mei* etc. have been said; (B) Those who held for one, single, indivisible consecration of the bread and wine; i.e. they teach that, although the words *Hoc est corpus meum* are operative in changing the bread into Christ's Body, nevertheless these words produce their effect only in conjunction with the second formula: *Hic est calix etc.*; or in other words, there is no consecration of either bread or wine until that moment when the two formulae have been completed. We shall now outline the teaching of the leading exponents of these two theories.

### III. THE THEORY OF THE SEPARATE CONSECRATION OF THE BREAD AND THE WINE

#### (a) Late Twelfth Century Theologians

Peter of Poitiers succeeded Peter Comestor in the theological chair at the Cloister School in 1169.<sup>31</sup> His most famous work is his *Sententiarum Libri Quinque* probably written at the very beginning of his teaching career (1168-1170).<sup>32</sup> In the fifth book of the *Sentences*, he deals at some length with the problem of the moment of consecration.<sup>33</sup> We regret that the new critical edition of Peter's work<sup>34</sup> is not yet available for this part of our work; however we have tried to correct the Migne text with the aid of *Ms Troyes* 909.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>28</sup> On his career and works, cf. J. Warichez, *Les Disputationes de Simon de Tournai* (*Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense* 12, Louvain, 1932), pp. i-xli.

<sup>29</sup> We have read through his treatise on the Eucharist in the *Summa*, in Paris B.N. *Ms Lat.* 14,886, fol. 56<sup>va</sup>-58<sup>va</sup>.

<sup>30</sup> *Disputatio* LXXI, ed. Warichez, *op. cit.* p. 202: Quarto queritur quando fiat transsubstantiatio panis in corpus Christi, vel in benedictione, vel in verborum prolatione, vel in principio, vel in medio, vel in fine verborum. Inquit quedam auctoritas: Quod in benedictione. Inquit alia auctoritas: Quod in verborum virtute. Reddatur. Nomine benedictionis vel verborum intelligitur tota illius officii executio. An vero vel in principio, vel in medio vel in fine officii, fiat transsub-

stantiatio, nescio; Deus scit.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.* p. 202.

<sup>32</sup> *Disputatio* XC; ed. Warichez, *op. cit.* pp. 258-259.

<sup>33</sup> For his career and works, cf. Philip S. Moore, *The Works of Peter of Poitiers* (Publication in Mediaeval Studies I, Notre Dame, 1936).

<sup>34</sup> Moore, *op. cit.* pp. 39-41.

<sup>35</sup> *Lib.* V, c. xi; PL 211, 1243-1246.

<sup>36</sup> At this date, May 1944, only Book I has appeared; P. S. Moore & Marthe Dulong, *Sententiae Petri Pictavensis* I (Publications in Mediaeval Studies VII, Notre Dame, 1943).

<sup>37</sup> This is not the best manuscript; it is the only one that is available to us at the moment.

After dealing with some general questions on the form of the sacrament and the form used by Christ at the Last Supper, Peter of Poitiers poses the problem of the priest who is compelled to stop in the middle of the words of consecration, i.e. half way through the words: *Hoc est corpus meum*. Would there be the sacrament? Or should another priest repeat the whole blessing, or take up where the first left off? He refuses to solve this difficulty or to waste time over it since, as he says, nothing has been revealed on the matter:

Solet queri quiddam simile ei quod quesitum est supra cum de baptismo ageretur, utrum prolata medietate verborum quorum vi fit transsubstantiatio ratum esset sacramentum, si forte necessitate ibi sisteret sacerdos vel obmutesceret vel morte preventus; et utrum oporteret super hostiam illam totam benedictionem repetere ab alio profundendam sacerdote, an esset incipiendum ubi terminavit. Sed credimus homini non esse revelatum et ibi non diu immorandum.<sup>36</sup>

The second case to engage his attention is that of the priest who has completed the words: *Hoc est corpus meum* and who stops there, having no intention to go further. Is the sacrament complete? Yes, he answers, since the bread is already transubstantiated into Christ's Body and the Blood would be present as well; so too would the soul and the Godhead:

Sed numquid si, prolatis his verbis: *Hoc est corpus meum* etc. integre, quiesceret sacerdos nil aliud perfecturus, cum iam esset facta conversio panis in corpus et ibi esset sanguis, completum esset sacramentum? Videtur quia ibi est caro et sanguis et anima et deitas. Quod si dicatur, nil obest.<sup>37</sup>

He then proceeds to state the objection of his opponents. Some claim that the sacrament is not complete until both forms have been pronounced, and that the bread is not transubstantiated until the second form: *Hic est sanguis* etc. has been said. They argue as follows: the Body of Christ is never *sine sanguine*, nor the Blood of Christ *sine corpore*; if then the bread is changed into the Body of Christ at the completion of the form: *Hoc est corpus meum* and before the pronouncement of the words: *Hic est sanguis* etc., the Body is there *cum sanguine*; therefore the Blood is there either by conversion of the wine into the Blood or not by conversion. If the Blood is there by conversion of the wine as the Body is there by conversion of the bread, then the words: *Hoc est corpus meum* are effective in changing both the bread into the Body and the wine into the Blood. If this is so, then there is nothing effected by the words: *Hic est sanguis* etc.; or if both forms produce the same result, then the sacrament is re-iterated in exactly the same way that it would be if one were to say twice: *Hoc est corpus meum*. In fact, one might well ask: What bread and what wine are changed by the words: *Hic est sanguis* etc., since there is no longer bread and wine on the altar; they have already been changed by virtue of the form: *Hoc est corpus meum*.<sup>38</sup>

<sup>36</sup> PL 211, 1245; Troyes 909, fol. 162<sup>rh</sup>.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>38</sup> Dicunt, tamen quidam quod non est completum sacramentum donec omnia prolata sunt utraque verba nec facta est transsubstantiatio panis in corpus donec prolata sunt verba hec: *hic est sanguis* etc. Item corpus Christi numquam est sine sanguine nec sanguis sine corpore. Ad prolationem istorum verborum completam: *hoc est corpus meum* facta est transsubstantiatio panis in corpus antequam proferantur hec verba: *hic est sanguis* etc.; tunc ergo est corpus cum sanguine in altari; ergo tunc est ibi sanguis; ergo est ibi conversio vini in sanguinem vel non. Si conversio vini in sanguinem,

sicut conversio panis in corpus, ergo ex vi illorum verborum et panis in corpus et vinum in sanguinem est conversum. Ita ergo ad prolationem eorum que sequuntur, istorum scilicet: *hic est sanguis* etc., non fit panis vel vini conversio in corpus vel sanguinem; ergo superflue proferuntur illa verba. Vel si ad utramque fit conversio, prorsus eandem vim videntur habere, et ita iteratur sacramentum quemadmodum si repeterentur illa verba semel prolata. Imo potest queri quis panis vel quod vinum convertitur cum dicitur forma: *hic est sanguis* etc.; non enim relinquitur panis et vinum super altare cum prolatio istorum verborum est completa: *hoc est corpus*

Peter of Poitiers answers that, by the pronouncement of the words: *Hoc est corpus meum*, the wine is not converted into the Blood; it is true that the Flesh of Christ is never *sine sanguine*, but the Blood is not there by conversion; in fact nothing is changed into the Blood until the words: *Hic est sanguis meus* etc. have been said. However, the Blood is present in Christ's Body just as the soul is; and the soul is not there *per conversionem*.<sup>39</sup>

There is one more objection: the bread is changed into Christ's Body by the words: *Hoc est corpus meum*; therefore it is changed into the Body *cum sanguine* or *sine sanguine*. If the bread is changed into the Body *cum sanguine*, then the bread is changed into Blood; if the bread is changed into the Body *sine sanguine*, then the Body is *sine sanguine*. Peter's answer to this problem is weak. He simply states that we must hold that bread is changed into the Body, neither *cum sanguine* nor *sine sanguine*, just as Christ willed to suffer neither *cum peccato Judaeorum* nor *sine peccato eorum*.<sup>40</sup>

This summary of the doctrine of Peter of Poitiers shows that he was definitely for the separate consecration of the bread and the wine and consequently held that the bread was transubstantiated at the moment when the words: *Hoc est corpus meum* had been said.

As we saw above, Simon of Tournai in his *Disputatio* LXXI shows the same hesitancy as Peter Comestor in determining the moment of consecration. In his *Disputatio* XC, he approaches the teaching of Peter of Poitiers. He first asks the question whether the transubstantiation of the bread take place before that of the wine. This seems to be demonstrable, he says; for the transubstantiation of the bread is effected by virtue of the prolation of the words which are first said, and the transubstantiation of the wine by virtue of the prolation of the words which are said secondly. On the other hand, he continues, this proposition seems to be capable of disproof. For, if the bread is transubstantiated into the Body before the wine is converted into the Blood, then it (the bread) is transubstantiated into the Body without Blood; which is absurd.

He answers that the bread is transubstantiated before the wine; for, if by virtue of the first words both are transubstantiated, the second series of words are superfluous, or the wine is transubstantiated a second time, or the second form is merely for demonstration and not for transubstantiation. This would mean that the wine would not be transubstantiated by the words: *Hic est calix* etc., which is absurd.

Item queritur an prius fiat transsubstantiatio panis quam vini. Quod sic videtur probari. Fit enim virtute prolationis verborum que prius proferuntur transsubstantiatio panis, et virtute prolationis verborum que secundo proferuntur transsubstantiatio vini. E contra videtur probari quod non. Si enim panis prius transsubstantiatur in corpus quam vinum in sanguinem, ergo transsubstantiatur in corpus sine sanguine. Hoc autem absurdum. Redditur. Prius panis transsubstantiatur quam vinum. Si enim

*meum*, quia iam facta est transsubstantiatio utriusque in utrumque. PL 211, 1245-1246; *Troyes* 909, fol. 162<sup>b</sup>-163<sup>va</sup>.

<sup>39</sup> Ad hoc dicendum quod ex prolatione istorum verborum: *hoc est corpus meum*, non convertitur vinum in sanguinem sed panis in carnem. Non est tamen caro sine sanguine; est enim ibi sanguis sed non per conversionem, i.e. non est aliquid ibi conversum in sanguinem donec proferantur hec verba: *hic est sanguis* etc. ex quibus fit transsubstantiatio vini in sanguinem; quod est positum, quod non est transsubstantiatum donec hec verba proferantur: *hic est sanguis* etc.; sicut et anima est in corpore illo, non

tamen per anime conversionem. PL 211, 1246; *Troyes* 909, fol. 162<sup>va</sup>.

<sup>40</sup> Sed ad hoc obicitur: panis mutatur in corpus Christi prolatione illorum verborum; ergo in corpus cum sanguine, vel in corpus sine sanguine; si in corpus cum sanguine ergo in sanguinem est conversus panis. Si vero in corpus sine sanguine, ergo corpus est sine sanguine. Sed patet esse dandum quod panis convertatur in corpus nec tamen cum sanguine vel sine sanguine, sicut Christus voluit pati, non tamen cum peccato Iudeorum vel sine peccato eorum. PL 211, 1246; *Troyes* 909, fol. 162<sup>va</sup>.

virtute primorum verborum transsubstantiatur utrumque, secunda verba superfluerent, vel denuo transsubstantiaretur vinum, vel verba fierent tantum ad significandum non ad transsubstantiandum. Ergo his verbis: *Hic est calix testamenti* non fieret transsubstantiatio vini. Hoc autem absurdum.<sup>41</sup>

His next question makes a further contribution to the problem. Assuming that the bread is transubstantiated before the wine, can the former take place without the latter (*potest illa fieri sine ista*)? He answers that we must make a distinction between *posse de facto* and *posse de debito* and he notes that the preposition *sine* has two senses; when it refers to the same instant of time, as: *non est dies sine luce*, and when it indicates continuation of time, as: *non est dies sine nocte*. With these two distinctions in mind, he says that the first transubstantiation can *de facto* take place without the second, but it cannot *de debito* take place without the second, i.e. without the second necessarily following.<sup>42</sup>

Simon of Tournai does not illustrate these principles with practical cases. His meaning will be clearer if we apply them to the situations implied in his argument. A priest has completed the words: *Hoc est corpus meum* and is physically unable to continue, nor is there anyone to take his place. The transubstantiation of the bread has *de facto* taken place without that of the wine. If, however, the priest is able to continue or if some one can supply for him, the consecration must be completed with the transubstantiation of the wine. There is no question in this *Disputatio* of where he stands on the moment of consecration; he holds that the bread is consecrated once the words: *Hoc est corpus meum* have been said.

The next theologian to engage our attention is Martin of Fougères. Very little is known of this Master Martin; he was teaching at Paris in the latter part of the twelfth century and perhaps even during the early years of the thirteenth.<sup>43</sup> We give his testimony here because he is generally considered to be a follower of Peter of Poitiers and of Simon of Tournai.<sup>44</sup> His unpublished *Summa* is found in a number of manuscripts; for the purpose of this study we make use of *Paris B.N. Lat. 14,526* and *Toulouse 209*. The correct title of his work seems to be *Compilatio Questionum Theologiae*.<sup>45</sup>

In dealing with the problem of the moment of consecration Martin states the two current positions of his day and the objections that may be raised to either one of them. He begins by posing the problem of the priest who, after completing the words: *Hoc est corpus meum*, is physically unable to continue; has the transubstantiation of bread taken place? If you claim that it has, it would seem to follow that the Blood is necessarily present since the Flesh of Christ is never *sine sanguine*; then the Blood is there without any conversion of wine into Blood; therefore wine is not of the substance of the sacrament:

<sup>41</sup> *Disputatio* XC, *Quest. II*; J. Warichez, *Les Disputationes de Simon de Tournai* (Louvain, 1932), pp. 258-259.

<sup>42</sup> *Disputatio* XC, *Quest. III*: Sed queritur, si prius sit transsubstantiatio panis quam vini, ergo potest illa fieri sine ista. Reddatur. Posse dupliciter et sine dupliciter: posse de facto et posse de debito; et sine notat instantiam temporis vel continuationem. Instantiam, ut cum dicitur: Non est dies sine luce, id est, quando dies est, lux est. Continuationem, cum dicitur: non est dies sine nocte, id est, nulla dies est cui non continuatur nox. Ergo prima transsubstantiatio potest de facto fieri sine secunda, id est quando non secunda; sed non potest de debito fieri sine secunda, id est quin continue sequatur secunda. Warichez, *op. cit.* p. 259.

<sup>43</sup> On his career and works, see: M. Grabmann, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode II* (Freiburg i. Br., 1911), pp. 524-530. Msgr. Grabmann was under the impression that there were two Martins: Magister Martinus and Martin of Fougères. On the identity of these see: P. Moore, *Peter of Poitiers* pp. 33-39. On the teaching career of Martin, see also: P. Glorieux, *Repertoire des maîtres I*, 269.

<sup>44</sup> For the close relationship between his work and the *Sentences* of Peter of Poitiers see: P. Moore, *op. cit.* pp. 38-39. On his dependence on Simon of Tournai see: Warichez, *Les Disputationes de Simon de Tournai*, pp. xxxii and xxxix.

<sup>45</sup> The title in *Paris B.N. 14,526*, fol. 61<sup>ra</sup>: *Compilatio questionum theologie secundum Magistrum Martinum*.

Item si prolata hac serie verborum: *hoc est corpus meum*, statim sistat sacerdos obmutescens vel morte preventus, queritur utrum facta sit transsubstantiatio panis in carnem. Quod dicto, sic infer: ergo ibi est sanguis, et est necessarium argumentum illud, ideo quia caro Christi numquam est sine sanguine, ergo sine transsubstantiatione aliqua vini in sanguinem est ibi sanguis Christi; ergo sine vino potest confici sacramentum altaris; ergo vinum non est de substantia sacramenti huius; illud enim solet dici de substantia sacramenti sine quo non potest confici sacramentum.<sup>46</sup>

In his response, Martin first quotes the opinion of those who hold that the consecration is morally one single act even though the bread is converted by virtue of the words: *Hoc est corpus meum*, and the wine by the words: *Hic est calix etc.*:

Respondendum. Dicunt quidam quod tunc primo transsubstantiatur panis in carnem et vinum in sanguinem quando omnia prolata sunt verba utriusque, nec facta est transsubstantiatio panis in carnem donec prolata sunt hec verba: *hoc est corpus meum*, nec facta est transsubstantiatio vini in sanguinem donec prolata sunt hec verba: *hic est calix novi et eterni testamenti*.<sup>47</sup>

This is an imperfect and rather confusing statement of the theory of the single consecration; as we shall see later, that theory is stated with precision and exactness by Peter Cantor. There is, however, no doubt about the fact that Simon considered this opinion to be the equivalent of saying that the consecration of the bread was not completed until the final words of the second form had been pronounced, for he raises the following objection to it. This would mean, he says, that the bread and the wine are both transubstantiated by the form: *Hic est calix etc.*, and that nothing is accomplished by the utterance of the first form; in other words, the second form is more effective than the first. To illustrate this objection, he give two examples from everyday life. In a transaction of buying and selling, the contract is made by the utterance of the words of the buyer and is perfected by the words of the seller; the words of the former are more effective than those of the latter. Likewise in a verbal agreement when one party makes a stipulation which is accepted by the other party, the words of the respondent are more effective than the words of the stipulator:

Sed contra sic obicitur: in prolatione istorum verborum: *hic est calix*, transsubstantiatur panis in carnem et vinum in sanguinem; prolatis tantum verbis hiis: *hoc est corpus meum*, non transsubstantiatur panis in carnem nec vinum in sanguinem; ergo maioris effectus sunt hec verba: *hic est calix* quam illa: *hoc est corpus meum etc.* Exemplum. In prolatione verborum emptoris fit contractus emptionis et venditionis et perficitur emptio et venditio in prolatione verborum venditoris; ergo verba emptoris in contractu emptionis et venditionis maioris effectus sunt quam verba venditoris. Vel sic: non in verbo stipulantis est stipulatus sed in verbo respondentis; ergo maioris effectus sunt verba in stipulatu respondentis quam stipulantis.<sup>48</sup>

Martin then proceeds to state the second current opinion on the moment of consecration, namely that the bread is fully transubstantiated by the words: *Hoc est corpus meum*:

Alii dicunt quod in prolatione istorum verborum: *Hoc est corpus meum* transsubstantiatur panis in carnem.<sup>49</sup>

<sup>46</sup> Paris B.N. Lat. 14,526, fol. 128<sup>va-vb</sup>; Toulouse 209, fol. 199<sup>ra</sup>.

<sup>48</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>49</sup> Paris ibid.; Toulouse fol. 199<sup>rb</sup>.

<sup>47</sup> Paris ibid. fol. 128<sup>vb</sup>; Toulouse ibid.

One may object to this opinion on the grounds that, if the bread is consecrated before the wine, then the transubstantiation of the one can be effected without that of the other. Martin borrows this objection and the answer to it from the ninetieth Disputation of Simon of Tournai:

Sed contra hoc opponitur: prius fit transsubstantiatio panis in carnem quam vini in sanguinem; ergo ista potest fieri sine illa. R. *Posse dupliciter et sine dupliciter dicitur; posse de facto et posse de debito; et hec propositio sine notat instantiam temporis et continuationem; instantiam ut cum dicitur: non est dies sine luce, i.e. quando dies est lux est; continuationem ut cum dicitur: non est dies sine nocte, i.e. nulla est dies cui non continuetur nox. Ergo prima transsubstantiatio potest fieri sine secunda, i.e. quando non; sed non potest de debito fieri sine secunda, i.e. quin continue sequatur secunda.*<sup>50</sup>

The next objection raised to this opinion by Martin is the same which we already saw in the *Sentences* of Peter of Poitiers<sup>51</sup> in regard to the superfluity of the second form. The answer to the objection is developed somewhat more fully and along slightly different lines by Martin of Fougères:

Item corpus Christi numquam sine sanguine nec sanguis sine corpore est. Ad prolationem istorum verborum: *hoc est corpus meum* transsubstantiatur panis in carnem antequam proferantur hec verba: *hic est calix novi testamenti etc.*; ergo tunc corpus Christi cum sanguine est in altari; ergo est ibi sanguis conversione vini in sanguinem vel non; si conversione vini in sanguine ergo prolatione vel virtute istorum verborum: *hoc est corpus meum*, panis in carnem et vinum in sanguinem conversum est; ergo superflue proferuntur hec verba: *hic est calix novi testamenti*. Si est ibi sanguis non conversione vini in sanguinem, ergo cum non sit ibi sanguis nisi conversione et nulla facta sit ibi conversio nisi panis in carnem, est ibi sanguis conversione panis in carnem. Quo dicto, sic oppone: non plus sanguinis est ibi conversione vini in sanguinem facta quam sit conversione facta panis in carnem; ergo ex habundantia est conversio vini in sanguinem. Non sequitur. Exemplum: non plus huius sacramenti sumitur sub hac specie et sub illa quam sub altera tantum; ergo sumptio illius sacramenti sub altera illarum specierum superfluit. Non est verum quia in sumptione sub duplici specie est misterium; cum enim totus Christus et integer sit sub alterutra, sumptus est in utraque ut ostendatur totam humanam naturam assumpsisse ut totam redimeret scilicet corpus et animam; ergo in duabus speciebus celebrat ecclesia hoc sacramentum ut anime et carnis restauratio et utriusque liberatio in nobis significaretur; nec plus sub utraque nec tamen minus sub una sumitur hoc sacramentum. Eadem enim ratio, ut ait Ylarius, in corpore Christi quam in manna processit de quo qui amplius collegerat non plus habebat nec qui minus paraverat minus inveniebat.<sup>52</sup>

We may assume that Martin is in favor of this second opinion; he defends it and not the first. We may then rank him along with Peter of Poitiers and Simon of Tournai as a proponent of the theory that the bread is fully consecrated once the words: *Hoc est corpus meum* have been said; moreover he holds, with Simon, that though the action of the first form is complete in itself, it should never be separated from its companion form: *Hic est calix etc.*

(b) *The Canonists and Liturgists of the late Twelfth Century*

In the works of the canonists that have been available to us for this study,

<sup>50</sup> *Ibidem*; the text from Simon of Tournai is given above in note 42.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. note 38.

<sup>52</sup> Paris B.N. Lat. 14,526, fol. 128<sup>vb</sup>; Toulouse 209, fol. 199<sup>rb</sup>-200<sup>ra</sup>.

we find no reference to the problem of the moment of consecration in the following: the *Stroma* of Rolandus Bandinelli (c.1148);<sup>53</sup> the *Summa* of Rufinus (1157-1159);<sup>54</sup> the *Summa* of Stephen of Tournai (1160-1170);<sup>55</sup> the *Summa* of Joannes Faventinus (c.1171);<sup>56</sup> the *Summa* of Simon of Bisignano (1177-1179);<sup>57</sup> nor do we find any information in the anonymous works: the *Summa Coleniensis* (c.1169);<sup>58</sup> the *Summa Parisiensis* (c.1170);<sup>59</sup> the *Summa Lipsiensis* (c.1186).<sup>60</sup>

The earliest canonist to take note of our problem seems to have been Sicard of Cremona. In his *Summa Decretalium* written between 1179 and 1181,<sup>61</sup> Sicard poses the question whether the transubstantiation of the bread takes place before the words: *Hic est sanguis* are said. He gives the various opinions but for his part, he says, he leaves this and similar difficulties to the theologians:

Item queritur si hoc prolato: *hoc est corpus meum*, facta sit transsubstantiatio panis in carnem antequam proferatur: *hic est sanguis meus*. Diverse sunt opinioniones; quidam aiunt utrumque verbum ad utriusque transsubstantiationem esse necessarium, unde si primo prolato vinum effundatur, vino apposito, repetatur. Alii alterum ad alterius transsubstantiationem sufficere. Item de pronomiibus hoc et meum et multis aliis circa hanc formam queritur; hec omnia examini theologico relinquimus.<sup>62</sup>

Huguccio, the famous professor of Bologna, is one canonist of this period who has very decided views on the moment of consecration. In his unedited *Summa* (circa 1188),<sup>63</sup> he teaches that each form is effective by itself and independent of the other. He arrives at this conclusion in the course of his commentary on the Canon *Comperimus*;<sup>64</sup> here he is dealing with the problem of communion under one species. He holds for the validity of communion under the form of bread alone, save for the priest in the Mass, since the whole Christ is present in the one species. The Body is there by transubstantiation, and where the Body is, there too must be the Blood, Soul and Godhead. It is clear, he says, that the sacrament of the Body can be confected without the sacrament of the Blood for that is precisely what Christ did at the Last Supper. What is to be said of the case where the priest dies before saying the words: *Hic est sanguis meus*? Is the sacrament of the Body there without the sacrament of the Blood? Huguccio answers in the affirmative. Is the complete sacrament there? Yes, answers Huguccio, so far as the transubstantiation of the bread is concerned but not *quoad utrumque*; but since the conversion of the bread is completed, the Blood, Soul and Godhead are likewise present. In ordinary circumstances, however, the priest is bound to consecrate both the bread and wine just as he is bound to receive under both species:

. . . sed ecce sub specie panis est totus Christus scilicet caro et sanguis et anima et deitas. Queritur ergo qualiter sit ibi sanguis; si dicis conversione est, nulla res sit ibi conversa nisi panis, ergo sanguis est ibi per conversionem panis in sanguinem, ergo panis est conversus in sanguinem, ergo species panis non solum est sacramentum corporis

<sup>53</sup> F. Thaner, *Die Summa Magistri Rolandi* etc. (Innsbruck, 1874); S. Kuttner, *Repertorium der Kanonistik* (1140-1234) *Prodromus Corporis Glossarum* I (Studi e Testi 71, Città del Vaticano, 1937), pp. 127-129.

<sup>54</sup> H. Singer, *Die Summa Decretorum des Magister Rufinus* (Paderborn, 1902); Kuttner, *Repertorium* pp. 131-132.

<sup>55</sup> J. F. Schulte, *Die Summa des Stephanus Tornacensis über das Decretum Gratiani* (Giessen, 1892); Kuttner, *Repertorium* pp. 133-136.

<sup>56</sup> Kuttner, *Repertorium* pp. 143-146; Paris B.N. Lat. 14,606, fol. 1-166<sup>v</sup>; Paris B.N. Lat. 14,997, fol. 187-196<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>57</sup> Kuttner, *Repertorium* pp. 148-149; Rouen 710, fol. 64-117.

<sup>58</sup> Kuttner, *Repertorium* pp. 170-172; Paris B.N. Lat. 14,997, fol. 1-183.

<sup>59</sup> Kuttner, *Repertorium* pp. 177-178; Bamberg Can. 36 (P.II.26), fol. 1-100.

<sup>60</sup> Kuttner, *Repertorium* pp. 196-198; Rouen 743, fol. 1-141.

<sup>61</sup> Kuttner, *Repertorium* pp. 150-153. The *Summa* is unpublished; we use Ms Rouen 710.

<sup>62</sup> Rouen 710, fol. 59<sup>va</sup>.

<sup>63</sup> Kuttner, *Repertorium* pp. 155-160; Paris B.N. Lat. 3392.

<sup>64</sup> *De cons.* D. ii, can. 11.

Christi sed et sanguinis. Si dicis non per conversionem, ergo difficile sunt ibi corpus et sanguis quia unum est. Corpus est ibi per conversionem panis in corpus, sanguis non est ibi conversione alicuius rei sicut nec anima nec deitas, sed sanguis est ibi quia corpus illud non potest sine sanguine esse; et eadem ratione est ibi anima quia illa anima non potest esse sine ullo corpore nec e converso; similiter deitas est ibi quia est ubique; corpus illud a deitate separari non potest; ergo corpus est ibi vi illorum verborum: hoc est corpus meum, sed reliqua per aliud sicut dictum est. Si ergo dicatur: panis transit in corpus, ergo in corpus cum sanguine vel in corpus sine sanguine, distingue: panis transit in corpus cum sanguine, i.e. in corpus participans sanguinem, verum est; panis transit in corpus cum sanguine, i.e. in corpus et sanguinem, falsum est. Iam ex his que dicta sunt, patet quod sacramentum corporis potest confici sine sacramento sanguinis et e converso, quia Christus utrumque per se obtulerit et sacerdos utrumque per se confecerit et utrumque propria et singulari benedictione confecerit. Quod enim si confecto corpore Christi statim presbyter moriatur ante prolationem illorum verborum: *hic est sanguis meus*, nonne iam est ibi sacramentum corporis sine sacramento sanguinis? Utique; sed querit aliquis an ibi sit plenum sacramentum; dico quod ibi est plenum sacramentum quoad transsubstantiationem panis in corpus sed non est ibi plenum sacramentum quoad utrumque; et tamen facta transsubstantiatione est ibi corpus et sanguis et anima et deitas sed corpus est ibi per conversionem panis in corpus, reliqua sunt ibi sicut dictum est. Sed sacerdos utrumque debet conficere et neutrum sine altero et similiter debet cum sacrificat utrumque sumere. non alterum sine altero.<sup>65</sup>

The only liturgist to discuss the problem of the moment of consecration in this period is Innocent III. His great work on the Mass, the treatise *De sacro altaris mysterio*, was written when he was a cardinal and during the years that he was out of favor with the reigning pope, Celestine III (1191-1198).<sup>66</sup> A product of the schools of Paris and Bologna, Innocent was thoroughly conversant with the controversies of the day. It is not surprising then to find that his treatise on the Mass embodies a very complete statement on the theology of the Eucharist according to the knowledge of his time.<sup>67</sup> He deals with the problem of the moment of consecration in his fourth book. In the seventeenth chapter he treats the question: When does the transubstantiation take place?<sup>68</sup> In his answer he gives the two current opinions of the day and he sides definitely with those who hold for the separate consecration of the bread and the wine. His argument in favor of this position shows, we think, a close dependence on Huguccio:

Alii dicunt et bene, quod licet ad prolationem praecedentium [*i.e. Hoc est corpus meum*] panis a natura mutetur in corpus et ad prolationem sequentium [*i.e. Hic est sanguis meus*] vinum praeterea mutetur in sanguinem numquam tamen corpus est sine sanguine vel sanguis est sine corpore, sicut neutrum est sine anima, sed sub forma panis sanguis existit in corpore per mutationem panis in corpus; et e converso. Non quod panis in sanguinem vel vinum mutetur in corpus, sed quia neutrum potest existere sine reliquo.<sup>69</sup>

<sup>65</sup> Paris B.N. Lat. 3892, fol. 369<sup>rb</sup>. The Gloss on the *Decretum* of Gratian (edition of Lyons, 1560, col. 1876) quotes Huguccio as teaching that the bread is transubstantiated by the words: *Hoc est corpus meum* provided that the second form follows immediately. This quotation seems to be inexact.

<sup>66</sup> On his early career and his works, cf. A. Amann, 'Innocent III' *Dict. Théol. Cath.* VII, cols. 1961-1962.

<sup>67</sup> Particularly in Book IV; PL 217, 851 ff.

<sup>68</sup> PL 217, 868.

<sup>69</sup> PL 217, 868. The sentence which follows the above quotation in the Migne edition is an obvious interpolation: *Est ergo sanguis*



In the twenty-second chapter of the same book, he discusses the difficulty that arises when a priest is unable to continue the Mass after he has said the words: *Hoc est corpus meum*.<sup>70</sup> Two problems arise. If another priest repeats the service from the beginning, the consecration of the bread will be reiterated. If another priest continues from where the first left off, will not the unity of the sacrament be destroyed? This latter difficulty is met by a quotation from a Council of Toledo which permits the substitution of one cleric for another in case of illness.<sup>71</sup> The solution of the first problem depends on the moment of consecration, but since theologians are not in agreement on the moment of consecration, Innocent recommends a course of action which will solve all doubts and scruples; let the oblation of the first priest be carefully put away, and then the second priest should say the whole office over a new oblation:

Verum ne illa fiat iteratio vel divisio sacramenti, nec aliquis scrupulus erroris vel dubitationis remaneat, consultius et tutius iudicatur ut illa talis oblatio studiosissime recondatur et super aliam totum officium celebretur.<sup>72</sup>

To sum up the teaching of Innocent III as a liturgist, we may say that, while he favors the theory of two separate and distinct consecrations of the bread and the wine, yet when it comes to the application of that theory to a practical problem, he hesitates to accept all the implications of it but prefers to base his solutions on the more conservative position of Peter Manducator: 'When all is said, all is done'.

(c) *The Theologians of the First Decade of the Thirteenth Century*

In that period of the thirteenth century which could have elapsed before the promulgation of the synodal decree on the elevation,—it could not be later than July 1208 the date of the death of Odo of Sully—there are three theologians who hold for the separate consecration of the bread and the wine: Peter of Capua, Stephen Langton and Praepositinus.

Peter of Capua was teaching at Paris as late as 1219 but his unedited *Summa* was written in 1201 or 1202.<sup>73</sup> In treating of the Eucharist he raises the usual problem about the moment of consecration: The form *Hoc est corpus meum* is pronounced before the form *Hic est sanguis meus*, therefore the bread is converted into the Body before the wine is converted into the Blood; but this would seem to imply that the Flesh is present *sine sanguine*. In answering the difficulty, he first quotes the opinion of Peter Manducator to the effect that 'when everything is said, everything is done': this he interprets to mean that the bread is not converted before the wine. He then proceeds to give his own opinion, that the conversion of the bread takes place at the saying of the words: *Hoc est corpus meum*. This does not mean that the Flesh is present *sine sanguine*, for the Blood is present, not by the conversion of something into Blood but by the conversion of something else into something else, namely of bread into Flesh; and the Flesh cannot be present *sine sanguine*. Peter of Capua also brings up the practical case of the priest who dies after saying the words: *Hoc est corpus meum*. Should another priest begin all over again or is it sufficient if he proceeds from the point where the first left off? In his answer

sub speciebus panis, non ex vi sacramenti, sed ex naturali concomitantia secundum Fratrem Egidium.

<sup>70</sup> PL 217, 872.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibidem*: De hoc ita statutum legitur in concilio Toletano: Censuimus convenire ut cum a sacerdotibus missarum tempore mysteria consecrantur, si aegritudinis cujuslibet accidat eventus, quo coeptum nequeat consecrationis explere mysterium sit liberum episcopo vel presbytero alteri consecrationem exsequi coepti officii, ut praecedentibus,

libenter alii pro complemento succedant. This is an excerpt from can. 16, C. VII, I, of Gratian's Decretum.

<sup>72</sup> PL 217, 872. Innocent shows the same conservativeness on the question of the wine omitted in the Mass; cf. c. xxiv; PL 217, 873. He is definitely opposed to the theory of consecration by contact; cf. *ibid.* c. xxxi; on the influence of his teaching on this point, cf. M. Andrieu, *Immixtio et Consecratio* pp. 15-16.

he quotes the opinion of the 'bishop of Paris' who recommended in such cases that the second priest take a new host and fresh wine and repeat the whole consecration; the host used by the first priest was to be set aside and consumed at the time of communion. This statement is particularly interesting since it give us a *terminus post quem* for the synodal decrees of Odo of Sully. The reader will recall that those decrees had a quite different solution for this problem.<sup>74</sup> It is apparent that Peter of Capua is giving the opinion of Odo's predecessor, Maurice of Sully (d. 1196).<sup>75</sup> If the new decree had been in existence, he would certainly have quoted it, since it supports his own opinion. Here is the complete text from the *Summa* of Peter of Capua:

Item ex virtute horum verborum: *hoc est corpus meum*, fit conversio panis in corpus et ex virtute horum: *hic est sanguis meus*, fit conversio vini in sanguinem. Set prius proferuntur hec verba: *hoc est corpus meum*, quam illa: *hic est sanguis meus*; ergo prius convertitur panis in corpus quam vinum in sanguinem. Videtur ergo ibi prius esse caro sine sanguine. Et si sacerdos prolatis his verbis: *hoc est corpus meum*, decederet ante prolationem sequentium, succedens sacerdos deberetne inchoare a principio an ab eo loco ubi dimisit prior?

R. Manducator dicebat quod, quando totum dictum est, totum factum est, et ita non prius fit conversio panis in corpus quam vini in sanguinem. Nos dicimus quod ad prolationem precedentium fit conversio panis in carnem; non tamen est tunc ibi caro sine sanguine, sed est ibi etiam sanguis per conversionem non alicuius rei in se, cum solum vinum convertatur in sanguinem, quod nondum est conversum, sed per conversionem alicuius in aliud i.e. panis in carnem, quia caro non potest esse sine sanguine. Super predicto vero casu dat consilium episcopus parisiensis ut succedens sacerdos aliam hostiam et alium vinum a principio incipiat conficere et precedentem reservet, donec sumpta hostia quam ipse consecravit, sumat etiam precedentem. Tunc enim nullum imminet periculum.<sup>77</sup>

Among the theologians of this period the figure of Stephen Langton stands out. His teaching career at Paris probably began as early as 1180 and lasted until his nomination as archbishop of Canterbury in 1206.<sup>78</sup> He may have been a disciple of Peter Cantor<sup>79</sup> and is sometimes quoted as agreeing with Cantor on the question of the moment of consecration.<sup>80</sup> The truth is that he disagreed completely with Cantor on this point. Langton deals with this problem in his *Commentary on the Epistles of St. Paul* written in the year 1200 or very shortly afterwards, and in his *Quaestiones* composed before 1206.<sup>81</sup> In commenting on

<sup>73</sup> P. Glorieux, *Repertoire des maîtres en théologie* I, p. 265, no. 108.

<sup>74</sup> For the text of the synodal decree, cf. note 5.

<sup>75</sup> Gerald of Wales tells us that Maurice of Sully gave this same solution in a similar case, namely where a priest had completed the consecration while using *sicera* instead of wine. *Gemma Ecclesiastica* I, 46, ed. Brewer, p. 124; cf. also the testimony of Robert Courson on this point, *infra* p. 146.

<sup>77</sup> Ms Munich Clm. 14508, fol. 60<sup>r</sup>; quoted from J. R. Geiselmann, *Die Abendmahlslehre* etc. p. 148, n. 86k.

<sup>78</sup> For his teaching career, cf. F. M. Powicke, *Stephen Langton* (Oxford, 1927), pp. 29-74; D. O. Lottin, 'L'authenticité de la *Summa* d'Etienne Langton' *Recherches de Théol. Anc. Méd.* I (1929), 497-504; G. Lacombe, 'The Authenticity of the *Summa* of Cardinal Stephen Langton', *New Scholasticism*, IV (1930), 97-114.

<sup>79</sup> Powicke (*op. cit.* p. 30) thinks that he was a student of Cantor; Msgr Lacombe (*op. cit.* p. 107) claims he was a student of Peter Manducator.

<sup>80</sup> Albertus Magnus lists Langton and Praepostinus along with Cantor as holding for the single consecration of the elements; *De Eucharistia* D. vi, Tr. ii, 3. *Opera omnia* vol. 38 (Paris, 1899), p. 402. A modern scholar, and a good one, was misled by faulty texts into crediting Langton with this view; cf. J. R. Geiselmann, *Die Abendmahlslehre* pp. 145-146.

<sup>81</sup> Cf. G. Lacombe, A. Langraf, 'The Questions of Cardinal Stephen Langton' *New Scholasticism*, IV (1930), 115-164; A. L. Gregory, 'The Cambridge Ms of the Questions of Stephen Langton' *ibid.* 171-172; G. Lacombe, 'Studies on the Commentaries of Cardinal Stephen Langton' Part I, *Archives Hist. Litt. Doct.* V (1930), 61-63.

St. Paul's first epistle to the Corinthians, Langton states the two prevalent opinions on the time of the transubstantiation of the bread and the wine; he then proceeds to express his preference for the theory of the separate consecration of each species without giving any reason for his choice:

Sed dubium est utrum ille due prolationes quoad effectum se expectent an successive fiat transsubstantiatio, prius scilicet panis in corpus et vini postea in sanguinem. Comestor dicebat quod quando totum dictum est totum factum est, nec aliud volebat ibi determinare. Unde duplex est opinio; quidam enim dicunt quod ille due prolationes se coexpectant nec prius transsubstantiatur panis in corpus quam vinum in sanguinem, quod fit in ultimo instanti ultime prolationis; alii dicunt quod in prolatione horum verborum: *hoc est corpus meum*, transsubstantiatur panis in corpus et postea in prolatione horum verborum: *hic est calix etc.* tunc transsubstantiatur vinum in sanguinem; et hoc verius nobis videtur quamvis non audemus precise asserere cum enim non sit precise ab ecclesia determinata.<sup>82</sup>

It is extremely difficult to date the *Quaestiones* of Langton; they have come down to us in several recensions. The same is true of his *Commentary* of St. Paul. Some editions of the *Quaestiones* refer to the *Commentary*, and some editions of the *Commentary* refer to the *Quaestiones*. The best explanation seems to be that the various recensions of these two works are due to a revision of material for each year's lectures.<sup>83</sup> In any case we are safe in dating the material that we use here as being prior to 1206. Langton's question on transubstantiation is found in all recensions; for the purpose of this study we have used three manuscripts: Cambridge, *St. John's College* 57; Paris *B.N. Lat.* 14,556; Paris *B.N. Lat.* 16,385. The text which we will quote on the moment of consecration is the same in all three, except for some verbal variants that do not affect the sense.

In his *Quaestiones* Langton approaches the problem of the moment of consecration by asking the question why we do not do the same as Our Lord did at the Last Supper; for, according to the Gospel, He gave His Body to His disciples before he said the words: *This is the chalice of My Blood etc.* If we take the gospel narrative literally, it would appear that Christ first transubstantiated the bread and gave communion under that form before he did the same with the wine. Langton was too good a churchman to use this argument to prove the prior consecration of the bread; to do so, would be to condemn the actual usage of the church in the Mass. Accordingly he proceeds to reconcile the gospel narrative and the practice of the church. This can be done in two ways. Either we must assume that Christ first converted the bread and the wine by a secret blessing and then said the words: *Take and eat, this is My Body; this is the chalice of My Blood*, or we must assume that he said the words of the form twice, first to convert the bread and the wine and secondly to demonstrate what he was giving his disciples.<sup>84</sup>

Item queritur cur non observamus quod notat evangelista, scilicet quod dominus fecit; dicit enim quod prius dominus dedit corpus suum discipulis quam dixit: *hic est calix novi testamenti*. Dicit enim evangelista quod *accepit panem, benedixit et fregit et dedit discipulis dicens: hoc est corpus meum*, et post subiungit: *similiter et calicem posteaquam cenavit*

<sup>82</sup> *Comm. in I Cor. xi*; Paris *B.N. Lat.* 14,443, fol. 312<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>83</sup> Cf. note 81 above.

<sup>84</sup> St. Thomas gives these two interpretations and denies the validity of both; for his explanation cf. *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 78, 1, ad primum. Langton is, of course, merely quoting opinions of his predecessors and

contemporaries, e.g. Manducator, Innocent, Cantor. It is curious to note that some modern non-catholic writers have again appealed to the order of the words in the gospel to deny the consecratory power of the two forms; cf. Walter Lowrie, *The Lord's Supper and the Liturgy* (New York, 1943), p. 9.

*dicens: hic est calix novi testamenti, bibite ex hoc omnes; et ita prius transsubstantiavit et dedit sub forma panis quam dederit sub forma vini; quare non similiter et modo? Item sitne modo prius transsubstantiatio sub una forma quam sub altera? Hic duplex opinio. Dicunt quidam quod dominus virtute secretae benedictionis prius transsubstantiavit et deinde dedit discipulis dicens: hoc est corpus meum, accipite et comedite; et similiter: hic est sanguis meus etc. et secundum hoc nulla est obiectio quia per pronomen demonstravit corpus suum et similiter sanguinem, et tunc dedit verbis hanc virtutem ut ad prolationem eorum rite factam fieret transsubstantiatio. Alii dicunt quod in prolatione horum verborum: hoc est corpus meum, hic est sanguis meus, et ex virtute collata his verbis transsubstantiavit; et secundum hoc ad constructionem evangelii faciendam, deberent verba repeti, quia secundum hoc bis protulit dicens sic: accepit panem et benedixit dicens: hoc est corpus meum, hic est sanguis meus, et deinde fregit et dedit discipulis dicens: accipite et comedite, hoc est corpus meum, i.e. comedite sacramentaliter et spiritualiter; et ita primo protulit ad transsubstantiandum et secundo ut discipulis quid daret demonstraret; nec per seriem evangelii legitur quod Christus prius dederit sub una forma discipulis quam transsubstantiavit sub alia, sed ita distinguit evangelista ut ostendat quod Christus sub utraque forma transsubstantiavit et sub utraque discipulis dedit.<sup>85</sup>*

Langton goes on to state that there still remains the problem whether the transsubstantiation of bread is prior to that of the wine. On this question he again quotes the opinion of Peter Manducator, insisting, as we saw before, that Manducator refused to go further than the statement that 'when all is said, all is done'. However, the followers of that master did teach that the conversion of bread did not precede that of the wine, but that the two forms were so dependent on one another that no change was effected in the elements until the second form was completed. To this teaching, he immediately poses the objection: if there is no transsubstantiation when we say the first form why do we genuflect at that point in the Mass? This objection is interesting from more than one point of view. It is the first evidence, so far as we know, of the practice of genuflecting at the consecration. Moreover it is evidence that the decree on the elevation did not yet exist; had that decree been already promulgated by the Parisian synod, Langton would undoubtedly have made use of the fact to refute the argument of his opponents. His own opinion of this question is stated clearly and concisely. We hold, he says, that the conversion under one form is prior to the conversion under the other; the bread is transsubstantiated by the words: *Hoc est corpus meum* and the wine by the words: *Hic est sanguis meus*; the whole Christ is present under each species, but neither the bread nor the wine are transsubstantiated into Christ, but the bread is changed into the Body only, and the wine into the Blood only; nothing is changed into the Soul, and yet where the Body is, there is the Blood and vice versa:

Sed utrum Christus secundum hanc opinionem prius transsubstantiavit sub una forma et deinde sub alia, similiter et nostri sacerdotes, duplex est opinio. Dicebat enim Manducator quod quando totum dictum est totum factum est, nec aliud ibi dicere volebat. Sed eius sequaces dicebant quod non prius fit transsubstantiatio panis quam vini; due enim prolationes duarum formarum verborum sese expectant nec fit aliqua transsubstantiatio in prolatione prime forme verborum, sed ad eorum

<sup>85</sup> Cambridge, St. John's 57, fol. 206<sup>va-vb</sup>; B.N. Lat. 16,385, fol. 46<sup>va</sup>. Paris B.N. Lat. 14,556, fol. 198<sup>vb</sup>-199<sup>ra</sup>; Paris

prolationem quia illa prolatio vim suam habet in prolatione secunde forme. Sed secundum hoc quare flectamus genua in prolatione prime forme cum nulla sit transsubstantiatio? Nobis videtur quod prius fiat transsubstantiatio sub una forma quam sub alia et in prolatione prime forme transsubstantiatur panis in corpus Christi, in prolatione secunde forme transsubstantiatur vinum in sanguinem, tamen sub utraque forma est totus Christus; nec tamen dicendum quod panis vel vinum transsubstantiatur in Christum vel quod vinum transsubstantiatur in corpus vel panis in sanguinem, immo panis tantum in corpus et vinum tantum in sanguinem et nichil in animam, et tamen ubicumque est corpus ibi est sanguis et e converso.<sup>86</sup>

Praepositinus of Cremona, chancellor of Paris from 1206 to 1210,<sup>87</sup> does not make any further contribution to the subject. He is in general agreement with Langton and his predecessors in upholding the independence and effectiveness of each form. In dealing briefly with the case of the priest who is forced to stop after saying the words of the first form: *Hoc est corpus meum*, he maintains that the transsubstantiation of the bread has taken place but he insists that another priest must continue where the first left off:

Item si pretermisissis his verbis: *hoc est corpus meum*, si diceretur a sacerdote: *hic est sanguis meus*, utrum fieret transsubstantiatio et videtur quod non, quia non esset servata forma; et quid, si sacerdos negligens putans se dixisse hoc et transeat ad illa alia, numquid non fieret transsubstantiatio. Nonne, si ipse dixisset: *hoc est corpus meum* et antequam ad illa alia veniret, caderet, diceretur esse facta transsubstantiatio? Videtur quidem quia alius sacerdos, sicut dicit decretum, ubi dimisit ille, deberet incipere . . .

Magistri nostri dicunt quod licet sub utraque specie sit utrumque, tamen panis transsubstantiatur tantum in corpus et vinum in sanguinem. Ad quod obicitur: unde est sub specie panis sanguis? Respondetur quod ex hoc quod ubi est corpus, ibi est sanguis quia corpus non potest esse sine sanguine, alioquin esset inanimatum corpus. Nam et anima ibi est; non tamen est dicendum quod panis in animam transsubstantiatur . . .<sup>88</sup>

We have now traced the history of the theory of the separate consecration of the bread and the wine from Peter of Poitiers to Langton and Praepositinus, that is from the late sixties of the twelfth century to the end of the first decade of the thirteenth. We have seen how that theory is stated with greater precision as the years go on and how the objections to it are countered by the best minds of this period. In the course of our investigation, we have encountered repeatedly another theory generally ascribed to anonymous authors; a theory that held that the bread was not consecrated before the wine and that neither element was transsubstantiated until the second form had been pronounced. Stephen Langton tells us that the supporters of this theory were the followers of Peter Manducator; no doubt the names of some will always remain unknown, but we can identify the two most important of them: Peter Cantor and Robert Courson.

<sup>86</sup> Cambridge, *St. John's* 57, fol. 206<sup>vb</sup>; Paris B.N. Lat. 14,556, fol. 199<sup>ra</sup>; Paris B.N. Lat. 16,385, fol. 46<sup>va-vb</sup>.

<sup>87</sup> For his career and works, cf. G. Lacombe, *La vie et les oeuvres de Prévostin* (Bibliothèque Thomiste XI. Le Sauchoir, 1927).

<sup>88</sup> The only manuscript that we had of

this *Summa* (Tours 142) is incomplete and does not have the text on the eucharist; we give the above selections from J. R. Geiselmann, *Die Abendmahlslehre* p. 150, where they are taken from *Ms Munich Clm* 6985, fol. 126<sup>v</sup>-127<sup>r</sup>. For the decretum mentioned in this text, see note 71 above.

## IV. THE THEORY OF ONE SINGLE AND UNDIVIDED CONSECRATION

(a) *The Teaching of Peter Cantor*

Peter Cantor (d. 1197) was the most famous of the theological professors at Paris during the last quarter of the twelfth century. His teaching career began in 1171 and lasted until 1196 when he quit Paris to go to Reims as Dean of the cathedral chapter. He died on his way to Reims at the Cistercian Abbey of Longpoint September 22, 1197.<sup>80</sup> His teaching on the Eucharist is contained in his unedited *Summa de sacramentis et animae consiliis*. His treatise on this sacrament is the most complete of any twelfth century master both from the speculative and practical points of view.<sup>81</sup>

After settling a number of difficulties on the form of the sacrament, Peter Cantor examines the problem of the moment when the two forms produce their effect. Though it is undoubtedly true that the transubstantiation of the bread and the wine are effected in virtue of Christ's words and by His authority, yet the doubt arises whether the conversion of one is effected before that of the other. It would seem that, when the priest says he words: *This is My Body*, the bread is transubstantiated into the Body since those words are productive of transubstantiation; the same would seem to be true of the words: *This My Blood*. If one takes this position, the objection may be raised: once the first series of words are uttered, the Body of Christ is immediately present, but the Body cannot be *sine sanguine*; therefore the Blood is there and it is there in the sacrament, so it must be there by the conversion of something into It; it is certainly not by conversion of bread into Blood and the conversion of the wine into Blood has not yet taken place. A second objection is possible: If one were to change the order and begin with the words: *This is My Blood*, surely you would not say that the wine was converted into Blood at that point; and yet this follows if you take the above position:

Sed cum illud indubitanter constat quod in virtute dominicorum verborum et auctoritate ipsius domini fiat transsubstantiatio panis et vini, dubitatur tamen an fiat transsubstantiatio unius antequam alterius. Videtur enim quod cum sacerdos protulerit hec verba: *hoc est corpus meum*, fiat transsubstantiatio panis in corpus quia verba illa efficacia sunt per se ad transsubstantiationem; postea in prolatione istorum verborum: *hic est sanguis novi testamenti etc.* fiat transsubstantiatio vini in sanguinem. Si autem hoc dicitur, obicitur sic: facta prolatione istorum verborum a sacerdote: *hoc est corpus meum*, statim ibi est corpus Christi, corpus autem sine sanguine esse non potest, ergo ibi est sanguis et in sacramento ibi est, ergo ibi est facta conversio alicuius in ipsum sanguinem; sed constat quia non sit omnino conversio panis in sanguinem nec adhuc facta est conversio vini. Preterea si quis ordine mutato inciperet a benedictione vini et verba illa diceret: *hic est sanguis etc.*, numquid diceretur statim post prolationem istorum verborum fieri conversionem vini in sanguinem; videtur dicendum secundum opinionem predictam.<sup>81</sup>

After stating in this fashion the theory of the double consecration and his objections to it, Peter Cantor then goes on to promulgate his own theory on the consecratory action of the two forms. The words: *This is My Body* are efficacious, he says, for the transubstantiation of the bread into the Body and the words: *This is My Blood* are efficacious for the transubstantiation of the wine into the Blood, but there is no immediate transubstantiation at the utter-

<sup>80</sup> For his career and works, cf. M. Grabmann, *Geschichte der scholastischen Methode* II, pp. 478-485; also N. Iung, 'Pierre le Chantre' *Dict. Théol. Cath.* XII, cols. 1901-6.

<sup>81</sup> In *Ms Troyes* 276, this treatise occupies 8 double-column folios; it is c. 36 to 48 inclusive of his first book.

<sup>82</sup> *Troyes* 276, fol. 20<sup>vb</sup>.

ance of the former words; but only when both clauses have been completed are both the bread and wine transubstantiated, and only then are both Body and Blood present under both species. These two forms are so dependent on one another that they produce their effect in common and have no efficacy if separated. If a priest were to stop after saying the words: *This is My Body* and proceed no further, nothing would be accomplished as far as the sacrament is concerned:

Nos autem super hoc ita decernimus. Dicimus verba ista: *hoc est corpus meum*, efficaciter esse ad transsubstantiandum panem in corpus et ista: *hic est sanguis meus*, ad transsubstantiandum vinum in sanguinem, sed tamen non statim post prolationem priorum verborum sit transsubstantiatio sed tunc deinde cum utraque clausula completa fuerit sit transsubstantiatio tam panis quam vini; tunc sub utraque specie est tam corpus quam sanguis. Illa enim verba ita coexpectant se et suos effectus communiter ut non habeant suam efficaciam nisi coniuncta iuxta quod poeta dicit: *Alterius sic altera res exposcit opem et coniurat amice* [Horace, *Ars Poetica* 410-411]. Secundum hoc si sacerdos post prolationem istorum verborum: *hoc est corpus meum*, subsistat nil ulterius proferens, dicetur nil esse factum ab illo quantum ad sacramentum.<sup>62</sup>

Having thus stated his position on the moment of consecration, Peter Cantor proceeds to answer some objections that may be brought against his opinion. One might oppose this theory, he says, by referring back to the order of the words and actions of Our Lord at the Last Supper. On first sight it would appear that on that occasion He transubstantiated the bread and gave it to His disciples before He consecrated the wine. Peter answers that we must interpret the gospel narrative to mean that, before Christ said the words: *Take and eat, this is My Body*, he had already converted the bread and wine into His Body and Blood by the utterance of the words of consecration or by some other form, or in some way unknown to us. Only then did he say: *Take and eat, this is My Body*, thus conferring on these words the power of transubstantiating. Some may say that immediately after the words: *This is My Body* are pronounced, transubstantiation has taken place and that the Blood of Christ is present even though nothing has been converted into the Blood; but if they claim this, they are basing their contention on the order of the words in the gospel:

Obicitur autem huic opinioni quod ex ordine verborum domini et gestorum conicitur quod dominus prius consecravit corpus quam sanguinem. Cum enim dixisset: *hoc est corpus meum*, nondum facta transsubstantiatione vini in sanguinem nec prolatis his verbis: *hic est sanguis meus*, precepit discipulis suis comedere illud corpus suum. Ad hoc possumus dicere quod et supra diximus quod antequam diceret: *Accipite et comedite, hoc est corpus meum etc.* ipsum sive per eadem verba sive per alia ante prolata utrumque i.e. tam panem quam vinum transsubstantiasse et postea dedisse discipulis suis et verba prenotata protulisse ut vim ad transsubstantiandum illis conferret et hoc ecclesie innueret, vel etiam alio aliquo modo quem ignoramus; hoc potuit facere qui omnium auctor est. Dicunt alii aliter, quod statim post prolationem verborum istorum: *hoc est corpus meum*, sit transsubstantiatio panis in corpus et tunc ibi est sanguis licet non facta conversione alicuius in ipsum, et in sumptione carnis sumitur sacramentaliter sanguis. Hoc autem dicunt sumentes auctoritatem ex facto domini prenotato.<sup>63</sup>

A number of practical applications of his theory are then given by Peter Cantor. In the first of these, he discusses the case of the priest who has completed the

<sup>62</sup> *Ibidem*, fol. 20<sup>th</sup>-21<sup>ra</sup>.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibidem*, fol. 21<sup>ra</sup>.

Canon of the Mass and consumed the two portions of the host on the paten. At this point he discovers that there was water and not wine in the chalice. It is certain that there is no transubstantiation into the Blood of Christ since the sacrament requires both bread and wine for matter, and there was no wine in this case. According to the theory of one single consecration, the bread was not converted either,—the two forms work in conjunction, and since the second did not have the proper matter, it was ineffective; hence both forms were ineffective. It will not avail to add wine to the chalice and repeat the blessing over it, for it would be necessary also to take another host and repeat the whole consecration. The priest cannot do this since he would have to consume the consecrated species; he cannot do this since he has broken his fast by consuming the unconsecrated host in the first instance. Peter's solution is for the priest to proceed no further but to leave off the Mass and to do penance for his negligence:

Sed queritur secundum opinionem nostram quam prediximus quid debeat facere sacerdos in tali casu: iam sacramento toto confecto quantum ad prolationem verborum in altari et perceptis duabus portionibus hostie, tertia adhuc remanente in calice que cum sanguine sumpta est, deprehendit sacerdos vinum non fuisse in calice sed aquam tantum. Certum est quod nulla ibi transsubstantiatio facta est in sanguinem. Sicut enim cetera sacramenta simplicem speciem requirunt et puram ita hoc sacramentum duplicem speciem requirit et puram, scilicet frumentum purum et purum vinum. De illa enim particula aque que vino admiscetur in sacramento nulla debet esse questio quia ipsa secundum regulam Boetii<sup>94</sup> tota absorbetur a vino et convertitur in vinum. Secundum hoc etiam nec facta est transsubstantiatio panis in carnem. Numquid ergo sacerdos apponet de novo vinum in calicem et benedictionem faciet? Sed hoc nil proderit ut ante diximus nisi et hostiam sumat et illam benedicat; sed nec hoc secure poterit facere ut percipiat eucharistiam cum iam solverit ieiunium sumendo edulium panis in duabus portionibus hostie. Unde etiam preceptum est ne sacerdos qui denuo celebraturus est recensionem calicis faciat et eam sumat. In hoc casu non consulimus quod sacerdos in aliquo procedat sed in eo quod facit subsistat et penitentiam agat.<sup>95</sup>

In the next case, he considers the situation where the priest discovers the defect in the matter of the sacrament before the communion but after the consecration. Peter Cantor's theory requires that the defect in the matter be remedied and that the whole formula of consecration be repeated. The one exception to this rule that he allows is where the absence of the wine is discovered immediately after the words: *Hoc est corpus meum*; in that case, it would be sufficient to remedy the defect and then to continue on with the consecration; however he suggests that even in this case it would be safer to repeat the whole consecration:

Sed quid si ante sumptionem aliquam, benedictione tota facta, hoc deprehendat? vel quid si e converso, vino apposito in calicem ante sumptionem aliquam, hostiam benedictam esse de sigalo deprehendat? vel quid si in utraque specie peccaverit? In his duobus casibus dicere possumus quod secure poterit sacerdos de novo et panem congruentem apponere et vinum in calicem infundere et tunc totam benedictionem ab initio iterabit. Sed quid si hostiam congruam invenerit et benedictionem fecerit, postea, antequam verba proferat ad vinum benedicendum, deprehendat aquam in calice esse? In hoc casu dicimus quod potest vinum denuo infundere statim et continuare benedictionem his verbis: *Hic*

<sup>94</sup> *Liber de Persona* c. vi; PL 64, 1349.

<sup>95</sup> *Troyes* 276, fol. 21<sup>ra-rb</sup>.



*calix etc.*, ita ut non repetat ab initio. Tutius tamen videtur esse quod totam benedictionem repetat ut omnis hesitatio removeatur.<sup>96</sup>

Peter Cantor also applies his theory of the single consecration to the situation where a priest is taken ill after saying the words: *Hoc est corpus meum*. Another priest may take his place, as the canons allow, but this second priest must repeat the whole consecration, but not the parts of the Mass that precede it. If another priest is unavailable, should the first communicate with the bread over which he has said the words: *Hoc est corpus meum*, since according to this theory, it remains pure bread? Peter says that the priest will do well to do so, even though he believes that it is the Body of Christ; that pious error will not be held against him:

Oritur alia questio de his que dicuntur in canonibus quia si sacerdotem celebrantem morbus invaserit, succurrere ei debet alius sacerdos qui suppleat statim et perficiat quod alius inchoavit. Quid enim si prior sacerdos iam benedictionem fecerit super panem et finitis his verbis: *hoc est corpus meum*, incideret in valetudinem ut implere benedictionem non possit? Numquid sacerdos qui subrogatur incipiet a benedictione vini? Numquid recipit sectionem hoc sacramentum ut possit confici a duobus? Dicimus non sic esse faciendum sed totum unius ore conficiatur. Securius itaque totam benedictionem repetet sequens sacerdos; sed hoc non oportet observari in his que precedunt consecrationem ut ante dicta iterentur.

Queritur si sacerdos super speciem panis benedictionem fecerit et invasus ab egritudine non possit complere benedictionem vini et immineat ei periculum mortis nec sacerdos alius presto sit, quid ei faciendum sit? Numquid debet sumere pro eucharistia quod benedixit in specie panis cum non sit ibi nisi purus panis secundum predictam opinionem? Ad hoc dicimus quod benefaciet sacerdos si sumpserit illud etiamsi crediderit quod sub specie illa sit verum corpus Christi; pius ille error non oberit illi.<sup>97</sup>

After solving these various practical problems according to his theory of one single undivided consecration, Peter returns for a moment to his doctrine to clarify a point. According to our opinion, he says, the sacrament is confected only when the whole 'blessing' has been pronounced over both species; can we then concede the following: the bread is only transubstantiated into Christ's Body at that moment at which is terminated the blessing of the wine; and if so, is it the form then being said or the first form which operates the change? The answer is an emphatic declaration that the bread is transubstantiated at that moment but the change is operated by the form proper to it. Peter Cantor is here meeting an objection which, as we have seen before,<sup>98</sup> was brought against his theory, namely that, if you hold that the bread is only consecrated at the moment when the second form has been completed, then the second form operates the conversion of both elements and the first form is superfluous.

Queritur etiam secundum predictam opinionem qua diximus tunc demum confici sacramentum cum in utraque specie completur totalis benedictio, an debeat concedi: modo panis transsubstantiatur in corpus Christi demonstrato illo tempore in quo terminatur benedictio que pertinet ad vinum, et in qua forma verborum fiat illa transsubstantiatio sive in illa forma que tunc profertur sive in alia. Ad hoc respondemus: revera tunc sit transsubstantiatio panis in corpus et in forma verborum, non que iam profertur, sed que iam prolata est.<sup>99</sup>

<sup>96</sup> *Ibidem*, fol. 21<sup>rb</sup>.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibidem*, fol. 21<sup>rb-vr</sup>.

<sup>98</sup> Cf. *supra* p. 131; this is an objection of

Martin of Fougères.

<sup>99</sup> *Troyes* 276, fol. 21<sup>ra</sup>.

There is one last feature of Peter Cantor's teaching to be noted before we leave him. He is an avowed opponent of the theory of consecration by contact.<sup>100</sup> He brings up the case of the Mass of the Presanctified on Good Friday; at this service, a Host consecrated the previous day is used along with a chalice of unconsecrated wine. At the fraction, a particle of the Host is put into the wine; according to a Roman *Ordinarium* of his time, Peter tells us, the wine would be consecrated by contact with the Host. Peter denies that this is so, and insists, quite rightly, that the wine remains wine:

Queritur demum cum in die parasceve non fiat consecratio aliqua hostie alicuius quia, quando veritas ipsa immolatur, non iustum quod in figura representatur immolatio et ideo reservatur ad communionem eucharistia consecrata die precedenti, et revera sub illa specie panis sumitur corpus domini, an sub specie vini sumatur eodem die domini sanguis. Non enim fit consecratio de novo sub specie vini sicut nec sub specie panis neque reservatus est sanguis in specie vini a die precedenti sicut diximus de carne. Videtur secundum ordinarium romanorum quod ex contactu dominici corporis vinum convertatur in sanguinem; sicut enim legitur ut contactu dominici corporis sub utraque specie integra fiat conversio. Dicimus ad hoc quod vinum quod in die illa infunditur in calicem purum vinum remanet neque fit illius transsubstantiatio; sumitur tamen plenum sacramentum quia sub specie panis sumitur sanguis in carne, et licet non sumatur in utraque specie, dicitur tamen in utraque fieri plena communio et in altera sumitur vinum quod est sanguinis representativum.<sup>101</sup>

Peter Cantor's denial of consecration by contact is again repeated when he comes to the problem of communion. He tells us that on great feast days, such as Easter, it was the custom to give the people a chalice of unconsecrated wine after they had received under the form of bread. Certain priests would say at this point: *Sanguis domini nostri Jesu Christi prosit tibi ad remissionem peccatorum*. This is quite wrong, he says, since the chalice contains only wine; nor does it make any difference, he continues, even if a small quantity of consecrated wine has been poured into the chalice of wine. If it were true that the wine was consecrated by contact with a few drops of the Precious Blood, how could the priest purify the chalice? The wine poured into the chalice for that purpose would be consecrated too. Consequently Peter concludes: *In ea tamen opinione sumus quod numquam ex contractu dominici sanguinis efficitur aliquis sanguis dominicus*.<sup>102</sup>

<sup>100</sup> In his excellent study on this problem, M. Andrieu, quotes the liturgist, Hittorp, as authority for the fact that Peter Cantor believed in consecration by contact; *Immixtio et Consecratio* (Paris, 1924), p. 49. Hittorp did not state the source of his information. We are glad to be able to restore Peter Cantor to his rightful place in this controversy, and to add a footnote to M. Andrieu's researches on this point.

<sup>101</sup> *Troyes* 276, fol. 21<sup>vb</sup>.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibidem*, fol. 21<sup>vb</sup>-22<sup>ra</sup>; the complete text is as follows: Queritur etiam cum in die pasche communicantur homines et in porrectione eucharistie sub specie panis dicat sacerdos: Corpus domini nostri Jesu Christi prosit tibi ad remissionem peccatorum etc. quid debeat dici in porrectione calicis; vinum enim purum est quod in calicem propinatur et magis fit ad oris ablutioem quam ad communionem. Non videtur ergo dicendum: Sanguis domini nostri Jesu Christi etc., nec nos approbamus quod ita dicatur. Si tamen apud aliquos inolevit hec prava consuetudo

dicimus hunc esse sensum: sanguis perceptus a te cum carne, scilicet in specie panis, cuius tibi speciem propino, prosit tibi etc. Sed si forte aliquid sanguinis residui fuerit in calice et postea superfunditur purum vinum, numquid aliquid erit ibi sanguinis superfuso vino? Numquid vel totum efficitur sanguis vel ex toto adnichilatur sanguis vel aliquid est ibi sanguinis vino permixtum? Non videtur dicendum aliqua ratione quod sanguis domini adnichilatur vel desinit esse. Dicere autem quod totum ex contactu dominici sanguinis efficiatur, absurdum est; pari enim ratione, si maxima quantitas vini funderetur in calicem, totum efficeretur sanguis; similiter etiam illud quod post communionem in recantatione vel expalinatione infunditur dicendum esset esse sanguis. Quare prohibetur presbyter celebrare post sumpcionem talis infusionis? Fuerunt autem qui dicerent sanguinem permixtum esse cum vino superfuso ita ut forte in aliqua particula vini sit aliquid sanguinis admixtum; ideoque, ut dicunt, bene potest sacerdos dicere in pro-

The relationship of this teaching on consecration by contact to the problem of the moment of consecration may not be at once apparent. It should, however, be recalled that this theory of consecration by contact had wide acceptance up to this time<sup>103</sup> and had been used as a solution for the difficulty which arose when the celebrant neglected to put wine in the chalice and discovered the omission after the consecration;<sup>104</sup> according to this theory it was sufficient if he placed a particle of the consecrated Host in the wine to overcome the difficulty. Peter Cantor is closing that loophole and insisting that the sacrament can only be confected through the use of the proper form.<sup>105</sup>

(b) *The Teaching of Robert Courson*

Robert Courson, a native of England, is well known for his work as papal legate at Paris, in the Midi and in the Near East. A student of Peter Cantor, he was master of theology at Paris from 1200 until his nomination as cardinal in 1211.<sup>106</sup> His *Summa* written between 1204 and 1207<sup>107</sup> is unpublished except for a few chapters on usury.<sup>108</sup> In dealing with the problems of the form of the Eucharist, he follows Peter Cantor closely although he is not entirely lacking in originality as we shall see.

In broaching the problem of the consecratory power of the form of the sacrament, Robert lays down the general principle that four things are necessary for the confection of this sacrament: (a) the order of the celebrant; (b) the intention to consecrate in the form and according to the form of the church; (c) the form of the words instituted by Christ for this purpose; (d) the substance of the elements, namely bread, wine and water. He then goes on to state that Christ conferred such power on the words: *Hoc est corpus meum* and *Hic est calix novi testamenti*, that at their utterance, provided the other three essentials are present, the bread becomes the Body of Christ and the wine becomes the Blood of Christ:

De quatuor sine quibus non potest fieri confectio. Sequitur de illis que exiguntur ad hoc quod fiat confectio. Sunt autem quatuor sine quibus non potest fieri confectio, scilicet; ordo conficientis et intentio ipsius ut intendat conficere in forma et secundum formam ecclesie, et forma verborum ad hoc a domino instituta, et substantie elementorum ut panis et vinum et aqua; si aliquod istorum quatuor defuerit, non potest fieri confectio.

Sed queritur unde tanta vis sit in verbis quod in prolatione illorum ut de pane fiat corpus et de vino sanguis Christi. Dicimus ad hoc quod dominus tribus rerum generibus summam contulit virtutem, scilicet: lapidibus, herbis et verbis; unde Marsius incantator fugat serpentes sicut habetur super locum psalmi: *furor illis secundum similitudinem serpentis etc.* Dominus itaque tantam virtutem contulit huic forme verborum: *hoc est corpus meum*, et huic forme: *hic est calix novi testamenti*, quod ad prolationem illorum, si predicta tria assunt, de eo quod fuit verus panis

pinatione calicis: Sanguis domini nostri prosit tibi etc., etiamsi purum vinum sit infusum sanguine tamen in calice remanenti. Sed utrum ita sit et quam diu et in quot effusionibus nos nescimus. In ea tamen opinione sumus quod numquam ex contactu dominici sanguinis efficitur aliquis sanguis dominicus; unde ut superius diximus si aliquid superinfunditur, post perceptionem illius non debet sacerdos conficere quasi non ieiunus.

<sup>103</sup> Cf. M. Andrieu, *Immixtio et Consecratio* pp. 5-15; 42-49.

<sup>104</sup> Cf. the case of Abbot Guy of Trois Fontaines in the Introduction to this article.

<sup>106</sup> We do not claim that Peter Cantor was the first to challenge the theory of consecration by contact; that had already been done by John Beleth (cir. 1160) in his *Rationale divinarum officiorum* c. 99; PL 202, 104.

<sup>108</sup> For his career, cf. M. & C. Dickson, 'Le Cardinal Robert de Courson. Sa Vie', *Archives Hist. Doct. Litt.* IX, (1934), 53-142.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.* p. 72.

<sup>108</sup> G. Lefèvre, *Le traité De Usura de Robert de Courson* (Lille, 1902).

efficiatur verum corpus Christi et de eo quod fuit verum vinum efficiatur verus sanguis Christi.<sup>109</sup>

Robert Courson then proceeds to discuss the question whether one species can be consecrated without the other. He first states the arguments on the affirmative side. Let us suppose the case, he says, of a priest who has duly said the words: *Hoc est corpus meum*, and who dies at that moment. The four things necessary for confection seem to be present; therefore he has confected. Moreover, that he has fulfilled all these conditions is a statement referring to a past event whose outcome does not depend either on the present or future; therefore he must have confected the sacrament. But it is possible that this priest had no intention of saying the second form: *Hic est sanguis etc.* Then it must be equally true in this last case that he confected; therefore it is possible to consecrate one species without the other. Courson immediately raises an objection to this argument and proceeds to state his own position. The Body of Christ, he says, is never *sine sanguine*; then the Body is not confected unless the Blood be present; but the priest in this case did not confect the Blood; then if the Blood is present, it is there without confection and without the prolation of the words: *Hic est sanguis etc.* and without the confection of wine and water,—essential elements for valid confection. Some people, he goes on, assert, presumptuously and without any authority, that one species can be consecrated without the other; we hesitate, he continues, to take a definite stand on the matter but we do say, along with our master, Peter Cantor, that no one should assert or deny that the Body of Christ has been confected at that point in between the two forms. We do maintain, however, that when the two forms (i.e. both *Hoc est corpus meum* and *Hic est sanguis meus*) have been said, then both the Body and the Blood of Christ have been confected. The two forms are mutually dependent and the one requires the aid of the other:

Sequitur utrum confectio in una specie possit fieri sine confectione in alia specie; quod videtur posse ostendi. Esto quod aliquis rite prolata hac forma verborum: *hoc est corpus meum*, moriatur. Circa istum concurrunt predicta quatuor que sufficiunt ad confectionem; ergo ipse confecit. Item ipsum complevisse illa omnia est dictum de preterito cuius eventus non spectat ad presens vel ad futurum; ergo est necessarium. Si hoc est, ipse conficit; ergo necessarium est eum confecisse. Sed possibile est eum non esse prolaturum postmodum hec verba: *hic est calix novi testamenti*; ergo hoc cum illo est possibile; ergo aliquis potest conficere corpus Christi sine sanguine.

Sed contra; corpus non est sine sanguine, ergo corpus non est confectum nisi assit ibi sanguis. Sed ipse non conficit sanguinem, ergo ibi est sanguis sine sanguinis confectione et sine prolatione istorum verborum: *hic est calix novi testamenti*, et sine confectione ex aqua et vino; quod obviat predictis auctoritatibus. Unde quamvis quidam presumptuose asserunt et sine omni auctoritate quod una confectio possit esse sine alia, tamen nolumus hic aliquid asserere; immo dicimus cum Cantore magistro nostro quod in medio illo tempore non est asserendum quod corpus Christi sit confectum, neque ideo est negandum. Solus enim deus vel cui deus inspiravit novit utrum illud sit verum. Hoc tamen asserimus quod cum utriusque forme prolatio completa est, tunc utrumque confectum est et una confectio ex altera pendet ut *alter alterius pascat opem et coniuret amice*, quia si quis corpus sine sanguine possit conficere, ad quid conficeret sanguinem cum in utraque sumatur utrumque? Sufficit unum credenti. Preterea si corpus per se posset confici, quilibet cum haberet opus

<sup>109</sup> Ms Bruges 247, fol. 135<sup>vb</sup>; Ms Troyes 1175, fol. 201<sup>rb-va</sup>. The reference to Marsius incantator is taken from: St. Augustine, *Enarratio in Ps. lvii*; PL 36, 679.

curreret ad illius confectionem parum curans de confectione sanguinis, et ita pestis gravissima oriretur in ecclesia.<sup>110</sup>

It will be noted that Courson here takes a less positive position than Peter Cantor; the latter, as we saw above, taught that the words: *Hoc est corpus meum* do not produce any effect by themselves. Courson disclaims any certainty on this point and simply states that we do not know whether anything has been effected or not *in medio illius temporis*, i.e. after the words: *Hoc est corpus* have been said but before the prolation of the second form: *Hic est calix etc.* When he states that this too was the opinion of his master, Peter Cantor, he is either misinterpreting his opinion or else he had access to a later development of Cantor's thought than is available to us in the known works of that master. It must however be borne in mind that he is in essential agreement with Cantor on the inter-dependence of the two forms.

Near the end of his treatise on the Eucharist, Robert Courson returns again to the problem of the moment of consecration in the solution of the practical difficulty arising from the absence of wine in the chalice. A priest who thinks that he has put wine in the chalice, whereas in fact he put only water, arrives at the communion of the Mass; at this point he begins to doubt about the contents of the chalice. We must assume that he was using white wine for the celebration of the sacrifice. In his desire to be certain about the validity of the matter, he tastes the liquid in the chalice and finds that it is water. He is then confronted with a very real difficulty. He should remedy the defect in the matter of the sacrament but he cannot repeat the consecration over new bread and wine, for he is obliged to communicate and he has broken his fast. In the case where the priest has discovered the defect in the wine, and has not broken his fast, our author recommends that he follow the practice prescribed by Bishop Maurice of Paris, namely that he repeat the Canon over a new host and a chalice of wine, and after he has consumed this second host, he should then consume the first host which he may, or may not, have consecrated. If he has broken his fast in tasting the water, he should reserve the host and consume it at his Mass the following day:

Sed queritur quid debemus consulere sacerdoti qui credens se imponere vinum in calicem pro eo imposuit aquam et cum pervenit ad perceptionem dubitavit cuiusmodi liquor esset in calice. Volens autem certificare de qualitate liquoris prelibat ex illo, cum non habeat clericum qui eum certificet de liquore, et ipse non invenit nisi aquam. Quero quid faciat? utrum de novo missam reincipiet et iterum consecrabit hostiam iam consecratam vel iterum iam consecratam sumet et puram aquam post illam? Sed videtur quod non debeat reconficere, quia si conficit, oportet quod confectum sumat; et oportet quod ieiunus sumat; sed non est ieiunus quia pregustavit aquam; quid ergo faciet? Consilium M[auritii] episcopi parisiensis fuit in hac casu qui parisiis accidit ut aliam hostiam et vinum de novo apponeret et totum canonem repeteret et sumeret prius illam hostiam secundam et calicem confectum et postea illam hostiam sumeret quam sine calice forte confecit forte non, quia non est diffinitum, ut prenotavimus, utrum possit fieri confectio panis sine subsequenti confectione vini; et hoc debet facere sacerdos si est ieiunus. Si autem solvit ieiunium per aquam gustatam vel alio modo, ipse debet reservare illam hostiam usque in crastinum et tunc post perceptam communionem in altari potest sumere illam. Magister noster Cantor satis approbavit hanc rationem.<sup>111</sup>

There are two facts in this statement of Robert Courson that gives us reason

<sup>110</sup> *Bruges* 247, fol. 135<sup>vb</sup>-136<sup>ra</sup>; *Troyes* 1175, fol. 202<sup>ra</sup>-<sup>rb</sup>

<sup>111</sup> *Bruges* 247, fol. 140<sup>va</sup>; *Troyes* 1175, fol. 210<sup>ra</sup>-<sup>rb</sup>

to say that his *Summa* must have been written before the promulgation of the elevation by the Parisian synod under Odo of Sully. In the case just outlined, the problem was complicated by the use of white wine; the Parisian synod prescribed the use of red wine in the Mass to obviate any confusion in this matter.<sup>112</sup> Furthermore our author refers to the decision of Bishop Maurice of Paris, the predecessor of Odo of Sully. Is it conceivable that he would have done so, had the decree of the Parisian synod regulating this very point<sup>113</sup> been already promulgated? This permits us to date the synod with considerable accuracy. Robert's *Summa* was written after 1204 but before 1207;<sup>114</sup> Odo of Sully, under whom the synod was held, died in 1208. The date of the Parisian synod which decreed the elevation and legislated on the two points mentioned above must fall between 1205 and 1208.

#### V. THE PROBLEM OF THE MOMENT OF CONSECRATION AFTER 1208

There is no need for us to trace the subsequent history of the theory of the separate consecration of the bread and the wine. That view is generally taught by the great scholastic theologians of the thirteenth century, e.g. William of Auxerre,<sup>115</sup> Albert the Great,<sup>116</sup> St. Thomas.<sup>117</sup>

As far as the theory of one, indivisible consecration is concerned, we do not know of any Parisian master who held to that opinion after the elevation was decreed by the synod of Paris. We have, however, some evidence that this opinion did persist away from Paris. Caesar of Heisterbach relates in his *Libri Miraculorum* (1225-1237) that his abbot one day asked Stephen Langton, archbishop of Canterbury, whether the bread was immediately transubstantiated after the pronouncement of the words: *Hoc est corpus meum*; Langton replied: *Hoc credo, in hac fide moriar; unde cum hostiam depono, supplex illam adoro*. Caesar goes on to tell us that he has related this incident because there are still some persons who pertinaciously adhere to the opinion of Peter Cantor and who claim that the bread is only converted when the benediction of the chalice is completed. Such an opinion, Caesar says, is quite absurd and contrary to the practice sanctioned by the church of elevating and adoring the host:

. . . Eandem consuetudinem habet magister Stephenus, archiepiscopus Cantuarensis, qui nullo theologo huius temporis inferior scientia esse dignoscitur. Interrogatus a domino Henrico, abbate nostro, si post haec verba "Hoc est corpus meum" statim fiat transsubstantiatio panis scilicet in corpus Christi, respondet: "Hoc credo, in hac fide moriar; unde, cum hostiam depono, supplex illam adoro". Hoc commemoravi propter quosdam, qui quibusdam scriptis Petri Cantoris pertinacius adhaerentes dicunt, tunc primum panem transsubstantiari, quando benedictio calicis completa est. Quod omnino videtur absurdum et consuetudini s. ecclesiae contrarium, quae in elevatione hostiae procidens adorat.<sup>118</sup>

This is clear evidence that the theory of one single consecration was still in vogue in certain circles twenty or thirty years after the synod of Paris. In fact this opinion is still being refuted in the schools at the time of St. Albert<sup>119</sup> and St. Thomas;<sup>120</sup> however, since they refer to it as a view of 'certain ancient doctors' we may assume that no one of their time was actually teaching it. Even the greatest of the schoolmen were not free from that quaint practice of setting up a 'strawman' in order to show how easily it could be demolished.

<sup>112</sup> PL 211, 66: vinum autem potius rubeum ministretur in calice propter similitudinem albi vini cum aqua.

<sup>113</sup> See the text in note 5.

<sup>114</sup> M. & C. Dickson, 'Le Cardinal Robert de Courson' *Archives Hist. Doct. Litt.* IX (1934), 72.

<sup>115</sup> *Summa Aurea* Lib. IV; (Paris, 1500), fol. cclviii'.

<sup>116</sup> *De Eucharistia* D. vi, Tr. ii, 3; *Opera Omnia* vol. 38 (Paris, 1899), pp. 402 ff.

<sup>117</sup> *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 78, 6c.

<sup>118</sup> *Libri Miraculorum* I, c. 4; A. Hilka, *Die Wundergeschichten des Caesarius von Heisterbach* (Bonn, 1937), pp. 22-24.

<sup>119</sup> *De Eucharistia* D. vi, Tr. ii, 3.

<sup>120</sup> *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 78, 6c.

## VI. CONCLUSION

With the aid of the documents at our disposal, we have followed the history of the controversy on the moment of consecration from 1160 to 1210. We have found that there were during this period, three schools of thought on this problem. The chief representative of the first school is Peter Manducator who refuses to determine the exact moment of consecration and who states his opinion in these rather ambiguous terms: 'When all is said, all is done'. Simon of Tournai shares this view in his *Disputatio* LXXI; Bishop Maurice of Paris (1160-1196) applies this principle to practical cases, and Innocent III as a cardinal thought this the safer basis on which to settle difficulties.

The second school, whose adherents are characterized by Langton as the followers of Peter Manducator, maintain that the form: *Hoc est corpus meum* produces its effect only when the benediction of the chalice is completed; it is true that they hold that the bread and wine are transubstantiated by virtue of the form proper to each, but these forms are so inter-dependent that they only work in conjunction with one another. Peter Cantor is the best known proponent of this theory; he is closely followed by his pupil Robert Courson who was teaching this opinion at Paris as late as 1204-1207. It is apparent that this school would be opposed to the elevation and the adoration of the Host immediately after the pronouncement of the words: *Hoc est corpus meum*.

The third school, whose view was to be generally accepted by the scholastic theologians, holds that the words: *Hoc est corpus meum* are immediately effective in transubstantiating the bread; they maintain that the consecration of the bread should not be separated from that of the wine, but in case the latter is omitted through necessity, the consecration of the bread has, *de facto*, taken place. Among those who hold this theory are: Peter of Poitiers, Simon of Tournai in his *Disputatio* XC, Martin of Fougères, the canonist Huguccio, Peter of Capua, Stephen Langton and Praepositinus; Innocent III favors this view but hesitates to accept all the consequences of it.

There still remains for us to discuss the problem of the influence of this controversy on the introduction of the elevation of the Host in the Mass. In the course of this study, we have seen that the masters of Paris were still divided on the question as late as 1204-1207; we have also seen that the date of the Parisian synod which decreed the elevation must be placed between 1205 and 1208. In view of these facts, we cannot accept the view that the controversy was closed and the problem settled when the elevation of the Host was decreed at Paris.<sup>121</sup>

Let us try to visualize the situation and see the problems which confronted the synod of Paris. First of all, it was a well-known fact that there was a growing practice among the clergy of raising the host aloft while saying the consecratory prayer: *qui pridie quam pateretur etc.* Now whichever view one took on the moment of consecration, all were agreed that the host was not changed into Christ's Body at least until the words: *Hoc est corpus meum* had been said; consequently any adoration offered to the host up to that point was idolatry, at least material idolatry. Secondly, devotion to Christ in the Sacrament of the Eucharist was growing among the faithful and was taking the form of a desire to see and to adore the Host at the elevation. It is true that writers on the subject have produced little evidence of this fact for the first decade of the thirteenth century. We can, however, offer some rather striking testimony on this point.

Peter of Roissy (d. cir. 1213) was a priest who had served for several years in the diocese of Paris. Appointed canon and chancellor of the church of

<sup>121</sup> The view of Professor E. Dumoutet: *Le désir de voir l'hostie* (Paris, 1926), p. 53.

Chartres about 1208, he composed a *Handbook* on the church offices and the sacraments for the use of his fellow priests.<sup>122</sup> It is not a great work nor an original work. Peter culls his material from the works of his predecessors in theology, canon law and liturgy; he quotes their opinions without making any particular attempt to reconcile them. On the question of the moment of consecration, he copies such diverse views as those of Martin of Fourgères, Peter Cantor and Innocent III.<sup>123</sup> But Peter's work is of unusual value because he gives his own experiences as a priest active in the ministry and in doing so describes the practices of his day. When he is dealing with Mass, he asks the question: What should we say when the priest elevates the Host? He answers as follows: The priest elevates the Host when he says: *accepit panem in sanctas et venerabiles manus suas*, and there is the laudable custom for all to join and raise their hands and to bow down to earth, because the Lord then comes upon the altar and we should welcome Him with reverence and honor; he then goes on to give a number of prayers which may be said at this time.<sup>124</sup> Here Peter is referring to the old type of elevation, the lifting of the Host during the *Qui pridie*; apparently the newly established Parisian practice was not yet in use at Chartres when he wrote this. The main point is that Peter here testifies to the existence of a devotion to the Eucharist at this point in the Mass,—a devotion which has been in existence so long that he calls it a custom.

The picture, we hope, is now clearer. The synod of Paris had two problems to face: (a) to prevent material idolatry of the Host before the moment of consecration;<sup>125</sup> (b) to satisfy the devotion of the people. To solve the first, they must prevent the showing of the Host until it is consecrated; to solve the second, they must make the Host visible once it is consecrated. But to legislate on this, it is essential to know the exact moment of the consecration of the Host. We may be sure that the opinions of the theologians of the day were sought and apparently the synod accepted the opinion of the majority;—there could have been no unanimity with Robert Courson present. Once the synod accepted the view that the bread is fully transubstantiated at the moment when the words: *Hoc est corpus meum* are pronounced, it was an easy matter to draw up legislation which would cover both points; and so, as we have seen, the synod commanded that the host be kept concealed until the words: *Hoc est corpus meum* had been said, then it was to be raised aloft so that it might be seen by all:

Praecipitur presbyteris ut cum in canone inceperint *Qui pridie* tenentes hostiam ne elevent eam statim nimis alte ita quod possit videri a populo sed quasi ante pectus detineant donec dixerint *Hoc est corpus meum* et tunc elevent eam ita quod possit videri ab omnibus.<sup>126</sup>

<sup>122</sup> Cf. my article: 'The Handbook of Master Peter, Chancellor of Charters' *Mediaeval Studies*, V (1943), 1-38.

<sup>123</sup> He deals with the problems first in his explanation of the Mass where he is following Innocent III's *De sacro altaris mysterio*; Paris B.N. Nouv. Acq. Lat. 232, fol. 38<sup>r</sup>. He returns to it again in his tract on the sacrament of the Eucharist where he combines the teaching of Cantor and Martin; *ibid.* fol. 129<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>124</sup> Paris B.N. Nouv. Acq. Lat. 232, fol. 36<sup>r</sup>: Quid debemus dicere cum sacerdos hostiam elevat. In his prefatis verbis, levat hostiam sacerdos cum dicit: *Accipit panem in sanctas et venerabiles manus suas*; unde mos est laudabilis in ecclesia ut iunctis manibus et elevatis ad celum, ad terram prosternant se quia tunc venit dominus super altare et cum reverentia et honore

debent eum suscipere dicentes cum propheta: *Domine miserere nostri, te enim exspectavimus* . . . Among the prayers that he recommends is one 'which P. Chancellor of Paris composed'; an indication that this devotion was not confined to the common people.

<sup>125</sup> Constitutions drawn up by a synod of London between 1215 and 1222 show full awareness of this problem: *Caveant sibi sacerdotes ne elevent hostiam sed caute teneant eam ante pectus suum quousque protulerunt hec verba, 'Hoc est corpus meum', quia si forte prius eleverant circumstantes pocius creaturam adorarent quam creatorem*. R. M. Woolley, 'Constitutions of the Diocese of London c. 1215-22', *English Historical Review*, XXX (1915), 293.

<sup>126</sup> Paris B.N. Lat. 14.443, fol. 291<sup>va</sup>; PL 211, 65; Mansi, *Concilia* v. XXII, 682.



Having accepted the theory of the separate consecration of the bread and wine, the synod could solve definitely another problem; the procedure to be followed by a priest who, through negligence or inadvertence, has failed to put wine and water in the chalice and who notices the omission after the consecration. Since the transubstantiation of the bread is independent of that of the wine, and has already been effected by the words: *Hoc est corpus meum*, it is only necessary for the wine and water to be supplied and for the Canon of the Mass to be repeated from the words: *Simili modo postquam coenatum*.<sup>127</sup> Finally, to avoid the danger of mistaking water for wine, and to eliminate doubts which might arise after the consecration on the validity of the contents of the chalice, the synod prescribes the use of red wine in the Mass.<sup>128</sup>

We have attempted to give a reasonable explanation of the origin of the present form of the elevation of the Host in the Mass. We grant, in great part, the validity of the thesis of Professor Dumoutet that the elevation was decreed by the synod of Paris to satisfy the devotion of the people to see and to adore the Host; but we do think that Dumoutet has oversimplified the problem and has not given sufficient weight to the role played by the controversy on the moment of consecration. On the other hand, we cannot accept the view of the late Father Thurston that this decree was a protest against the teaching of Peter Cantor. In our opinion, the origin of the elevation can best be explained by taking into account two factors: (a) the growing devotion of the faithful to the Blessed Sacrament at the consecration in the Mass; (b) the determination, by discussion in the schools, of the moment of consecration and the acceptance of the Parisian synod of the opinion of the majority of theologians on this point.

<sup>127</sup> The text of the statute will be found in note 5 above.

<sup>128</sup> The text is given above in note 112.

# The Hexameron of Robert Grosseteste

## The First Twelve Chapters of Part Seven

J. T. MUCKLE C.S.B.

### INTRODUCTION

THE following text is an excerpt (the first seven chapters of Part Seven) from the *Hexameron* of Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln.<sup>1</sup> It embraces his complete commentary on the first part of *Genesis* i, 26: *Let us make man to our image and likeness*. The topics discussed in these chapters, as Grosseteste tells us, are two: the Trinity and the sublime dignity of man's estate from his creation; *Ostendit unius Dei Trinitatem et humane condicionis dignitatem*. In this extract as well as in his *Hexameron* as a whole, Grosseteste follows in general the tradition of the previous hexameral literature both in his method of approach and in the topics treated. He devotes very little space to consideration of the terms nature, substance, essence, and person, and then mostly by quotation from such authors as Boethius. His terminology is often that of St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, but he refers to that treatise by name only once and then by an erroneous citation; on the other hand he quotes several times from other works of St. Augustine.

While in this work Grosseteste in general is definitely in the Augustinian tradition, yet he gives the impression that he is trying to reintroduce the thought of the Greek Fathers on the subject into Western literature. While he often quotes from various Latin writers, St. Jerome, St. Augustine and St. Venerable Bede along with several spurious treatises under the names of St. Ambrose, St. Augustine or St. Bernard, he manifests a preference for the Greek sources, St. Basil, St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. John Chrysostom, St. John Damascene and especially the treatise *De Structura Hominis* falsely attributed, now to St. Basil, again to St. Gregory of Nyssa in various manuscripts. More than once he uses Augustinian terms and tries to read their meaning into an extract from a Greek writer where it does not fit, or he tries to base an interpretation which is his own on a passage from a Greek author which does not sustain it.<sup>2</sup>

Grosseteste begins his commentary in this part with the definition of *imago* as *summa similitudo* which he says is taken from the *De Trinitate* of St. Augustine. I have not found it there but the term is applied to the *Verbum* viewed as Truth in St. Augustine, *De Vera Religione* 36, 66; PL 34, 152: *Veritas . . . ea forma est omnium quae sunt, quae est summa similitudo principii*. This is the only instance in these chapters of a citation from a work where it is not found. Grosseteste makes great use of this definition of *imago* and recurs to it several times; in fact it is the key to his whole commentary. How did it come about that he erroneously assigns it a source when he is so accurate in the other instances? Several explanations suggest themselves. He may have been using a collection of excerpts on the Trinity bound together in which this false attribution was found; or in such a florilegium it may have been correctly

<sup>1</sup> As has already been announced, a group of scholars under the chairmanship of S. Harrison Thomson is working on a critical edition of Grosseteste, *Opera hactenus inedita*. I am editing the *Hexameron* for

that corpus.

<sup>2</sup> I intend to contribute an article to the next number of *Mediaevalia et Humanistica* on Grosseteste's use of Greek sources in his *Hexameron*.

assigned to the *De Vera Religione* but the extracts from this treatise may have followed some from the *De Trinitate* while the distinction between the excerpts from the two treatises was not clearly marked and so escaped his notice; or it is possible that he was using a treatise on the Trinity falsely ascribed to St. Augustine which contained this definition but I have not found any such work among the several printed spurious treatises which in whole or in part treat of the Trinity; or finally he may simply have made a mistake.

A further difficulty arises from the fact that in the text cited above from the *De Vera Religione*, St. Augustine says that *Veritas* is the *summa similitudo principii*; et *Veritas est sine ulla dissimilitudine*; that is not to define *imago* as *summa similitudo*; but in his *De Trinitate* 6, 2; PL 42, 925, he writes: *Filius solus imago Patris*. Grosseteste later uses this same statement and adds that man is not the *imago* but made to the image (p. 170, ll. 15-23). It seems then that he takes the term *summa similitudo* from St. Augustine who applies it only to the *verbum* considered as the *imago Patris* and forms a general definition of *imago* as *summa similitudo* with no hint that he is adapting a text of St. Augustine.

He goes on to say that the Son is the likeness of the Father according to equality which is Augustinian doctrine; but man is the likeness of the Trinity according to imitation. The term *imitatio* applied to *imago* is found in St. Augustine v.g. *De Trinitate*, 7, 6, 12; PL 42, 946: . . . *ad imaginem nostram. Quomodo enim nostram, cum Filius solius (solus?) Patris imago sit? Sed propter imparem . . . similitudinem dictus est homo ad imaginem: et ideo nostram, ut imago Trinitatis esset homo; non Trinitati aequalis sicut Filius Patri, sed accedens . . . quadam similitudine: sicut in distantibus significatur quaedam vicinitas, non loci, sed cujusdam imitationis*; and in the paragraph cited above from the *De Vera Religione* we read: *At si corpora in tantum fallunt in quantum non implent illud unum quod convincuntur imitari, a quo principio unum est quidquid est . . . Si enim falsitas ex iis est quae imitantur unum, non in quantum id imitantur, sed in quantum implere non possunt*. But the term is not common in St. Augustine and by no means central in his doctrine of man as the image of God. On the other hand it is used frequently in its Platonic sense by St. Gregory of Nyssa. With him the *similitudo* is in the *imago* itself: it consists in the endowments of the soul, free-will etc., and in the virtues which increase throughout life. By all of these the soul imitates the divine attributes and brings out the *imago* in man more and more. (cf. *De Hominis Opificio* 5; PG 44, 137A-C, quoted in part by Grosseteste p. 168 ll. 6-20; and part on p. 169, ll. 35 ff.; also 156B; 161C; 180BC; 184D-185A, et passim. He always uses the translation of Dionysius Exiguus PL 67, 347 ff. under the title *De Creatione Hominis*. The division into chapters is not the same throughout as that of the Greek text. It is not a good translation). And it is in this sense that Grosseteste further precises the definition of *imago* as applied to man; *homo est Dei Trinitatis summa similitudo imitativa*. And since man is the *summa similitudo* he must imitate God in all things and this demands as a consequence that every attribute of God be found by imitation in man and man is so to speak all things: *Cum igitur homo imago sit Dei Trinitatis, et ita sit Dei Trinitatis summa similitudo imitativa. Summa autem similitudo imitativa non esset nisi secundum omnia eum, cuius est summa similitudo, imitari potest ut videlicet omnia haberet in imitatione . . . Quapropter et homo in hoc quod ipse est imago Dei est quodam modo omnia* (p. 158 ll. 17-26).

This doctrine is found though less explicitly in St. Gregory of Nyssa who remarks that it far transcends the old notion of man as a microcosm (PG 44, 177D-180A, and cf. references to St. Gregory of Nyssa above). The idea is

also found in the treatise *Quid sit ad imaginem Dei et ad similitudinem* printed in the appendix to the works of St. Gregory of Nyssa, PG 44, 1335B. The author has been showing that there is a unity of Trinity in man, viz. the soul unbegotten and uncaused like the Father, the intellectual (noeros) word not unbegotten but begotten from the soul in an ineffable, invisible and inexplicable manner like the Son, and the mind neither uncaused nor unbegotten but arising from procession, pervading, perceiving and invisibly examining all things like the Holy Ghost; he then goes on to say that in man and especially in the just so to speak all the plenitude of the Divinity dwells typically but not physically.

Grosseteste concludes that man as the image of God is in a sense all things; and that the development of this statement requires more than the explanation of forms and species and all other things but along with this the establishment of the relation of God and man and of these things with one another (p. 158 ll. 26-29): *Quapropter et dicti verbi explicacio exigit plus quam formarum et specierum et rerum omnium explicacionem quia cum hoc Dei et hominis et illarum ad invicem coaptacionem.*

He follows the traditional interpretation of the words *faciamus* and *nostram*, in *Genesis* i, 26, that the plural verb implies the doctrine of Three Persons in God and that the form *nostram* indicates the unity of nature. He strengthens this interpretation by a consideration of the nature of God and of the divine operations. His first argument is similar to the doctrine in his treatise *De Inchoatione Formarum* wherein he makes light the prime element of the universe. In this text of the *Hexameron* (p. 160 ll. 14 ff), he demonstrates the Trinity with the assumption that God is light, neither corporeal nor incorporeal but transcending each. And as light of necessity produces of itself *splendor*, so the light begetting and the *splendor* begotten necessarily embrace each other and breathe forth mutual *fervor* and each of these the *lux* *gignens*, the *splendor* *genitus* and the *fervor* *spiratus* is a person. And there can be only these three persons in God for a fourth cannot be thought of in relation to these three. That he does not mean literally that God is transcendent light but is using this explanation as an example of the Trinity is clear from what he says later on that in the realm of material things the clearest example of the Trinity is: *ignis sive lux que necessario gignit de se splendorem, et hec duo in se reflectunt mutuum fervorem* (p. 163 ll. 2-4).

The use of these terms *lux*, *splendor* and *fervor* to illustrate the Trinity has a curious history. Of course *lux* and *splendor* are terms applied to the Divinity in the New Testament. St. Augustine uses the relation of *lux*, *fulgor* and *calor* not to illustrate the doctrine of the Trinity but the relation between wisdom and number: *sed quemadmodum in uno igne consubstantialis, ut ita dicam, sentitur fulgor et calor, nec separari ab invicem possunt; tamen ad ea calor pervenit quae prope admoventur, fulgor vero etiam longius latiusque diffunditur; sic intelligentiae potentia, quae inest sapientiae, propinquiora fervescunt, sicuti sunt animae rationales; ea vero quae remotiora sunt, sicuti corpora, non attingit calore sapiendi, sed perfundit lumine numerorum.* *De libero Arbitrio*, 2, 11, 32: PL 32, 1258.

St. Anselm, in his *De Processione S. Spiritus*, 14; PL 150, 307AC rejects the argument the Greeks had made at the Council of Bari that just as *splendor* and *calor* proceed from the one sun, but neither from the other, so the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son: *Quod autem dicitur quia Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sic possunt esse de solo Patre ut nec Filius sit de Spiritu Sancto nec Spiritus Sanctus de Filio; sicut splendor et calor simul procedunt de uno sole, ut alter non sit de altero, non recte hoc nobis opponitur.* He admits that *calor* does not proceed from *splendor* but affirms the divinity of the Son and of the Holy Ghost and that the Three Persons of the Trinity are one God,

*et idipsum esse de eodem ipso*: whereas we do not say that the sun is of the sun nor that the sun, *splendor* and *calor* are one sun. In other words, the figure does not apply as a demonstration of the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son.

Alexander of Hales (*Summa Theologica*, Pars I, Inq. II, Tract. un. Quaestio I, Tit. II, Quaracchi, 1924, I, p. 452) endorses St. Anselm's position but gives a poor summary of his argument.

St. Bonaventure (*In Hexameron*, Collatio XXI, 2, *Opera Omnia*, Quaracchi, 1924, V, p. 431) on the other hand adopts the figure to prove circuminsession of the Divine Persons, but to do so he is forced to warp it somewhat. *Sol aeternus; Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, est vigens, fulgens, calens: Pater est summe vigens; Filius, summe fulgens; Spiritus Sanctus, summe calens. Pater, lux vigentissima; Filius, splendor pulcherrimus et fulgentissimus, Spiritus Sanctus, calor ardentissimus . . . et sicut ista tria: vigor, splendor, calor, sunt unus sol; sic Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus unus Deus, etc.*

In the edition of the *Hexameron* by Ferdinandus DeLorme O.F.M. (Quaracchi, 1934, p. 234) which follows a different manuscript tradition the sentence *et sicut ista tria . . . sunt unus sol* is not found.

Grosseteste uses two arguments derived from the divine operations. The first is based on the premise that of all modes of generation the highest and that of greatest power is to transfer the whole substance of the principle to the generated and at the same time for the former to retain its substance in its totality. Just as the creation of the world from nothing is an act of greater power than would be the forming of it from created matter, so too it is incomparably greater for the principle to beget another from its own substance as given in every way as itself.

The second argument is based on the Divinity considered as the supreme goodness. The Divine Goodness communicates in the Trinity not only its own but itself and that without division or diminution but substantially which is the highest form of communication; such a communication is possible only to the Divine Persons. And it is the highest form of communication for the Divine Goodness, else a greater goodness could be thought of and so the former would not be supreme.

Numerous examples from man and nature are brought forward by Grosseteste in which vestiges of the Trinity are found. Several of these are derived from the *De Trinitate* of St. Augustine, though he does not cite that work as his source. And he says that these analogies are not simply examples but arguments conclusively proving the doctrine of the Trinity but that to avoid profusion, he cites them simply as illustrations to help the imagination: *exempla imaginacionem iuvancia* (p. 162, ll. 14-15). Among these analogies are: The trinity of matter, form and the 'composition' from the two; *magnitudo*, *species* and *ordo*: *numerus pondus* and *mensura*; *memoria*, *intellectus* and *amor*; the perfection of the number three.

A further proof of the Trinity he draws from his theory of knowledge (p. 163, ll. 5-41). The part played by the object known, the species impressed on the sense or faculty and the *intencio animi* exemplify respectively the Father, Son and Holy Ghost. The terminology he employs is Augustinian but he gives his own interpretation to the function of the *intencio animi*. His theory of sense knowledge is a modification of St. Augustine's doctrine but he extends it and carries it up to reach and to include the rational processes.

To develop his argument of the trinity of memory, intelligence and love, Grosseteste makes use of the term *suprema facies rationis* which no doubt was suggested to him by the doctrine of the *duae facies animae* of Avicenna (See note 1, p. 164). For Grosseteste, man's memory, intelligence and love in the *suprema facie rationis* by its own power remembers, knows and loves the

Triune God without the clouding effect of phantasms and without the use of the senses. The memory laying hold of the eternal memory is the likeness of God, the Father; the intelligence or knowledge begotten in the memory is the likeness of God the Son; and love proceeding from the memory and intelligence by man of the supreme power and loving the uncreated benignity proceeding from the Father and the Son is the supreme likeness of the Holy Ghost.

By the possession of this natural power, man is naturally the image of God, but when it becomes active, then man becomes the renewed image of God, deiform and renewed in the spirit of his mind and a new creature. And this, the highest power in man, so renewed and made deiform draws to its likeness and imitation all his lower powers and makes like to itself the operations of these powers and of the organic body in action and so to speak brings them into conformity with itself. This supreme part of the soul has expressed on it principally and with no intermediary the *vestigium* of the Trinity and as intermediary itself between God and its lower powers it imprints the same *vestigium* on the lower powers of man. The man who is justified thereby becomes in his whole being, soul and body, the image of the Trinity.

The *suprema facies rationis* imprints more distinctly what is in closer relation to it and with less force what is further from it, transfusing the whole man with what it has immediately received just as the ether receives directly the light of the sun and transmits it with decreased power to the upper air and then to the lower air. Without the ether, the upper air would not be conformed to the sun by the reception of light even though it were to reach right up to the sun; on the other hand, even if the upper and lower air were taken away, the ether would bear a supreme and imitating conformity to the sun through the light it received. In like manner, the *suprema facies rationis* directly and immediately bears the imprint and seal of a supreme and imitating likeness to the Trinity and through itself as a medium the seal of this likeness extends to the whole man and he thereby in his integrity becomes the image of the Trinity. Take away this *suprema facies* of reason and the image disappears in the rest of man, but in this part of man taken by itself alone it is perfect.

Grosseteste goes on to say after St. Augustine that this image can be taken in a threefold sense: the natural image, reason and free will, as a natural good coming to man from his creation; the renewed image, whereby man is raised above his natural state and turns to the enjoyment of his Creator; the deformed image when his reason and will turn from the Supreme Good to lower things. The natural is never lost; Grosseteste insists on this and develops his argument at length when he comes to deal with the effects of original sin. The renewed image is lost and replaced by the deformed image through sin.

He proceeds to expound another interpretation of image and likeness which is only loosely connected with what he has already said. He starts this section with a definition which he attributes to St. Jerome: *imago Dei in participatione eternitatis, similitudo vero in moribus*. I do not find this statement in St. Jerome, although he does distinguish (*Commentary on Ezekiel* 28; PL 25, 269BC) between the image which man has from his creation and the similitude which was lost by the fall and is regained when Christ is formed in us and brought to completion in baptism: *donec Christus formetur in vobis ut recipiatis videlicet similitudinem ejus quam vestro vitio perdidistis . . . Et notandum quod imago facta sit tantum, similitudo in Christi baptisate compleatur . . . Ubi enim similitudo Dei est, ibi et plenitudo sapientiae et perfectus decor . . . atque composita corona virtutum quam proprio studio augeat diligens*. Grosseteste probably got it from Bede, in *Pentateuchum Commentarii*, 2; PL 91, 201C, a treatise he constantly quotes from as of St. Jerome. The inter-

pretation of *similitudo* as virtue I find first in Origen, *I Homily on Genesis* I, 13, (*Die Griechischen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte* 6, pp. 16-18, Rufinus' translation; PG 12, 156-7) in the sense that by turning to Christ, one takes on again the likeness of the image he had lost. It is also stated as Grosseteste has it in the treatise, *De Dogmaticis Ecclesiasticis* (PL 42, 1213 ff.; 58, 981 ff.; 83, 1227 ff.). C. H. Turner in his edition of the text of the treatise in *Journal of Theological Studies* 7 (1905-6) pp. 78 ff. does not give any instance from antiquity of its attribution to St. Jerome; many now think it belongs to Gennadius.

Whatever Grosseteste's source may have been, he develops the doctrine at length and quotes St. Gregory of Nyssa and pseudo-Basil to support his argument. His line of thought is quite like that already expressed by St. Bernard though he does not seem to have copied him even though he had read him. Both St. Bernard and Grosseteste likely used the thought of St. Gregory of Nyssa and the pseudo-Basil directly or in translations, or as found in some treatise which embodied their thought. Personally I make bold to express the opinion that there was a treatise on asceticism based on the Greek tradition, especially as found in St. Gregory of Nyssa, which was used by St. Bernard, Grosseteste and Gundissalinus in the last part of his treatise *De Anima* (pp. 98-103 of my edition of the work, *Mediaeval Studies* II, 1940). There is in the Bibliothèque Royale at Brussels a manuscript which once contained a Latin translation of St. Gregory of Nyssa, *Commentary on the Canticle of Canticles*. But, alas, all the folios for this part, except the index page, have been cut out. Of course I cannot say when the translation was made.

The argument set forth by Grosseteste is based on the interpretation of *eternitas* as the unchangeable essence of God; by his participation in this unchangeable essence man is most especially the image of God. He quotes a short passage from the *De Hominis Opificio* (PL 67, 353BC; PG 44, 137C) of St. Gregory of Nyssa wherein it is asserted that God is *mens* and *verbum* and man imitates the divine *mens* and *verbum*; and also God is *charity*, and Christ the *formator* of our substance confers on man this charity as a person so to speak for He says: *By this shall all men know that you are my disciples, if you have love one for another*. This quotation would have it that man is an image of each of the three Divine Persons in as much as he imitates the divine *mens*, *verbum* and *caritas*.

Grosseteste comes back to his conclusion that whatever is predicated of God is found in man by imitation. Other creatures bear likeness of God in a remote manner but not the image for it is the supreme and closest likeness (*summa et propinquissima similitudo*). The natural capacity of man to possess what is in God by very close imitation is the image in him; but when he actualizes this potentiality, he is the reformed image; and once he recedes from this imitation, the reformed image is destroyed and the deformed image takes its place. Grosseteste tries to read all this into his quotations from St. Gregory of Nyssa but it is not there except perhaps by implication. It is another instance of the use of Augustinian terminology by him in his interpretation of a Greek Father.

In his development of the phrase *similitudo in moribus* he uses the treatise *De Hominis Structura* which he attributes to St. Basil. It is found in the appendix to the works of St. Basil, PG 30, 9-61 and also among the works of St. Gregory of Nyssa under the title: *In Verba, Faciamus etc. Orationes duae*, PG 44, 257-297. The work while very early is not considered authentic in either case. In substance the treatise is the same in both these volumes of Migne but the one in PG 30 differs not only in title but belongs to a different manuscript tradition from that in PG 44. Further, the latter is shorter and in

some passages the text is not the same as the former. This is the earliest attribution, so far as I know, of the work to St. Basil. Garnier in his excursus on the treatise, paragraph 19 (PG 29, Ch. XXXIV) says that only paper manuscripts of St. Basil's works contain this treatise. But Grosseteste could hardly have been using a paper manuscript. To the reasons given by scholars for considering it the work neither of St. Basil nor of St. Gregory I should add another based on its doctrine. It is Pelagian in tone, especially in the text in PG 30; the author does not consider the need of grace in our sanctification, quite the opposite. He implies that man from unaided choice acquires the moral virtues; so much so, that Grosseteste inserts in one excerpt the phrase, *gratia adiuvante* to make it orthodox (p. 169 l. 28). He adds an extract from the *De Hominis Opificio* (PL 67, 352D-353A; PG 44, 137AB) of St. Gregory of Nyssa in which man is compared to a portrait. The virtues are the colours which bring out clearly the lines and features. But St. Gregory attributes these to the divine artisan: *sic intellige nostre substantie formatorem velud quibusdam virtutibus miram pulchritudinem sue imagini contulisse* (Dionysius' translation); but he goes on to show that spiritual perfection is the result of the right use of free-will.

The last two chapters of this extract Grosseteste devotes to the demonstration of the dignity of man from the manner of his creation; the Divine Persons entered into council, man was created last as the perfection of earthly creation. But he gives little of his own simply linking together long quotations from St. Augustine, St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. Gregory the Great and St. John Damascene.

\* \* \*

In constructing the text I have used the following manuscripts: Prague, Nat. Mus. XII E, 5; Queen's College, Oxford, 312 and British Museum 6, E. V. I have generally followed the reading of the Prague manuscript and given the readings of the other two manuscripts as variants where either differs from Prague. Queen's College manuscript usually agrees with the latter but is not nearly as good a manuscript. I have adopted the reading of the British Museum manuscript where Prague is evidently corrupt. I shall give a description of these and the other manuscripts of Grosseteste's *Hexameron* and also treat of the date and authenticity of the *Hexameron* in my forthcoming edition of that work. Suffice it to say now that I consider the Prague manuscript the best of these three though I doubt that it is the oldest. I have omitted from the list of variants all corruptions, scribal errors and unimportant variants such as *quod* and *quia*, *ergo* and *igitur* and the like. I do not always list a variant from the Queen's College manuscript where it stands alone. In the list of variants, Q indicates Ms Queen's College 312, B is for Ms British Museum 6, E. V. and P for the Prague manuscript.

## HEXAMERON ROBERTI LINCOLNIENSIS

### PARS SEPTIMA<sup>1</sup>

#### *Capitulum Primum*

*Faciamus<sup>2</sup> hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram. Valde breve est istud verbum sed tamen profundissimis et amplissimis sensibus fecundissimum, cuius fecunditas, si esset explicanda et scribenda per singula, non arbitror*

<sup>1</sup> Q omits division of the work into parts and chapters throughout.

<sup>2</sup> Gen. i, 26.



mundum<sup>3</sup> posse capere eos qui scribendi essent libros.<sup>4</sup> Comprehendit enim Dei secretissimum et hominis sacratissimum. Ostendit enim<sup>5</sup> unius Dei<sup>6</sup> Trinitatem et humane condicionis summam dignitatem; dicit enim hominem factum ad imaginem summe Trinitatis. Imago autem, ut dicit Augustinus in libro<sup>7</sup> de Trinitate,<sup>8</sup> est summa similitudo. Similitudo autem est<sup>9</sup> duplex: aut equalitatis vel<sup>10</sup> paritatis,<sup>11</sup> aut imparitatis<sup>12</sup> et imitationis. Quapropter et imago duplex est: aut summa<sup>13</sup> videlicet similitudo secundum paritatem, aut summa similitudo secundum imitationem. Secundum primam acceptionem imaginis, solus Filius est imago Dei Patris. Omnia enim quae habet Pater, habet equaliter et Filius<sup>14</sup> et quaecumque<sup>15</sup> facit Pater hec<sup>16</sup> eadem et similiter facit<sup>17</sup> Filius<sup>18</sup> et sicut<sup>19</sup> habet Pater vitam in semetipso sic dedit et Filio vitam habere in semetipso, vitam, inquam, hoc<sup>20</sup> est, Divinitatis plenam et totam substantiam, non multiplicatam, neque divisam, neque<sup>21</sup> imminutam. Ideoque Patris est similitudo secundum equalitatem. Homo vero similitudo est Dei Trinitatis per imitationem. Non enim potest<sup>22</sup> creatura factori suo comparari nec cum eo in aliquo univocari; potest tamen per modum aliquem imitari.

Cum igitur homo, testante Scriptura, imago sit Dei Trinitatis, et<sup>23</sup> ita sit Dei Trinitatis summa similitudo imitativa. Summa autem similitudo imitativa non esset nisi secundum omnia eum, cuius est summa similitudo, imitari posset ut videlicet omnia haberet in imitatione et quasi vestigii impressione quae et<sup>24</sup> ille<sup>25</sup> habet in substantiali possessione. Explicatio huius verbi exigeret ut evolverentur omnia quae habet in se Trinitas Deus, et singulis quae sunt in Deo invenirentur singula imitatorie aptata in homine. Deus autem est omnia in omnibus, vivencium vita,<sup>26</sup> formosorum<sup>27</sup> forma, speciosorum species,<sup>28</sup> et homo in omnibus eius propinquissima similitudo<sup>29</sup> imitatoria. Quapropter et homo in hoc quod ipse est imago Dei, est quodam modo omnia. Quapropter et dicti verbi explicatio exigit plus quam formarum et specierum et rerum omnium explicationem quia<sup>30</sup> cum hoc Dei<sup>31</sup> et hominis et illarum<sup>31</sup> ad invicem coactionem. Huius igitur explicatio non est exspectanda ab homine, quanto magis a me, imperito homine. Quantumcumque enim de<sup>32</sup> hoc explicabit homo neque tantum est quantum punctus ad lineam aut calculus unus ad maris arenam aut una stilla pluviae ad maris aquam aut una athomus ad totius mundi machinam. Quod tamen Deus<sup>33</sup> de hoc dare dignatur, summam, quantumlibet<sup>34</sup> potero, verbis balbutiens effabor.

<sup>3</sup> om. B.

<sup>4</sup> cf. John xxi, 25.

<sup>5</sup> om. B.

<sup>6</sup> om. Q.

<sup>7</sup> in libro om. P.

<sup>8</sup> I do not find this in the *De Trinitate* of St. Augustine. In his *De Vera Religione* 36; PL 34, 152 we read: *Veritas . . . ea forma est omnium quae sunt, quae est summa similitudo principii; et veritas est quia sine ulla dissimilitudine est.*

<sup>9</sup> est duplex] dupliciter Q] dupliciter est P.

<sup>10</sup> om. PQ.

<sup>11</sup> paritatum P.

<sup>12</sup> imparietatis B.

<sup>13</sup> autem B.

<sup>14</sup> cf. John xvi, 15.

<sup>15</sup> cf. John v, 19.

<sup>16</sup> om. P.

<sup>17</sup> om. Q.

<sup>18</sup> add. operatur Q.

<sup>19</sup> John v, 26.

<sup>20</sup> hoc est om. P.

<sup>21</sup> nec PQ.

<sup>22</sup> add. Dei B.

<sup>23</sup> et . . . Trinitatis om. B.

<sup>24</sup> om. B.

<sup>25</sup> ipse B.

<sup>26</sup> cf. pseudo-Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus*, 1, 3; PG 3, 589C.

<sup>27</sup> formarum Q.

<sup>28</sup> cf. Grosseteste, *De Unica Forma Omnium*, in *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des M.A.* 9 (1910) p. 108, 1, 27: *Deus igitur est perfectio perfectissima, completio completissima, forma formosissima et species speciosissima.*

<sup>29</sup> add. eius B.

<sup>30</sup> om. B.

<sup>31</sup> illorum B.

<sup>32</sup> de hoc om. Q.

<sup>33</sup> Dominus Q.

<sup>34</sup> quamlibet PQ.

## Capitulum Secundum

In consignificatione pluralitatis huius verbi *faciamus* et huius pronomini *nostram* insinuat nobis pluralitas personarum unius Dei. Deus enim est qui loquitur. Alius<sup>1</sup> enim<sup>2</sup> est qui loquitur et alius vel alii ad quem vel ad quos dicit *faciamus* et *nostram*. Ille igitur alius vel alii aut creator<sup>3</sup> aut creatura est.<sup>4</sup> Sed creatura esse non potest quia creatoris et creature non potest esse unica imago. Ipse autem dicit *faciamus ad imaginem nostram*. Creator enim et creatura nihil communicant univoce. Ergo non potest aliquid esse secundum idem utriusque summa similitudo et ita nec imago, nec etiam secundum diversa potest una creatura esse creatoris et creature imago et similitudo summa. Sit enim a. secundum quod homo est summa similitudo creatoris<sup>5</sup> et b. secundum quod est summa similitudo creature quae vocetur c. In primis itaque homo magis erit due imagines, Dei videlicet et c. creature,<sup>6</sup> secundum a. et b., quam<sup>7</sup> una imago; non enim gerit unam summam similitudinem duorum sed potius duas. Item si iste sermo est per se *faciamus hominem* etc., non est imago secundum diversa sed secundum solam hominis naturam, et perfectam quiditatem et naturam secundum quam non potest esse imago<sup>8</sup> naturaliter et substantialiter differentium. Praeterea is vel hi ad quem vel ad quos loquitur creant<sup>9</sup> hominem cum loquente ad imaginem loquentis Dei. Si ergo creature<sup>10</sup> dirigatur sermo ille, creat cum Deo<sup>11</sup> hominem ad imaginem Dei loquentis. Sed secundum quod homo est imago et summa similitudo Dei<sup>12</sup> non habet creaturam se superiorem, quia, si esset superior, esset etiam illa Dei similitudo maior, creans autem esset<sup>13</sup> maior a se creato. Esset igitur illa concreans creatura homine maior et non maior. Propterea<sup>14</sup> inferius dicit Scriptura repetens actum velud<sup>15</sup> huius consiliacionis *faciamus: et*<sup>16</sup> *creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem*<sup>17</sup> *suam, ad imaginem Dei creavit illum*. Non igitur ad creaturam dirigitur<sup>18</sup> sermo iste *faciamus* et *nostram*, igitur ad creatorem, qui non est nisi Deus unicus.

Dirigitur tamen necessario<sup>19</sup> ad alium vel ad<sup>20</sup> alios a loquente. Igitur unus Deus creator est unus hic loquens et alius vel alii ad quem vel ad quos<sup>21</sup> sermo dirigatur. Sed quid plures, cum non plures dii, non plures substantie, non plures essencie, non plura accidentia, non substantia et accidens, non plura universalialia? Non<sup>22</sup> potest igitur inveniri aut excogitari nisi plures persone, plures videlicet<sup>23</sup> sicut ibi dicit<sup>24</sup> potest res singulares quarum quilibet est substantia individua rationalis nature et omnes tamen una et individua substantia et<sup>25</sup> ita plures persone quia persona<sup>26</sup> est individua substantia rationalis nature.<sup>27</sup> Ex hac igitur consignificatione pluralitatis in his dictionibus *faciamus* et *nostram* habemus personarum pluralitatem, quod testantur huius loci expositores.<sup>28</sup>

Ait enim Augustinus: non indifferenter accipiendum<sup>29</sup> quod in aliis operibus dixit Deus: *Fiat*, hic autem dixit Deus: *Faciamus hominem ad imaginem*<sup>30</sup> et

<sup>1</sup> aliis B.<sup>2</sup> igitur PQ.<sup>3</sup> add. est PQ.<sup>4</sup> om. PQ.<sup>5</sup> creatoris . . . sim. om. P.<sup>6</sup> om. B.<sup>7</sup> qui P.<sup>8</sup> naturaliter imago B.<sup>9</sup> creavit P.<sup>10</sup> creatura B.<sup>11</sup> om. P.<sup>12</sup> add. et B.<sup>13</sup> maior est PQ.<sup>14</sup> preterea Q.<sup>15</sup> melius P.<sup>16</sup> quod B.<sup>17</sup> add. et similitudinem PQ.<sup>18</sup> dirigatur Q.<sup>19</sup> necessarie P.<sup>20</sup> om. BQ.<sup>21</sup> om. PQ.<sup>22</sup> nec P.<sup>23</sup> itaque B.<sup>24</sup> dicit PQ.<sup>25</sup> et . . . substantia om. BQ.<sup>26</sup> Boethius, *De Duabus Naturis* 3; PL 64, 1343C.<sup>27</sup> creature PQ.<sup>28</sup> cf. Bede, *Hexameron*, PL 91, 28D ff. and *Com. on Pent.*, 200C; Gregory of Nyssa, *De Hominis Opificio*, PG 44, 140C and many others.<sup>29</sup> add. est B.<sup>30</sup> ad . . . nostram] etc. B.

*similitudinem nostram*, ad insinuandam videlicet pluralitatem personarum, propter Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum.<sup>31</sup>

Basilii<sup>32</sup> quoque exponens hunc locum dicit: in hiis verbis personarum pluralitatem et simul divinitatis<sup>33</sup> unitatem esse notatam. Unde confunditur hic Iudeus qui non recipit plures personas et gentilis<sup>34</sup> qui plures recipit<sup>35</sup> deos. Convincitur quoque Iudeus mendax qui dicit eundem sibi ipsi et non alii loqui dicendo: *Faciāmus* et *nostram*. Nullus enim faber ferrarius aut carpentarius solus in suo existens ergastulo cui<sup>36</sup> nullus artis socius praesto est sibimet ipsi<sup>37</sup> dicit: *Faciāmus* gladium aut aratrum compaginemus. Et hoc exemplo superatus Iudeus recurrens ad aliud mendacium, videlicet, quod locutus sit Deus angelis dicens: *Faciāmus hominem ad imaginem nostram*,<sup>38</sup> item confutatur quia non potest creatoris et creature una esse imago.

### Capitulum Tercium

Quod autem Deus est<sup>1</sup> in personis trinus inde sequitur quod Deus est lux non corporea sed incorporea, immo magis, neque corporea est<sup>2</sup> neque incorporea sed supra utramque.<sup>3</sup> Omnia autem lux hoc habet naturaliter et essentialiter quod de se gignit suum splendorem. Lux autem gignens et splendor genitus necessario sese amplectuntur mutuo et spirant<sup>4</sup> de se mutuum fervorem.<sup>5</sup> Gignens autem et genitus aut est aliud et alius, aut<sup>6</sup> non aliud sed alius, aut non alius sed aliud, aut nec alius nec aliud sed alterum solum, aut nec alius nec aliud<sup>7</sup> nec alterum.<sup>8</sup>

De istis quinque membris huius<sup>9</sup> divisionis quattuor est impossibile in Deum cadere et quedam de his<sup>10</sup> in Deum vel in alium. Non enim alicubi possibile est ut genitus a gignente nec alius<sup>11</sup> nec aliud nec alter sit. Item nusquam possibile est ut genitus a gignente sit aliud nec tamen alius.<sup>12</sup> In Deo autem non est possibile ut genitus a gignente sit alterum, cum alterum dicamus per<sup>13</sup> differentiam accidentalem.<sup>14</sup> Neque iterum in Deo possibile est ut gignens a gignente sit aliud, cum non sit in Deo substantiarum multitudo. Relinquitur ergo quod ibi sit genitus a gignente non aliud sed solum alius; et eadem est ratio de spirante et illo qui spiratur. Est igitur apud Deum unus et alius et tercius quorum quilibet est individua substantia rationalis nature,<sup>15</sup> et ita tres persone,

<sup>31</sup> *De Genesi ad Lit.* 3, 19, 29; CSEL 28, 3, 2, p. 85, ll. 15-20; PL 34, 291.

<sup>32</sup> Basilii . . . 1, 12. una esse imago, *Hexameron* 9, 5; PL 53, 964B-965C; a paraphrase.

<sup>33</sup> om. B.

<sup>34</sup> gentiles Q.

<sup>35</sup> recipiunt Q.

<sup>36</sup> cuius B.

<sup>37</sup> om. B.

<sup>38</sup> nostram] etc. B.

<sup>1</sup> sit PQ.

<sup>2</sup> om. PQ.

<sup>3</sup> utrumque PQ.

<sup>4</sup> spiravit BQ.

<sup>5</sup> splendorem P.

<sup>6</sup> aut non . . . alius om. Q.

<sup>7</sup> alius P.

<sup>8</sup> cf. St. Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio*, 2, 11, 32; PL 32, 1258: *Sed quemadmodum in uno igne consubstantialis ut ita dicam, sentitur fulgor et calor, nec separari ab invicem possunt; tamen ad ea calor pervenit quae prope admoventur, fulgor vero etiam longius latiusque diffunditur, etc.; pseudo-Augustine, ad Fratres in Eremita sermo 44; PL 40, 1321: Unus est in terra ignis tria similiter habens, motum lucem et fervorem;*

*nec lucem a motu et fervore dividere potes, sic est sancta Dei Trinitas.* For the attribution of this and of some other of the *ad Fratres in Eremita sermones* to Geoffrey of Bath, see Dom Morin, *Revue Bénédictine* X (1893) pp. 28-36. Un écrivain belge ignore du XII<sup>e</sup> siècle and op. cit. XIII (1896) pp. 346-7. cf. also Etudes, Textes, Découvertes, *Anecdota Maredsolana* (1913) p. 77. cf. also St. Anselm, *De Processione S. Spiritus* 14; PL 158, 307AC; Alexander of Hales, *Summa Theologica*, Pars I, Inq. II, Tract. un. Quaestio I, Tit. II, (Quaracchi, 1924, I) p. 452; *Speculum*, PL 40, 979; St. Bonaventure, *Hexameron, Collatio XXI*, 2. (Quaracchi, 1924, V) p. 431. See above, *Introduction*, p. 153 sq.

<sup>9</sup> huius divis. om. B.

<sup>10</sup> add. nec B.

<sup>11</sup> aliud nec alius B.

<sup>12</sup> add. nec alius B.

<sup>13</sup> ad B.

<sup>14</sup> cf. Boethius, *In Isagogen Porphyrii Commenta* 4, 2; CSEL 48, I, p. 244, ll. 11 ff.; PL 64, 118B.

<sup>15</sup> Boethius, *Liber de Persona et duabus Naturis* 4; PL 64, 1343C.

nec potest ibi quartus alius aut esse aut cogitari.<sup>16</sup> Quis enim ut quartus potest adici luci gignenti et splendori genito et ex ambobus procedenti fervori mutuo?

Item inde<sup>17</sup> sequitur personarum trinitas ex hoc quod Deus est eterna et semper memorans memoria. Ipse enim est omnium scienciarum, non aliunde recipiens eas,<sup>18</sup> retencio nulla ex parte obliviosa. Sed memoria actu memorans non potest non gignere de se sibi omnino similem intelligenciam; ipse enim actus memoracionis est ipsius intelligencie sibi similis generacio.<sup>19</sup> Gignens autem memoria et generata intelligencia non possunt non reflectere in se mutuum amorem. Est ergo apud Deum memoria gignens aliquis unus et intelligencia genita aliquis alius et amor ex utrisque procedens aliquis tercius, nec est<sup>20</sup> qui possit adici aliquis quartus.

Et<sup>21</sup> forte ex hoc medio possit<sup>22</sup> probari Deus Pater et Filius et per consequens Spiritus Sanctus quod ipse alios parere faciat, sicut scribitur in Isaías: *Numquid ego, qui alios parere facio, ipse non pariam? dicit Dominus; si ego, qui generacionem aliis tribuo,*<sup>23</sup> *sterilis ero? ait Dominus Deus tuus.*<sup>24</sup> Quicquid enim tribuit efficiens causa habet illud in se quale illud tribuit aut habet illud in se excellencius. Igitur cum parere et generare sit suam substanciam in alium transferre aut suam substanciam totam transfert in alium, cum non possit secundum partem quia hoc esset diminucio potencie, aut facit aliquid<sup>25</sup> huic comproporcionale<sup>26</sup> isto<sup>27</sup> excellencius. Isto<sup>27</sup> autem quod est suam substanciam totam in alium transferre totamque<sup>28</sup> eandem sibi retinere nihil potest esse mirabilius neque maius, neque quod dicatur generare aut parere verius. Hoc enim facere summe potencie videtur esse. Maximum enim potencie quod<sup>29</sup> attribuerunt Deo quidam et<sup>30</sup> summi philosophi gencium fuit quod Deus ex materia ingenita quam ipse non creavit mundum velud opifex quidam et artifex formavit. Sed isto incomparabiliter potencius est materiam ex omnino nihilo creare et inde mundum formare, et sic ex pure non ente maximum ens post seipsum facere; quo adhuc incomparabiliter maius est non ex alio nec ex nihilo sed ex sui substantia alium quemdam tantum per omnia quantus ipse est gignere. Summa ergo potencia istud<sup>31</sup> facit, alioquin<sup>32</sup> non esset summa, cum posset excogitari maior.

Item bonitas est que tribuit non solum sua sed et<sup>33</sup> seipsam communicandam. Summa autem et maxima comunicacionum<sup>34</sup> est cum communicatur idem non partitum tempore aut quantitate aut multiplicacione sed totum simul indivisum non participacione sola communicatum sed substancialiter. Summa igitur bonitas, id est divinitas, sic communicatur, videlicet tota simul indivisa et immultiplicata, non sola participacione sed, a pluribus aliquibus ita quod communicatur ab illis substancialiter. Sed sic non potest a creatura communicari quia, a quibus sic communicatur, quilibet illorum est Deus. Sunt igitur plures, quorum nullus est creatura, sic communicantes summam bonitatem, id est, divinitatem, alioquin ista<sup>35</sup> non esset summa bonitas cum posset maior excogitari.

Congruit autem<sup>36</sup> ut personarum numerus sit<sup>37</sup> ternarius quia ipse ternarius<sup>38</sup> est primus perfectus numerus, habens principium, medium et finem; et ipse est primus qui redit<sup>39</sup> in circulum. Unus enim de se exprimit secundum; secundus

<sup>16</sup> excogitari B.

<sup>17</sup> om. B.

<sup>18</sup> ea B.

<sup>19</sup> genere B.

<sup>20</sup> om. P.

<sup>21</sup> forte et B. et om. Q.

<sup>22</sup> posset B.

<sup>23</sup> add. ipse P.

<sup>24</sup> Isaías lxvi, 9.

<sup>25</sup> aut B.

<sup>26</sup> proporcionale B.

<sup>27</sup> illo B.

<sup>28</sup> totaque BJ totam Q.

<sup>29</sup> quid B.

<sup>30</sup> et summi om. B.

<sup>31</sup> illud Q.

<sup>32</sup> aliquando B.

<sup>33</sup> om. Q.

<sup>34</sup> comunicancium Q.

<sup>35</sup> ipsa B.

<sup>36</sup> eciam B.

<sup>37</sup> fit B.

<sup>38</sup> cf. St. Isidore, *Liber Numerorum* 4, 13-14; PL 83, 181D-182A and Martianus Capella, *De Nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii* 7, 773; Teubner Ed. p. 368, 22 ff.

<sup>39</sup> regit B.

autem<sup>40</sup> se reflectit in primum et exprimit<sup>41</sup> de se suam reflexionem in primum; immo etiam primus per secundum in<sup>42</sup> seipsum reflectitur, proceditque hec reflexio a primo simul et secundo.

### Capitulum Quartum

His autem rationibus Trinitatem in unitate probantibus ad presens contenti sumus,<sup>1</sup> sed ad imaginandum aliquo modo illud<sup>2</sup> quod probatum est, exempla aliqua afferamus. Maxime enim necessaria<sup>3</sup> est nobis Trinitatis comprehensio. Huius enim amor salus est anime et sine huius amore nulla salus est anime. Tantum autem amatur, quantum fide aut intelligentia comprehenditur. Ipsa enim est pulchritudo que rapit in sui amorem credentis et intelligentis comprehensione.<sup>4</sup>

Exempla igitur summe Trinitatis que solent afferri sunt talia, et non solum sunt exempla, sed evidenter summe Trinitati<sup>5</sup> collata sunt argumenta ipsam Trinitatem efficaciter probantia. Non tamen, propter prolixitatem vitandam, afferimus<sup>6</sup> illa nunc sicut argumenta, sed sicut exempla imaginacionem iuvantia.

Unum ergo exemplum est: in unaquaque re composita sunt<sup>7</sup> materia et forma et istarum compositio; quarum prima ducit in apprehensionem<sup>8</sup> potencie<sup>9</sup> Patris, quia<sup>10</sup> non creavit eam<sup>11</sup> ex nihilo nisi potencia infinita, cum ipsa creata<sup>12</sup> exsuperet nihilum in infinitum; secunda ducit in comprehensionem<sup>13</sup> sapientie Filii, quia in forma qualibet tam corporea quam incorporea descripta est et resplendet infinita<sup>14</sup> sapientia; tertia ducit in apprehensionem<sup>15</sup> Spiritus Sancti qui est amor et coniunctio Patris et Filii.

Exemplum alterum est: in unaquaque re sunt<sup>16</sup> ipsius rei magnitudo, species<sup>17</sup> et ordo. Magnitudo enim ducit apprehensionem<sup>18</sup> in Patris potenciam; species in Filium qui<sup>19</sup> est splendor<sup>20</sup> Patris et figura substance eius; ordo ducit in Spiritus Sancti<sup>21</sup> benignitatem que unamquamque rem in cuiuslibet alterius ordinat pulcritudinem et utilitatem.

Tercium exemplum est: in unaquaque re numerus,<sup>22</sup> pondus et mensura. Mensura enim ducit<sup>23</sup> apprehensionem in contentivam omnipotenciam; numerus in sapientiam quia, secundum<sup>24</sup> Augustinum,<sup>25</sup> idem sunt sapientia et numerus; pondus vero rei est inclinatio ad propriam collocacionem et ita ad proprium ordinem, et quietans<sup>26</sup> rem<sup>27</sup> in propria collocacione et proprio ordine;<sup>28</sup> et insinuat benignitatem Spiritus in ordine conservantem.<sup>29</sup>

Materia ergo et magnitudo et mensura ostendunt potenciam creantem, formantem et continentem. Forma vero et species<sup>30</sup> et numerus ostendunt sapientiam creantem, formantem et continentem. Compositio vero et ordo et pondus ostendunt bonitatem creantem, formantem et continentem.

<sup>40</sup> add. de B.

<sup>41</sup> exponit B.

<sup>42</sup> et B.

<sup>1</sup> sumus PQ.

<sup>2</sup> ad P.

<sup>3</sup> vobis nec. est B.

<sup>4</sup> comprehensionem Q.

<sup>5</sup> trinitatis B.

<sup>6</sup> afferemus B.

<sup>7</sup> om. PQ.

<sup>8</sup> apprehensione B.

<sup>9</sup> cf. Hugh of St. Victor. *De Sacramentis*. I, 2, 6; PL 176, 208D . . . et assignavit (fides) potestatem Patri, sapientiam Filio, bonitatem Spiritui Sancto.

<sup>10</sup> que B.

<sup>11</sup> illam B.

<sup>12</sup> creatura B.

<sup>13</sup> comprehensione B.

<sup>14</sup> cf. St. Augustine. *Ep.* 118, 4, 24; CSEL 34, 687. ll. 17-19; PL 33, 443: *Manifestum est*

*enim omnium rerum descriptionem et modum ab illa (sapientia) fieri eamque non incongrue dici infinitam non per spatia locorum sed per potentiam . . .*

<sup>15</sup> apprehensione B.

<sup>16</sup> om. PQ.

<sup>17</sup> spes. Q. corrupt P.

<sup>18</sup> om. B.

<sup>19</sup> que P.

<sup>20</sup> cf. *Hebrews* i, 3.

<sup>21</sup> om. B.

<sup>22</sup> cf. *Wisdom*, xi, 21.

<sup>23</sup> add. in B.

<sup>24</sup> Augustinus ait B.

<sup>25</sup> cf. *De libero Arbitrio*, 2, 1132; PL 32, 1258.

<sup>26</sup> quietam PQ.

<sup>27</sup> specie PQ.

<sup>28</sup> cf. St. Augustine. *Enarratio* 2, in *Psalmum* 29. 10; PL 36, 22.

<sup>29</sup> conservante P.

<sup>30</sup> numerus et species P.

Hec igitur tria Trinitatis exempla est invenire universaliter in omnibus. Inter res autem corporeas manifestissimum Trinitatis exemplum est ignis sive lux que<sup>31</sup> necessario gignit<sup>32</sup> de se splendorem, et hec duo in se reflectunt mutuum<sup>33</sup> fervorem.

In coniunctione autem corporei cum incorporeo prima exempla sunt in formis sensibilibus et speciebus formarum sensibilibus generatis in sensibus et intencione animi coniungente speciem genitam in sensu cum forma gignente que est extra sensum. Et huius rei evidencior est exemplacio in visu. Color enim rei colorate gignit de se speciem sibi similem in oculo videntis, et intencio animi videntis coniungit speciem coloris genitam in oculo cum colore gignente exterius et sic unit gignens et genitum quod apprehensio visus non distinguit inter speciem genitam et colorem gignentem; fitque una visio ex gignente et genito et intencione copulante genitum cum gignente. Et similiter est ista trinitas<sup>34</sup> in quolibet exteriorum sensuum.

Consequenter species genita in sensu particulari gignit de se speciem sibi similem<sup>35</sup> in sensu communi, et est iterum intencio anime coniungens et uniens hanc speciem genitam cum specie gignente in unam imaginacionem. Et est hoc exemplum Trinitatis propinquius exemplum quam illud quod proximo dictum erat.

Tercio, species genita in fantasia sensus communis gignit de se speciem sibi similem in memoria et est intencio animi coniungens speciem genitam cum gignente, et efficitur ex tribus una fixio memorie.

Similiter contingit videre exemplum Trinitatis in apprehensionibus intellectivis et que sunt proprie anime rationalis. Species enim apprehensibilis ratione sui, sive intellectu sive intelligencia, generat in<sup>36</sup> sibi correspondente virtute suam similitudinem; quam similitudinem genitam coniungit anime intencio cum specie gignente eam. Et sic ex tribus fit una apprehensio in effectu, que apprehensio una et trina exemplum est et elocucio<sup>37</sup> unius substantie divine in personarum Trinitate.

Item quelibet species primogenita in aliqua rationalis anime virtute apprehensive gignit sui similitudinem in retentiva memoria illi apprehensiva comproporcionata et unit intencio anime gignentem<sup>38</sup> speciem et genitam<sup>39</sup> retentamque<sup>40</sup> similitudinem in unam memoriam.

Memoria autem nostra cum receperit<sup>41</sup> et retinuerit formam memorabilem non semper actu<sup>42</sup> memoratur; sed cum fit de non actualiter memorante actualiter memorans, gignit et exprimit de se actuale intellectum<sup>43</sup> sive intelligenciam sibi omnino similem; que gignens memoria et intelligencia genita in se mutuum reflectunt unientem et copulantem amorem.<sup>44</sup> Et est hoc exemplum Trinitatis ceteris dictis exemplis vicinius exemplacio. Omnia tamen hec exempla magnam habent ad summam Trinitatem dissimilitudinem.<sup>45</sup>

### Capitulum Quintum

In genere autem huius exempli ultimi, memorie videlicet gignentis et sue

<sup>31</sup> add de se P.

<sup>32</sup> de se gignit PQ.

<sup>33</sup> cf. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, 11, 2, 5; PL 42, 987: *species corporis quae videtur, et impressa ejus imago sensui quod est visio sensusve formatus et voluntas animi quae rei sensibili sensum admovet et eoque ipsam visionem tenet.*

<sup>34</sup> ternitas P.

<sup>35</sup> consimilem B.

<sup>36</sup> inde Q.

<sup>37</sup> et elocucio om. B.

<sup>38</sup> gignente B.

<sup>39</sup> genitamque B.

<sup>40</sup> om. B.

<sup>41</sup> reciperet B.

<sup>42</sup> actum B.

<sup>43</sup> intell. sive om. B.

<sup>44</sup> cf. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, 14, 6, 8; PL 42, 1042: *Haec autem duo, gignens et genitum, dilectione tertia copulantur, quae nihil aliud est quam voluntas fruendum aliquid appetens vel tenens. Ideoque etiam illis tribus nominibus insinuendam mentis putavimus trinitatem, memoria, intelligentia, voluntate.*

<sup>45</sup> cf. St. Augustine, *op. cit.* 15, 20, 39; PL 42, 1088.

genite similitudinis et amoris copulantis, vicinissimum exemplum Dei Trinitatis est memoria, intelligencia et amor in suprema facie<sup>1</sup> rationis, qua sola vi suprema Deus Trinitas sine nubilo fantasmatum et non per<sup>2</sup> corporeum instrumentum memoratur, intelligitur et diligitur. Huius igitur supreme virtutis memoria memorans eternam memoriam est summa et propinquissima creata similitudo Dei Patris; huius supreme virtutis intelligencia, genita de predicta eiusdem virtutis memoria, intelligens eternam de Patre genitam sapienciam est summa creata similitudo Dei Filii; eiusdem quoque supreme virtutis amor, procedens de predictis memoria et intelligencia eiusdem virtutis, diligens benignitatem increatam de Patre et Filio procedentem est summa similitudo creata Spiritus Sancti.<sup>3</sup>

Et ita<sup>4</sup> secundum hanc supremam virtutem unam et simplicem dicto modo memorantem, intelligentem et diligentem est homo summa<sup>5</sup> similitudo et per hoc imago unius Dei Trinitatis. Et<sup>6</sup> secundum<sup>7</sup> naturalem potentiam sic memorandi, intelligendi et diligendi est homo naturaliter Dei Trinitatis imago. Cum autem habet habitum et actum huius potencie, tunc est homo renovata imago Dei Trinitatis, deiformis videlicet, et<sup>8</sup> renovatus spiritu mentis sue<sup>9</sup> et nova creatura.<sup>10</sup>

Et hec pars anime suprema, sic renovata et deiformis effecta, vires anime inferiores singulas secundum receptabilitatis sue<sup>11</sup> facultates in sui trahit<sup>12</sup> similitudinem et imitationem, et per consequens ipsarum virium actus et corpus organicum agens assimilatur sibi et in sui trahit imitationem et<sup>13</sup> quandam conformitatem.

Totum igitur hominem sibi subiugatum imprimit et<sup>14</sup> signat<sup>15</sup> et figurat hec pars anime suprema, Trinitatis<sup>16</sup> vestigio principaliter et primo et nullo interiecto medio in seipsa expresso, per se mediam imprimens eodem vestigio formacius quod sibi subicitur vicinior et minus fortiter quod a se distat longius, in totum tamen hominem transfundit quod ipsa immediate recipit; quemadmodum videmus quod ether primo recipiens lumen solis clarissime illustratur, et deinde transmittit susceptam illustrationem in aera superiorem purum et subtilem, et post in hunc aera inferiorem et crassiorem, et tandem in aquam. Et aer superior purus etheri vicinior plus illustratur quam aer iste inferior et crassior; et aer inferior plus illustratur quam aqua corpulencior.<sup>17</sup>

Totum tamen corpus perspicuum quod est a terra usque ad solem una illuminatione illustratur, totumque est unum lucidum soli lucenti conforme per susceptam a sole illuminationem, mediante ethere primam illustrationem suscipiente; subtracto autem ethere, sequens corpus inferius non esset per receptum lucidum soli conforme; non enim recipit<sup>17</sup> solis lumen nisi per

<sup>1</sup> facie . . . . Trinitas om. B. For the phrase *facies rationis* cf. Avicenna, *De Anima*, I, 5: in the Venice edition (1508) fol. 5v, col. 1: *tangquam anima nostra habet duas facies, faciem scilicet deorsum ad corpus . . . et aliam faciem sursum versus principia altissima*. Also Algazel, *Metaphysics* 2, 4, 5 (Toronto, 1933), p. 172: *anima vero humana habet duas facies, unam ad partem superiorem . . . et aliam ad partem inferiorem*. Also Gundissalinus, *De Anima*, 10, *Mediaeval Studies* II (1940), p. 86. For later authors and discussion, see J. Rohmer, *Sur la doctrine franciscaine des deux faces de l'âme*, *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age* II (1927), pp. 74 ff.; to the uses of the term given by Rohmer add: *supremam faciem intellectus*, in *Summa de Anima*, Ms Brussels 2793-93, f. 44r col. 2. But Grosseteste seems here to be using the phrase in the sense in which

Cicero uses *acies mentis*.

<sup>2</sup> om. B.

<sup>3</sup> cf. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, 15, 23, 43; PL 42, 1090.

<sup>4</sup> ideo P; add ideo Q.

<sup>5</sup> om. B.

<sup>6</sup> om. PQ.

<sup>7</sup> per PQ.

<sup>8</sup> om. B.

<sup>9</sup> cf. Ephesians iv, 23.

<sup>10</sup> cf. Galatians vi, 15.

<sup>11</sup> om. B.

<sup>12</sup> trahit PQ.

<sup>13</sup> om. B.

<sup>14</sup> assignat B.

<sup>15</sup> add. anime B.

<sup>16</sup> cf. St. Basil, *Hexameron*, 2, 7; PL 53, 887AB; Greek text in PG 29, 44C-45A; also St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad Litteram*, 12, 16, 32; PL 34, 466, CSEL 28, 3, 2, p. 401.

<sup>17</sup> recepit B.

etheris mediacionem. Et etiam si poneremus, sublato ethere, aera usque ad solem pertingere, nec sic quidem<sup>18</sup> esset perspicuum lucidum<sup>19</sup> lucentis solis manifestissimo vestigio impressum. Non enim est<sup>20</sup> aer quantumcumque purus equalis illuminationis cum<sup>21</sup> ethere receptivus. Non igitur haberet sol in perspicuo subiecto sui<sup>22</sup> summam<sup>23</sup> imitationem aut imitatoriam conformitatem. Posito vero ethere, etiam ceteris sublatis, esset in ethere per lucidatatem receptam summa solis imitatoria conformatio.

Isto quoque modo est in suprema facie<sup>24</sup> rationis humanae mentis expressa et signata nullo interposito medio Dei Trinitatis summa imitatoria similitudo, id est imago. Et per huius partis mediacionem transfunditur hec similitudinis signacio in totum hominem, et fit totus integer homo summe Trinitatis imago. Circumscripita tamen suprema facie rationis non posset in residuo hominis remanere ratio imaginis; hac tamen parte sola posita posset in ea ratio imaginis esse perfecta.<sup>25</sup>

Nihil igitur nominatum<sup>26</sup> in homine citra<sup>27</sup> supremam rationis faciem est Trinitatis imago, ut si nomines corpus aut sensum aut imaginacionem. Si vero solum nomines rationem, expressisti Trinitatis imaginem. Si autem corpus aut sensum aut imaginacionem dicas, et consideres secundum quod a ratione impressa sunt, imaginem Trinitatis considerasti.<sup>28</sup>

Racio enim in seipsa et per hoc ratio in sibi subiectis viribus et corpore et hoc in ratione Trinitatis est imago. Unde Augustinus super<sup>29</sup> hunc locum: intelligimus in eo factum hominem ad imaginem Dei in quo irracionabilibus<sup>30</sup> animantibus antecellit. Id autem est ipsa ratio vel mens vel intelligencia vel si quo alio vocabulo commodius appellatur. Unde et Apostolus dicit: *Renovamini in<sup>31</sup> spiritu mentis vestre et induite novum hominem qui renovatur in agnitione Dei secundum imaginem<sup>32</sup> eius qui creavit eum*, satis ostendens ubi sit homo creatus ad imaginem Dei quia non corporis liniamentis sed forma quadam intelligibili mentis illuminata.<sup>34</sup>

Basilius<sup>35</sup> quoque dicit quod non sumus ad imaginem Dei secundum formam corporis, neque secundum alterabilia aut corruptibilia sed secundum animam et secundum rationem sumus ad imaginem Dei. Et secundum Basilium homo interior hic nominatur cum dicitur *faciamus hominem ad imaginem*. De quo dicit Apostolus: *et si exterior noster<sup>37</sup> homo corrumpitur sed interior renovatur de die in diem*. Duos igitur, ut Basilius ait, in hoc verbo Apostoli cognoscimus homines; unum apparentem, et alterum<sup>38</sup> absconditum ab apparente, invisibilem interiore hominem. Et vere tunc dictum est quod nos sumus interior homo. Ego enim secundum interiorem hominem, quæ vero extra, non ego, sed mea; non enim manus, sed ego rationale anime, manus vero pars hominis, sicque corpus organicum anime; homo ergo proprie secundum ipsam animam. *Faciamus hominem ad imaginem*, hoc est,<sup>39</sup> demus illi rationis substantiam.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>18</sup> quidam B] qui Q.

<sup>19</sup> om. B.

<sup>20</sup> esset Q.

<sup>21</sup> in Q.

<sup>22</sup> sue P.

<sup>23</sup> simillimam B.

<sup>24</sup> om. P.

<sup>25</sup> cf. St. Augustine *De Trinitate* I2, 4; PL 42, 1000: *Sed in tota natura mentis in trinitatem reperiri opus est ut si desit actio temporalium . . . in una nusquam dispersa mente trinitas invenitur; et facta iam ista distributione, in eo solo quod ad contemplationem pertinet æternorum, non solum trinitas, sed etiam imago Dei; in hoc autem quod derivatum est in actione temporalium, etiam si trinitas possit, non tamen imago Dei possit inveniri. Cf. also op. cit. I2, 7, 10. PL 42, 1003.*

<sup>26</sup> nominandum P.

<sup>27</sup> corrupt PQ.

<sup>28</sup> si . . . imaginacionem om. B.

<sup>29</sup> in B.

<sup>30</sup> irracionabilibus BQ.

<sup>31</sup> cf. *Collossians* iii, 10.

<sup>32</sup> om. B.

<sup>33</sup> imaginacionem B.

<sup>34</sup> *De Genesi ad Lit.* 3, 20, 30; PL 34, 292, CSEL 28, 3, 2, p. 86, ll. 8-17.

<sup>35</sup> cf. pseudo-Basil, *De Hominis Structura*, oratio I, 6-7; PG 30, 16-17. A paraphrase. It is closer to the text of the same treatise but of a different manuscript tradition found among the works of St. Gregory of Nyssa, PG 44, 261-2.

<sup>36</sup> cf. 2 Cor. iv, 16.

<sup>37</sup> om. B.

<sup>38</sup> unum B.

<sup>39</sup> add. ut PQ.

<sup>40</sup> animam vel subsistentiam P.



Itaque, ut dictum est secundum Basilium, interior homo hic nominatur qui primo et proprie gerit conditoris imaginem. Potest<sup>41</sup> tamen integer homo compactus<sup>42</sup> ex interiori et exteriori homine hic intelligi, si, quemadmodum dictum est, consideretur homo interior conformans sibi exteriorem vel exterior conformatus<sup>43</sup> interiori.

Augustinus quoque contra Manicheos ait: Homo ad imaginem Dei factus dicitur secundum interiorem hominem, ubi<sup>44</sup> est ratio et intellectus, unde . . . addidit<sup>45</sup> continuo, *et habeat<sup>46</sup> potestatem piscium maris et volatilium celi*, ut intelligeremus non propter corpus dici hominem factum ad imaginem Dei, sed propter eam potestatem qua<sup>47</sup> superat omnia pecora. Omnia enim animalia cetera subiecta sunt homini non propter corpus sed<sup>48</sup> propter intellectum quem nos habemus et illa non habent, quamvis etiam<sup>49</sup> corpus nostrum sic fabricatum<sup>50</sup> sit, ut indicet nos meliores esse quam bestias et propterea Deo similes. Omnium enim animalium corpora, sive que in aquis sive que in terra vivunt sive que in aere volitant inclinata sunt ad<sup>51</sup> terram et non sunt creata erecta sicut hominis corpus.<sup>52</sup> Quo<sup>53</sup> significatur etiam<sup>54</sup> animum nostrum in superna sua et eterna spiritalia erectum esse debere. Ita intelligitur per animum maxime, attestante etiam erecta corporis forma, homo factus ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei.<sup>55</sup>

### Capitulum Sextum

Et animadvertendum quod tripliciter est considerare ipsam rationem et arbitrii libertatem secundum quam homo factus est ad Dei imaginem: potest enim considerari in substantia boni naturalis quod recepit<sup>1</sup> a naturali condicione; et potest considerari secundum quod elevatur supra<sup>2</sup> bonum condicionis sue in deiformitatem per conversionem ad creatoris fruicionem, qua conversione spiritus mentis innovatur et<sup>3</sup> decoratur; potest quoque considerari a summo bono aversa et ad inferiora conversa et sic deformata. Unde et imago tripliciter intelligitur<sup>4</sup> in ea, naturalis, videlicet, imago et renovata et deformata. Naturalis itaque imago numquam amittitur; renovata vero imago amittitur per peccatum; deformata vero tollitur per Spiritus Sancti gratiam.<sup>5</sup>

Unde, etsi<sup>6</sup> alicubi<sup>7</sup> inveniatur dictum hominem per peccatum Dei imaginem amittere et per gratiam recuperare, intelligendum est hoc de reformata imagine. Quod enim naturalis imago semper maneat docet Hieronymus sic dicens contra<sup>8</sup> Origenem: inter multa mala etiam<sup>9</sup> illud ausus est dicere perdidisse imaginem Dei Adam, cum hoc in nullo penitus loco Scriptura significet. Si enim ita esset, numquam omnia que in mundo sunt servirent semini Adam, id est,

<sup>41</sup> Another instance where Grosseteste bases a doctrine of his own on a Greek text which does not support it.

<sup>42</sup> confectus B.

<sup>43</sup> conformans B.

<sup>44</sup> ut P.

<sup>45</sup> addit PQ.

<sup>46</sup> habet P.

<sup>47</sup> om. Q; quasi P.

<sup>48</sup> om. sed propter B.

<sup>49</sup> et B.

<sup>50</sup> fabricatam P.

<sup>51</sup> ad terram] in terra B.

<sup>52</sup> cf. *Ecclesiastes* vii, 30; Plato, *Timaeus*, 90A; Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1, 4, 11; Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 1, 84-86; Seneca, *Epistle* 94, 56; St. Ambrose, *Hexameron*, 6, 9, 54; PL 14, 280; St. Gregory of Nyssa, *De Hominis Opificio*, 8; PG 44, 144B; St. Ven. Bede, *In Pent. Comm.*: Genesis 2; PL 9, 205C. The thought is a commonplace in mediaeval literature.

<sup>53</sup> om. B.

<sup>54</sup> om. PQ.

<sup>55</sup> 1, 17, 28; PL 34, 186-7.

<sup>1</sup> recipit PQ.

<sup>2</sup> super P.

<sup>3</sup> om. B.

<sup>4</sup> consideratur Q.

<sup>5</sup> cf. St. Augustine, *De Spiritu et Littera*, 28; PL 44, 230: *Nam sicut ipsa imago Dei renovatur in mente credentium per Testamentum Novum quam non penitus impietas aboleverat; nam remanserat utique id quod anima hominis nisi rationalis esse non potest . . .*; and *De Trinitate* 14, 14, 18; PL 42, 1050: *Jam enim se non diligit perverse, sed recte, cum Deum diligit cujus participatione imago illa non solum est, verum etiam ex vetustate renovatur ex deformitate reformatur.* Cf. also op. cit. 14, 17, 23.

<sup>6</sup> si B.

<sup>7</sup> aliter Q; alicui P.

<sup>8</sup> circa BQ.

<sup>9</sup> et B.

universo generi hominum, sicut et Jacobus Apostolus testatur,<sup>10</sup> *omnia domantur et subiecta sunt nature humane*. Numquid enim universa<sup>11</sup> essent subiecta hominibus si non haberent homines iuxta id<sup>12</sup> quod universis imperarent, imaginem Dei.<sup>13</sup> Naturalem vero et reformatam imaginem insinuat Augustinus in verbis suis super hunc locum que<sup>14</sup> supraposuimus.<sup>15</sup>

Insinuat quoque utramque<sup>16</sup> et beatus Bernardus sic dicens: Oportet id quod ad imaginem est cum imagine convenire et non in vacuum nomen<sup>17</sup> imaginis participare. Representemus ergo in nobis imaginem eius in appetitu pacis, in intuitu veritatis, et<sup>18</sup> in amore caritatis. Teneamus eum in memoria, portemus in consciencia, et ubique presentem veneremur.<sup>19</sup> Ecce in his verbis reformata imago evidenter describitur.

De naturali verbo subiungit dicens: Mens siquidem nostra eo ipso imago eius est, quo eius capax est<sup>20</sup> eiusque particeps esse potest, non propterea eius imago est, quia sui meminit mens seque intelligit<sup>21</sup> ac diligit, sed quia potest meminisse, intelligere ac diligere a quo facta est.<sup>22</sup> Ecce in his verbis habes expressam naturalem imaginem. Quibus verbis adhuc adicit ista dicens: Nihil tam simile est illi summe Sapientie quam<sup>23</sup> mens rationalis que per memoriam, intelligenciam et voluntatem in illa Trinitate ineffabili consistit. Consistere autem in illa non potest nisi eius meminerit eamque intelligat ac<sup>24</sup> diligit.<sup>25</sup>

### Capitulum Septimum

Ut autem docet nos Augustinus ad imaginem eciam suam creavit<sup>1</sup> nos Deus eo quod sicuti Deus unus semper ubique totus est, omnia vivificans, movens et gubernans, sicut Apostolus ait: *quod in eo vivimus, movemur<sup>2</sup> et sumus*, sic anima in suo corpore ubique tota viget, vivificans et gubernans et movens illud. Neque enim in maioribus corporis eius membris maior et in minoribus minor sed in minimis tota est et in maximis tota est, et haec est imago unitatis omnipotentis<sup>3</sup> Dei quam anima<sup>4</sup> habet<sup>5</sup> in se. Trinitatis vero imago est in eo quod ipsa est<sup>6</sup> et vivit et sapit.<sup>7</sup>

Secundum Hieronymum autem homo est imago Dei in participatione eternitatis.

<sup>10</sup> cf. James iii, 7.

<sup>11</sup> omnia Q.

<sup>12</sup> illud BQ.

<sup>13</sup> Ep. 51, 6; CSEL 54, 1, 1, p. 407, ll. 1-13; PL 22, 524: Epiphanius ad Joannem Episcopum Hierosolymorum a Hieronymo reddita.

The Greek text is in PG 43, 388A.

<sup>14</sup> quem B.

<sup>15</sup> cf. supra p. 166, 1. 6 sq.

<sup>16</sup> utrumque PQ.

<sup>17</sup> om. B.

<sup>18</sup> om. BQ.

<sup>19</sup> De *Cognitione Humanae Conditionis* 1. 2; PL 184, 486A. It is put in Migne among the *Opera Supposititia et Aliena*. I do not know who the true author is but the work is a rehash of Bernard's thought.

<sup>20</sup> om. B.

<sup>21</sup> intelligit . . . in his verbis om. B.

<sup>22</sup> loc. cit. 486B. The sense of this sentence is found with the clauses in inverse order in St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, 14, 12, 15; PL 42, 1048: *Haec igitur trinitas mentis non propterea Dei est imago quia sui meminit mens, et intelligit ac diligit se; sed quia potest etiam meminisse et intelligere et amare a quo facta est . . . Quod, ut brevius dicam, colat Deum non factum, cujus ab eo capax est facta, et cujus particeps esse potest . . .*

<sup>23</sup> qua B.

<sup>24</sup> ac diligit om. PQ.

<sup>25</sup> loc. cit.

<sup>1</sup> om. B.

<sup>2</sup> movemur B.

<sup>3</sup> Dei omnipotentis B.

<sup>4</sup> om. Q.

<sup>5</sup> in se habet PQ.

<sup>6</sup> om. B.

<sup>7</sup> This is from the *De Dignitate Conditionis humanae* printed in the Appendix to the works of St. Ambrose in PL 17, 1105B. Cf. Grosseteste, *De Intelligentiis*, Ludwig Baur, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters* 9 (1912), p. 114, ll. 7-23: *sicut autem Deus simul totus est ubique in universo, ita anima simul tota est ubique in corpore animato. Unde Ambrosius (codd. Augustinus) exponens qualiter homo sit factus ad imaginem Dei, ita ait: Sicuti Deus unus etc. as in this quotation. Then follows: Item idem Augustinus ad b. Hieronymum de origine animae: Quemadmodum anima per omnes particulas corporis tota adest simul, nec minor in minoribus, nec maior in maioribus, sed tamen in aliis intentius, in aliis remissius operatur, cum in singulis particulis corporis essentialiter tota sit, ita et Deus; cum sit in omnibus essentialiter et totus in illis, tamen plenius esse dicitur in eis quos inhabitat. cf. Mamertus Claudianus. De Statu Animae, 3, 2, 1; PL 53, 761BC.*

similitudo vero in moribus.<sup>8</sup> Eternitas enim est essencie incommutabilitas sive essencia incommutabilis. Dei autem maxime proprium nomen est essencia. Quicquid enim alio nomine significatum de Deo dixeris, in hoc nomine quod est essencia instauratur; propterea in participatione incommutabilitatis essencie est homo maxime propinque Dei imago.

Gregorius quoque Nisenus ait: si discucias et alia per<sup>9</sup> que divinum decus elucet, haec <eciam><sup>10</sup> in imagine ad illius similitudinem salva profecto reperies; mens etenim et verbum est summa Divinitas. In principio namque erat Verbum et qui, secundum Paulum, proficiunt, mentem Christi, qui in eis loquitur, se habere profitentur. Non ergo procul hec a natura humana conspicias; in te namque et verbum et intelligencia est, que imitantur<sup>11</sup> verbum mentemque divinam.

Item caritas Deus est<sup>12</sup> fonsque caritatis; hoc enim ait ille magnus Iohannes: Quoniam<sup>13</sup> caritas ex Deo est et Deus est caritas. Hanc autem nobis veluti personam Christus formator nostre substance conferens ait: In hoc cognoscent omnes quoniam mei estis discipuli, si dileccionem habueritis ad invicem. Quod si dileccio ista nobis defuerit, tocius imaginis species figuraque solvetur. Cuncta eciam conspicit exauditque Divinitas et omnia perscrutatur. Habes et tu per oculos et aures rei huius efficaciam vitalemque<sup>14</sup> et perscrutatricem<sup>15</sup> eorum que sunt intelligenciam te possidere cognoscis.<sup>16</sup>

Ex his verbis autenticis<sup>17</sup> perpendi potest quod quicumque dicuntur de Deo, aliquo modo imitatorio eciam homini<sup>18</sup> congruunt nec conveniunt irrationali creature tanta imitationis propinquitate. Unde etsi in aliis creaturis eluceat aliqua Dei similitudo nec<sup>19</sup> tamen<sup>18</sup> elucet in illis Dei imago quia<sup>20</sup> imago est summa et propinquissima similitudo. Naturalis enim<sup>21</sup> capacitas omnium que sunt in Deo per maxime propinquam imitationem est in homine Dei imago. Cum autem capit ea secundum possibilem sibi imitationem, tunc est reformata imago. Cum vero recedit ab eorum imitatione, fit deformata imago et reformate<sup>22</sup> imaginis species figuraque solvitur, sicut in supradictis<sup>23</sup> verbis dicit Gregorius Nisenus.

### Capitulum Octavum

Ad similitudinem vero Dei dicitur homo factus in participatione bonorum

<sup>8</sup> St. Venerable Bede, *In Pentateuchum Commentarii Expositio in Primum Librum Moysis*, 2; PL 91, 201C: alii vero inquirunt in quibus interior homo imaginem Dei et similitudinem teneat, id est, in aeternitate et in moribus secundum Origenem. Grosse-teste in his *Hexameron* used this treatise of Bede many times and he always cites it as by St. Jerome. Perhaps it is based on Origen, *I Homily on Genesis* 13, *Die Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte* 6, pp. 16-18 (Rufinus' translation; PG 12, 156-157.) It is stated as Bede has it except for the phrase *secundum Origenem* also in the last chapter of *De Dogmatibus Ecclesiasticis* by some attributed to Gennadius, PL 42, 1222: PL 58, 1000; PL 83, 1244; also in the edition of this treatise based on a group of manuscripts by C. H. Turner, *Journal of Theological Studies* 7, (1905-6), p. 99. In his *Commentary on Ezechiel*, Book 9, 28; PL 25, 269C, St. Jerome says: *Faciamus hominem etc. et notandum quod imago tunc facta sit tantum similitudo in Christi baptismo compleatur.*

<sup>9</sup> propter PQ.

<sup>10</sup> enim BPQ.

<sup>11</sup> imitatur P.

<sup>12</sup> The phrases *Deus est* and *Deus est caritas* do not occur in Dionysius' translation in PL but they are in the Greek text.

<sup>13</sup> I John iv, 7, 8.

<sup>14</sup> vitalem Q.

<sup>15</sup> scrutatricem PQ. This is a faulty translation of the Greek for this sentence; the literal rendering would be: you also have through sight and hearing a grasp of reality and the inquiring and scrutinizing perception of it.

<sup>16</sup> *De Hominis Opificio* 5 (translation of Dionysius Exiguus); PL 67, 353BC; the Greek text is in PG 44, 137BC.

<sup>17</sup> For the meaning of the terms *auctoritates*, *authentica*, *magistralia* in mediaeval writings, see Chenu, *Authentica et Magistralia in Divus Thomas*, (Placentiae, 1925), pp. 258 ff.

<sup>18</sup> om. B.

<sup>19</sup> non B.

<sup>20</sup> add enim P.

<sup>21</sup> igitur B.

<sup>22</sup> See Introduction p. 156.

<sup>23</sup> See above ll. 6-20.

gratuitorum. Unde, sicut dicit Basilius, ad imaginem habemus ex creacione, ad similitudinem vero dirigimus ex eleccione. In prima condicione extitit<sup>1</sup> in nobis esse ad imaginem Dei; ex eleccione vero dirigitur esse ad similitudinem Dei. Hoc secundum eleccionem potentia nobis inest; actum<sup>2</sup> vero nobis ipsis inducimus. Ideo primo dixit: *Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem*, et non repetit nisi unum istorum duorum, id est, *ad imaginem*. Sic enim infra recapitulatur: *et fecit Deus hominem . . . ad imaginem Dei fecit ipsum*. Nisi enim ambo dixisset, non haberemus potentiam naturalem fieri ad similitudinem. Quia tamen relictum<sup>3</sup> est nobis complere istud secundum actum ex eleccione, in recapitulacione omissum est. Dicens igitur: *faciamus ad similitudinem*, potentiam nobis tribuit ad essendum secundum similitudinem, et dimisit, nos operatores actuum similitudinis ut esset nobis merces operacionis ut non essemus sicut statue a pictore facte frustra iacentes, ut non ea que nostre assimilacionis <sunt><sup>4</sup> frustra laudem ferrent. Quando enim statuam vides diligenter formatam ad suum primitivum, non statuam laudas sed pictorem admiraris.<sup>5</sup>

Ut igitur admiracio mea fiat et<sup>6</sup> non aliena, mihi reliquit<sup>7</sup> ad similitudinem Dei fieri. Ad imaginem enm<sup>8</sup> habeo rationale esse; ad similitudinem vero factus sum<sup>9</sup> in eo quod Christianus factus sum.<sup>10</sup>

*Estote*<sup>11</sup> *perfecti sicut Pater vester celestis perfectus est*.<sup>12</sup> Vides ubi dedit nobis Dominus<sup>13</sup> ad similitudinem? . . . Si fias oditor mali . . . immemor inimicie; . . . si fias<sup>14</sup> amator fratris<sup>15</sup> et<sup>16</sup> compaciens, assimularis Deo . . . Si qualis est in te peccatorem Deus . . . talis fias in fratre in te delinquentem compassionem misericordie, assimularis Deo. Sicque ad imaginem quidem habes in esse rationale; ad similitudinem vero fis ex recipere<sup>17</sup> bonitatem. Casta<sup>18</sup> sume viscera misericordiarum ut induas Christum; per que enim recipis compassionem, per ea Christum induis . . . Si fecit et ad similitudinem . . . propter quid tu coronaris? Hoc itaque<sup>19</sup> imperfectum est<sup>20</sup> relictum ut teipsum tu ipse iuvante<sup>21</sup> gracia perficiens, dignus fias retributione a Deo. Assimulamur igitur Deo per Christianitatem. Quid est Christianitas? Dei similitudo secundum receptibile hominis per naturam. Quid vero est homo? Ex cognitis et auditis hic definiamus; non enim egemus mutuari definitiones alienas . . . Homo igitur est factura rationalis facta ad imaginem creantis ipsum.<sup>22</sup>

Gregorius vero Nisenus de hac similitudine sic dicit: Sicut formas hominum per colores quosdam pictores in tabulis transferunt, tincturas proprias congruasque miscentes, ita ut a primeve forme decore in similitudinem diligentissima imitatione transmigrant,<sup>23</sup> sic intellige nostre substance formatorem velud quibusdam virtutibus <miram><sup>24</sup> pulcritudinem sue imagini contulisse, in nobis <exprimentem><sup>25</sup> proprium principatum. Sunt autem multiplices et multiformes colores huius imaginis quibus vere forme

<sup>1</sup> coexistit B.

<sup>2</sup> om. B.

<sup>3</sup> nobis relictum est PQ.

<sup>4</sup> om. BPQ.

<sup>5</sup> Grosseteste summarizes the text of this treatise fairly closely as found in PG 44, 273AB except for the clause *ut non essemus . . . iacentes*: which is closer to the treatise as found in PG 30, 29D-32D. In substance the two treatises are the same but one is a rewritten version of the other; the difference is more than that of two manuscript traditions of the work.

<sup>6</sup> om. B.

<sup>7</sup> relinquit B.

<sup>8</sup> vero PQ.

<sup>9</sup> op. cit. PG 44, 273B.

<sup>10</sup> cf. loc. cit. 273D.

<sup>11</sup> estote . . . 1. 31, below per naturam,

pseudo-Basil, *De Hominis Structa*, 1. 20; PG 30, 32D-33B.

<sup>12</sup> cf. Matt. v, 48.

<sup>13</sup> Deus B.

<sup>14</sup> fies PQ.

<sup>15</sup> fratres BQ.

<sup>16</sup> om. et B.

<sup>17</sup> opere P.

<sup>18</sup> A faulty translation. The Greek means: Take on therefore the bowels of mercy, benignity, that you may put on Christ.

<sup>19</sup> add. et PQ.

<sup>20</sup> om. est PQ.

<sup>21</sup> The phrase *iuvante gracia* is not in the Greek text.

<sup>22</sup> op. cit. PG 30, 24D.

<sup>23</sup> transmigrant B.

<sup>24</sup> minimam B!; in iram Q!; miriam P.

<sup>25</sup> exprimens, all mss.

similitudo depingitur, non cerussa et purpurissa, nec<sup>26</sup> horum mixta cum altero qualitas, nec alicuius nigredinis superduccio cilia oculosque subliniit, et per aliquod temperamentum depressa et concava <caracteris><sup>27</sup> assimulat, vel quecumque similia pictorum manus <artificis><sup>28</sup> composuere solercia; sed pro istis adest puritas, impassibilitas, beatitudo, malique tocius aversio, et quecumque generis huius existunt, per que in hominibus imprimitur similitudo divina. Talibus floribus<sup>29</sup> <mirabilis><sup>30</sup> conditor imaginem propriam, id est, naturam nostre condicionis, ornavit.<sup>31</sup>

Ex his auctoritatibus<sup>32</sup> iam patet differentia imaginis et similitudinis. In nomine tamen imaginis reformate intelligitur similitudo; ipse enim similitudo est imaginis reformatio.

### Capitulum Nonum<sup>1</sup>

Et considerandum quod Scriptura dicit hominem factum ad imaginem ut per preposicionem insinuet<sup>2</sup> subiectam imitationem et distinccionem modi quo Filius est imago ad modum quo homo est imago. Dicitur enim homo imago Dei ab Apostolo; ait enim: *Vir<sup>3</sup> non debet velare<sup>4</sup> caput, cum sit imago et gloria Dei.*

Non itaque homo est imago Dei tanquam unigenitus Filius Dei, quia Filius sic est imago Patris quod ipse<sup>5</sup> est hoc quod Pater, eadem natura, eadem substantia, alius in persona. Et ideo Filius, testante <Augustino><sup>6</sup> in *Libro<sup>7</sup> Retractationum*, non ad imaginem Patris, sed tantummodo imago est Patris. Homo vero sic est imago Dei quod etiam ad imaginem Dei est, non parificatus ei cuius est imago, sed subiecta imitatione sequens illud cuius est imago.

Unde et Augustinus in *Libro De Vera Religione* ait: (Sapiencia Patris), que nulla ex parte dissimilis similitudo eius<sup>8</sup> est, dicta est et imago quia de ipso est. Ita etiam Filius recte dicitur ex ipso, cetera per ipsum.<sup>9</sup> Precessit<sup>10</sup> enim forma omnium, summe implens unum de quo est, ut cetera que sunt in quantum sunt<sup>11</sup> uni similia per eam formam fierent.

Horum alia sic sunt per ipsam ut ad ipsam etiam sint, ut omnis rationalis et intellectualis creatura in qua homo rectissime dicitur factus ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei; non enim aliter incommutabilem veritatem posset mente<sup>12</sup> conspiciere.

Alia vero ita sunt per ipsam facta ut non<sup>13</sup> sint ad ipsam. Et ideo rationalis creatura, si creatori suo serviat, a quo facta est et per quem facta est et ad quam facta est; cuncta ei cetera servient.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>26</sup> add enim, all mss.

<sup>27</sup> caracteres B; characteres PQ.

<sup>28</sup> artifice, all mss.

<sup>29</sup> add et, all mss.

<sup>30</sup> miraculis, all mss.

<sup>31</sup> *De Hominis Opificio* PL 67, 352D-353A (Dionysius' translation); Greek text, PG 44, 137AB.

<sup>32</sup> see note 17, chap 7, p. 00.

<sup>1</sup> Q. inserts in the text, P in the margin: quid similitudo? Sermo ostendens quare homo ad imaginem Dei factus dicitur (Q Dei). Filius non ad ad imaginem, sed imago. (P creatae) non que sunt post hominem (Q hominum), per imaginem et non imago neque ad imaginem.

<sup>2</sup> insinuat B.

<sup>3</sup> cf. I Cor. xi, 7.

<sup>4</sup> om. P.

<sup>5</sup> cf. *Symbolum Quicumque*, Denzinger, *Enchiridion Symbolorum* (Freiburg i. Breslau, 1911), 39, pp. 17-18. Also St. Augustine, *Collatio cum Maximino Arianorum Episcopo*, 14; PL 42, 720.

<sup>6</sup> Augustinus, all mss.

<sup>7</sup> I, 25; CSEL 36, p. 122, ll. 14-15; PL 32, 626; in PL the chapter number is 26.

<sup>8</sup> om. B.

<sup>9</sup> 43, 81-44, 82; PL 34, 159: Pater suae sapientiae . . . servient.

<sup>10</sup> precessit . . . fierent: loc. cit. and *De Trinitate* 6, 10, 11; PL 42, 931.

<sup>11</sup> habent B. om. Q.

<sup>12</sup> mentem P.

<sup>13</sup> om. B.

<sup>14</sup> serviant P.

*Capitulum Decimum<sup>1</sup>*

Per<sup>2</sup> hoc autem quod dicitur ad imaginem nostram, cum eo quod postea subiungitur: *Et fecit Deus hominem ad imaginem Dei*, evidenter declaratur quod homo est una imago unius Dei Trinitatis, in se representens unitatis Trinitatem et Trinitatis unitatem; non quasi Pater ad imaginem Filii fecerit hominem aut Filius ad imaginem Patris, sed unus Deus Trinitas ad imaginem sui unius et trini.

Unde<sup>3</sup> et convenienter quando creandus erat homo ad Trinitatis imaginem secundum rationem potentem<sup>4</sup> comprehendere eandem Trinitatem, revelata est expresse fides Trinitatis et<sup>5</sup> evidenter emicuit eius doctrina. In superioribus namque velud in profundo fuit abdita Trinitatis predicatio; hic autem quasi de abditi obscuro cepit in lucem splendescere.

*Capitulum Undecimum<sup>1</sup>*

Nec pretereundum est quod non solo, ut dicit Augustinus, iubentis sermone, ut alia sex dierum opera, sed consilio sancte Trinitatis et opere maiestatis dominice creatus<sup>2</sup> sit homo, ut ex<sup>3</sup> prime condicionis honore intelligeret quantum suo conditori deberet; dum tamen in condicione dignitatis privilegium prestatit ei conditor ut tanto ardentius amaret conditorem, quanto mirabilius se ab ipso conditum intelligeret.

Gregorius quoque in *Moralium IX* ait:<sup>4</sup> Quamvis enim per coeternum Patris Verbum cuncta creata sunt, in ipsa tamen relatione creacionis ostenditur quantum cunctis animalibus, quantum rebus vel celestibus sed tamen insensibilibus homo preferatur; cuncta quippe *dixit et facta sunt*,<sup>5</sup> cum facere hominem decrevit, hoc quod reverenter pensandum est premitit dicens: *Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram*. Neque enim sicut de rebus ceteris scriptum est: *fiat et factum est*, neque ut aque volatilia<sup>6</sup> sic terra hominem protulit; sed, priusquam fieret, *faciamus* dicitur, ut, videlicet, quia rationalis creatura condebatur quasi cum consilio facta videretur, quasi per studium de terra plasmatur et inspiracione conditoris et<sup>7</sup> virtute spiritus vitalis<sup>8</sup> erigitur;<sup>9</sup> ut scilicet non per iussionis vocem sed per dignitatem operacionis existeret qui ad conditoris imaginem fiebat.

Gregorius quoque Nisenus ait: Orbis<sup>10</sup> tanti huius extruccio et parcium eius quibus in elementis continetur universitas, a<sup>11</sup> divina potencia perficitur extemplo pariter cum iussione subsistens;<sup>12</sup> hominis autem formacionem artificis tanti precedit consilium, et descriptio verbi quod futurum est ante signatur<sup>13</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Q. inserts in the text, P. in the margin: Sermo ostendens quod non solum ad imaginem Filii vel Patris factus hoc loco per hoc quod dicitur ad imaginem etc. homo declaratur, sed a Trinitate factus ad Trinitatis imaginem demonstratur.

<sup>2</sup> per hoc . . . 1. 6 et trini. Cf. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, 12, 6, 7; PL 42, 1001; also *De Genesi ad Litteram*, 3, 19; CSEL 28, 3, 2, p. 85, ll. 17-26; PL 34, 291.

<sup>3</sup> unde . . . 1. 00 splendescere. Cf. Bede, *Hexameron* 1; PL 91, 28C-29A; St. Augustine, *Sermo* 1, 5, 5; PL 38, 25; Pseudo-Augustine, *Quaestionum ex Veteri Testamento*, II, 3, PL 35, 2394.

<sup>4</sup> potencia P.

<sup>5</sup> om. PQ.

<sup>6</sup> Q. inserts in the text, P. in the margin: Sermo ostendens quare in solius hominis creacione curante exquisicionis et quasi sermone usum refert scriptura Deum quasi sermone consiliativo et tante exquisicionis

operacione (Q. operacionem), cum in aliis condendis dixerit Deus tantum: *fiat et factum est*, et cetera rationes ut notatur in summa 8 (referring to the paraphrase p. 172 which is so numbered in Q).

<sup>7</sup> pseudo-Augustine, *De Spiritu et Anima*, 35; PL 40, 805.

<sup>8</sup> om. B.

<sup>9</sup> chapter 49; PL 75, 900AB.

<sup>10</sup> Psalm cxlviii, 5.

<sup>11</sup> Genesis 1, 20.

<sup>12</sup> in B.

<sup>13</sup> add utiliter Q.

<sup>14</sup> Genesis ii, 7.

<sup>15</sup> Orbis . . . 1. 17, p. 172 esse probaretur. *De Hominis Opificio* 3; PL 17, 351C-352A (translation of Dionysius) Greek text, PG 44, 133C-136A.

<sup>16</sup> et P.

<sup>17</sup> existens B.

<sup>18</sup> aut signatur B.

qualemque<sup>14</sup> esse oporteat et cuius primeve<sup>15</sup> forme similitudinem referat, ob quam etiam causam fiat, quid fictus efficiat et quorum dominatum gerat, omnia priusquam subsisterent perspecta sunt ut ante generationem suam homo antiquiorem quodam modo sortitus sit dignitatem priusquam subsisteret, universorum possidens principatum. Dixit enim Deus: *Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, et dominetur piscibus maris et bestiis terre et volatilibus celi et pecoribus universeque terre.*

O quale miraculum! Sol fit, et nullum precedit omnino consilium; celum quoque, cui nihil in creaturis visibilibus simile reperitur, verbo solo perficitur et opus tam mirabile nec unde fiat nec qualiter intimatur; sic singula queque creaturarum: ether, stelle et aer qui medium locum <continet>,<sup>16</sup> mare, terra, animalia et nascencia, omnia verbo tantummodo producantur ut sint. Ad hominis autem solius condicionem cum consilio quodam modo conditor universitatis accedit et materiam que constructioni eius sit necessaria preparat et ad formam primeve ac principalis pulcritudinis eius coaptat similitudinem <et intencionem><sup>17</sup> cuius rei gracia fiat insinuat congruam illi naturam effectibus suis instituens <que><sup>18</sup> ad propositum aptissima esse probaretur.

Hoc autem consilium quod in hoc loco nominant expositores non est proprie dictum consilium quia, ut ait Iohannes Damascenus: Non consiliatur Deus; ignorancie<sup>19</sup> enim est consiliari. De eo enim quod cognoscit nullus consiliatur . . . Deus igitur omnia noscens simpliciter non consiliatur.<sup>20</sup>

Innuitur igitur in hoc loco nomine consilii et modo loquendi consiliativo, cum dicitur *faciamus hominem ad imaginem nostram*, prerogativa dignitatis humane condicionis, quod videlicet animal honoratissimum in vitam adducitur. Et innuitur etiam conditoris cura et providencia specialis<sup>21</sup> faciendi perfectum et preciosissimum sibi et carissimum opus et maxime sapienciale et artificiale et ex<sup>22</sup> artificii singularitate maxime inter cetera opera admirabile; coniuncta est enim in homine in<sup>23</sup> unitatem persone suprema creatura, rationalis videlicet et arbitrio libera intelligencia, cum creatura infima, videlicet . . . terra, et non cum qualicumque terra sed cum pulvere sumpto de terra; ut enim infra scriptum est secundum translationem Septuaginta:<sup>24</sup> *formavit Deus hominem pulverem sumens de terra.* Et quid tam distancium coniunctione artificialius aut mirabilius potest excogitari? Innuitur quoque in modo sermonis consiliativo<sup>25</sup> specialis cura Dei de homine secundum ea que hic commemorantur in hominis condicione et incommemorata relinquuntur in condendis creaturis ceteris, sicut insinuat uterque Gregorius in his que supra diximus.

Hanc specialem Dei de homine curam a generali cura de creaturis ceteris volens Apostolus distinguere, in *Epistola prima ad Corinthios* ait: *Scriptum<sup>26</sup> est in lege Moysi: non alligabis os bovi trituranti.*<sup>27</sup> Numquid de bobus cura est Deo? An propter nos utique hoc dicit? Nam propter nos scripta sunt. De generali tamen cura scriptum est in *Libro<sup>28</sup> Sapiencie* quod Deo est cura de omnibus.

In modo quoque consiliativo huius sermonis insinuat altum et incomprehensibile secretum divine providencie de modo reparacionis humani generis

<sup>14</sup> om. PQ.

<sup>15</sup> om. B.

<sup>16</sup> continent, all mss.

<sup>17</sup> et intencionem, om. all mss but in the translation as found in PL.

<sup>18</sup> quod, all mss.

<sup>19</sup> ignorantis B.

<sup>20</sup> De Fide Orthodoxa, II, 22; PG 94, 945C-D. Grosseteste here follows the translation of Burgundio of Pisa as found in Ms Bruges 515, f. 42r. col 2.

<sup>21</sup> spiritualis B.

<sup>22</sup> de B.

<sup>23</sup> om. B.

<sup>24</sup> Genesis ii, 7. The Septuagint has no word for *sumens*. Grosseteste may be using the treatise *In Verba, Faciamus*, etc. PG 44, 290D where we find it so expressed; it is not so worded in any of the Greek versions of the Hexapla of Origen.

<sup>25</sup> translativo P.

<sup>26</sup> I Cor. ix, 9-10.

<sup>27</sup> triturantis P.

<sup>28</sup> cf. Wisdom xiii, 13: *Non enim alius Deus quam tu, cui cura est de omnibus.*

per dispensacionem incarnationis Filii Dei, et insinuatur ipsum secretum et incomprehensibile mysterium Verbi incarnandi. Per facturum namque primi Ade qui factus est in *animam viventem* significatur secundus Adam, qui factus est in *spiritum vivificantem*<sup>29</sup> et semine *David secundum carnem qui predestinatus est Filius Dei in virtute*;<sup>30</sup> significatur quoque et nostra per Verbum Incarnatum reparacio et renovacio in spiritu mentis nostre<sup>31</sup> ad imaginem et similitudinem eius qui nos creavit.<sup>32</sup>

### Capitulum Duodecimum<sup>1</sup>

Et cum tanta et tam preciosa res sit, homo racionabiliter creatus est creaturarum ultimus. Ipse enim est creaturarum dominus, nec decuerat, ut dicit<sup>2</sup> Gregorius Nisenus, prius existere principem quam illa quorum gereret principatum. Sed ubi cuncta ei subicienda parata sunt, iam conveniens<sup>3</sup> erat apparere rectorem; et sicut<sup>4</sup> . . . invitator non prius in domum pransorem quam preparet<sup>5</sup> epulas introducit sed omnis apparatus instruens, domumque congruenter exornans discutitum quoque et mensam et cetera, tunc ad preparatas iam delicias convocatum invitat. Iuxta hunc modum dives et copiosus nostre conditor educatorque substantie, bonis omnibus replens habitaculum huius mundi et magnas has epulas variasque disponens, sic<sup>6</sup> introduxit hominem dans ei opus eximium custodire mandatum, quo non appetitu rerum non extancium sed presencium possessione gauderet.

Idecirco etiam duplicis compositionis ei causas intexit, terreno spirituale commiscens, ut per utriusque *<cognacionem>*<sup>7</sup> utraque proprietate potiretur, Deo quidem spiritualiter fruens, terrena vero bona corporali usu percipiens.

Est etiam homo ultimo<sup>8</sup> conditus, exigente hoc ordine naturali. Unde et item Gregorius Nisenus ait: post<sup>9</sup> exanimum materiam primum quidem velud crepidinem quamdam, hanc germinabilem substantiam legislator expressit, et deinceps eorum generationem que sensibus tantummodo continentur aperuit. Et quia secundum istam consequenciam ea, que vitam in carne sortita sunt, sensibilia quidem sine intelligibilibus per se subsistere videntur, racionabilis autem substantia non potest in alio nisi in sensibili corpore contineri, idcirco post germina atque iumenta factus est homo, via quadam consequenter ad perfeccionem natura *<proficiente>*.<sup>10</sup> Omnium autem specierum, id est, crescentis germinis et sensualis animalis animantis, hoc rationale animal homo participat. Nutritur enim iuxta germinabilem substantiam anime qualitas, incrementi vero vim sensuali subministracione sortitur que, iuxta quemdam modum suum inter intellectualem et materialem substantiam in medio collocata, quantum illius comparacione crassior, tantum huius prelacione videtur esse sincerior. Deinde<sup>11</sup> sensibilis rei quod est subtilissimum intellectuali sociatum fit quedam permixcio nature conveniens, ita ut in tribus istis videatur homo subsistere.

Quod et Apostolum tale aliquid cognoscimus intimare, ubi pro *<Thessalonicensibus>*<sup>12</sup> orans ait: *Ipse autem Deus pacis sanctificet vos per omnia ut*

<sup>29</sup> cf. I Cor. xv, 45: *Factum est primus homo Adam in animam viventem, novissimus Adam in spiritum vivificantem.*

<sup>30</sup> cf. Romans i, 3-4.

<sup>31</sup> cf. Ephesians iv, 23.

<sup>32</sup> cf. Colossians iii, 10.

<sup>1</sup> P. adds in the text, Q. in the margin: *Sermo ostendens quare creaturarum ultimus factus est homo et sunt rationes quinque.*

<sup>2</sup> *De Hominis Opificio* 2; PL 67, 350D-351A (Dionysius' translation); Greek text, PG 44, 132D.

<sup>3</sup> consequens PQ.

<sup>4</sup> Sicut . . . l. 23 usu percipiens. *op. cit.* 351BC; PG 44, 33B.

<sup>5</sup> prepararet PQ.

<sup>6</sup> om. PQ.

<sup>7</sup> cognicionem all mss. This sentence is a free rendering of the Greek.

<sup>8</sup> ultime P.

<sup>9</sup> Post exanimum . . . to end. *op. cit.* PL 67, 357A-358B; PG 44, 145B-148C.

<sup>10</sup> perficiente, all mss.

<sup>11</sup> demum B.

<sup>12</sup> I Thess. v, 23. St. Gregory refers it to the Ephesians by mistake.



*integer spiritus vester et anima et corpus sine querela in adventum*<sup>13</sup> *Domini nostri Jesu Christi servetur*; pro nutribili parte corpus, pro sensibili animam,<sup>14</sup> pro intellectuali spiritum ponens.

Similiter et scribam in Evangelio<sup>15</sup> Dominus instruens omni mandato dileccionem Domini<sup>16</sup> preponit que ex toto corde et ex tota anima et intellectu toto perficitur. Nam et in presenti eandem mihi sermo differentiam videtur interpretationis offerre; corpulenciozem quidem efficaciam cor appellans, animam vero mediam sedem tenere significans, intellectum autem sublimiorem substantiam rationabilis insinuans perspicabilisque virtutis. Unde et tres distancias voluntatum novit Apostolus:<sup>17</sup> carnalem que circa ventrem et inferiores partes voluptatibus tantum<sup>18</sup> viciosis obsequitur; animalem vero que media inter virtutem maliciamque versatur, hanc quidem supergrediens, illius autem nequaquam particeps sinceritatis existens que effectum spiritalem Deo placite conversacionis assequitur . . . spiritalem quoque que omnia diiudicat, *ipse*<sup>19</sup> *autem a nemine iudicatur*.

Denique sicut carnali animalis supereminet, iuxta eandem mensuram animalem quoque spiritualis excellit. Quod igitur novissimum post omnia factum hominem Scriptura commemorat nihil aliud quam de statu anime philosophari nos debere latenter informat, necessaria quadem rerum consequencia, id quod perfectum est in postremis insinuans. Natura eciam rationalis cetera quoque continet, et incrementa germinis et sensus animantis. Natura namque sensibilis germinalem speciem sine dubitatione complectitur; hec autem propter quod materialis<sup>20</sup> est in se sola conspicitur; consequencia<sup>21</sup> igitur nature veluti per gradus quosdam, vite dico proprietatum, ab inferioribus ad perfectiora conscendit.

<sup>13</sup> adventu BP.

<sup>14</sup> anima PQ.

<sup>15</sup> cf. *Matthew* xxii, 36-8; *Mark* xii, 29-30.

<sup>16</sup> Dei B.

<sup>17</sup> cf. *I Cor.* ii, 10 ff.

<sup>18</sup> tamen B.

<sup>19</sup> *I Cor.* ii, 15.

<sup>20</sup> PL loc. cit. reads *immaterialis* by mistake.

<sup>21</sup> PL loc. cit. reads *consequenter igitur natura* following the Greek.

# An Inquiry into the Origins of Courtly Love

A. J. DENOMY C.S.B.

## I. THE ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF COURTLY LOVE

COURTLY LOVE first appeared in the South of France during the first two decades of the twelfth century. The troubadours of Provence introduced it to the world of letters and from Guillaume IX, duke of Poitiers (1071-1127), the first known troubadour, until Guiraut Riquier (ca.1230-ca.1292), the last court poet, Courtly Love was the theme of their lyric poetry. Their conception of love was novel to a world that had looked upon licit love as a domestic comfort, upon passionate, illicit love as a madness or as a masculine form of enjoyment and pleasure. Their cult of the beloved was novel to a world that regarded woman as man's help-mate, the bearer of his children or the object of his lust and sensuality. For the troubadours love was a noble and ennobling passion even though illicit and adulterous. The beloved held a place of superiority over the lover; his desire, anxious and fearful, spurred him on to rise in worth to her and to attain the union he sought.<sup>1</sup>

The literary innovation of the troubadours had an enormous influence on the subsequent literature of France, Italy, England, Spain and Germany and on those countries touched by their civilization and culture. It is not too difficult to trace the course and development of the ideas and ideals of the troubadours in Provence and their spread into the countries of Western Europe. Given the first troubadours, the new view of love and the position of women in literature from the twelfth century on becomes understandable and explicable.<sup>2</sup> What is much more difficult to understand and explain is the origin of such ideas and ideals, or, perhaps better, their formation. Did the troubadours, specifically Guillaume IX, find it at hand fully developed, or was it something that owed its formation and development to him and to his immediate successors? Scholars and critics have attacked the problem of origins from almost the time of Dante down to the present without having definitely settled it. That much remains to be done is evidenced from the divergency of theories that have arisen from their efforts and from the rather fiercely contested worth of them. The result of years of research has been the erection of five theories according to a division worked out by Lapa,—the Arabic, ballad, Classical Latin, Mediaeval Latin and liturgical theory.<sup>3</sup> There is no need to describe or summarize the tenets of the various theories here; that the reader may find to better advantage elsewhere.<sup>4</sup> It is sufficient to note that as yet none of the theories has advanced beyond the stage of theory although in more recent times that of Arabic origin possibly holds preeminence in the present world of scholarship.

In seeking the origin or formation of an idea or of a system of ideas, the essential is to get at the fundamental feature or features of that idea or of that system of ideas. Otherwise one is apt to lose sight of the essential fact and to spend oneself on concomitant and attendant details. That is why, at the outset, we distinguish sharply between the troubadour lyric and the idea of

<sup>1</sup> Cf. C. S. Lewis, *The Allegory of Love* (Oxford, 1936), pp. 2-23.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Alfred Jeanroy, *La Poésie des troubadours I* (Paris, 1934), pp. 150-279.

<sup>3</sup> Manuel Rodrigues Lapa, *Lições de Literatura Portuguesa, Época Medieval* (Lisbon, 1934), pp. 24-66; *Das Origens da*

*poesia lírica em Portugal na Idade-Média* (Lisbon, 1929), pp. 13-205.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Käthe Axhausen, *Ueber den Ursprung der provenzalischen Lyrik* (Diss. Marburg, 1937). Cf. also, Guido Errante, *Sulla lirica romanza delle origini* (New York, 1943), pp. 65-307.

Courtly Love. The Provençal lyrics are the vehicle through which the troubadours expressed their novel ideas of love; they are the externals of Courtly Love, the garment or shell that clothes and encloses its essential doctrine. Research has found parallels, analogues, even sources for the form and music of the troubadour lyric in the liturgical chant of the Church,<sup>5</sup> Mediaeval Latin verse,<sup>6</sup> Latin hymnology and liturgical Latin poetry,<sup>7</sup> in the Andalusian popular *muwassaha* and *zagal*.<sup>8</sup> Research, too, has uncovered analogues, parallels, likenesses of situations, conceits and formulae in the literatures of other languages and countries,—the typical nature introduction, love as a sickness, the external manifestation of unrequited love, the conception of love as a war, the feudalistic portrayal of the relationship between the lover and beloved, the use of messengers and messages between the lovers, the need of secrecy and the ever present danger of scandalmongers and tale-bearers. These features and many other characteristics have been found to have analogues in Arabic,<sup>9</sup> and in Latin literature, Classical<sup>10</sup> and Mediaeval.<sup>11</sup> However much this research shows the relationship of the Provençal lyric with the lyric of other lands and languages, in confining itself to externals and to extraneous characteristics, it leaves untouched the question of the origin or the formation of the central, fundamental and essential kernel of Courtly Love.

What is it then that makes Courtly Love to be Courtly Love? What is it in the troubadour conception of love that distinguishes it from that of the ages that had preceded them? The first essential characteristic is twofold and inseparable,—the ennobling force of love and the elevation of the woman loved to a place of superiority above the lover. These two elements, the cult of the beloved and the ennobling power of love, are inextricably linked one with the other. The lover grows more virtuous through his love of the beloved and it is love which raises him in the scale of worth and virtue. Schrötter has very aptly phrased one of the salient features of Courtly Love in his remark: "Ovid sagt Liebe erniedrigt; die Troubadouren sagen Liebe veredelt".<sup>12</sup> The second characteristic concerns the nature of love. For the troubadours, love is not a complacency, a quiescence in attainment of the beloved, but rather a ceaseless desire, a yearning that is unappeased. That feature is perhaps best exemplified in the "amor de lonh" of Jaufré Rudel.<sup>13</sup>

It is the purpose of this study to analyze the general framework of Courtly

<sup>5</sup> Cf. J. B. Beck, *La Musique des troubadours* (Paris, 1910); Friederich Gennrich, 'Das Formproblem des Minnesangs', *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte* IX (1931), pp. 285-349 and *Grundriss einer Formenlehre des mittelalterlichen Liedes* (Halle, 1932).

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Hans Spanke, *Beziehungen zwischen romanischer und mittellateinischer Lyrik* (Berlin, 1936), and *Untersuchungen über die Ursprünge des romanischen Minnesangs* (Göttingen, 1940).

<sup>7</sup> Cf. P. A. Becker, 'Vom christlichen Hymnus zur Minnesangs', *Historisches Jahrbuch der Görres Gesellschaft* LII (1932), pp. 1-39, 145-177; 'Die Anfänge der romanischen Verskunst', *Zeitschrift für französische Sprache und Literatur* LVI (1932), pp. 257-323.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Ramon Menendez Pidal, 'Poesia araba y Poesia europea', *Bulletin Hispanique* XL (1938), pp. 337-391; A. R. Nykl, *The Dove's Neck-Ring about Love and Lovers*, composed by Abu Muhammad Ali Ibn Hazm Al-Andalusi (Paris, 1931), pp. xc-ci.

<sup>9</sup> Lawrence Ecker, *Arabischer, provenzalischer und deutscher Minnesang* (Diss.

Bonn, 1934).

<sup>10</sup> Willibald Schrötter, *Ovid und die Troubadours* (Halle, 1908).

<sup>11</sup> Heinrich Brinkmann, *Entstehungsgeschichte des Minnesangs* (Halle, 1926).

<sup>12</sup> Willibald Schrötter, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

<sup>13</sup> John Wilcox, 'Defining Courtly Love', *Michigan Academy of Science, Arts and Letters* XII (1930), pp. 313-325. His definition concerns Courtly Love as it existed in the North of France under the patronage of Marie de Champagne and as exemplified in the Romances. His definition contains three elements: the worship of women, doctrinaire free love, sublimation of sexual impulse through chivalric activity. It does not apply to Courtly Love as conceived by the first troubadours.

According to Myrrha Lot-Borodine, 'Sur les origines et les fins du service d'Amour', *Mélanges de linguistique et de littérature offerts à M. Alfred Jeanroy* (Paris, 1923), pp. 223-242, the following are the essential characteristics of the Provençal conception of Courtly Love: 1° La reconnaissance d'un principe moral, d'une valeur inhérente au sentiment, ou l'amour vertu; 2° Le don de soi désintéressé, la

Love, to arrive at an idea of the thought-pattern characteristic of it. Our object in so doing is to search in the life and times of the troubadours, in the thought, culture and civilization they knew and lived, for the origin of that framework of ideas. We feel that if we do find the thought-pattern characteristic of Courtly Love in that civilization, we have, then, come close to the key that explains why the troubadours wrote of human love in the fashion they did. In our analysis we shall restrict ourselves to the first troubadours, to Guillaume IX, Cercamon, Marcabru, Jaufré Rudel, among whom the ideas of Courtly Love emerged and gradually evolved; to Bernard de Ventadour with whom the formation of Courtly Love is complete and its ideas solidified; to Andreas Cappellanus who codified the laws of Courtly Love and embodied the ideas and teaching of that system in his *De Arte honeste amandi*.

Love has its genesis in the lady's physical beauty and exterior good qualities and much more so in the apprehension of the excellence of her moral worth in her deportment and speech:<sup>14</sup>

Aquesta don m'auzetz chantar  
Es plus bella q'ieu no sai dir;  
Fresc' a color e bel esgar  
Et es blancha ses brunezir;  
Oc, e non es vernisada,  
Ni om de leis non pot mal dir,  
Tant es' fin' et esmerada.  
E sobre tota's deu prezar  
De dig ver, segon mon albir,  
D'ensegnamen e de parlar.<sup>15</sup>

Lo cors a fresc, sotil e gai,  
et anc no'n vi tan avinen.  
pretz e beutat, valor e sen  
a plus qu'eu no vos sai dire.<sup>16</sup>

gratuité de service, ou l'amour qui est sa propre fin; 3° La supériorité de l'objet aimé sur l'amant, ou la suprématie de la dame. We entirely agree with the first essential,—the ennobling force of love; we cannot agree with the second,—that Courtly Love is disinterested. The *service d'amour* is a selfish one on the part of the troubadours, devoted towards union with the beloved. If the lover serves his lady, it is not for love alone but to possess her. That love is idealised to desire, as Mme. Lot-Borodine claims, does not destroy its selfishness even if it frustrates it. Andreas Cappellanus will recognize this fact when he speaks of loving *concupiscibiliter*. Mme. Lot-Borodine recognizes it, too, when in comparing the mysticism of Saint Bernard to Courtly Love, she sees that in spite of apparent similarities, they are diametrically opposed: one is *caritas*, the other *cupiditas* (p. 234). She traces the elevation of the beloved, her cult, to the idealisation of the loved object; this is a consequence of the idealisation of love to desire which she describes as disinterested. On the contrary, love is specified by its object. Courtly Love is spiritual or idealised because of the cult of the lady. It is because of the elevation of the lady that love is ennobling and not vice-versa.

<sup>14</sup> Love is an innate passion but not a blind physical force. It must be awakened by the sight and contemplation of the beauty of the beloved: *Amor est passio quaedam innata procedens ex visione et immoderata contemplatione formae alterius sexus. Andrae Capellani de Amore libros tres* I, 1, ed. Amadeu Pages (Castello de la Plana, 1930), p. 2.

<sup>15</sup> The lady of whom you hear me sing is fairer than I can say; fresh complexioned, beautiful to look upon, blond without blemish. Yes, and she is not rouged nor can anyone say evil of her, so pure and noble is she. She is praiseworthy above all others. I think, for her truthfulness, her education and fluency of speech. *Les Poésies de Cercamon*, ed. Alfred Jeanroy (Paris, 1922, *Classiques fr. du m. a.*, 27), II, 15-24, pp. 5-6. The translation above and those that follow are meant to be faithful renditions into English of the German and French editions cited. Where notable differences are noted, they are to be ascribed to the present author.

<sup>16</sup> She is lovely, gay and slender; never was there seen a more charming person. Worth and beauty, excellence and sagacity are hers more than I can tell you. *Bernart von Ventadour. seine Lieder*. hrsg. von Carl Appel (Halle, 1915), 27, 37-40, p. 159.

These are the touch-stones of love. Later Andreas will judge that of all good qualities, excellence of character, spiritual beauty are the more important.<sup>17</sup>

In relation to his beloved, the lover occupies an inferior position. She is far above him in worth and excellence. Frequently the troubadours make use of the verbiage of feudalism to portray that relationship:

Qu'ans mi rent a lieys e'm livre,  
Qu'en sa carta'm pot escriure.<sup>18</sup>

The lover is completely submissive; he is his lady's vassal, her servant:

Domna, vostre sui et serai,  
del vostre servizi garnitz.  
vostr' om sui juratz e plevitz  
e vostre m'era des abans.<sup>19</sup>

As her vassal, the beloved may do as she pleases with him:

tan sui vas la bela doptans,  
per qu'e'm ren a leis merceyans:  
si'lh platz, que'm don o que'm venda!<sup>20</sup>

The beloved wields enormous power for weal or woe over her subject:

Per lieys serai o fals o fis,  
o drechuriers o ples d'enjan,  
o totz vilas o totz cortes,  
o trebalhos o de lezer.<sup>21</sup>

Therefore, when love is requited, or at least the hope of it is granted, that love is ennobling; the lover is made virtuous, for love is the source of virtue:

Aquest amor ne pot hom tan servir  
Que mil aitans no'n doble'l gazardos:  
Que Pretz e Joys e tot quant es, e mays,  
N'auran aisselh qu'en seran poderos.<sup>22</sup>

Ai! fin' Amors, fons de bontat,  
C'a[s] tot lo mon illuminat.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>17</sup> Sola ergo probitas amoris est digna corona. *Op. cit.*, I, 6, p. 9.

<sup>18</sup> Rather do I yield and deliver myself to her, for she may ascribe me in her charter. *Les Chansons de Guillaume IX*, ed. Alfred Jeanroy (Paris, 1913, *Classiques fr. du m. a.*, 9), VIII, 7-8, p. 20.

<sup>19</sup> Lady, I am and shall be yours, ready for your service. I am your sworn and pledged vassal, and have been yours for time past. Bernard de Ventadour, *ed. cit.*, 33, 29-32, p. 196. Cf. also, 12, 23, p. 69 and 35, 13, p. 200.

<sup>20</sup> So fearful am I in regard to her, the fair one, that I deliver myself to her, imploring her mercy. So long as it may please her, let her give me away or sell me. Bernard de Ventadour, *ed. cit.*, 26, 26-28, p.

152.

<sup>21</sup> Through her I shall be perfidious or faithful, straightforward or full of deceit, wholly vile or wholly courteous, industrious or lazy. Cercamon, *ed. cit.*, I, 51-54, p. 3. Cf. also, Guillaume IX, *ed. cit.*, IX, 25-30, p. 23.

<sup>22</sup> No one can be a servant to that love that his be not a thousand-fold the reward. For those who have such a love in their power shall have Worth and Joy and all that is and more. Cercamon, *ed. cit.*, V, 7-10, p. 15.

<sup>23</sup> Oh! pure love, fount of goodness, through which the world is enlightened. *Poésies complètes du troubadour Marcabru*, ed. J. M. L. Dejeanne (Toulouse, 1909), XL, 34-36, p. 198.

Bernartz, greu er pros ni cortes  
qui ab amor no's sap tener.<sup>24</sup>

e no m'es vis c'om re poscha valer,  
s'eras no vol amor e joi aver.<sup>25</sup>

Per re non es om tan prezans  
com per amor e per domnei,  
que d'aqui mou deportz e chans  
e tot can a proez' abau.<sup>26</sup>

Andreas sums up the doctrine in saying that love is the fount and origin of all good deeds and that in this world there is no good or courteous deed that has not its origin in love.<sup>27</sup>

The troubadours speak not only of the power of love for good, but emphasize the power of love to make more virtuous, the power that love has to further the lover along the path of virtue into which love has set him:

Ja non creirai, qui que m'o jur,  
Que vins non iesca de razim,  
E hom per Amor no meillur.<sup>28</sup>

Ben a mauvais cor e mendic  
qui ama e no's melhura;  
qu'eu sui d'aitan melhuratz  
c'ome de me no vei plus ric,  
car sai c'am e sui amatz  
per la gensor qued anc Deus fei  
ni que sia el mon, so crei,  
tan can te terra ni dura.<sup>29</sup>

Ben es mortz qui d'amor no sen  
al cor cal que dousa sabor;  
a que val viure ses valor  
mas per enoi far a la gen?<sup>30</sup>

The troubadour Guilhem Montanhagol will sum up the doctrine thus:

<sup>24</sup> Bernard, hardly will he be virtuous and courteous who is not attached to love. Bernard de Ventadour, *ed. cit.*, 2, 15-16, p. 11.

<sup>25</sup> And I cannot see how a man may be of worth who will not have love and joy. *Ibid.*, 42, 5-7, p. 241.

<sup>26</sup> By nothing is man made more excellent than by love and the service of women, for thence arises delight and song and all that pertains to excellence. *Ibid.*, 21, 25-28, pp. 119-120. Cf. also 8-14, p. 345.

<sup>27</sup> Profitetur etenim, quod magis sunt digna praeterita facta muneribus, verumtamen universis constat hominibus, quod nullum in mundo bonum vel curialitas exercetur, nisi ex amoris fonte derivetur. Omnis ergo boni erit amor origo et causa. Cessante igitur causa eius de necessitate cessat effectus. Nullus ergo poterit homo facere bona, nisi amoris suasionem cogatur. *De Amore*, *ed. cit.*, p. 15. Cf. also pp. 34, 38, etc.

<sup>28</sup> I shall ever believe, whoever may swear to the contrary, both that wine comes from grapes and that a man grows better through love. Marcabru, *ed. cit.*, XIII, 25-27, p. 54.

<sup>29</sup> That man has indeed a vile and miserable heart who loves and does not grow better. For I have grown so much better that I see no man more mighty than I, because I know that I love and am loved by the fairest creature that ever God created in this world, I think, as long as the world shall last or endure. Bernard de Ventadour, *ed. cit.*, 24, 17-24, p. 140. Cf. also, 22, 5-8, p. 127.

<sup>30</sup> He is indeed dead who does not feel some sweet savor of love in his heart. What avails it to live without worth except to be irksome to people. Bernard de Ventadour, *ed. cit.*, 31, 9-12, p. 188.

Amors non es peciatz;  
Anz es vertutz que lo malvatz  
Fai bos, e'lh bo'n son melhor.  
Et met om en via  
De bon far tota dia.<sup>31</sup>

The lover is modest in what he seeks from his beloved. He asks that he be allowed to serve her:

Bona domna, re no'us deman  
mas que'm prenatz per servidor,  
qu'e'us servirai com bo senhor,  
cossi que del gazardo m'an.<sup>32</sup>

He is satisfied with his lady's acquiescence to his plea, that she give him a sign that his service and his suit are pleasing to her and that he is not without hope for the future:

De midons me lau cent aitans  
qu'eu no sai dir; et ai be drei,  
que, can pot, me fai bels semblans  
e sona me gent e suau;  
e mandet me (per qu'eu m'esjau)  
que per paor remania  
car ela plus no'm fazia,  
per qu'eu n'estau en bon esper.<sup>33</sup>

Negus jois al meu no s'eschai,  
can ma domna'm garda ni'm ve,  
que'l seus bels douz semblans me vai  
al cor, que m'adous' e'm reve.<sup>34</sup>

What the lover desires above all is union with his beloved. That is the goal of his yearning. It has been said that Courtly Love is never Platonic in its implications. That, indeed, is the general impression one does gather from the writings of the troubadours and Andreas Capellanus. The union longed for, sought and envisaged is a physical one; the ultimate goal to which love impels the lover is the physical enjoyment of the beloved and in this sense Courtly Love is not disinterested. In truth, the language of the troubadours, even the most spiritual,<sup>35</sup> at times does little to dissipate that general impression. The implication in Bernard de Ventadour, for example, is fairly obvious:

<sup>31</sup> Love is not a sin. Rather it is a power that makes the evil good and by it the good become better. It puts man in the way of doing good daily. *Le Troubadour Guilhem Montanhagol*, ed. Jules Coulet (Toulouse, 1898), 13-17, p. 69.

<sup>32</sup> Good lady, I ask nothing of you except that you take me as your servant for I shall serve you as I would a good lord, however I may fare as regards reward. Bernard de Ventadour, *ed. cit.*, 31, 49-52, p. 191.

<sup>33</sup> I value my lady a hundred times more than I can say; and I am indeed right for, when she can, she looks kindly upon me

and sweetly; and she has announced to me, whence I rejoice, that is the result of fear that she does not do more for me, wherefore I am of good hope. Bernard de Ventadour, *ed. cit.*, 21, 33-40, p. 120. Cf. also, 35, 13-16, p. 200.

<sup>34</sup> No joy equals mine when my lady sees me and looks upon me, for to my heart goes her sweet beauteous glance which fills me with sweetness and heals me. Bernard de Ventadour, *ed. cit.*, 17, 41-44, p. 100.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. for example Jaufré Rudel, *Les Chansons de Jaufré Rudel*, ed. Alfred Jeanroy, (Paris, 1924, *Classiques fr. du m.a.* 15) II, 11-14, p. 4 and IV, 36-39, p. 11.

Las! e viure que'm val,  
 s'eu no vei a jornal  
 mo fi joi natural  
 en leih, sotz fenestral  
 cors blanc tot atretal  
 com la neus a nadal,  
 si c'amdui cominal  
 mezuressen egal?<sup>36</sup>

One might cite passages from the troubadours, from almost any of them, in which like sentiments, like desires are expressed. And yet, though they clothe their aspirations in language that is sensuous, the love they have for their beloved is not always lustful, not entirely sensual. The troubadours distinguish between a love that is pure, 'fin' amor', and a love that is impure and founded on sensuality and mercenary motives. It was against the latter that Marcabru directs his strictures. It is of such a love that he says:

Amors es mout de mal avi;  
 Mil homes a mortz ses glavi,  
 Dieus non fetz tant fort gramavi.<sup>37</sup>

Marcabru is a misogynist in as far as love that is deceitful, ephemeral, false and lustful is concerned. He is not at all a misogynist in so far as love that is 'pura' is concerned. It is that love, the love that used to flourish and is no more, that he advocates and defends:

L'amors don ieu sui mostraire  
 Nasquet en un gentil aire;  
 E'l luoc[s] on ill es creguda  
 Es claus de rama branchuda  
 E de chaut et de gelada,  
 Qu'estrains no l'en puosca traire.<sup>38</sup>

That is the burden of his poetry and not to recognize the basic distinction is to misunderstand his poetry and his doctrine. That distinction and doctrine are expressed thus:

Fals amic, amador tafur,  
 Baisson Amor e levo'l crim,  
 E no'us cuidetz c'Amors pejur,  
 C'atrestant val cum fetz al prim . . .  
 Ja non creirai, qui que m'o jur,  
 Que vins non iesca de razim,  
 Et hom per Amor no meillur.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>36</sup> Alas, what is the use of living for me if I do not ever see my pure sincere joy in her bed under the casement window, her body as white as the snow at Christmas time, so that both of us in like measure may vie with each other. Bernard de Ventadour, *ed. cit.*, 28, 33-40, p. 167.

<sup>37</sup> Love is of a very evil ancestry. It has killed thousands of men without a sword. God never created such a mighty sorcerer. Marcabru, *ed. cit.*, XVIII, 43-45, p. 81.

<sup>38</sup> The love that I teach and profess had its origin in a noble atmosphere; and the

place where it had its increase is protected with leafy branches from heat and cold so that no outsider may draw it forth. Marcabru, *ed. cit.*, V, 49-54, p. 21.

<sup>39</sup> False sweethearts, perfidious lovers, depreciate Love and enhance crime. But do not think that Love worsens, for it has the very same value as it had in the beginning . . . I shall never believe, no matter who may swear it, that wine does not issue from grapes and that a man does not become better through Love. Marcabru, *ed. cit.*, XIII, 9-23, pp. 53-4.



He reproves those troubadours who dare equate true and false love, for one is productive of Joy, Patience, Moderation; the other is sordid, false, deceitful and debasing:

E meton en un' eganssa  
 Falss' Amor encontra fina,  
 Qu'ieu dic que d'Amar s'aizina  
 Ab si mezesme guerreia; . . .  
 Por so'n port ir' e pesanssa  
 C'aug dir a la gen frairina  
 C'Amors engan' e trahina  
 Cellui cui Amars reneia;  
 Menton . . .  
 C'Amors a signifianssa  
 De maracd' o de sardina,  
 E[s] de Joi cim' e racina . . .<sup>40</sup>

The love that the lover bears his beloved is a pure love of union of will and heart that does not depend on the physical satisfaction of his yearnings:

En agradar et en voler  
 es l'amors de dos fis amans.  
 nula res no i pot pro tener,  
 si'lh voluntatz non es egaus.  
 e cel es be fols naturaus  
 que de so que vol, la repren  
 e'lh lauza so que no'lh es gen.<sup>41</sup>

What that pure love is and how much is allowed to those who love purely is described by Andreas Capellanus:

Ego quoddam aliud vobis cupio reserare, quod mente gero, quod multorum scio corda latere, vos tamen ignorare non credo, quod amor quidam est purus, et quidam dicitur esse mixtus. Et purus quidem amor est, qui omnimoda dilectionis affectione duorum amantium corda coniungit. Hic autem in mentis contemplatione cordisque consistit affectu; procedit

<sup>40</sup>And they place on equal footing false love and pure love. But I say that he who draws near to (false) love, wages war upon himself . . . Therefore I am sad and grieved when I hear my fellow troubadours say that (true) love deceives and betrays him whom (false) love makes a renegade; they lie . . . for (true) love has the meaning of emerald and sardonix; it is the height and root of joy. Marcabru, *ed. cit.*, XXXVII, 13-33, pp. 179-180.

The attitude of the troubadours towards love that is impure, sensual and mercenary is illustrated in the somewhat cynical three-fold division made in a poem attributed in some manuscripts to Daude de Pradas and in others to Bernard de Ventadour:

De totz los biens qu'en amor so,  
 ai ieu ara cal que plazer,  
 car ieu ai mes tot mon esper,  
 mon pensar e m'entencio  
 en amar dompna coind' e bella,  
 e soi amatz d'una piucella,  
 e qan trob soudadeira gaia,

deporte mi, cossi qu'm plaia;  
 e per tant non sui meins cortes  
 ad amor, si la part en tres.

Amor vol ben que per razo  
 eu am midonz per mais valer,  
 et am piucella per tener,  
 e sobre tot qe'm sia bo  
 s'ab toseta de prima sella,  
 qand ill es fresca e novella,  
 don no'm cal temer que ja'm traia,  
 m'aizine tant que ab lieis jaia  
 un ser o dos de mes en mes  
 per pagar ad amor lo ces.

Bernard de Ventadour, *ed. cit.* pp. 316-17, and *Poesies de Daude de Pradas*, ed. A. H. Schutz (Toulouse, 1933), pp. 70-71.

<sup>41</sup>The love of two pure lovers consists in desire and willing. In it nothing can be worthwhile unless their wills be alike. And he is indeed truly foolish who rebukes her for (not giving him) what he wants and requests of her what is not fitting. Bernard de Ventadour, *ed. cit.*, 15, 29-35, p. 86. Cf. also 40, 57-64, p. 227.

autem usque ad oris osculum lacertique amplexum et verecundum amantis nudaë contactum, extremo praetermisso solatio; nam illud pure amare volentibus exercere non licet. Hic quidem amor est, quem quilibet, cuius est in amore propositum, omni debet amplecti virtute. Amor enim iste sua semper sine fine cognoscit augmenta, et eius exercuisse actus neminem poenituisse cognovimus; et quanto quis ex eo magis assumit, tanto plus affectat habere. Amor iste tantae dignoscitur esse virtutis, quod ex eo totius probitatis origo descendit, et nulla inde procedit iniuria, et modicam in ipso Deus recognoscit offensam. Et tali nempe amore neque virgo nunquam corrupta nec vidua vel coniugata potest aliquod sentire gravamen vel propriae famae dispendium sustinere. Hunc ergo colo amorem, hunc sequor et semper adoro et instanter vobis postulare non cesso.<sup>42</sup>

Mixed love, on the other hand, goes beyond physical contact and though it lasts but a short time and though by it God may be offended and the neighbor injured, still it is not to be condemned. Though pure love is preferable, mixed love is to be approved because it too is a source of virtue:

Mixtus vero amor dicitur ille, qui omni carnis delectationi suum praestat effectum et in extremo Veneris opere terminatur. Qui qualis sit amor, ex superiori potestis notitia manifeste percipere. Hic enim cito deficit et parvo tempore durat, et eius saepe actus exercuisse poenituit; per eum proximus laeditur et Rex coelestis offenditur, et ex eo pericula graviora sequuntur. Hoc autem dico non quasi mixtum amorem damnare intendens sed ostendere cupiens, quis ex illis alteri sit praeferendus. Nam et mixtus amor verus est amor atque laudandus et cunctorum esse dicitur origo bonorum, quamvis ex eo immineant pericula graviora. Ergo tam purus quam mixtus amor mihi probatus existit, sed puri amoris actuum magis placet exactio.<sup>43</sup>

Ultimately both pure and mixed love are of the same nature, because they proceed from the same feeling of the heart and the substance of both is the same, that is, desire,—*appetitus*. Both are love because they are desire:

Licet enim purus et mixtus diversi videantur amores, recte tamen intuitibus purus amor quo ad sui substantiam idem cum mixto iudicatur amore et ex eadem cum ipso cordis affectione procedit. Eadem est in illis amoris substantia, sed varius est modus atque respectus amandi, ut in exemplo tibi poterit liquere praesenti. Videmus enim aliquando aliquem purum bibendi vinum habere appetitum, et eidem postmodum aquam solam vel mixtum cum ea bibere vinum similiter suadet appetitus; quamvis huic sit varius appetendi respectus, ipsius tamen appetitus substantia eadem et invariata consistit. Sed et, ubi aliqui fuerint diu puro amore coniuncti, postea vero mixto si placet amore gaudere, eadem in istis perdurat substantia amoris, licet modus et forma atque respectus sit varius amandi.<sup>44</sup>

It is this desire that informs the poems of the troubadours. Except in rare instances, the beloved seldom goes beyond the indication that the lover and

<sup>42</sup> *Andreae Capellani de Amore libri tres*, I, vi, H. ed. Amadau Pagès (Castello de la Plana, 1930), pp. 105-106; translated, John

York, 1941), p. 122.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 106; Parry, p. 123.

Jay Parry, *The Art of Courty Love* (New

<sup>44</sup> *De Amore*, II, vi, ed. cit., p. 153; Parry, p. 164.

his service are acceptable and that he may hope for the fulfillment of his love. It is in this sense that pure love is bilateral and it is that hope that keeps alive the love in the lover's breast:

c'aitals amors es perduda  
qu'es d'una part mantenguda.<sup>45</sup>

The lover bewails his lady's severity, her coldness, the sufferings of unrequited love, the fear that his love is unacceptable. His theme is his desire, his yearning. It is that unfulfilled desire or the yearning that is never quenched, the striving for the apparently unattainable that is an essential to Courtly Love, just as it is of the essence and substance of love:

Totz tems de leis me lauzara,  
s'era'm fos plus volontoza,  
c'amors, qui'l cor enamora,  
m'en det (mais no'm n'escazegra):  
non plazers, mas sabetz que?  
envey' e dezir anse!<sup>46</sup>

It is this torment of desire, this suffering that is love, which is productive of every virtue:

Noih e jorn pes, cossir e velh,  
planh e sospir; e pois m'apai.  
on melhs m'estai, et eu peihz trai.  
mas us bos respiehz m'esvelha,  
don mos cossirers s'apaya.  
fols! per que dic que mal traya?  
car aitan rich' amor envei,  
pro n'ai de sola l'enveya.<sup>47</sup>

What might be called the mechanics of Courtly Love consists in three fundamentals: the exalted position of the beloved, the surge of the lover upwards to the beloved, love as desire and yearning. The necessity of these three essential characteristics emerges quite clearly from an examination of a law peculiar to Courtly Love and the basis of that law as advanced by Andreas Capellanus: that love cannot exist between married people.

Vehementer tamen admiror, quod maritalem affectionem quidem, quam quilibet inter se coniugati adinvicem post matrimonii copulam tenentur habere, vos vultis amoris sibi vocabulum usurpare, quum liquide constet inter virum et uxorem amorem sibi locum vindicare non posse.<sup>48</sup>

This was the judgment, likewise, handed down by Marie Countess of Champagne

<sup>45</sup> For such love is lost which is maintained one-sidedly. Bernard de Ventadour, *ed. cit.*, 30, 12-14, p. 181.

<sup>46</sup> I should ever praise her if she were only more willing now towards me; for Love which enamors my heart (but will not free me from it) has given me not delight, but do you know what? rather longing and desire. Bernard de Ventadour, *ed. cit.* 3, 23-28, p. 16.

<sup>47</sup> Night and day I ponder, am full of care

and watch, bewail and sigh; and then I grow calm. Where things went better with me, now I suffer pain. But a fond expectation awakens me whence my care is soothed. Fool! Why do I say that I suffer? for I desire so excellent a love that I profit from the mere desire. Bernard de Ventadour, *ed. cit.*, 7, 33-40, p. 42.

<sup>48</sup> *De Amore*, I, vi, G, *ea. cit.*, p. 83; Parry, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

in answer to the question proposed: whether love could exist between married people. That judgment is recorded by Andreas Capellanus:

Vestra igitur pagina demonstravit, talem inter vos dubitationis originem incidisse: Utrum inter coniugatos amor possit habere locum, et an inter amantes zelotypia reprobetur, et in ambobus dubiis utrumque vestrum in suam declinare sententiam et alterius adversari opinioni, et cuius de iure mereatur obtinere sententia, nostro velle vos iudicio definiri. Ideoque utriusque diligenter assertionem perspecta et ipsa veritate omnimoda inquisita indagine praesens litigium tali volumus iudicio terminare. Dicimus enim et stabilito tenore firmamus, amorem non posse suas inter duos iugales extendere vires.<sup>49</sup>

The reasons advanced for this law of Courtly Love and for this judgment are three in number and are substantially the same in each case. First of all, there is the lack of furtiveness in the embrace of married people,—a necessary requisite between lovers:

Licet enim nimia et immoderata affectione coniungantur, eorum tamen affectus amoris non potest vice potiri, quia nec sub amoris verae definitionis potest ratione comprehendi. Quid enim aliud est amor nisi immoderata et furtivi et latentis amplexus concupiscibiliter percipiendi ambitio? Sed quis esse possit, quaeso, inter coniugatos furtivus amplexus, quum ipsi se adinvicem possidere dicantur et cuncta sine contradictionis timore suae voluntatis desideria vicissim valeant adimplere? Nam et ipsa excellentissima principum doctrina demonstrat, suae rei neminem posse usum furtiva fruitione percipere.<sup>50</sup>

Desire, then, is of the essence of love. Love is not complacency in a good already possessed habitually but it is an inordinate ambition and desire towards a good as yet unpossessed or possessed with fear of loss. Love between married people requires that union be freely given. It does away with the yearning, seeking and desiring *concupiscibiliter* which is inseparable from true love. When stability of union is acquired, love disappears.

A second reason why love cannot exist between married people arises from the fact that the very essence of love—*zelotypia*—is reprobable and to be avoided among them:

Sed alia iterum ratio coniugatis mutuum contradicit amorem, quia ipsius amoris substantia, sine qua verus amor esse non potest, scilicet zelotypia inter eos scilicet coniugatos per omnia reprobatur et ab eis tanquam pestis debet semper nociva fugari; amantes vero illam oportet semper tanquam matrem et amoris amplexari nutricem. Unde liquide vobis constat, inter vos et virum vestrum amorem nullatenus posse vigere.<sup>51</sup>

<sup>49</sup> *De Amore*, I, vi, G, ed. cit., p. 89; Parry, p. 106.

<sup>50</sup> *De Amore*, I, vi, G, ed. cit., p. 83; Parry, p. 100. The Countess of Champagne gives the same reason:

Nam amantes sibi invicem gratis omnia largiuntur nullius necessitatis ratione cogente. Iugales vero mutuis tenentur ex debito voluntatibus obedire et in nullo se ipsos sibi invicem denegare. *De Amore*, I,

vi, G, ed. cit., p. 89; Parry pp. 106-107.

<sup>51</sup> *De Amore*, I, vi, G, ed. cit., pp. 83-84; Parry, p. 101. Cf. the Countess of Champagne:

Sed et alia quidem ratio eis ob stare videtur, quia vera inter eos zelotypia invenire non potest, sine qua verus amor esse non valet ipsius amoris norma testante, quae dicit: Qui non zelat, amare non potest. *De Amore*, I, vi, G, ed. cit., p. 90; Parry p. 107.

It is not a shameful suspicion which Andreas has in mind, the suspicion of a husband concerning his wife's fidelity, but a pure jealousy. Suspicion of that type is a false jealousy and were it to exist between persons who are not married, they would be not *amantes* but *amicus* and *amica*:

Nam maritus de uxore sine turpi cogitatione suspicionem habere non potest. Pura namque zelotypia applicata marito ex ipsius subjecti vitio maculatur et desinit esse, quod erat . . . Multi tamen in hoc reperiuntur esse decepti, qui turpem suspicionem zelotypiam esse, asserentes falluntur. [Sicut etiam saepe saepius quam plurimum optimum esse stagnum mentiuntur argentum.] Unde non pauci zelotypiae originis et descriptionis ignari decipiuntur saepissime et in durissimum trahuntur errorem. Nam et inter non coniugatos falsa sibi potest zelotypia locum vindicare, qui postea non dicuntur amantes, sed amicus et amica vocantur.<sup>52</sup>

Pure jealousy has three essentials:

Est igitur zelotypia vera animi passio, qua vehementer timemus, propter amantes voluntatibus obsequendi defectum amoris attenuari substantiam, et inaequalitatis amoris trepidatio ac sine turpi cogitatione de amante concepta suspicio. Unde manifeste apparet, tres species in se zelotypiam continere. Nam verus zelotypus semper timet, ne ad suum conservandum amorem propria non valeant sufficere obsequia, et ut, qualiter amet, ametur, atque recogitat, quanto cogeretur anxii dolore, si coamans eius alteri copularetur amanti, quamvis hoc credat posse nullatenus evenire.<sup>53</sup>

Therefore the jealousy that is the mother and nurse of love is a vehemence in desire and devotion of a truly ardent lover concerning his beloved, a fear that his love be not requited and that she be diverted from him, a solicitude and anxiety for her well-being to the exclusion of everything and everyone else. It approaches the jealousy with which Elias served his God,<sup>54</sup> and with which we are to serve Him.<sup>55</sup> It is, as it were, the jealousy of God Himself who is a jealous God.<sup>56</sup> It is that jealousy described by the pseudo-Dionysius as applied to God.<sup>56b</sup> Therefore this jealousy cannot concern something possessed as is the love of married people, but it is desire, an anxious fear, a burning devotion, an ardent service towards the attainment of the beloved.

In his third argument why love cannot exist between husband and wife, Andreas has recourse to the analogy of friendship and kinship:

Nec vobis videatur absurdum, quod dixerim, quamvis omnimoda coniugati dilectionis affectione iungantur, eorum tamen affectum amoris non posse vice perfungi; quia videmus idem in amicitia evenire. Licet enim mutua se in omnibus pater et filius diligant affectione, vera tamen inter eos amicitia non consistit, quia Ciceronis hoc traditione testante sanguinis

<sup>52</sup> *De Amore*, I, vi, G, ed. cit., pp. 85-86; Parry, pp. 102-103.

<sup>53</sup> *De Amore*, I, vi, G, ed. cit., p. 85; Parry, p. 102.

<sup>54</sup> Zelo zelatus sum pro Domino Deo exercituum. 3 Kings xix, 10; 14.

<sup>55</sup> Quoniam zelus domus tuae comedit me. Ps. lxxviii, 10.

<sup>56</sup> Ego sum Dominus Deus tuus, fortis, zelotes. Exodus, xx, 5. Cf. also Exodus xxxiv, 14: Dominus zelotes nomen eius. Deus est

aemulator.

<sup>56b</sup> Propter quod et zelotem eum divini sapientes appellant, velut multum in existentia optimum amorem, et ut ad zelum suscitatore concupiscentiae suae amatoriae, et ut zelotem eam ostendentem, et concupita zelantem, et ut provisum eum existentibus per semetipsa zelantibus. Joannis Scoti Opera. Sancti Dionysii Areopagitae de Divinis Nominibus, IV, PL 122, 1136.

sola propago inter eos dilectionis conservat affectum. Tantum igitur distare constat inter omnimodam coniugatorum affectionem et amantium obligationem, quantum distat inter patris et filii mutuam dilectionem et firmissimam duorum virorum amicitiam, quia, sicut nec ibi dicitur esse amor, ita et amicitia hic fertur abesse.<sup>57</sup>

The Ciceronian tradition of which Andreas speaks consists in the fact that friendship is necessarily tied up with or even identified with benevolence.<sup>58</sup> Kinship, the relation of father and son, can exist without benevolence but friendship cannot. Therefore, friendship far outweighs kinship. Benevolence may be eliminated from kinship but may never be eliminated from friendship. If you remove benevolence from friendship, the very name of friendship is gone. If you remove it from kinship, the name of kinship will remain.<sup>59</sup> In the same way, there is a quality, an essence of love that if removed or eliminated the very name of love is destroyed. But if that quality be removed from the love or affection of husband and wife, the name of love remains. To put it another way, friendship is to kinship as is love to marital affection. Friendship has an essential quality, in this case benevolence, that kinship lacks. In the same way, love has an essential quality that marital love lacks.

That essential quality of love that lovers possess and which husband and wife do not possess emerges from the very analogy used by Andreas. Father and son have a natural affection for each other, but in their relationship there is a bar to that equality of status that friendship demands. It is likewise of the Ciceronian tradition that friendship exists between equals or tends to make equal.<sup>60</sup> Friendship can reign only among equals. It is the love of equals for equals. Equality is essential to it. But the relationship of father and son can never rise to the status of equality. There is just as much difference, then, between the affection of father and son and the friendship between two good men as there is between the love of lovers and the love of husband and wife. Just as there is equality between friends, so there is between husband and wife. But between lovers there is inequality as there is between father and son, that inequality between beloved and lover which is of the essence of love. Thus the equality of friendship is equated to the equality of married people; the inequality of father and son to the inequality of status between the beloved and her lover.

To sum up: the passion of love is awakened in a virtuous man by the sight and contemplation of the physical and especially of the moral and spiritual qualities of the lady. The beloved occupies an exalted position above the lover comparable to that of the lord above his vassal. This love is essentially a desire, a yearning for the beloved. From this love proceeds all good and all virtue, and through it the lover advances in virtue and rises in worth towards the beloved who is its source. That is the thought-pattern of Courtly Love. What might be called the mechanics of Courtly Love is best portrayed in the surge upwards of the lover towards the beloved through the force and energy of love.

<sup>57</sup> *De Amore* I, vi, G, ed. cit., p. 83; Parry, pp. 100-101.

<sup>58</sup> Principio qui potest esse vita vitalis, ut ait Ennius, quae non in amici mutua benevolentia conquiescit? Quid dulcius quam habere quicum omnia audeas sic loqui et tecum. *De Amicitia*, VI, ed. W. A. Falconer (London, 1923), p. 130.

<sup>59</sup> Namque hoc praestat amicitia propinquitati, quod ex propinquitate benevolentia tolli potest, ex amicitia non potest; sublata enim benevolentia amicitiae nomen tollitur,

propinquitatis manet. *De Amicitia*, V, ed. cit. p. 128.

<sup>60</sup> Sed maximum est in amicitia superiorem parem esse inferiori. *De Amicitia*, XIX, ed. cit., p. 179. The idea of equality in friendship is developed especially in chapter XX. Cf. St. Ambrose who continues the Ciceronian tradition: Pietatis custos amicitia est, et aequalitatis magistra; ut superior inferiori se exhibeat aequalem, inferior superiori. *De Officiis Ministrorum*, III, xx, PL 16, 192.

What is the source of this pattern that is characteristic of Courtly Love and which was invented or, at least, first introduced by the troubadours in literature? Or, rather, can a preexistent thought-pattern on which the mechanics of Courtly Love are based and formed be found? If this can be done, then we can say with confidence that, no matter what relations its poetic form and externals may have with the poetic form and externals of other lands and languages, we have isolated the essential basis of its formation.

## II. COURTLY LOVE AND CHRISTIAN MYSTICISM

On the surface, Courtly Love has much in common with Christian spirituality and mysticism. A love that is directed towards a superior being, that is the source of virtue; a love that is desire and yearning for union with that superior being has superficially many points of contact with the love of God and union with God through love. It was these considerations that led Wechssler to seek the essential thought of Courtly Love in the Church and in Christianity, and to find its pattern in the Christian theological virtue of charity.<sup>1</sup> Closer examination, however, reveals fundamental differences between the love of God and Courtly Love, between the union of the Christian mystic with God and the yearning of the courtly lover for union with the beloved.

The Christian teaching on charity is contained in the fourth chapter of the First Epistle of Saint John. There the beloved disciple comments on the teaching of Our Lord on the love of God. The fundamental of Christian love of God is that God is Charity.<sup>2</sup> Since God is Charity, it is He who gives us charity.<sup>3</sup> This gift of charity operates our union with God,<sup>4</sup> a union effected by the Holy Spirit dwelling in us, Who is given to us with the gift of charity.<sup>5</sup> The motive and cause why we ought to love God is one: that He has first loved us.<sup>6</sup> The fruit of this divine charity is confidence which excludes fear and its consequent pain.<sup>7</sup> Union of God and the soul through charity is not a gift made to a restricted group or class, but is extended to all mankind redeemed and regenerated by grace.<sup>8</sup> It is grace received at Baptism whereby fallen man is raised to the supernatural order that opens the door to love of God and to union with Him. A primary requisite of charity and union with God is this gift of grace. With it comes charity, whereby God, as it were, comes down to the soul to dwell there through His Holy Spirit.<sup>9</sup> That union is a secure one that casts out fear of its instability.

In Courtly Love, love is free to descend where it will. Love inflames the heart with desire for the beloved and the lover must follow willy-nilly the passion aroused:

<sup>1</sup> Zuvor aber müssen wir fragen, in welchem Lebenskreise die charakteristische Stimmung und der wesentliche Gedankengehalt des Minnesangs ihr Heimatrecht hatten. Der geistige Nährboden dieser Kultur war die Kirche und war das Christentum. So befremdend der Satz vielleicht klingen mag, schon hier kann er ausgesprochen werden: die höfische Minne der dienenden Frauensänger hat sich ihre Krone von der *Caritas*, der christlichen Kardinaltugend (sic!) genommen. Eduard Wechssler, *Das Kulturproblem des Minnesangs*, I (Halle, 1909), p. 216.

<sup>2</sup> I John, iv, 9: Deus caritas est.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 7: Caritas ex Deo est.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 16: Et nos cognovimus et credidimus caritati, quam habet Deus in nobis. Deus caritas est: et qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet et Deus in eo.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 13: In hoc cognovimus, quoniam in eo manemus, et ipse in nobis, quoniam de Spiritu suo dedit nobis.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 19: Nos ergo diligamus Deum, quoniam Deus prior dilexit nos.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 17-18: In hoc perfecta est caritas Dei nobiscum, ut fiduciam habeamus in die iudicii; quia sicut ille est, et nos sumus in hoc mundo. Timor non est in caritate, sed perfecta caritas foras mittit timorem, quoniam timor poenam habet; qui autem timet, non est perfectus in caritate.

<sup>8</sup> John, xiv, 23: Si quis diligit me, sermonem meum servabit; et Pater meus diligit eum, et ad eum veniemus, et mansionem apud eum faciemus.

<sup>9</sup> Rom. v, 5: quia caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis.

Pero Amors sap dissendre  
lai on li ven a plazer.<sup>10</sup>

The lover can but declare his love; it is left to the beloved absolutely to return it or not:

Mas en amor non a om senhoratge,  
e qui l'i quer, vilanamen domneya,  
que re no vol amors qu'esser no deya.<sup>11</sup>

Nor can the beloved make known her love, rather she is bound to conceal it:

que dompna non ditz son desir,  
anz cela plus so que volria  
de son amic se vol honrar  
e fai's ades plus a prezar  
on plus la destreing sos talans.<sup>12</sup>

The courtly lady is cold and disdainful to the prayers of her lover:

No'n fatz mas gabar e rire,  
domna, car eu re'us deman;  
e si vos amassetz tan,  
alres vos n'avengr' a dire.<sup>13</sup>

He loves and is not loved:

Qu'enaissi'm fadet mos pairis  
Qu'ieu ames e non fos amatz.<sup>14</sup>

The lover bewails his lot and asks the mercy of his beloved:

ai, domna, per merce'us playa  
c'ayatz de vostr' amic mercei.<sup>15</sup>

He is content to suffer and to endure in the hope of success:

Ma mort remir, que jauzir  
no'n posc ni no'n sui jauzire;  
mas en sui tan bos sofrire  
c'atendre cuit per sofrir.<sup>16</sup>

because:

<sup>10</sup> Nevertheless Love can descend there where it may please her. Bernard de Ventadour, *ed. cit.*, 4, 25-26, p. 23. Cf. also 8, 13-16, pp. 51-52; 35, 10, p. 200.

<sup>11</sup> But in love man has no dominion and who seeks it there serves women basely, for love does not wish what is not fitting. Bernard de Ventadour, *ed. cit.*, 42, 15-17, p. 242.

<sup>12</sup> For the lady does not make known her desire but rather the more hides what she would wish from her lover if she wishes to be honored and therefore more prized there where her longing constrains her. Poem ascribed to Daude de Pradas and to

Bernard de Ventadour, *ed. cit.*, 19-23, p. 313.

<sup>13</sup> You merely laugh at me and ridicule me, my lady, because I ask something of you; and if you loved me so much, you would bring yourself to say otherwise. Bernard de Ventadour, *ed. cit.*, 4, 57-60, p. 25.

<sup>14</sup> For thus my godfather doomed me, that I should love and not be loved. Jaufre Rudel, *ed. cit.*, V, 48-49, p. 15.

<sup>15</sup> Ah! my lady, may it please you in your mercy that you have compassion on your lover. Bernard de Ventadour, *ed. cit.*, 7, 54-55, p. 44.

<sup>16</sup> I look upon my death because I can-



El mon non es mas una res  
per qu'eu joya pogues aver;  
e d'aquela no'n aurai ges,  
ni d'autra no'n posc ges voler.<sup>17</sup>

Even though the lover be rewarded now by a kiss, now by an embrace, now by union with his beloved, even though his joy be full,—fuller than may be imagined,—yet that possession and union are fleeting, a prey to evil-mongers,<sup>18</sup> to the caprice of the beloved, to separation. There is no stability, no permanent peace and happiness; there is no security that his beloved will remain faithful to him. Bernard de Ventadour expresses his unutterable joy at his lady's acceptance of him and his service; even that knowledge brings no peace because he is torn with desire for her, for union with her.<sup>19</sup> The knowledge that he is loved by her and the joy of it turn to sadness because he is separated from her.<sup>20</sup> He is filled with joy and song, yet he knows that at night he will not sleep because he does not possess her.<sup>21</sup> This lack of certainty brings fear and sadness, worry and anxiety that he may lose his beloved:

mas greu veiretz fin' amansa  
ses paor e ses doptansa.<sup>22</sup>

It is this lack of possession that is the source of the fear, anxiety, sadness and desire on the part of the lover. And yet, union, possession do not belong to Courtly Love:

Amor blasmen per no-saber,  
fola gens; mas leis no'n es dans,  
c'amors no'n pot ges deschazer,  
si non es amors comunaus.  
aisso non es amors; aitaus  
no'n a mas lo nom e'l parven,  
que re non ama si no pren.<sup>23</sup>

Moreover, he is a congenital idiot who reproves his beloved for not yielding to him or even asks it:

E cel es be fols natura  
que de so que vol, la repren  
e'lh lauza so que no'lh es gen.<sup>24</sup>

not rejoice in her nor am I rejoiced in her; but I am so good a sufferer that I count on attaining (my aim) through suffering. Bernard de Ventadour, *ed. cit.*, 9, 41-44, p. 56.

<sup>17</sup> There is in the world but one thing through which I should be able to have joy; and of her I shall never have any (joy), nor of another can I wish ever to have any. Bernard de Ventadour, *ed. cit.*, 10, 43-46, p. 63.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Marcabru, *ed. cit.*, XXVIII, 15-16, p. 131; Cercamon, *ed. cit.*, II, 8-14, p. 5.

<sup>19</sup> Bernard de Ventadour, *ed. cit.*, 27, 8-13, p. 157 and 46-51, p. 159.

<sup>20</sup> Bernard de Ventadour, *ed. cit.*, 33, 8-11, p. 195 and 36-37, p. 196; cf. also 39, 7-8, p. 220 and 9-12, p. 220.

<sup>21</sup> Bernard de Ventadour, *ed. cit.*, 41, 6-8, p. 234 and 17-22, p. 235.

<sup>22</sup> But hardly will you see true love without fear and without distrust. Bernard de Ventadour, *ed. cit.*, 1, 13-14, p. 3.

<sup>23</sup> Fools censure love through ignorance; but it does not suffer harm for love cannot ever fall low unless it be requited love. Love is not such; such a love has only the name and the appearance which does not love a thing unless it possesses it. Bernard de Ventadour, *ed. cit.*, 15, 15-21, p. 86.

<sup>24</sup> He is indeed a congenital idiot who blames her for what he wants and praises her for that which is not worthy of her. Bernard de Ventadour, *ed. cit.*, 15, 33-35, p. 86.

Later, Daude de Pradas will say that the lover who wishes to possess his lady entirely is not a true servant of love:

Non sap de dompnei pauc ni pro  
qui del tot vol si donz aver.  
Non es dompneis, pois torn'a ver,  
ni cors s'i ren per guizerdo.<sup>24a</sup>

At almost every point, the concept of charity differs radically from the courtly conception of love. On the one hand, we love God because He is good and has first loved us; on the other, the lover, often unloved, loves his beloved because of her qualities of body and mind. On the one hand, as far as God is concerned, there is permanent union of God and the soul; on the other, momentary union dependent on the humor of the lady, on the possibility of separation, on the machinations of others. On the one hand, there is union that casts out fear of insecurity and instability, that inspires confidence that, on the part of God, it is a lasting, permanent union; on the other, a fear rising from insecurity, a yearning that is for the most part unfulfilled and even when fulfilled, unstable and insecure. The whole framework of Christian charity differs essentially and radically from that of Courtly Love, so much so that in their essential features they are at opposite poles. As such, charity could not have been the pattern of Courtly Love. Charity is spontaneous and uncaused; Courtly Love is dependent on the beauty, quality and value of its object; it is not spontaneous but called forth by the value of its object. Charity is the free gift of God; Courtly Love is the lover striving towards his beloved. Charity is a love of God already possessed; Courtly Love is a desire to have and possess what it has not, resting on a sense of need. In charity love must descend to us from the Beloved before we are able to love God; in Courtly Love there is no descent of love from the beloved prior to the birth of love in the lover.

Gilson speaks of a great wave of mysticism whose power, perceptible about 1125, burst with full force during the twelfth century.<sup>25</sup> It is with this burst of mysticism which flowered with William of Saint-Thierry, Hugh of Saint Victor and with Saint Bernard, that Wechssler would attach the origins of Courtly Love and would explain the formation of its ideas in the Christian mysticism of that age. At the outset, it is well to note that the appearance and flowering of both movements were roughly contemporaneous. Those mystics whose writings Wechssler uses to develop his theory were born at the end of the eleventh century and died at the middle of the twelfth. Their writings appeared from the first quarter to the middle of the twelfth century.<sup>26</sup> In comparison, the lyrics of the earlier troubadours were written at about the same time. Thus, the first troubadours were composing their poetry while these great mystics were alive or but a few years dead. From the point of view of chronology, direct influence on the part of the Western mystics on the formation of the ideas of Courtly Love is hardly likely, especially when the three greatest and most influential of these were of Belgium and the North of France: William from Liège, Hugh from Paris and Bernard at Clairvaux.

Gilson has shown pretty conclusively that the love of Courtly Love has nothing at all in common with Saint Bernard's love of God and, what is more,

<sup>24a</sup> He knows little or nothing of the service of women who wishes to possess his lady entirely. That is not the service of women because it becomes a reality, nor does one yield one's heart because of reward. *Poésies de Daude de Pradas*, ed.

A. H. Schutz (Toulouse, 1933), XIV, p. 71.

<sup>25</sup> Etienne Gilson, *La théologie mystique de Saint Bernard* (Paris, 1934), p. 24.

<sup>26</sup> For a chronology of their writings cf. Gilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-16.

with Christian mysticism. The love of the troubadours is in opposition to the charity which is at the basis of all Christian mysticism.<sup>27</sup> Again superficially, there are likenesses: the seeking of union through love, fleeting periods of union separated by times of burning desire, likenesses of language. Mysticism did not influence the formation of the ideas of Courtly Love nor did it influence the development of courtly poetry in the later troubadours, because the love of God of the mystics differs essentially in its object, nature and effects from the love of the troubadours.

Courtly Love is directed towards union of the lover with the beloved. This union with the first troubadours is carnal at least in its aspirations. It is true that they champion pure love,—*fin' amor*,—which Andreas Capellanus will confine to a chaste kiss, embrace, or contact with the nude body of the beloved. But they do admit of mixed love which aims at carnal union. In the eyes of the mystics, even *fin' amor* is in direct opposition to the love of God which abhors and condemns fleshly love in even its most innocent aspirations and manifestations.<sup>28</sup> Courtly Love is essentially a love of concupiscence, mystical love essentially a love of benevolence.

Moreover, the very natures of Courtly Love and mystical love differ essentially. Courtly Love is desire for a lady who is often cold and indifferent, who is to be wooed and besought by the poet's prayers. The love of the troubadours is not love in the eyes of Christian mysticism, but merely desire because for them love is mutual by necessity. The poet desires and, if he is not loved in return, then his love remains merely desire. Since it is desire, Courtly Love may imagine itself disinterested on the ground that it can last until reward or weariness make an end of it. But the Christian mystic is never in that situation: God has first loved us. To desire Him is to love Him, to possess Him. Courtly Love must content itself with less than mystical love. It lives and endures without attaining its end, whereas charity, by definition, is the embrace of the object. The Christian mystic desires, too, but not because he is not loved of God nor because he loves, but because he desires to give yet more love for love. He suffers, too, from his desires, but his sufferings arise not from unrequited love, but from his inability to return enough love for love.<sup>29</sup>

Courtly Love is a prey to fear. The mystic never fears that his love may not be returned. For the mystic there is fear only for what is not God; he fears created goods which, because they are created, are vain and inconstant. Courtly love is fearful because it may and often does go unrewarded. But the love of God of the Christian mystic cannot go unrewarded since charity essentially attains its object.<sup>30</sup>

Courtly Love and mystical love differ radically in the effects they produce. That is a result of the nature of the love involved. When a courtly poet speaks of pure love, what he has in mind is exactly the contrary of what the Christian

<sup>27</sup> 'Saint Bernard et l'amour courtois', *La théologie mystique de saint Bernard*, appendice IV, pp. 193-215. The following material is taken directly from this article.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. *Matt.* v, 28: Ego autem dico vobis, quia omnis qui viderit mulierem ad concupiscendum eam iam moechatus est eam in corde suo. *I Cor.* vii, 1: Bonum est homini mulierem non tangere. *I Thess.* iv, 3-5: Haec est enim voluntas Dei, sanctificatio vestra; ut abstinatis vos a fornicatione, ut sciatis unusquisque vestrum vas suum possidere in sanctificatione et honore, non in passione desiderii, sicut ut gentes, quae ignorant Deum.

<sup>29</sup> Le mystique, lui aussi, désire, mais il se rend compte que, s'il souffre alors de son amour comme d'une blessure, ce n'est

pas parce qu'il n'est pas aimé, ni parce qu'il aime, mais parce qu'il ne rend pas encore assez amour pour amour. Le problème n'est jamais, pour les Chrétiens de se faire aimer d'un Dieu qui les a créés par amour et rachetés de son sang, mais de l'aimer assez eux-mêmes pour se trouver unis à lui. *Gilson, op. cit.*, p. 203.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Saint Gregory the Great: Ipse namque Spiritus Sanctus amor est. Unde et Johannes dicit: *Deus charitas est*. Qui ergo mente integra Deum desiderat, profecto jam habet quem amat. Neque enim quisquam posset Deum diligere, si eum quem diligit non haberet. *Sancti Gregorii Magni XL Homiliarum in Evangelia Libri II, Homilia XXX. PL 76, 1220.*

mystic designates by that name. The very thing that constitutes pure love for the troubadour constitutes its impurity for the mystic. In pure love, the courtly lover has to divorce the fulfillment of his love from the love itself. The joy of fulfillment is essentially impure and cannot exist with the love without contaminating it or, at least, without rendering it suspect even in the eyes of the lover himself. Therefore pure love for the courtly lover disallows union of the lover with the beloved.<sup>31</sup> On the contrary, mystical love consists in that real union.<sup>32</sup> That is why the union of the mystic with God is pictured as mystical marriage, the marriage of the soul with God.

Finally, the point of departure of the Christian mystic differs from that of the courtly lover. For the latter, love is awakened by the sight and contemplation of the external and internal beauties of the beloved. On the other hand, man begins the ascent of his soul to God by the knowledge and contemplation of himself.<sup>32a</sup> Saint Augustine teaches that recollection and introversion are the proximate preparation for the contemplation of God. For him recollection means a gathering together and concentrating the mind. It consists in shutting off all external things and emptying it of distracting thoughts. Then by introversion, the mind concentrates itself on its most intimate depths.<sup>33</sup> One might put it this way: the way of man to God begins with self-knowledge and leads to the contemplation of God within; the way of the courtly lover to his beloved is knowledge of her and contemplation of her.

### III. NEO-PLATONISM: PLOTINUS

To know the world into which Courtly Love made its appearance, it is indispensable to know the philosophical traditions of that period. To understand the milieu in which the troubadours lived, studied and wrote their poetry, it is necessary to know not only the historical, religious, social and literary background, but also the philosophical. It is not so much a question here of formal philosophy as such, but rather of their philosophy of life,—how they looked at life, how they thought of the world and its order, the relation of creation

<sup>31</sup> Bref, l'amour pur courtois se définit par l'exclusion de ce qui constitue l'amour pur des mystiques: l'union réelle de l'aimant et l'aimé; rien ne peut effacer ni pallier cette opposition. Gilson, *op. cit.*, p. 212.

<sup>32</sup> There is no need, then, to seek the origins of Courtly Love in such elements so foreign to it as the cult of the Blessed Virgin Mary. At the time of the first troubadours, devotion to and veneration of her had not as yet reached the popular heights that they were later to reach under the influence of Saint Bernard and the Mendicant Orders. (Cf. H. J. M. Ahsmann, *Le Culte de la sainte Vierge et la littérature française profane du moyen âge* (Paris, 1933), pp. 4-46). Even then, devotion to and veneration of her are sufficient to explain her cult, but certainly not the cult of women in general, nor in particular of the women who were the objects of the adulterous desire of the troubadours. The whole framework of love of the Blessed Mother is wholly foreign to the thought-pattern of Courtly Love. The Christian loves the Blessed Virgin because of the special prerogatives with which God endowed her as the Mother of God. She is the channel of grace to all mankind but only because she is His Mother. The Christian loves her as his own mother because she was given to him as such by Our Lord. (When Jesus

therefore had seen His mother and the disciple standing whom He loved, He saith to His mother: Woman behold thy son. After that, He saith to His disciple: Behold thy mother. *John* xix, 26-27). Fundamentally our love for her is that of children for their mothers. It is impossible to reconcile love of her in any fashion whatsoever with Courtly Love, as having provided or contributed to Courtly Love anything in the way of inspiration, content or thought.

<sup>32a</sup> Cf. Saint Bernard, *De Diligendo Deo* II, 6; PL 182, 977-978: meretur ergo amari propter se ipsum Deum, et ab infideli; qui etsi nesciat Christum, scit tamen seipsum. And *ibid.*: clamat nempe intus et innata, et non ignorata rationi iustitia, quia ex tota se illum deligere debeat, cui se totum debere non ignorat. Cf. Gilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 51 ff. Cf. Also Saint Augustine, *The Confessions of Saint Augustine* III, 6, ed. Gibb and Montgomery (Cambridge, 1927), p. 65: tu autem eras interior intimo meo et superior summo meo; X, 27, *ed. cit.*, p. 302: et ecce intus eras et ego foris et ibi te quaerebam et in ista formose, quae fecisti, deformis inruebam. mecum eras, et tecum non eram.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Dom Cuthbert Butler, *Western Mysticism* (London, 1927), pp. 38-40.

to the Uncreated, and so on. It may well be that in that knowledge lies the key to the problem of the formation of the conception of love they introduced. We hasten to add here that this study is not concerned with the sources of individual troubadours, even of individual motifs and formulae characteristic of their lyrics, but with the sources of the general framework of Courtly Love as set forth above.<sup>1</sup>

Therefore, this study proposes to trace a chain or pattern of ideas that arises from various sources,—Neo-Platonism, Albigensianism, Arabic mysticism and philosophy. These meet in the South of France in the age preceding the first troubadours and are the dominant trends of philosophic and heterodox religious thought of their own. In a sense, what is common to them all is the Neo-Platonic concept that man's soul is divine, an emanation of an infinitely superior Being. When that soul is joined to the body, matter prevents it from recognizing its true nature. Man's body is a burden to be borne for a cosmological purpose,—to organize matter. In that union with the body, the soul submits to something that is in opposition to its true nature. Knowledge becomes for it a spiritual voyage that awakens it to its divinity and to the truth that its home is elsewhere; thence comes its unhappiness and its yearning for repatriation, its desire to ascend to the intelligible and divine world from which it has fallen. Its aim is to turn away and to separate itself from its body, from all that is material and evil, physical and moral, and thus to regain the simplicity and beauty it has lost by its fall into matter. When it has done that, then it is on the ascendant road that leads to the divine world of its origin; then it is prepared to contemplate the intelligible world and by contemplation to be assimilated to it. There is its perfection and happiness. It is our suggestion and contention that this chain or pattern of ideas supplied Courtly Love with the framework wherein are embodied the characteristics essential to it.

The philosophy of the world into which the troubadours introduced Courtly Love was Neo-Platonic. Klibansky has argued and shown the continuity of the Platonic tradition through the Middle Ages down to the Renaissance.<sup>2</sup> It is true that at the time of the troubadours the works of Plato were not known directly except for a part of the *Timaeus*. What was known of Plato and his teaching came indirectly through accounts in pagan Latin writers,—in Cicero, Seneca, Valerius Maximus, and especially in Macrobius' *Commentary on the Somnium Scipionis*. The world of the troubadours was familiar, too, with Platonism through such early Christian writers as Saint Augustine and Boethius who had been influenced by Platonic thought and who had in turn embodied that thought in their own writings. Thus, while it is true that there was a continuity of Platonic tradition, it is equally true that for the most part the Middle Ages knew Platonism through the *Platonici*,—Neo-Platonists,—Latin, Arabian and Jewish. It is they who transmitted to the Middle Ages by translation, commentary, elaboration, development and modification the teaching of Plotinus, the most influential teacher and master of the Neo-Platonists.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Supra pp. 3-16.

<sup>2</sup>Raymond Klibansky, *The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition* (London, The Warburg Institute, 1939).

<sup>3</sup>The source of our knowledge of Plotinus is Porphyry's biography of him, ed. Emile Bréhier, *Plotin, Ennéades I* (Paris, 1924), pp. 1-31. Plotinus was born at Lycopolis in Egypt about 204 or 205. He studied philosophy at Alexandria for eleven years under Ammonius Saccas. Hoping to learn Eastern philosophy, he joined the expedi-

tion of Gordianus against Persia in 242. He escaped with his life from that ill-fated expedition and at the age of 40 came to Rome and settled there as a teacher of philosophy until his death in 270. His work was published after his death by Porphyry and comprises six books each consisting of nine divisions—whence the name *Ennéades*. All our references are to the edition of Emile Bréhier, *Plotin Ennéades*, 6 vols. (Paris, 1924-38).

Except for elaboration of details and refinements introduced especially in those points most open to attack, Plotinus' doctrine was taken over and taught by the later Neo-Platonists. The salient features of Neo-Platonism, then, may be gleaned from a sketch of his teaching. Plotinus aims at a systematic exposition of the origin and nature of the world and the return of all things to the first principle. While his system is philosophical in its explanation of the origin and nature of reality, it is religious in its concern for the return of the world and of man to that first principle. Plotinus' teaching centres around the Triad,—the One, the Nous and the World Soul—the emanation of the Nous from the One, the World Soul from the Nous and all other existences from the World Soul.<sup>4</sup> The term emanation is taken from one of the metaphors used by Plotinus to illustrate the production of each order of being from the next above. He compares the cause of all to an overflowing spring which by its excess gives rise to that which comes after it. This, in like manner, produces the next, and so on, until finally pure indetermination is reached in matter.<sup>5</sup> Again, his teaching of emanation is illustrated by the metaphor of illumination by a central source of light which radiates and grows dimmer as it passes through the various grades of being until it shades off into total darkness.<sup>6</sup> This total darkness is matter. The metaphorical character of these illustrations is carefully insisted on. There is no lessening, no subtraction from the higher principle. The One and Nous do not disperse themselves in individual souls and in natural things, although these latter are nowhere cut off from their causes. There is a continual living process from first to last, and the law that governs it is the same throughout. Each producing cause remains wholly in its proper seat, while that which is produced assumes an inferior station. The One produces the Nous, the Nous produces the World Soul, the World Soul produces all other existences. None of these causes ever lapses. The order both for the intelligible causes, the Nous and the World Soul, and for the visible universe is a logical order of causation, not an order of time. The production by the higher causes is by natural necessity without volition or discursive reasoning. These are secondary results within the world of individual, particular things.

Plotinus calls the first principle τὸ ὄν, τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὸ εἶν, — Existence, Goodness, the One. In the One there is no plurality, no movement, no distinction. The One is above all thought because thought involves distinction between the object and subject; in the One there is no volition because volition involves distinction between the one willing and the willed; no activity because activity involves distinction between the actor and that which is acted upon. The One, therefore, is ineffably one, absolutely infinite. Nothing can be predicated of it since the One would then be limited; nothing can be thought of it since even thought limits and confines. The attributes Unity, Goodness, Existence, do not even literally express the nature of the first principle but are applied by analogy only. Nothing can be known of the One except that it is.

Excluding all activity, immutable, the One cannot create the world. Exalted utterly above the world, the One cannot enter into it; as absolutely one, the many cannot issue from it. But as the first principle, the One must be regarded in some way as the source of all beings. Plotinus solved the impasse by his doctrine of emanation. The One, all perfect, as it were overflows itself; as flame emits light, as snow cold, so all lower beings issue forth from the One. The first emanation is called νοῦς,—thought, mind, reason. Its object is twofold: it thinks the One, though its thinking thereof is necessarily inade-

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Thomas Whittaker, *The Neo-Platonists* (Cambridge, 1928), ch. 5, pp. 40-97. and Emile Bréhier, *La philosophie de*

*Plotin* (Paris, 1928), ch. IV, pp. 35-45.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. *Enneads* III, 8, 10; Bréhier, III, p. 166.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *Enneads* V, 1, 6; Bréhier, V, p. 22.

quate; it thinks itself. The Ideas of all things exist in the Nous, not only the Ideas of classes but of every individual thing. Within its indivisible unity it contains the archetype of the whole visible world. It is all things actually, for knowledge of things in their immaterial essence is the thing itself.<sup>7</sup> The Nous knows its object not as external but as one with itself. This unity which involves the duality of thinking, the thinker and the thought, is not, therefore, the highest but the second in order of the supramundane causes.

From the Nous proceeds the World Soul. Incorporeal, indivisible it produces out of itself rationally and unconsciously the individual souls that inhabit the world. Thus it inclines upward to the Nous on the one hand, and downward to the world of nature on the other.<sup>8</sup> It is the organising force of visible bodies, the active, living principle pervading matter and giving order to bodies. At the same time, it is a contemplating activity, containing in itself the order it imposes on reality, because it has contemplated that order in the Nous.

Thus, there is in the sensible world a certain order realised in space and time. The principle of this world order must be immutable and intellectual, containing under an eternal form accessible to pure intelligence the relations and harmonies visible in the sensible world. This is the Nous or intelligible world. The Nous is logically anterior to the sensible world because the sensible world is an imitation of it. Above this multiple unity which is the intelligible world there must be an absolute unity without distinction and variety. This absolute unity is superior and logically anterior to the intelligible order which proceeds from it. It is the One. On the other hand, below the intelligible world there must be an active, intermediary being extending between the Nous and matter, so that the intelligible order may be realised in matter. This is the World Soul. The cause of this emanation is a continuous spiritual life. The series of Triads is not a series of distinct forms, unconnected and separated from each other, but is the continual movement of expanding spiritual life. The One is the spiritual life extending in and by itself. In the process of emanation, each stage takes place when the life emanating from the One, tending at first to lose itself in an indefinite multiplicity, gathers itself together, concentrates upon itself, grows conscious of itself and fixes itself.

For Plotinus, the end of all living may be phrased in his own words:

*Καὶ οὗτος θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων θεῶν καὶ εὐδαιμόνων βίος, ἀπαλλαγὴ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τῆδε, βίος ἀνήδονος τῶν τῆδε, φυγὴ μόνου πρὸς μόνον.*<sup>9</sup>

The destiny of all men is the Good, the first principle. The way is marked out:—the freeing of oneself from the earthly and material, and the flight by contemplation of the individual soul into the absorption of the One. The basis of the doctrine is the conviction that human life in its actual form is arrested and diminished by obstacles that arise from the body and from the passions. The soul in its body suffers evil; it is a prey to desire, to fear, to chagrin; the body is its prison and tomb.<sup>10</sup> The soul is by nature independent, impassible but in life it is joined to matter, the cause of evil and the principle of division. For Plotinus, evil or matter is not the suppression of something the soul possesses; rather it is the addition of an element foreign to it. The soul is, as it were, a piece of pure gold soiled by clay. Hence arises the conflict between the soul and its body and the struggle of the soul to free itself of the body and to return to the One.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. *Enneads* V, 4, 2; Bréhier, V, p. 81.

<sup>8</sup> *Enneads* IV, 6, 3; Bréhier, IV, p. 174.

<sup>9</sup> *Enneads* VI, 9, 11; Bréhier, VI, p. 188.

Such is the life of the divinities; such is also that of divine and blessed men; detachment from all things here below, scorn of all earthly pleasures, and flight of the

soul towards the Divinity that we shall see face to face (that is, 'alone with the alone' as thought Numenius). K. S. Guthrie, *Plotinus Complete Works*, I, p. 172. All translations are from this translation of Plotinus in four volumes, Alpine, 1918.

<sup>10</sup> *Enneads* IV, 8, 3; Bréhier, IV, p. 219.

The first step is purification, a process of liberation from the dominion of the body and the senses by the exercise of virtue. The ascent is begun by thought, reason, by interior recollection, a gathering of the soul to itself where the soul glimpses the great and marvellous beauty of the World Soul. Then that soul may rise higher by intuition to the Nous, to rise still farther to the supreme and final stage of ecstasy in which it becomes one with the One. Here all thought is transcended. Its ecstasy is not thought of God as though the soul saw God, since these conscious activities involve the separation of the subject from its object. The soul does not look upon the One from the outside; it is one with the One. It is the One.<sup>11</sup> Plotinus claimed to have experienced this ecstasy several times in his life. They are but momentary, and the soul sinks back into the level of ordinary consciousness.

According to Bréhier, the characteristic of the doctrine of Plotinus is the intimate linking of the metaphysical solution of the origin and nature of the world with the solution of the religious problem of the destiny of man.<sup>12</sup> Plotinus' teaching of the nature and principle of things by the procession or emanation of all things from the One is peculiarly his own in this sense that, when the question of the principle of things has been answered, in that very answer is found the solution to the question of the end of man. In its discovery of the principle of things, the soul has accomplished its destiny. His doctrine of the ascent of man to the One has its roots in Plato and its background in the mystery religions of his own age. Their preoccupation was with freeing the soul from the elements that made it impure. Their function was to prepare the soul for its voyage from the world of sense to a superior region there to unite with the divinity. For Plotinus, too, there was a superior world where the souls of men took their origin and to which they were to return, and the inferior world of sense that the soul aspires to leave. The original feature in the system of Plotinus was that he, the first of the Greeks, integrated his religious conception of the destiny of the soul into his philosophic conception of reality. The end of man, his ascent to the One, is integrated into the necessary structure of reality. Thus the philosophy of Plotinus is important, not in the history of religion,—it was not a religion with rites and ceremonies,—but in the history of religious thought and mysticism. It is this characteristic that makes Neo-Platonism of paramount importance for the history of mediaeval thought and makes Plotinus, along with Plato and Aristotle, one of the great masters of the Middle Ages.

Conscious of the dangers of over-simplification in outlining so complex and intricate a question as the transmission of Neo-Platonism to the Middle Ages to the year roughly 1000, we may say that in general it reached the land of the troubadours through two main streams: one Graeco-Roman and the other Jewish-Arabian. For the present, we shall leave aside the Jewish-Arabian to return to it later, and shall sketch very briefly the Graeco-Roman tradition. It is clear that in spite of the unbridgeable chasm that lies between Christianity and Neo-Platonism, there are some superficial likenesses between them,—union with God as the end of man, man's struggle to repatriate himself, the teaching of a providence that governs the world and is the source of order and harmony in it, the reflection in man's soul of the perfection of its creator, the doctrine of the Trinity on the one hand and the Plotinian Triad on the other. Hence it is that the Neo-Platonists and the Church Fathers are concerned in expounding and defending ideas that are superficially alike, although their solution of them is absolutely at odds. The language in which they clothe their thoughts is often similar. Some of the Church Fathers in their exposition of Christian dogma made limited use of Neo-Platonic language by attempting with varying success

<sup>11</sup> *Enneads* VI, 9, 10; Bréhier, VI<sup>2</sup>, p. 186.

<sup>12</sup> *La Philosophie de Plotin*, p. 23.



so to modify and adapt it that it could carry the burden of Christian truths. In the first centuries, it was at Neo-Platonic schools that most ecclesiastical writers learned philosophy. Moreover, certain Church Fathers had been Neo-Platonists before their conversion to Christianity, — Hilary of Poitiers, Saint Augustine. Origen had been a pupil of Ammonius Sacca and the instructor of Porphyry. His influence is seen in the three Cappadocian Fathers, Saint Basil of Caesarea, Saint Gregory of Nazianzen and Saint Gregory of Nyssa. What these Greek and Latin Fathers did was to adapt Neo-Platonic notions to Christian purposes by using their ideas and converting them to Christian orthodoxy and, in so doing, helped to disseminate the knowledge of a Christian Platonism and Neo-Platonism in the Western Church.<sup>13</sup> The greatest and most influential of these men was, of course, Saint Augustine.<sup>14</sup> He knew Plotinus and quotes from him and the Neo-Platonists; to him Plato and the Platonists appeared as the philosophers who came nearest to Christianity.

Next to Saint Augustine, two of the chief sources in the Latin tradition were Macrobius and Boethius. Both were widely read and used. Both, though Christians nominally at least, wrote from the point of view of Greek philosophy. Macrobius (ca. 400) wrote his *Commentary on the Somnium Scipionis*, extracted from Cicero's *De Republica*. From it the Middle Ages came to know the Plotinian triple emanation and the ascent of man to God. Boethius, besides translating Porphyry's *Categoriae Aristotelis*, before his death in 525, wrote the *De Consolatione Philosophiae*. Through it came a knowledge of something of Neo-Platonism, — the formation of the world and the concept of God forming the world to His own image and likeness through a process of emanation, the Divine Goodness as the first principle in which all things participate and to which all things return.

For us, a more important influence comes from the East, from the works of Dionysius the pseudo-Areopagite.<sup>15</sup> They are a fusion of Christianity and Neo-Platonism and comprise four treatises: *The Divine Names*, *The Mystical Theology*, *The Celestial Hierarchy* and *The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*. Dionysius' treatises center about the nature of God, the divine internal processions which are called the Persons of the Blessed Trinity and the divine external processions which are the beings that God raises outside of Himself by way of creation. Before creation, God bears within Himself the exemplars of all things, but after they are on earth, they are substantially distinct from God. Between God and man there are spirits arranged in a hierarchy of which the ecclesiastical hierarchy is a copy. God, whose divine attribute *par excellence* is Goodness, draws all things by the love which His Goodness inspires. All things, inorganic and organic, have within themselves this appetite for the divine. In man, this return to God through contemplation takes the form of ecstasy where 'the like is known by its like'.

The works of the pseudo-Dionysius had great importance and influence

<sup>13</sup> Ainsi l'Eglise emprunte, mais elle transforme le plus souvent à fonds ce qu'elle emprunte, et s'il est vrai que la spéculation grecque a passé pour la bonne part dans la pensée chrétienne, il faut entendre par là qu'elle y a passé, non dans sa forme originale, mais comme une matière dont s'empare, pour en faire une chose substantiellement autre, une forme nouvelle. Régis Jolivet, *Essai sur les rapports entre la pensée grecque et la pensée chrétienne* (Paris, 1931), p. 179.

<sup>14</sup> Saint Augustine: *Christian or Neo-Platonist*, Sister Mary Patricia Garvey (Milwaukee, Marquette U. Press, 1939), pp. 1-39 and 218-240.

<sup>15</sup> Dionysius professes to be Saint Paul's Athenian convert Dionysius mentioned in Acts xvii, 34. The real author is unknown. Since his works show the marked influence of Proclus and indeed quote his doctrine, it is generally held that the author was a Christian Platonist trained at the school of Athens. We first hear of Dionysius at the Council of Constantinople in 533 when appeal is made to him. The supposition is that Dionysius already enjoyed authority and the tendency is to place his life and literary activity towards the end of the fifth century and at the beginning of the sixth.

throughout the Middle Ages. 'The two chief exponents of the Latin and Greek Christian branches of the indirect tradition, Augustine and Denys the Areopagite, combine from the 9th Century to form, as it were, an element which may be termed the Christian transformation of Neo-Platonism the effect of which is felt throughout the Middle Ages'.<sup>16</sup> As early as 758, Pope Paul I sent his writings to Pepin the Short. No trace of their influence is found at this period but in 827 a copy of his writings in Greek was presented to Louis the Pious of France by Michael the Stammerer. These were enshrined in the Abbey of Saint Denis which Dionysius was reputed to have founded and in which he was reputed to be buried. Between 827 and 835, Hilduin, Abbot of Saint Denis, translated or had translated the complete works of Dionysius and inserted a series of chapters on these works in his account of the martyrdom of Saint Denis.<sup>17</sup> Dionysius and his works were already known when, at the command of Charles the Bald, John Scotus Eriugena made his translation and commentary of the Dionysian corpus with the exception of the *Theologia Mystica* between 860-862. In his work, he utilized the commentary of Maximus Confessor (580-662).

John Scotus Eriugena was born in Ireland in the first quarter of the ninth century and his activity falls between 850-870.<sup>18</sup> Besides his translation and commentary of the pseudo-Dionysius, his best known and most important work was the *De Divisione Naturae*. In it John Scotus undertakes to understand the content of Christian faith by means of the Neo-Platonic concept of the origin of the world through emanation or procession 'from the one uncreated and uncreating principle and the return of all things to that principle. Within the Neo-Platonic doctrine of procession and ascension and on the basis of faith and the interpretation of Scripture by reason, he interprets the Christian dogmas of the Trinity, creation, beatitude and redemption. There exists but one reality or nature in the sense that all things depend on it and return to it. That reality or nature is God. In the divine being or nature there is a fourfold division: uncreated and creating nature, created and creating nature; created and non-creating nature; uncreated and non-creating nature.'<sup>19</sup> Thus between the first and fourth, the *terminus a quo* and the *terminus ad quem* of all things, is the created world such as it is conceived in God and the created world such as it is realised outside of God. The end of the world is its principle.<sup>20</sup> All things are drawn to their principle by the power of its beauty as by a magnet.<sup>21</sup>

John Scot's position as master of the Palace School, the patronage of the king and the boldness and novelty of his teaching brought him to the attention of his contemporaries. A striking evidence of his immediate influence is seen in the letter of Almannus of Hautvillers, a monk of the diocese of Rheims, who lived in the time of Archbishop Hincmar (d. 882). This letter was addressed to Sigibod, Archbishop of Narbonne, and as Wilmart has shown, it is in reality an introduction to a commentary on the rites to be observed in the dedication of a church.<sup>22</sup> The commentary itself is replete with symbolism which resumes the theology and philosophy of that age. Almannus thought it advisable to write a letter in which he has concentrated the substance of his philosophic thought on the soul and body. These two works are contained in

<sup>16</sup> Raymond Klibansky, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

<sup>17</sup> Gabriel Théry, *Études dionysiennes* (Paris, 1932), pp. 20-22.

<sup>18</sup> Maieul Cappuyns, *Jean Scot Erigène, sa vie, son oeuvre, sa pensée* (Paris, 1933), pp. 9 ff.

<sup>19</sup> *De Divisione Naturae*, I, 1. PL 122, 441.

<sup>20</sup> *Finis enim totius motus est principium sui; non enim alio fine terminatur, nisi suo*

*principio, a quo incipit moveri, et ad quod redire semper appetit, ut in eo desinat atque quiescat. De Divisione Naturae*, V, 3, PL 122, 866.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.* I, 75, PL 122, 521.

<sup>22</sup> 'La lettre philosophique d'Almanne et son contexte littéraire', *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* III (1928), pp. 285-319, especially p. 294.

a manuscript preserved at Albi. It is in reality a manual characteristic of the Carolingian Renaissance, destined for the education of the clergy and lay folk. The teaching of the letter betrays John Scot and ultimately the pseudo-Dionysius:

Sicque, spiritu omnia hec mentientes et facili impulsu calcantes in campis memoriae cum latissimis tum profundissimis, adgrediemur figere gradus, quibus in lege domini meditemur die ac nocte: qua, corde mundato per fidem et sanato oculo, non iam Platonico sed diuino, uideamus super-essentialem causam omnium deum . . . Viuimus autem eum cognoscendo, mouemur in eo proficiendo, sumus illum amando. Non est igitur uita neque motus neque essentia sine eo qui est fons uitae et animae motus et finis amoris.<sup>23</sup>

The nature of this love is indicated later:

Tres sunt deinde animae similiter partes, et est prima sensus—non ille quinquepertitus qui in corpore fuit supremus, sed ille qui de *fantasiis* omnium rerum, quae administrantur per corporeos sensus, potest diiudicare. Altera pars est animae ratio, quae non solum de his quae sentimus in *fantasiis*, sed etiam de his quae intelligere possumus sine ullo corporis liniamento inuestigare ualet et discernere. Tertia dicitur animus. Qui animus, idest uoluntas, in spiritu solummodo roboratus, sicut diximus, et spiritaliter uiuens creatori suo *agonizat* adherere: quo in homine nichil excelsius, sicut in eodem nichil inferius corpore.<sup>24</sup>

Wilmart sums up the importance of the letter thus:

Nous voyons ici, en tout cas, que l'influence de Jean Scot et de ses explications de l'univers fut immédiate et profonde. L'intérêt véritable du court morceau que nous éditons n'est pas ailleurs. S'il mérite de n'être pas oublié . . . c'est bien parce qu'il se présente en fait comme un témoignage notable du prestige exercé par l'Eriugène sur ses contemporains.<sup>25</sup>

Little has come down from the tenth and eleventh centuries. Cappuyns traces the considerable influence of John Scot through the eleventh century though depreciating the exaggeration that the century was penetrated 'd'idées érigéniennes'.<sup>26</sup> The golden age of John Scot's influence was the beginning of the twelfth century,—the golden age, too, of the troubadours. It was then that the manuscripts of his Dionysian translations were multiplied and that commentaries on them were made. His *De Divisione Naturae* was the object of ecclesiastical opposition and was finally condemned in 1225 by Honorius III, though even after that it enjoyed wide popularity and diffusion. The condemnation arose, as Alberic of Trois-Fontaines tells us, because of the Albigenians and false theologians who pervert the truth and who rest their perversions on his doctrine.<sup>27</sup> Even more influential were his Dionysian translations through which he popularised Greek thought and put the West into definite and sure contact with Greek mystical teaching.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, ll. 28-39, p. 300-301.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, ll. 96-106, p. 303.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 312.

<sup>26</sup> Maieul Cappuyns, *op. cit.*, p. 246.

<sup>27</sup> Dampnationem incurrit propter novos Albigenes et falsos theologos qui verba

bene forsitan suo tempore prolata et antiquis simpliciter intellecta male intelligendo pervertebant et ex eis suam heresim confirmabant. *Chronica ad ann. 1225*, ed. G. H. Pertz, MGH, SS XXIII, p. 915.

<sup>28</sup> Bref, c'est par elle (traduction de

We have sketched the course of the influence of Neo-Platonic doctrine down through John Scotus Eriugena because we are convinced that the key to the essential features of Courtly Love is to be found in that teaching and in that tradition. Specifically, the framework of Courtly Love is identical to that of the recession of all things to the One as taught by Plotinus, by Dionysius and popularised by John Scot; specifically, the nature of Courtly Love is the same as the Eros of Plotinus and not unlike the *amor* of Dionysius and Eriugena. We do not say for a moment that Courtly Love is Neo-Platonic or Dionysian or Eriugenian. We do say that the mechanics of Courtly Love fit perfectly into the mold of the Neo-Platonic doctrine of the ascension of all things to the One as taught and explained by these philosophers. It is rooted in the teaching that the body and soul remain independent substances in their union in man and as such the soul may rise from the body to join its cause. To this end we intend to analyze the teaching of two men on this doctrine: Plotinus who, though not known directly to that age, was known indirectly through the channels we have indicated and who was responsible ultimately for the doctrine itself as it found its way to the Middle Ages; Dionysius, because it was his teaching on the subject that John Scot made known and popularised by his translations and by his own treatise.

The starting point of Plotinus<sup>29</sup> is the feeling that this life is a life diminished and impeded by obstacles that are earthly bodies and passions. The soul, enclosed in its body as in a prison, is a prey of desire, fear and suffering.<sup>30</sup> It is essentially pure but sullied by matter the cause of its weakness and of all evil.<sup>30</sup>

Καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι πτώμα τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ οὕτως ἐλθεῖν εἰς ὕλην καὶ ἀσθενεῖν, ὅτι πᾶσαι αἱ δυνάμεις οὐ πάρεσιν εἰς ἐνέργειαν κωλυούσης ὕλης παρεῖναι τῷ τὸν τόπον ὃν κατέχει. . . . Ὑλῃ τοίνυν καὶ ἀσθενείας ψυχῇ αἰτία καὶ κακίας αἰτία. Πρῶτερον ἄρα κακὴ αὕτη καὶ πρῶτον κακόν· καὶ γὰρ εἰ αὕτη ἡ ψυχὴ τῇ ὕλῃ ἐγέννησε παθοῦσα, καὶ εἰ ἐκοινώνησεν αὐτῇ καὶ ἐγένετο κακή.<sup>31</sup>

Plotinus opposes the being which is by nature in the state of need to that being which by its nature has plenitude of being. The latter has no void, no restless movement towards a complement. It is self-sufficient; it seeks nothing because it possesses what it would seek if it had not possession of it. It has its good; it is itself the Good which is completeness of being.<sup>32</sup> On the other hand, a being that is engendered seeks its complement which is plenitude of being. It lacks something it can attain. It is a being whose present is essentially indigent but which has a future. It is a being which is *in potentia*

Denys) principalement que le Pseudo-Denys a pu agir sur le Moyen-Âge. Forme d'influence moins caractéristique de Jean Scot assurément que celle du *De Divisione Naturae*, mais combien plus large et plus féconde. Aussi, le grand titre de gloire d'Erigène, aux yeux des historiographes, copistes et penseurs des siècles qui l'ont suivi, est-il d'avoir été le traducteur du Pseudo-Denys: *Translator sancti Dionysii*. Maieul Cappuyns, *op. cit.* pp. 251-252.

<sup>29</sup> In our analysis of Plotinus, we have used as a guide and have borrowed heavily and freely on René Arnou, *Le Désir de Dieu dans la philosophie de Plotin* (Paris, 1929).

<sup>30</sup> *Enneads* IV, 8, 3; Bréhier, IV, p. 219.

<sup>30</sup> *Enneads* I, 8, 14; Bréhier, I, pp. 128-129.

<sup>31</sup> *Enneads* I, 8, 14; Bréhier, I, p. 129. The

fall of the soul is, therefore, a descent into matter; hence comes our "weakness", which means, that not all of the soul's faculties are exercised; because matter hinders their action, intruding on the place occupied by the soul and forcing her, so to speak, to retrench. Until the soul can manage to accomplish her return into the intelligible world, matter degrades what it has succeeded in abstracting from the soul. For the soul, therefore, matter is a cause of weakness and vice . . . By its presence, matter is the cause of the soul's exerting her generative powers, and being led thus to suffering; it is matter that causes the soul to enter dealings with matter and thus to become evil. Guthrie, No. 51, IV, p. 1162.

<sup>32</sup> *Enneads* III, 7, 4; Bréhier, III, p. 131.

because its being consists in becoming.<sup>33</sup> That is the condition of all finite beings, even of the Nous which, though it has no need and therefore no desire as regards the finite world, though in it there is no succession, no future, still is dependent on the One and is an emanated being.

At the basis of this continual movement of sensible, created beings towards perfect act is the Platonian Eros<sup>34</sup> interpreted by Plotinus.<sup>35</sup> In the *Symposium*, Diotima of Mantinea tells Socrates of the nature of love. Love is neither fair nor good, evil nor foul but participating in both, a creature in want of and desiring the fair and good. Love is a great spirit (*δαίμων*) intermediate and mediator between the divine and the mortal. Diotima tells Socrates of love's parentage: the son of Plenty and Poverty, and the follower of Aphrodite the Beautiful. As his parentage is, so is his fortune: like his mother always poor, always in distress, homeless and anything but tender and fair; like his father, love is bold, resourceful, an intriguer, a mighty hunter, conspiring always against the fair and the good. Neither mortal nor immortal, love is alive and flourishing at one time, dead at another and then alive again. Never in want, never in wealth, not wise but a lover of wisdom, different from the beloved which is beautiful and good. That is the nature of love or desire. It is from the synthesis of this need and abundance, of opposed elements that springs the cause of the unrest, inquietude, anxiety of love; it is by nature a seeker and an enemy of repose; it is the cause of those ceaselessly renewed urges in which the soul indulges and by which it obtains insufficiency in its vain struggles towards the inaccessible. Its lack of success does not discourage it. It is intermediary between what it has and what it has not and its function is to struggle towards the conciliation and unification of those extremes. Thence the eternal struggle of desire lodged between the two extremes, sharing in both, and the ever unsatisfied tendency to unite them.

Plotinus thus sums up his interpretation of Plato's myth:

Ἡ δὲ συναίρεσις ψυχὴ νῶ συνούσα καὶ παρὰ νοῦ ὑποστᾶσα καὶ αὐτὴ λόγων πληρωθεῖσα καὶ καλὴ καλοῖς κοσμηθεῖσα καὶ εὐπορίας πληρωθεῖσα, ὡς εἶναι νῦν αὐτῇ ὄραν πολλὰ ἀγαθίσματα καὶ τῶν καλῶν ἀπάντων εἰκόνας, Ἀφροδίτῃ μὲ ἐστὶ τὸ πᾶν, οἱ δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ λόγοι πάντες εὐπορία καὶ Πόρος, ἀπὸ τῶν ἄνω ῥύνεντος τοῦ ἐκεῖ νέκταρος· τὰ δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ ἀγαθίσματα ὡς ἂν ἐν ζωῇ κείμενα κῆπο. Διὸς λέγεται, καὶ εὐδεῖν ἐκεῖ ὁ Πόρος οἷς ἐπληρώθη βεβαρημένος. Ζωῆς δὲ φανείσης καὶ οὔσης αἰεὶ ἐν τοῖς οὐσιν ἐστιασθαι οἱ θεοὶ λέγονται ὡς ἂν ἐν τοιαύτῃ μακαριότητι ὄντες. Ἀεὶ δὲ οὕτως ὑπέστη δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐφέσεως πρὸς τὸ κρείττον καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἦν αἰεὶ ἐξ οὐπερ καὶ ψυχὴ <ὁ> ἔρως. Ἔστι δὲ οὗτος μικτόν τι χρῆμα μετέχον μὲν ἐνδείας ἢ πληροῦσθαι θέλει, οὐκ ἄμοιρον δὲ εὐπορίας, ἢ οὐ ἔχει τὸ ἐλλείπον ζητεῖ· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ πᾶμπαν ἄμοιρον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἂν ποτε ζητήσειεν. Ἐκ Πόρου οὖν καὶ Πενίας λέγεται εἶναι, ἢ ἢ ἑλλείψις καὶ ἢ ἐφεσις καὶ τῶν λόγων ἢ μνήμη ὁμοῦ συνελθόντα ἐν ψυχῇ ἐγέννησε τὴν ἐνέργειαν τὴν πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἔρωτα τοῦτον δντα. Ἡ δὲ μῆτηρ αὐτῷ Πενία, οἱ αἰεὶ ἢ ἐφεσις ἐνδεοῦς. Ὑλῇ δὲ ἢ Πενία, ὅτι καὶ ἢ ὕλη ἐνδεῆς τὰ πάντα, καὶ τὸ ἀόριστον τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐπιθυμίας—οὐ γὰρ μορφή τις οὐδὲ λόγος ἐν τῷ ἐπιέμενῳ τούτου—ὕλικώτερον τὸ ἐπιέμενον καθ' ὅσον ἐφίεται ποιεῖ. Τὸ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ εἶδος ἐστὶ μόνον ἐν αὐτῷ μένον· καὶ δέξασθαι δὲ ἐπιέμενον ὕλην τῷ ἐπιόντι τὸ δεξιόμενον παρασκευάζει. Οὕτω τοι ὁ ἔρως ὕλικός τις ἐστὶ καὶ δαίμων οὗτος ἐστὶν ἐκ ψυχῆς, καθ' ὅσον ἐλλείπει τῷ ἀγαθῷ, ἐφίεται δέ, γεγεννημένος.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> *Symposium*, 201-213D.

<sup>35</sup> *Enneads* III, 5, 2; Bréhier, III, pp. 76-77.

<sup>36</sup> *Enneads* III, 5, 9; Bréhier, III, pp. 86-87. Venus is the soul which coexists with Intelligence and subsists by Intelligence. She

receives from Intelligence the reasons which fill her, and embellishes her, and whose abundance makes us see in the Soul the splendor and image of all beauties. The reasons which subsist in the Soul are Abundance of the nectar which flows down

The fever of desire which torments all beings shows that there exists a good which is proper to them.<sup>37</sup> Since the universe is ordered and ruled by an intelligence, that desire cannot be vain. Hence, the existence of this desire supposes the existence of the Good. If there were no good, there would be no desire.<sup>38</sup> Desire then tends to the perfection of being, to its complement because it lacks something, to the accomplishment of what is imperfect in it, to pass from potency to act. It is a progress towards becoming, towards perfection of its being, towards something it does not possess. Hence, it is a seeking for itself, a selfish love. But it is not a selfish love exclusive of all other loves, but the love of the Good which englobes in its universality all our own good. We love only what is informed by the Good because of the Good which is in it, which colors it.<sup>39</sup> That is the ultimate object of desire.

The object of desire is, first of all, being, the desire of being in a stable way, of permanence, of perpetuity in that state. It is a desire not of repose or of inertia, but a desire of activity under its most perfect form,—contemplation.<sup>40</sup> It is a life without fatigue, of wisdom that demands no reasoning, no research, which never produces satiety,<sup>41</sup> of unchangeable permanence. It is a desire of unity, for what is not self-sufficient seeks completion by union and what is multiple seeks unity. Grief, sadness, arises when two beings seek to be one and do not succeed. Hence, nothing here below can satisfy this desire for unity. The pleasure that sensible things procure for the soul cannot satisfy this desire, for nothing in the diversity of reality can give it the calm possession of permanent unity. The ephemerality of pleasure shows its insufficiency and futility.<sup>42</sup> Beauty cannot satisfy this desire but rather torments and excites it, for the Beautiful is something objective and exterior which while attracting, resists being ours entirely.<sup>43</sup> Our Good is yonder. It is God who is the object of our love and desire, with whom we can unite and whom we can possess.<sup>44</sup> Therefore, nothing is desirable except in so far as it is because of the Good that lies in it, or in which there is a trace of the Good. Nothing can satisfy that desire completely, not even the Nous which beautiful and good as it is, is good because of the Good that is in it. The soul rises higher than the Nous and, if it does not reach beyond the Good, it is because there is nothing else above.<sup>45</sup> When one has attained the Good, then one seeks nothing further, experiences no more regrets, is filled with it and remains near it.<sup>46</sup> All the

from above. Their splendors which shine in the Soul, as in life, represent the garden of Jupiter. Abundance falls asleep in this garden, because he is weighted down by the fulness contained within him. As life manifests and ever exists in the order of beings, (Plato) says that the deities are seated at a feast because they ever enjoy this beatitude. Since the Soul herself exists, Love also must necessarily exist, and it owes its existence to the desire of the Soul which aspires to the better and the Good. Love is a mixed being; it participates in need, because it needs satisfaction; it also participates in abundance, because it struggles to acquire good which it yet lacks, inasmuch as only that which lacked good entirely would cease to seek it. It is, therefore, correct to call Love the son of abundance and need, which are constituted by lack, desire, and reminiscence of the reasons—or ideas—which, reunited in the soul, have therein engendered that aspiration towards the good which constitutes love. Its mother is Need, because desire belongs only to need and "need" signifies matter, which is entire need. Even

indetermination, which characterizes the desire of the good, makes the being which desires the Good play the part of matter—since such a being would have neither form nor reason, considered only from its desiring. As soon as it desires to attain a new perfection, it is matter relatively to the being from which it desires to receive somewhat. That is why Love is both a being which participates in matter, and is also a Guardian born of the soul; it is the former, inasmuch as it does not completely possess the good; it is the latter, inasmuch as it desires the Good from the very moment of its birth. Guthrie, IV, No. 50, pp. 1139-1140.

<sup>37</sup> *Enneads* VI, 7, 26; Bréhier, VI<sup>2</sup>, p. 98.

<sup>38</sup> *Enneads* VI, 7, 27; Bréhier, VI<sup>2</sup>, p. 100.

<sup>39</sup> *Enneads* VI, 7, 22; Bréhier, VI<sup>2</sup>, p. 94.

<sup>40</sup> *Enneads* V, 8, 1; Bréhier, V, p. 135.

<sup>41</sup> *Enneads* V, 8, 4; Bréhier, V, pp. 139-140.

<sup>42</sup> *Enneads* VI, 7, 26; Bréhier, VI<sup>2</sup>, p. 98.

<sup>43</sup> *Enneads* V, 5, 12; Bréhier, V, p. 105.

<sup>44</sup> *Enneads* VI, 9, 3; Bréhier, VI<sup>2</sup>, p. 184.

<sup>45</sup> *Enneads* VI, 7, 22; Bréhier, VI<sup>2</sup>, p. 94.

<sup>46</sup> *Enneads* VI, 7, 26; Bréhier, VI<sup>2</sup>, p. 98.

roads that climb from beauty to beauty, from unity to unity end there in that which is at the same time the first and the last. So, like the descent in the metaphysical explanation of reality, its order and relation, the ascent goes from a being to that which is above it. There is its good. It is an ascendant progress which stops only when one cannot ascend farther:

Ἐφετὸν μὲν οὖν δεῖ τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, οὐ μέντοι τῷ ἐφετὸν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν γίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ἐφετὸν γίνεσθαι. Ἀρ' οὖν τῷ μὲν ἐσχάτῳ ἐν τοῖς οὐσι τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, καὶ αἰεὶ ἡ ἀνάβασις τὸ ὑπὲρ ἑκαστον διδοῦσα ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τῷ ὑπ' αὐτῷ, εἰ ἡ ἀνάβασις οὐκ ἐξίσταται τοῦ ἀνὰ λόγον, ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ μείζον αἰεὶ προχωροῖ; Τότε δὲ στήσεται ἐπ' ἐσχάτῳ, μεθ' ὃ οὐδὲν ἔστιν εἰς τὸ ἄνω λαβεῖν, καὶ τοῦτο τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ ὄντως καὶ τὸ μάλιστα κυρίως ἔσται, καὶ αἴτιον δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις.<sup>47</sup>

Then a being has arrived at its end; it has achieved its destiny.

A corollary of the emanation of reality from the One and of its insatiable desire to be reintegrated in the One is its unhappiness in the midst of the material and sensible world. So it is with man. He knows that the sensible world is but a shade and a shadow and that in it is but fleeting and ephemeral pleasure incapable by its very nature of satisfying his desire. Sometimes, in fact, the material part of him,—the exterior man,—through weakness and ignorance will become so embroiled in the sensible world about him that he is surrounded by evil and weakness. There is another road that leads elsewhere, —on high to the Good:

Τῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων οἱ μὲν γίνονται τῶν ἐκ τοῦ ὄλου καὶ τῶν ἔξω ὥσπερ γοητευθέντες καὶ ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδὲν αὐτοῖ· οἱ δὲ κρατοῦντες τούτων καὶ ὑπεραίροντες οἶον τῇ κεφαλῇ πρὸς τὸ ἄνω καὶ ἐκτὸς ψυχῆς ἀποσφύζουσι τὸ ἄριστον καὶ <τὸ> ἀρχαῖον τῆς ψυχικῆς οὐσίας.<sup>48</sup>

A most important step, then, on the way to union with the One, the Good, is purification of self, of the material encumbrances within which the soul is imprisoned.<sup>49</sup> God is present to all beings. If we see Him not nor grasp Him, it is not because He is not there, but because we are not capable of seeing and grasping Him. He is not present in time and space, but, as it were, by a living presence. As in an animal, life does not go beyond the point to which it cannot extend but is everywhere, so in an analogous way is the One.<sup>50</sup> Hence, to unite oneself to the One, one must free oneself from limits to become limitless:

μᾶλλον δὲ ἐν τῷ παντὶ γενόμενος, οὐδὲν ἔτι ζητήσεις, ἢ ἀπειπὼν παρεκβήσῃ εἰς ἄλλο καὶ πεσῇ παρὸν οὐκ ἰδὼν τῷ εἰς ἄλλο βλέπειν. Ἄλλ' εἰ οὐδὲν ἔτι ζητήσεις, πῶς ποτε τοῦτο πείσῃ; Ἡ ὅτι παντὶ προσήλθες καὶ οὐκ ἔμεινας ἐν μέρει αὐτοῦ οὐδ' εἴπας οὐδὲ σύ "τοσοῦτός εἰμι", ἀφείς δὲ <τὸ> τοσοῦτον γέγονας πᾶς, καίτοι καὶ πρότερον ἦσθα πᾶς· ἀλλ' ὅτι καὶ ἄλλο τι προσῆν σοι μετὰ τὸ πᾶν, ἐλάττων ἐγίνου τῇ προσθήκῃ· οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος ἦν ἡ προσθήκη (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐκείνῳ

<sup>47</sup> *Enneads* VI, 7, 25; Bréhier, VI<sup>2</sup>, p. 97-98. The good must then be desirable; but it is good not because it is desirable, but it is desirable because it is good. Thus in the order of beings, rising from the last to the First, it will be found that the good of each of them is the one immediately preceding, so long as this ascending scale remain proportionate and increasing. Then we will stop at Him who occupies the supreme rank, beyond which there is nothing more to seek. That is the First, the veritable, the sovereign Good, the author of all goodness in other beings. Guthrie, No. 38, III, p. 742.

<sup>48</sup> *Enneads* II, 3, 15; Bréhier, II, p. 41. Some men, fascinated by the universe and exterior objects, completely or partially abdicate their freedom. Others, dominating their environment, raise their head to the sky, and freeing themselves from exterior circumstances, release that better part of their souls which forms their primitive being. Guthrie No. 52, IV, p. 1182.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. Marcel De Corte, "Technique et fondement de la purification plotinienne", *Revue d'histoire et de philosophie* V (1931), pp. 42-74.

<sup>50</sup> *Enneads* VI, 5, 12; Bréhier, VI, p. 211.

προσθήσεις) ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος. Γενόμενος δέ τις καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἐστὶν οὐ πᾶς, ἀλλ' ὅταν τὸ μὴ ὄν ἀφῇ.<sup>50</sup>

One obstacle prevents us from knowing the Good,—the body. The soul cannot know itself and possess itself without knowing whence it came and where it is going. In knowing itself, it raises itself to the Nous which in turn knowing and contemplating itself turns towards the Good.<sup>51</sup> There lies the value of the Greek maxim 'Know thyself' and Saint Augustine's: *Qui ergo se diligere novit, Deum diligit*.<sup>52</sup> While, therefore, the soul is united to the body, the soul is dispersed and, as it were, absent from itself. Its scattered life is like that of a dreaming man. Therefore it must concentrate itself anew, recollect itself, and that by separating itself from sensible things.<sup>53</sup> As long as the soul is in the body, it dreams. Its real awakening consists in separating itself from the body and not in rising with the body:

Καὶ γὰρ τὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ψυχῆς ἐστὶν εὐδούσης· ὅσον γὰρ ἐν σώματι ψυχῆς, τοῦτο εὐδεῖ· ἢ δ' ἀληθινὴ ἐγρήγορσις ἀληθινὴ ἀπὸ σώματος, οὐ μετὰ σώματος, ἀνάστασις. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ μετὰ σώματος μετὰστασις ἐστὶν ἐξ ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλον ὕπνον, οἷον ἐξ ἐτέρων δεμνίων· ἢ δ' ἀληθῆς ὁλως ἀπὸ τῶν σομάτων.<sup>54</sup>

Thus one must close the eyes of the body to awake in ourselves the eyes of the spirit which all possess but which few use.<sup>55</sup> Purification is a flight from matter and ignorance, evil and evil desires to which it gives rise;<sup>56</sup> it is a conversion from the sensible world to the Good;<sup>57</sup> a separation whose object is to leave the soul pure and unmixed.<sup>58</sup>

What then must one cut away and retrench? In speaking of the light to be contemplated, Plotinus asks: "How are we to arrive at it?" He answers: "By cutting off everything else."<sup>59</sup> We must cut away all things that are not the One: certainly possessions, affections, sensible things, the irrational part of our souls,<sup>60</sup> even to discursive reasoning.<sup>61</sup> It is not sufficient to suppress the pleasure that these things bring, but we must suppress even the exercise of our inferior faculties, because, when we exercise them, they have a sort of dominion over us.<sup>62</sup> This state of purity is possible of attainment while the soul is in the body, because here it is not a question of local separation but of

<sup>50</sup> *Enneads*, *ibid.*; Bréhier, VI, p. 212. When therefore, you will have embraced the universal Essence, and you will be resting within it, you must not seek anything beyond it. Otherwise, you will be withdrawing from it; and, directing your glance on something foreign, you will fail to see what is near you. If, on the contrary, you seek nothing beyond it, you will be similar to a universal Essence. How? You will be entirely united to it, you will not be held back by any of its parts, and you will not even be saying, "That is what I am". By forgetting the particular being that you are, you will become universal Being. You had, indeed, already been the universal Essence, but you were something besides; you were inferior by that very circumstance; because that which you possessed beyond the universal Essence did not proceed from the universal Essence, for nothing can be added thereto; but rather had come from that which is not universal. When you become a determined being, because you borrow something from non-essence, you cease being universal. But if you abandon non-essence, you will be increasing yourself. It is by setting aside all the rest that the

universal Essence may be discovered; for essence does not reveal itself so long as one remain with the rest. Guthrie, No. 23, II, p. 331.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. *Enneads* V, 5, 5; Bréhier, V, pp. 96-97 and VI, 9, 7; Bréhier, VI<sup>2</sup>, p. 181.

<sup>52</sup> *De Trinitate* XIV, 14; PL 42, 1050.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. *Enneads* I, 2, 4-5; Bréhier, I, pp. 55-56.

<sup>54</sup> *Enneads* III, 6, 6; Bréhier, III, p. 104. Sensation is the dream of the soul; so long as the soul is in the body, she dreams; the real awakening of the soul consists in genuine separation from the body, and not in rising along with the body. To rise with the body is to pass from one sleep into another kind; from one bed to another; really to awake is to separate oneself completely from the body. Guthrie No. 26, II, p. 363.

<sup>55</sup> *Enneads* I, 6, 8; Bréhier, I, p. 105.

<sup>56</sup> *Enneads* I, 8, 8; Bréhier, I, pp. 123-124.

<sup>57</sup> *Enneads* I, 2, 4; Bréhier, I, p. 55.

<sup>58</sup> *Enneads* I, 6, 9; Bréhier, I, pp. 105-106.

<sup>59</sup> *Enneads* V, 3, 17; Bréhier, V, p. 73.

<sup>60</sup> *Enneads* I, 2, 5; Bréhier, I, p. 56.

<sup>61</sup> *Enneads* VI, 8, 19; Bréhier, VI<sup>2</sup>, p. 158.

<sup>62</sup> *Enneads* I, 2, 5; Bréhier, I, p. 56.



a moral separation which consists in not allowing ourselves to follow after the solicitations of the body and of the world.

In renouncing the world, it follows that the soul becomes detached from creatures and is prepared to live a life that is good and virtuous. From the preliminary and negative process of purification the soul proceeds to the positive acquisition of virtue. This life of virtue Plotinus calls the life of a wise man. The second chapter of the first *Ennead* is devoted to the consideration of virtue.<sup>63</sup> We need to examine its teaching because it is intimately connected with the purification of the soul and union with the divinity, and, so, ultimately with our study. Virtues, in general, put order in us and make us better. They impose limits on us, measure on our desires and passions and deliver us from error. These are the civic or cardinal virtues. These virtues are in turn determined by the divinity from which they receive their limits and their form. They possess, as such, the vestige of the perfection which is on high. The more, then, a being has and practices them, the more he becomes like the divine being, not in the sense that the divine has and practices them, but because they are from it. So the soul possessing and practicing these virtues comes ever closer to the divinity and, in this sense, men who practice virtue become godlike.

According to Plato, flight from the world consists in being assimilated to the divinity. This assimilation is accomplished by virtue. Purification is necessary to the assimilation by virtue in the sense that it converts us to the intelligible world. The soul in the body is evil; it is good if that link with the body be destroyed. The resultant state of purification is the suppression of what is foreign in us, and the soul so purified is prepared for the virtues that will assimilate it to the divine. Thus, our resemblance to the divine depends on something higher than the purification and the exercise of the ordinary virtues. It consists in the higher virtues which are the contemplation of and the imprint of intelligible objects:

Ἄρ' οὖν μετὰ τὴν κάθαρσιν ἐπιστρέφεται; Ἡ μετὰ τὴν κάθαρσιν ἐπέστραπται. Τοῦτο οὖν ἡ ἀρετὴ αὐτῆς; Ἡ τὸ γινόμενον αὐτῇ ἐκ τῆς ἐπιστροφῆς. Τί οὖν τοῦτο; Θέα καὶ τύπος τοῦ ὁφθέντος ἐντεθεὶς καὶ ἐνεργῶν, ὡς ἡ ὄψις περὶ τὸ ὁρώμενον. Οὐκ ἄρα εἶχεν αὐτὰ οὐδ' ἀναμνησκεται; ἢ εἶχεν οὐκ ἐνεργοῦντα, ἀλλὰ ἀποκείμενα ἀφώτιστα. Ἴνα δὲ φωτισθῇ καὶ τότε γινῶ αὐτὰ ἐόντα, δεῖ προσβαλεῖν τῷ φωτίζοντι.<sup>64</sup>

Contemplation, then, puts these virtues in act in the soul. The soul possessed these objects before but not in act. They were, as it were, in an obscure part of the soul and to enlighten them, the soul had to receive the impression of a light to enlighten them. Now the soul conforms that impress enlightened by the source of all clearness to reality.

The soul possesses two sorts of virtue: the virtue that moderates its actions and the virtue that it has by contact with the intelligible world. So there are two wisdoms, two prudences and so on:

Διττὴ δὴ ἑκατέρω, ἡ μὲν ἐν νῷ οὖσα, ἡ δὲ ἐν ψυχῇ. Κάκει μὲν οὐκ ἀρετὴ, ἐν δὲ ψυχῇ ἀρετὴ. Ἐκεῖ οὖν τί; Ἐνέργεια αὐτοῦ καὶ ὅ ἐστιν ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ ἐν ἄλλῳ

<sup>63</sup> Bréhier, I, pp. 51-59.

<sup>64</sup> *Enneads* I, 2, 4; Bréhier, I, p. 55. Now this conversion does not begin to occur after the purification, but is its very result. The virtue of the soul, therefore, does not consist in her conversion, but in that which she obtains thereby. This is the intuition of her intelligible object; its image produced and realized within herself; an image similar

to that in the eye, an image which represents the things seen. It is not necessary to conclude that the soul did not possess this image, nor had any reminiscence thereof; she no doubt possessed it, but inactively, latently, obscurely. To clarify it, to discover her possessions, the soul needs to approach the source of all clearness. Guthrie, No. 19, I, p. 262.

ἐκείθεν ἀρετή. Οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοδικαιοσύνη καὶ ἐκάστη ἀρετή, ἀλλ' οἷον παράδειγμα. τὸ δὲ ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἐν ψυχῇ ἀρετή. Τινὸς γὰρ ἡ ἀρετή.<sup>65</sup>

The higher virtues emanate or are images of the essence in the Intelligible world. They become guides of the soul towards unity:

Ἐν ψυχῇ τοῖνονν πρὸς νοῦν ἡ ὅρασις σοφία καὶ φρόνησις, ἀρεταὶ αὐτῆς· οὐ γὰρ αὐτὴ ταῦτα, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ.<sup>66</sup>

In practice, the virtuous man makes use of the lower virtues but he must supplement them by standards derived from the higher. For example, such a man would not be satisfied to practice a temperance consisting in mere moderation, but he will seek to separate himself from matter. He will not seek to be merely respectable but will aspire higher to the life of the gods themselves:

Ὅμοίωσις δὲ ἡ μὲν πρὸς τοὺτους, ὡς εἰκὼν εἰκόνι ὁμοίωται ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐκατέρα. Ἡ δὲ πρὸς ἄλλον ὡς πρὸς παράδειγμα.<sup>67</sup>

In this state of purification and living the life of a virtuous man, it will be well to understand that it is not strictly correct to say that the soul becomes the Nous. The whole effort of the soul is to destroy itself so that the Nous which colors it may reign alone in it. The soul strives to cause to vanish all that might impede the reign of the Nous in it so that all that remains is the trace of the Nous it bears. Purification reestablishes the resemblance of the soul to the One. Its result is not to identify itself with the One, but to make itself like the One, to wipe away whatever would impede the soul's ascent to the One.<sup>68</sup>

It may well be asked if the process of our ascent to the Nous is our own work or the work of the One. The possession of superior beings by the soul is the result of action. Plotinus repeats over and over again that the sufficient condition of our elevation is our individual efforts.<sup>69</sup> Our elevation depends on us, on the use we make of the means to do so. But on the other hand, union and contemplation are said to suppose a light which comes from on high, which enlightens and strengthens, after our own preparation by purification. It is certain that in the vision that unifies us to the divine, God gives and the soul receives.<sup>70</sup> That which the soul receives is a sudden light granted to it:

Τότε δὲ χρὴ ἐωρακεῖν πιστεῖν, ὅταν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐξαίφνης φῶς λάβῃ· τοῦτο γὰρ παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτός . . . καὶ τοῦτο τὸ τέλος τὰ ληθινὸν ψυχῇ, ἐφάσθαι φωτὸς ἐκείνου καὶ αὐτῷ αὐτὸ θεάσασθαι, οὐκ ἄλλω φωτί, ἀλλ' αὐτῷ, δι' οὗ καὶ ὁρᾷ.<sup>71</sup>

<sup>65</sup> *Enneads* I, 2, 6; Bréhier, I, p. 57. There are two kinds of wisdom, one being proper to the Intelligence, the other to the soul; only in the latter may we speak of virtue. In the Intelligence exists only the energy (of thought), and its essence. The image of this essence, seen here below in a being of another nature, is the virtue which emanates from it. In Intelligence, indeed, resides neither absolute justice, nor any of those genuinely so-called virtues; nothing is left but their type. Its derivative in the soul is virtue; for virtue is the attribute of an individual being. Guthrie, No. 19, I, p. 265.

<sup>66</sup> *Enneads* I, 2, 7; Bréhier, I, p. 58. To contemplate intelligence will, therefore, for the soul, constitute wisdom and prudence, which then become virtues, and no longer remain individual types. Guthrie, No. 19, I, p. 266.

<sup>67</sup> *Enneads* I, 2, 7; Bréhier, I, p. 59. To seek no more than to be assimilated to

respectable individuals would be like trying to make an image by limiting oneself to copying another image, itself modeled after another image (but not copying the original). The assimilation here recommended results from taking as model a superior being. Guthrie, No. 19, I, p. 267-268.

<sup>68</sup> Cf. *Enneads* VI, 9, 4; Bréhier, VI<sup>2</sup>, pp. 176-177.

<sup>69</sup> *Enneads* VI, 9, 4; Bréhier, VI<sup>2</sup>, p. 177. Cf. also, V, 8, 11; Bréhier, V, pp. 148-149.

<sup>70</sup> *Enneads* VI, 7, 34; Bréhier, VI<sup>2</sup>, pp. 107-108.

<sup>71</sup> *Enneads* V, 3, 17; Bréhier, V, p. 73. We should believe that we have seen Him when a sudden light has enlightened the soul; for this light comes from Him, and is Himself . . . The true purpose of the soul is to be in contact with this light, to see this light in the radiance of this light itself, without the assistance of any foreign light, to see this principle by the help of which she sees, No. 49, IV, p. 1120.

It is this light that must be awaited patiently. On the one hand, then, preparation; on the other, the gift of light by the One, a gift which is necessary and which is infallibly given to the soul which prepares. And yet, Plotinus cannot say that the One or God gives Himself; that would be against His simple unity to attribute to Him an activity *ad extra*. The whole success of the soul's elevation is in man's hands. He is the artisan of his salvation. The One is immobile, inert yet:

ἀλλ' ἔστι τῷ δυναμένῳ θιγεῖν ἐκεῖνο παρόν, τῷ δ' ἀδυνατοῦντι οὐ πάρεστιν.<sup>72</sup>

If God, then, overwhelms with joy and happiness the soul that possesses Him, it is in the nature of things that He does so:

Οὐδενὸς <οὖν θεός>, φησὶν, ἔστιν ἔξω, ἀλλὰ πᾶσι σύρεστιν οὐκ εἰδόσι.<sup>73</sup>

Plotinus has defined or rather described what he means by contemplation. Once the soul has been purified, then it recollects itself and begins to contemplate intelligible beings. Then it is raised to the level of the Nous. But this is not its supreme goal, no more than the Nous is the supreme reality. The soul's goal is its elevation to the One. In that contemplation there is no more distinction between the object and subject such as is found in sensible, intellectual knowledge, but there is established a contact between them. To contemplate is to see and be in contact with the One. Plotinus says that it is:

ἔκστασις καὶ ἁπλῳσις καὶ ἐπίδοσις αὐτοῦ καὶ ἔφεσις πρὸς ἀφὴν καὶ στάσις.<sup>74</sup>

If we examine the definition or description, we shall see that it is first, *ἔκστασις*,—animated by its desire for union, the soul gives itself, goes out of itself. This is really the result of contemplation. Secondly, it is *ἁπλῳσις*—the simplicity of the soul returning towards its origin. Its descent was a fall into the variety and multiplicity of the sensible world. This simplification is purification and separation from the body and from all that has been added to it. Thirdly, *ἐπίδοσις αὐτοῦ*,—the giving of self to the One who is greater. Fourthly, *ἔφεσις πρὸς ἀφὴν*,—the desire for union is the touchstone or motive that moves the soul to purify itself. Union is its work. Lastly, *στάσις*, for once gone out of itself in ecstasy, the soul is in a superior state far from the sensible world where it found only ephemeral rest. Now it finds stability which is the property of beings that know no change.

What are the characteristics of this contemplation, of this union with the One? First of all, it is simplification pushed to its supreme limits, further than the state in which the soul contemplates the Nous in its knowledge and possession of the intelligible world. Even there and in sensible knowledge there is duality, but not in contemplation of the One:

ἀλλὰ γενομένη μὲν ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ αὐτὸν ἔχουσα τὸ νοητὸν νοεῖ, ἐπὴν δ' ἐκείνον ἴδῃ, πάντα ἤδη ἀφίησιν, οἷον εἴ τις εἰσελθὼν εἰς οἶκον ποικίλον καὶ οὕτω καλὸν θεωροῖ ἔνδον ἕκαστα τῶν ποικιλιμάτων καὶ θαυμάζοι, πρὶν ἰδεῖν τὸν τοῦ οἴκου δεσπότην, ἰδὼν δ' ἐκείνον καὶ ἀγασθεῖς οὐ κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἀγαλμάτων φύσιν ὄντα, ἀλλ' ἄξιον τῆς ὄντως θεας, ἀφείς ἐκεῖνα τοῦτον μόνον τοῦ λοιποῦ βλέπει, εἴτα βλέπων καὶ μὴ ἀφαιρῶν τὸ ὅμμα μηκέτι ὄραμα βλέπει τῷ συνεχεῖ τῆς θεας, ἀλλὰ τὴν ὅψιν αὐτοῦ συγκεράσαιτο τῷ θεάματι, ὥστε ἐν αὐτῷ ἥδη τὸ δρατὸν πρότερον ὄψιν γεγόνει, τῶν δ' ἄλλων πάντων ἐπιλάθοιτο θαυμάτων.<sup>75</sup>

<sup>72</sup> *Enneads* VI, 9, 7; Bréhier, VI<sup>2</sup>, p. 181. He is present to him who touches Him, absent to the one incapable of it. Guthrie, No. 9, I, p. 161.

<sup>73</sup> *Enneads*, *ibid.*; Bréhier, VI<sup>2</sup>, p. 182; God is in all creatures. Guthrie, *ibid.*, I, p. 163.

<sup>74</sup> *Enneads* VI, 9, 11; Bréhier, VI<sup>2</sup>, p. 187. An ecstasy, a simplification, a self-abandonment, a desire for intercourse, a perfect quietude. Guthrie, No. 9, I, p. 170.

<sup>75</sup> *Enneads* VI, 7, 35; Bréhier, VI<sup>2</sup>, p. 109. Having arrived at Intelligence, and having

Contemplation is, moreover, a certain state of unity:

Καθ' ἑαυτὴν δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ ὅταν ἰδεῖν ἐθέλῃ, μόνον ὁρῶσα τῷ συνείναι καὶ ἐν οὐσα τῷ  
ἐν εἶναι αὐτῷ οὐκ οἶεται πῶς ἔχειν ὃ ζητεῖ, ὅτι τοῦ νοουμένου μὴ ἑτερόν ἐστιν.<sup>76</sup>

Assimilated to the object, the soul loses consciousness of the act by which it possesses and in its joy of possession believes itself transported into it.

The question arises whether union with the One consists in absorption of the One and the soul; does it result in identity? Purification effects simplification by retrenching everything that makes the soul unlike the One. It reduces the soul to the trace of the One which constitutes its resemblance to the One. Then as a pure resemblance to the One, when in the presence of the One, there is nothing which separates them. The soul is absorbed by the One, submerged and lost in the infinity of its presence:

ὡς εἰκὼν πρὸς ἀρχέτυπον.<sup>77</sup>

But the expression with which Plotinus qualifies this union shows that he does not mean identity of the soul with the One, with God: in the measure of its capacity.<sup>78</sup> So, when the soul has risen to the first principle, when it touches it and is in the state in which it was before separation, it can see the One in so far as it is of its nature to be seen.<sup>79</sup> God measures His gifts according to the capacity of His creatures, communicating Himself more or less according to their dispositions. They desire unendingly and that is their limitation even in the state of ecstasy,—never to exhaust the liberality of the infinite One. They are two who form but one,<sup>80</sup> and yet there is no complete identification:

μεταξὺ γὰρ οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἔτι δύο, ἀλλ' ἐν ἁμῶν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν διακρίναις ἔτι, ἕως πάρεστι.<sup>81</sup>

That there was no identity, however, is evidenced by the fact that union, the result of contemplation, may be and is lost at times.

Contemplation or union, is thirdly, an enrichment, an embellishment:

Γερόμενος δὲ τις καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἐστὶν οὐ πᾶς, ἀλλ' ὅταν τὸ μὴ ὄν ἀφῇ.  
Αὔξεις τοίνυν σεαυτὸν ἀφείς τὰ ἄλλα.<sup>82</sup>

Union with the One is a deliverance from the sensible. Each purification is a

cause established therein, the soul possesses the intelligible, and thinks; but as soon as she achieves the vision of the supreme Divinity, she abandons everything else. She behaves as does the visitor who, on entering a palace, would first admire the different beauties that adorn the interior, but who regards them no longer as soon as she perceives the master; for the master by his (living) nature, which is superior to all the statues that adorn the palace, monopolizes the consideration, and alone deserves to be contemplated; consequently, the spectator, with his glance fixed on Him, henceforward observes Him alone. By dint of continual contemplation of the spectacle in front of him, the spectator sees the master no longer; in the spectator, vision confuses with the visible object. What to the spectator first was a visible object, in him becomes vision, and makes him forget all that he saw around himself. Guthrie, No. 38, III, p. 758.

<sup>76</sup> *Enneads* VI, 9, 3; Bréhier, VI<sup>2</sup>, p. 174. When the soul wishes to see by herself, then seeing only because she is the object that she sees, and, further, being one be-

cause she forms but one with the object, she imagines that what she sought has escaped, because she herself is not distinct from the object which she thinks. Guthrie, No. 9, I, p. 151.

<sup>77</sup> *Enneads* VI, 9, 11; Bréhier, VI<sup>2</sup>, p. 188. Becoming as it were an image that becomes indistinguishable from its model. Guthrie, No. 9, I, p. 172.

<sup>78</sup> *Enneads* VI, 4, 12; Bréhier, VI, p. 191. Cf. also, VI, 4, 5; Bréhier, VI, p. 183; VI, 8, 4; Bréhier, VI<sup>2</sup>, p. 137.

<sup>79</sup> *Enneads* VI, 9, 4; Bréhier, VI<sup>2</sup>, p. 177.

<sup>80</sup> *Enneads* VI, 9, 10; Bréhier, VI<sup>2</sup>, p. 186.

<sup>81</sup> *Enneads* VI, 7, 34; Bréhier, VI<sup>2</sup>, p. 108.

Then no more interval between them, no more doubleness; the two fuse in one. It is impossible to distinguish the soul from the divinity, so much does she enjoy His presence. Guthrie, No. 38, III, p. 756.

<sup>82</sup> *Enneads* VI, 5, 12; Bréhier, VI, p. 212. When you become a determined being, because you borrow something from non-essence, you cease being universal. But if you abandon non-essence, you will be increasing yourself. Guthrie, No. 23, II, p. 331.

gain for it. Its ascent frees it from the ephemeral to gain the stable. The soul raised to union with the One by contemplation, shares in the superior mode of knowledge proper to the One. What that mode is, is obscure to us who are still sunk in the sensible world.<sup>83</sup>

The soul in this state is blessed and happy because happiness consists in the possession of the real good, and the means of acquiring it is to look towards it, to become like it and to live in conformity with it.<sup>84</sup>

Τοῦτο οὖν εἴ τις ἴδοι, ποίους ἂν ἴσχοι ἔρωτας, ποίους δὲ πόθους, βουλόμενος αὐτῷ συγκερασθῆναι, πῶς δ' ἂν ἐκπλαγείη μεθ' ἡδονῆς; Ἔστι γὰρ τῷ μὲν μήπω ἰδόντι ὀρέγεσθαι ὡς ἀγαθοῦ· τῷ δὲ ἰδόντι ὑπάρχει ἐπὶ καλῷ ἄγασθαι τε καὶ θάμβους πῖμπλασθαι μεθ' ἡδονῆς καὶ ἐκπλήττεσθαι ἀβλαβῶς καὶ ἑρᾶν ἀληθῆ ἔρωτα καὶ δριμύος πόθου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐρώτων καταγελᾶν καὶ τῶν πρόσθεν νομιζομένων καλῶν καταφρονεῖν· ὅποῃον πάσχουσιν ὅσοι θεῶν εἶδεν· ἡ δαιμόνων προστυχόντες οὐκέτ' ἂν ἀποδέχοντο ὁμοίως ἄλλων κάλλη σωμάτων. Τί δῆτα οἰόμεθα, εἴ τις αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν θεῶν αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ καθαρὸν, μὴ σαρκῶν, μὴ σώματος ἀνάπλεων, μὴ ἐν γῇ, μὴ ἐν οὐρανῷ, ἢν' ἡ καθαρὸν; Καὶ γὰρ ἐπακτὰ πάντα ταῦτα καὶ μέμικται καὶ οὐ πρῶτα, παρ' ἐκείνου δέ. Εἰ οὖν ἐκείνο, ὃ χορηγεῖ μὲν ἅπασιν, ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ δὲ μένον διδῶσι καὶ οὐ δέχεται· τι εἰς αὐτό, ἴδοι, μένων ἐν τῇ θῆα τοῦ τοιούτου καὶ ἀπολαύων αὐτοῦ ὁμοιούμενος, τίνος ἂν ἐτι δέοιτο καλοῦ; Τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτὸ μάλιστα κάλλος ὃν αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐργάζεται τοὺς ἐραστὰς αὐτοῦ καλοὺς καὶ ἐραστοὺς ποιεῖ. Οὐδ' ἡ καὶ ἀγὼν μέγιστος καὶ ἔσχατος ψυχᾷς πρόκειται, ὑπὲρ οὗ καὶ ὁ πᾶς πόνος, μὴ ἀμοίρους γενέσθαι τῆς ἀρίστης θῆας, ἥς ὃ μὲν τυχὼν μακάριος ὄψιν μακαρίαν θεθεαμένος· ἀτυχῆς δὲ ὄντως ὃ μὴ τυχών.<sup>85</sup>

That is the happiness to which all souls are called and to which all desire to rise.

This beatitude, however, does not dispel or destroy desire:

δριμύος πόθου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐρώτων καταγελᾶν.<sup>86</sup>

Moreover, the action of contemplation may relax, we may at times turn from the One to that which is multiple. Knowing that our beatitude is there, there exists the fear of losing it. There is an anxiety, a shade of doubt, an apprehension of falling back. That is eminently true in this world where the soul is not entirely separated from the body.

Our analysis of the teaching of Plotinus with reference to the study of the origins of Courtly Love would be incomplete were we not to follow the soul

<sup>83</sup> Cf. *Enneads* V, 8, 11; Bréhier, V, pp. 148-149.

<sup>84</sup> *Enneads* I, 4, 6; Bréhier, I, pp. 75-76.

<sup>85</sup> *Enneads* I, 6, 7; Bréhier, I, pp. 103-104. He who beholds Him is overwhelmed with love; with ardor desiring to unite himself with Him, entranced with ecstasy. Men who have not yet seen Him desire Him as the Good; those who have, admire Him as the sovereign beauty, struck simultaneously with stupor and pleasure, thrilling in a painless orgasm, loving with a genuine emotion, with an ardor without equal, scorning all other affections, and disdaining those things which formerly they characterized as beautiful. This is the experience of those to whom divinities and guardians have appeared; they reckon no longer of the beauties of other bodies. Imagine, if you can, the experiences of those who behold Beauty itself, the pure Beauty, which, because of its very purity, is fleshless and bodiless, outside of earth and heaven. All these things, indeed are contingent and

composite, they are not principles, they are derived from Him. What beauty could one still wish to see after having arrived at vision of Him who gives perfection to all beings, though himself remains unmoved, without receiving anything; after finding rest in this contemplation, and enjoying it by becoming assimilated to Him? Being supreme beauty, and the first beauty, He beautifies those who love Him, and thereby they become worthy of love. This is the great, the supreme goal of souls; this is the goal which arouses all their efforts, if they do not wish to be disinherited of that sublime contemplation the enjoyment of which confers blessedness, and the privation of which is the greatest of earthly misfortunes. Guthrie, No. 1, I, p. 51.

<sup>86</sup> *Enneads*, *ibid.* This beatitude, however, does not destroy or dispel desire; if we see this being, what love and desire we feel in desiring to be united to it. Guthrie, *ibid.*

in its upward path from sensible beauty to the Beauty.<sup>86a</sup> On the way to the One, the way whose final limit is the ecstasy of contemplation, there are three men whom Plotinus sets forth: the musician, the lover and the philosopher. These three must rise.<sup>87</sup> The musician and the lover differ from the philosopher in that the latter deals with ideas whereas the first two find good and beauty in the sensible world. Therefore these must first divest themselves of sensible beauty:

‘Ο δὲ ἐρωτικός . . . μνημονικός ἐστὶ πως κάλλους’ χωρὶς δὲ ὧν ἀδυνατεῖ καταμαθεῖν, πληττόμενος δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ὄψει καλῶν περὶ αὐτὰ ἐπτόχται. Διδακτέον οὖν αὐτὸν μὴ περὶ ἐν σῶμα πεσόντα ἐπτοῆσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ πάντα ἀκτέον τῷ λόγῳ σώματα δεικνύντα τὸ ἐν πᾶσι ταῦτόν καὶ ὅτι ἕτερον τῶν σωμάτων καὶ ὅτι ἄλλοθεν λεκτέον καὶ ὅτι ἐν ἄλλοις μᾶλλον, οἷον ἐπιτηδεύματα καλὰ καὶ νόμους καλοὺς δεικνύντα—ἐν ἀσωμάτοις γὰρ ὁ ἐθισμός τοῦ ἐρασμίου ἤδη—καὶ ὅτι ἐν τέχναις καὶ ἐπιστήμαις καὶ ἐν ἀρεταῖς. Εἴτα ἔν ποιητέον καὶ διδακτέον, ὅπως ἐγγίνονται. Ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἡδὴ <δεῖ> ἀναβαίνειν ἐπὶ νοῦν, ἐπὶ τὸ ὄν’ ἀκτεῖ βαδιστέον τὴν ἄνω πορείαν.<sup>88</sup>

The lover rises from the love of beautiful objects of the sensible world to the world of Beauty in which all beautiful objects participate. The method that he must follow is that of Dialectics which Plotinus defines and describes.<sup>89</sup> He cannot attain the Beauty directly. He catches a glimpse of it here below in the objects that attract him through their beauty. It is the science of Dialectics that will guide him from the contemplation of beautiful objects to the contemplation of the true Beauty.

Man perceives the beautiful by his sensitive faculties, especially sight, sometimes hearing:

Τί οὖν ἐστὶ τοῦτο τὸ παρὸν τοῖς σώμασι; . . . Τί οὖν ἐστίν, ὃ κινεῖ τὰς ὄψεις τῶν θεωμένων καὶ ἐπιστρέφει πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ ἔλκει καὶ εὐφραίνεισθαι τῇ θέᾳ ποιεῖ;<sup>90</sup>

Plotinus answers his question by stating that the principle is something the soul recognizes in the sensible object as analagous with its own essence. When the soul perceives something beautiful, it rejoices at the affinity and resemblance that exists between them. The basis of the resemblance is a form—*μὶ ὁ ρ ὁ φ η*—in which they both participate. It is this form which gives unity and order and therefore beauty to matter. The beauty of bodies derives from their participation in a *λόγος* come from the gods.<sup>91</sup> This sensible beauty is known and judged by a special faculty which compares the beautiful object

<sup>86a</sup> Edouard Krakowski, *L'Esthétique de Plotin et son influence* (Paris, 1929), especially pp. 103-128 and Sister Rose Emmanuel Brennan, 'The Philosophy of Beauty in the Enneads of Plotinus', *New Scholasticism* XIV (1940), pp. 1-32.

<sup>87</sup> *Enneads* I, 3, 1; Bréhier, I, p. 62.

<sup>88</sup> *Enneads* I, 3, 2; Bréhier, I, p. 63. But the lover has some reminiscence of the beautiful; but as here below he is separated (from it, he is incapable of clearly knowing what it is). Charmed with the beautiful objects which meet his views, he falls into an ecstasy. He must, therefore, be taught not to content himself with thus admiring a single body, but, by reason, to embrace all bodies that reveal beauty; showing him what is identical in all, informing him that it is something alien to the bodies, which comes from elsewhere, and which exists even in a higher degree in the objects of another nature; citing as

examples, noble occupations, and beautiful laws. He will be shown that beauty is found in the arts, the sciences, the virtues, all of which are suitable means of familiarizing the lover with the taste of incorporeal things. He will then be made to see that beauty is one, and he will be shown the elements, which in every object, constitute beauty. From virtues he will be led to progress to intelligence and essence, while from there he will have nothing else to do but progress towards the supreme goal. Guthrie, No. 20, I, p. 271.

<sup>89</sup> *Enneads* I, 3, 4-6; Bréhier, I, pp. 64-66.

<sup>90</sup> *Enneads* I, 6, 1; Bréhier, I, p. 95. What, then, is the principle whose presence in a body produces beauty therein? What is that element in the bodies that moves the spectator, and which attracts, fixes and charms his glance? Guthrie, No. 1, I, p. 41.

<sup>91</sup> *Enneads* I, 6, 2; Bréhier, I, p. 97.

to the Ideal of Beauty which is in him. Much in the same way does an architect judge a house which he has built to be beautiful because it accords with the ideal of the house that he had before building.

Concerning those higher beauties, such as virtuous actions, the soul sees them without the senses through the affinity it has with them. Just as a man born blind cannot know the beauty of sensible objects, so, too, the man who is evil cannot know these higher beauties. He can know them only when he has a soul capable of contemplating them. The soul, then, must first purify itself:

Γίνεται οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ καθαρθεῖσα εἶδος καὶ λόγος καὶ πάντα ἀσώματος καὶ νοερά καὶ ὅλη τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅθεν ἡ πηγὴ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τὰ συγγενῆ πάντα τοιαῦτα. Ψυχὴ οὖν ἀναχθεῖσα πρὸς νοῦν ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἐστι καλόν. Νοῦς δὲ καὶ τὰ παρὰ νοῦ τὸ κάλλος αὐτῇ οἰκείον καὶ οὐκ ἀλλότριον, ὅτι τότε ἐστὶν ὄντως μόνον ψυχῇ. Διὸ καὶ λέγεται ὀρθῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν τὴν ψυχὴν γίνεσθαι ὁμοιωθῆναι εἶναι θεῷ, ὅτι ἐκείθεν τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἡ μοῖρα ἡ ἑτέρα τῶν ὄντων.<sup>92</sup>

It is from the intelligible world that beauty comes and it is the soul purified that recognizes it and perceives it:

Καὶ τὸ πρῶτον θετέον τὴν καλλονὴν, ὅπερ καὶ τὰγαθόν· ἀφ' οὗ νοῦς εὐθὺς τὸ καλόν· ψυχὴ δὲ νῶ καλόν· τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἤδη παρὰ ψυχῆς μορφώσεως καλά, τὰ τε ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι τὰ τε ἐν τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασι. Καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ σώματα, ὅσα ὄντω λέγεται, ψυχῇ ἤδη ποιεῖ· ἅτε γὰρ θεῖον οὐσα καὶ οἷον μοῖρα τοῦ καλοῦ, ὧν ἂν ἐφάπηται καὶ κρατῇ, καλά ταῦτα, ὡς δυνατόν αὐτῇ μεταλαβεῖν, ποιεῖ.<sup>93</sup>

One attains true beauty by leaving corporeal beauty which is but its images and shadows, by purifying one's soul so as to see the Beauty imprinted on these objects by the World Soul, and with the interior eye of the soul to contemplate the Beauty of the Nous and finally the One from which ultimately comes all beauty.

Plotinus sets forth his view of body beauty in the fifth *Ennead*:

Πόθεν δὴ ἐξέλαμψε τὸ τῆς Ἑλένης τῆς περιμαχῆτου κάλλος, ἢ ὅσαι γυναικῶν Ἀφροδίτης ὁμοιοὶ κάλλει; Ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης αὐτῆς πόθεν.<sup>94</sup>

Plotinus answers that it comes from a form—*εἶδος*—come from the generator into that which is generated. Beauty cannot be attributed to the unformed mass, but to the form that touches it and creates dispositions in the souls of those who see it. The proof is that we do not perceive beauty so long as it remains exterior to us, yet as soon as it is interior to us, it moves us with love and desire of it. The form alone can pass through the eyes. The mass cannot. The form carries along with it its grandeur, not the grandeur of the mass. It is the same with the higher beauties of noble deeds and virtues. It is not the exterior which moves us but the interior beauty, the informing

<sup>92</sup> *Enneads* I, 6, 6; Bréhier, I, p. 102. The purified soul, therefore, becomes a form, a reason, an incorporeal and intellectual essence; she belongs entirely to the divinity, in whom resides the source of the beautiful, and of all the qualities which have affinity with it. Restored to intelligence, the soul sees her own beauty increase; indeed, her own beauty consists of the intelligence with its ideas; only when united to intelligence is the soul really isolated from all the remainder. That is the reason that it is right to say that "the soul's welfare and beauty lie in assimilating herself to the divinity", because it is the principle of beauty and of the essences; or rather, being is beauty. Guthrie, No. 1, I, p. 49.

<sup>93</sup> *Enneads* I, 6, 6; Bréhier, I, p. 102. The

first rank is to be assigned to beauty, which is identical with the good, and from which is derived the intelligence which is beautiful by itself. The soul is beautified by intelligence, then, the other things, like actions, and studies, are beautiful by the soul which gives them a form. It is still the soul which beautifies the bodies to which is ascribed this perfection; being a divine essence, and participating in beauty, when she seizes an object, or subjects it to her dominion, she gives to it the beauty that the nature of this object enables it to receive. Guthrie, No. 1, I, p. 50.

<sup>94</sup> *Enneads* V, 8, 2; Bréhier, V, p. 137. Whence comes the beauty of so many women comparable to Venus? Whence came the beauty of Venus herself? Guthrie, No. 31, II, p. 553.

spirit of those acts and virtues. Thus, there is in nature a *μóρφη* that is the model of the beauty which is in bodies. In the sensible world there are imperfections, ugliness which are faulty realizations of the intelligible world. Corporeal beauty is relative beauty. Beauty in the sensible object is a certain quality added to essence, to being, because of a certain perfection of form. This quality is perceived by the senses of sight and hearing. Therefore Beauty results from some measure of participation in an ideal form by the object, an intelligible form *μóρφη* imprinted by the *λόγος* recognized by the mind.

Ἔστιν οὖν καὶ ἐν τῇ φύσει λόγος κάλλους ἀρχέτυπος τοῦ ἐν σώματι, τοῦ δ' ἐν τῇ φύσει ὁ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καλλίων, παρ' οὗ καὶ ὁ ἐν τῇ φύσει. Ἐναργέστατός γε μὴν ὁ ἐν σπουδαίᾳ ψυχῇ καὶ ἤδη προῶν καλλεῖ· κοσμήσας γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ φῶς παρὰσχῶν ἀπὸ φωτὸς μείζονος πρῶτως κάλλους ὄντος συλλογίζεσθαι ποιεῖ αὐτὸς ἐν ψυχῇ ὢν, οἷός ἐστιν ὁ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ὁ οὐκέτι ἐγγιγνόμενος οὐδ' ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῷ. Διὸ οὐδὲ λόγος ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ ποιητὴς τοῦ πρῶτου λόγου κάλλους ἐν ὕλῃ ψυχικῇ ὄντος· νοῦς δὲ οὗτος, ὁ αἰεὶ νοῦς καὶ οὐ ποτε νοῦς, ὅτι μὴ ἐπακτὸς αὐτῷ.<sup>95</sup>

Neo-Platonism has been called a philosophy of perfection.<sup>96</sup> Perfection is the basis, the substance and the aim of its theoretical and practical investigation.<sup>97</sup> It is its principle, not in the sense of a metaphysical basis or as a deductive basis of a theory, but in the original sense of the word. The aim of its adherents is to divest themselves of the material and earthly elements due to generation and, on the other hand, by increasing in worth, to approach closer to their pristine simplicity, beauty and goodness.<sup>98</sup> In their philosophy of perfection, this pattern emerges from an analysis of the teaching of its foremost exponent, Plotinus. At the head of all being is the One. In the soul of man, as in everything, there is a yearning, a ceaseless, insatiable desire which nothing here below can stifle or satisfy. The object of that desire and yearning is the One, the Good and the Beautiful, the soul's principle and end. That yearning, innate in man, is awakened in the soul by the sight and contemplation of sensible beauty. From it the soul rises to a knowledge of the Beautiful and the Good of the Intelligible World. The first step in the ascent of the soul is a purification of self, a divesting of the material, the sensible which is its prison and tomb, and the acquisition of virtue. The object of this purification is to return the soul, as far as possible, to the condition of unity, beauty and goodness that obtained in it before its descent into matter, to reestablish the resemblance it had to the principle from which it had been separated by generation. In

<sup>95</sup> *Enneads* V, 8, 3; Bréhier, V, p. 138. The reason of the beauty in nature is the archetype of the beauty of the (bodily) organism. Nature herself, however, (is the image of the) more beautiful archetypal "reason" which resides in the (universal) Soul, from which it is derived. This latter shines more brilliantly in the virtuous soul, whenever it develops therein. It adorns the soul, and imparts to her a light itself derived from a still higher Light, that is, primary Beauty. The universal Soul's beauty thus inhering in the individual soul, explains the reason of the Beauty superior to it, a reason which is not adventitious, and which is not posited in anything other than itself, but which dwells within itself. Consequently it is not a "reason", but really the creating principle of the primary Reason, that is, the beauty of the soul, which in respect to the soul plays the part of matter. It is, in the last analysis, Intelligence, which is eternal and immutable because it is not adventitious.

Guthrie, No. 31, II, p. 555.

<sup>96</sup> Alexandre Koyré, *L'Idée de Dieu dans la philosophie de St. Anselme* (Paris, 1923), pp. 64 ff.

<sup>97</sup> Nous employons le mot perfection comme équivalent au terme allemand "Wert", "Philosophie der Werte", "Valor". Koyré, *op. cit.*, p. 64, n. 3.

<sup>98</sup> La perfection est pour les Néoplatoniciens l'objet de recherches incessantes, de préoccupations constantes, préoccupations et recherches pratiques, aussi bien que spéculative et théoriques. Ils envisagent tout, le monde, la nature, l'homme et la vie, *sub specie perfectionis*. Ils croient à la réalité de la perfection, à l'existence réelle, et même, supra-réelle de la Perfection Absolue, dont ils s'efforcent de s'approcher autant que possible. Il veulent non seulement la connaître, mais encore, et surtout, s'unir à elle, y participer, la vivre et la réaliser en eux-mêmes. Koyré, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-65.



this state, the soul is able to recollect itself, to contemplate the Intelligible World and thence to rise to the contemplation of the One. In this vision of and contact with the One is effected the union of the soul with the One. That is its destiny. There the soul is in a state of blessedness and happiness and possesses to the full virtue and goodness.

Now, if we were to set aside the philosophical content of the teaching of Plotinus, to divorce the skeleton framework from his doctrine and consider Neo-Platonism simply as a thought-pattern, a philosophy of life, that thought-pattern would resolve itself into an upward surge of the soul towards a superior object, an object that the soul loves and with which it yearns incessantly to unite itself. That framework or way of thinking was familiar to the era of the troubadours; it was the philosophy of their age and the ages that had preceded them. We suggest that, whatever be the inspiration that led them to write their love lyrics, when they did write of love, they wrote according to the thought-pattern with which they were familiar and which was, as it were, second nature to them. Much in the same way, we say that today we are materially and mechanically minded and tend to think in terms of material worth, machinery, and so on. In that same way, we suggest that the thoughts and the ideals of love of the troubadours fell into the mold of thought that is at the bottom of Neo-Platonism. On the basis of that suggestion and supposition, substitute for the One, the superior being and the source of all good, the lady who is the object of the troubadour lyric; for the individual soul, the poet or lover; for the yearning of the soul to be united with the One, a yearning that is productive of every good since it is its source, the love and yearning of the poet for his beloved; for the purification of the soul, the preliminary to its ascent, the lover's attempt to make himself worthy of his beloved: we suggest that that framework or skeleton of Courtly Love fits exactly into the mold of the framework of Neo-Platonism as exemplified in the teaching of Plotinus.

#### IV. *PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS, ERIUGENA*

The works of pseudo-Dionysius were available to the West from the late ninth Century on through the translation made of them by John Scotus Eriugena. We have already alluded to their popularity and to the influence exerted by them.<sup>1</sup> An analysis of his teaching on the ascent of the soul to God and its union with Him, as taught especially in the treatise *De Divinis Nominibus*, betrays the pattern already found in the doctrine of Plotinus on the one hand, and in the doctrine of Courtly Love on the other.

There are two ways of stating the nature of God: the positive and the negative. The first consists in attributing to God all the perfections which are revealed in creatures; thus God may be called Being, Good, Light, Unity. The second method consists in correcting the first by way of negation, that is by denying any imperfect mode of realization on the part of God of these perfections; thus God may be called non-Being, non-Good and so on. But God is absolutely above our knowledge and the names which are applied to Him are inadequate symbols of that which transcends all thought, all existence, every attribute. These names are not mere symbols, since they do denote a reality, but they belong properly to creatures. In speaking of God, therefore, Dionysius uses the prefix *super-*: He is super-Essence, super-Unity etc. By it he would exclude the notion of plurality, since even the title of the Good, the One suggests distinctions and so plurality. God is absolute in the sense that He is infinitely transcendent and unknowable. Thus super-Essence would mean

<sup>1</sup> pp. 34-38.

that God is beyond personality, beyond finite personal existence, wholly infinite and absolute on a plane where there is nothing whatever besides Himself:

Sicut enim incomprehensibilia et incontemplabilia sunt sensibilibus invisibilia, et his, quae sunt in figmento et similitudine, simpla et non simulata, et secundum corporum figuras formatis incorporealia intacta et non figurata informitas: juxta eandem veritatis rationem superat essentias superessentialis magnitudo, et animos super animum unitas, et omnibus virtutibus impossibile est quod super sensum est arcanumque rationi omni super rationale bonum, unitas unifica omnis unitatis, et superessentialis essentia, et intellectus invisibilis, et verbum arcanum, irrationabilitas, et invisibilitas, et innominabilitas secundum nullum eorum, quae sunt, ens, et causale quidem essendi omnibus: ipsum autem non  $\delta \nu$ , ut omnis essentiae summitas, et utcumque ipsa de seipsa proprie et scienter manifestat.<sup>2</sup>

To explain external reality, Dionysius does not posit intermediary beings,—the Nous, the World Soul,—to which Plotinus had recourse. While preserving His perfect transcendence, God is the *omnium est causa, et principium, et essentia, et vita*.<sup>3</sup> Dionysius says of the Godhead:

Quomodo vero ut bonitatis subsistentia ipsius esse omnium, quae sunt, est causa optima principalis divinitatis providentia ex omnibus causativis laudandum, quoniam et circa ipsam omnia, et propter ipsam, et ipsa est ante omnia, et omnia in ipsa constituta sunt.<sup>4</sup>

Creation is an overflowing of God's Goodness, as it were an overflowing of the super-Unity into multiplicity, pouring Itself out into being. The Good sends forth its rays to all things:

Etenim sicut quidem qui secundum nos est sol, non cogitans aut praeeligens, sed eo esse illuminat omnia, quae participare lumen ejus secundum propriam potentia sunt rationem, sic et optimum super solem, ut super obscuram imaginem excellenter principale exemplum, ipsi subsistentiae omnibus existentibus proportionaliter permittit totius bonitatis radios.<sup>5</sup>

The existence of the whole creation,—angels, men, animals and vegetables, inorganic matter,—is in the Good. It has not made them in the ordinary sense, but they are grounded in it and draw their existence from it and would not exist but for it. They exist not through any particular activity that It exerts, but solely because It is:

Et haec omnia per optimum animantur et vivificantur.<sup>6</sup>

In the Beautiful and Good is the beginning and end of all things:

<sup>2</sup> Our references to Dionysius are from the translation made by Eriugena: *Sancti Dionysii Areopagitae De Divinis Nominibus*, PL 122, 1113-1172, and to the English translation made by C. E. Rolt, *Dionysius the Areopagite on the Divine Names and the Mystical Theology* (Macmillan, New York,

1920). Ch. I, PL 122, 1113C; Rolt I, 1, pp. 52-53.

<sup>3</sup> Ch. I, PL 122, 1114C; Rolt I, 3, p. 55.

<sup>4</sup> Ch. I, PL 122, 1116D; Rolt I, 5, p. 60.

<sup>5</sup> Ch. IV, PL 122, 1129A; Rolt IV, 1, p. 87.

<sup>6</sup> Ch. IV, PL 122, 1130A; Rolt IV, 2, p. 89.

omnia quae sunt, ex bono et optimo, et omnia, quae non sunt, super-essentialiter in bono et optimo.<sup>7</sup>

There is an order in the participation of the Godhead; angels are more perfect than men because they participate in the Good more closely, and so on down the scale of creation:

Et est, ut arbitror, hoc votum, quia magis ipsi sunt proximiora et diviniore reliquis.<sup>8</sup>

But while standing thus in relation with creation, God retains His transcendent unity, distinct from His creation:

Sic enim omnium summitatis divina bonitas a sublimissimis et maximis essentiis usque ad novissima pervenit, et adhuc super omnes est, neque his, quae sursum sunt, anticipantibus ejus excellentiam, neque his quae deorsum sunt, ambitum transgredientibus; sed et illuminat potentia omnia.<sup>9</sup>

But in another sense, God touches another region, the region of relations and is, therefore, related to that region. That relation is manifested by its creative activity. So God as it were belongs to two worlds, the world of ultimate Reality and that of manifested appearances.

All things have not only being and existence through the emanation of the super-Essence and are conserved in being by It, but all things strive towards God as to their final end in the measure of their capacity:

et illud [bonum] concupiscunt omnia, intellectualia quidem et rationalia scienter, sensuality vero sensibilibus, sensus autem expertia insito motu vitalis appetitus, inanimalia autem et tantummodo existentia ad solam essentialem participationem opportunitate.<sup>10</sup>

The same idea is repeated:

et ipsam [bonitatem] omnia desiderant, intellectualia quidem et rationalia scienter, subjecta vero his sensibilibus, et alia, secundum vitalem motum et essentialem et conditionalem necessitatem.<sup>11</sup>

Thus angels and men, animals and vegetables, all inorganic matter, possess by the very fact of their existence an urge towards the 'source of their being which is God. Not only is there a desire in all things towards the supreme Good, but there is a mutual desire of things among themselves because of the participation of the Good that is in them:

Omnibus igitur est bonum et optimum concupiscibile et amabile et delectabile, et per ipsum et propter ipsum minora et meliora conversibiliter amant, et sociative aequiformia. aequae honorabiliora, et meliora minora provide, et haec semetipsa quaeque connexe et omnia bonum et optimum desiderantia facit . . .<sup>12</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Ch. IV, PL 122, 1134B; Rolt IV, 10, p. 101.

<sup>8</sup> Ch. V, PL 122, 1148A; Rolt V, 3, p. 134.

<sup>9</sup> Ch. IV, PL 122, 1130C; Rolt IV, 4, p. 91.

<sup>10</sup> Ch. IV, PL 122, 1131B; Rolt IV, 4, p. 93.

<sup>11</sup> Ch. I, PL 122, 1117A; Rolt I, 5, p. 60.

<sup>12</sup> Ch. IV, PL 122, 1134C; Rolt IV, 10, p. 101.

Just as the Good descends to all creatures even to the lowest, so also It mounts from the lowest upwards through the grades of being, all creatures pressing upwards according to the nature of each. Dionysius speaks clearly of this ascending and descending movement:

Age nunc et has iterum in unum congregantes, dicamus, quia una quaedam est simplex virtus, seipsam movens ad unitivam quamdam temperantiam, ex optimo usque existentium novissimum, et ab illo iterum consequenter per omnia usque optimum ex seipsa, et per seipsam, et ad seipsam seipsam revolvens, et in seipsam semper eodem modo revoluta.<sup>13</sup>

Dionysius equates this yearning that is common to all creatures with love as it is used by sacred writers in divine revelation:

Et est hoc virtutis unificae et conjunctivae, et differenter contemperativae in bono et optimo, per bonum et optimum antesubstitutae, ex bono et optimo per bonum et optimum editae, continentis quidem aequipotentia secundum sociabilem vicissitudinem, moventis autem prima ad minorum providentiam, et collocantis inferiora conversione superioribus.<sup>14</sup>

It is real yearning as contrasted with earthly, human desire:

Pulchre enim vere amore non a nobis tantum, sed et ab eloquiis ipsis laudato, multitudines non capientes uniforme amatoriae divinae nominationis, proprie semetipsos in partibile et corporale et dividuum labefecerunt, cum non sit verus amor, sed umbra, aut magis casus vero amore.<sup>15</sup>

But the use of the word *amor* has its value insofar as it may lead to a knowledge of true yearning:

Remotum enim est multitudine singulare divini et unius amoris. Ideo et sic difficiliter nomen multis putatum in divina sapientia statuitur, et ad reductionem eorum et restitutionem in veri amoris notitiam, et ita, ut absolvetur in ipso difficultas.<sup>16</sup>

The very use of the word causes men to penetrate beyond the words to the mystery hinted at by it. To sum up, Dionysius quotes from the *Hymn* of Hirotheus:

Amorem sive divinum, sive angelicum, sive intellectualem, sive animale, sive naturalem dicamus, unitivam quandam et continuativam intelligemus virtutem, superiora quidem moventem in providentiam inferiorum, aequiformia iterum in sociabilem vicissitudinem, et novissima subjecta ad meliorum et superpositorum conversionem.<sup>17</sup>

God is called desire or yearning by reason of the Good and the Beautiful in creatures of which He is the source and preserver:

Audendum autem et hoc pro veritate dicere, quia et omnium causalis

<sup>13</sup> Ch. IV, PL 122, 1137C; Rolt IV, 17, p. 109.

<sup>14</sup> Ch. IV, PL 122, 1136A; Rolt IV, 12, p. 105.

<sup>15</sup> Ch. IV, PL 122, 1135C; Rolt IV, 12, pp. 104-105.

<sup>16</sup> Ch. IV, PL 122, 1135C-D; Rolt IV, 12, p. 105.

<sup>17</sup> Ch. IV, PL 122, 1137A; Rolt IV, 15, pp. 107-108.

bonorum et optimorum omnium amore per excellentiam amatoriae bonitatis habitudine sua fit, in existentia omnia providentiis, et ut bonitate et dilectione et amore fovetur, et ex super omnia et omnibus remoto ad unum omnibus deducitur juxta mente excedentem superessentialem virtutem redeuntem semetipso.<sup>18</sup>

Desire or yearning as it exists in the social instinct in men, in animals, in the impulse of mutual attraction in the inanimate world, in the desire of the spirit for truth and beauty, and above all in the desire for the Good and the Beautiful is described by Dionysius from the same Hymn:

Quoniam ex uno multos amores ordinavimus, consequenter diximus, quales quidem eorum, qui in mundo sunt, et supermundalium amorum et scientiae et virtutes, quos supereminet secundum redditam rationis speculationem, intellectualium et invisibilium amorum ordines et dispositiones, post quos per se intelligentes, et si qui vere ibi bonis amoribus superapparent et hymnum proprie hymnizant. Et nunc iterum recipientes omnes in unum et complicitum amorem, et omnium ipsorum patrem convolvamus simul et congregemus ex multis, primo in duas comprehendentes eum amatorias universaliter virtutes, quarum potentatur et principatur omnino ex omnium summitate omnis amoris immensurabilis causa, et ad quam extenditur connaturaliter unicuique existentium ab existentibus omnibus universalis amor.<sup>19</sup>

Whether the yearning be of God or of creatures, they are one for the same Hymn states:

Agè nunc et has iterum in unum congregantes, dicamus, quia una quaedam est simplex virtus, seipsam movens ad unitivam quamdam temperantiam, ex optimo usque existentium novissimum, et ab illo iterum consequenter per omnia usque optimum ex seipsa, et per seipsam, et ad seipsam seipsam revolvens, et in seipsam semper eodem modo revoluta.<sup>20</sup>

The object of the universal desire in creatures is the Good, or, as Dionysius sometimes states, the Beautiful and the Good. The Beautiful imparts to things harmony and splendor and order in unity. If we compare it to the Good, we may infer that the Good is the efficient cause while the Beautiful is the exemplary cause of created things. God as Good gives being; as the Beautiful He gives harmony and splendor, and order in unity to created things. Dionysius does not always make clear cut the distinction, and it is worth while to quote at some length his own words on the nature of Beauty and the Beautiful:

Hoc optimum laudatur a sacris theologis, ut bonum, et ut pulchrum, et ut dilectio, et ut dilectissimum, et quaecunque aliae decentes sunt formificae et gratiosae speciositatis divinae nominationes. Bonum autem et pulchrum non separandum in ipsa in uno omnia comprehendenti causa. Haec enim in existentibus omnibus in participationes et participantia dividentes, bonum quidem esse dicimus pulchri particeps, pulchrum vero participationem pulchrificae omnium bonorum causae. Superessentiale autem bonum pulchrum quidem dicitur, propter ab eo omnibus existentibus traditam proprio unicuique pulchritudinem, et velut omnium bene compactionis et claritatis causale, instar lucis fulminans simul omnibus pulchrificas

<sup>18</sup> Ch. IV, PL 122, 1136B; Rolt IV, 13, p. 106. 108-109.

<sup>19</sup> Ch. IV, PL 122, 1137B-C; Rolt IV, 16, pp. <sup>20</sup> Ch. IV, PL 122, 1137C; Rolt IV, 17, p. 109.

fontalis radii sui traditiones, et velut omnia ad seipsum vocans. Inde et pulchrum dicitur, et velut tota in totis se congregans. Et bonum vero, sicut omne bonum simul, et plus quam bonum, et semper  $\delta\nu$  secundum eadem et similiter bonum . . . sed ut ipsum, per ipsum, cum ipso, uniforme semper  $\delta\nu$  bonum, et ut omnis boni fontem et pulchritudinem supereminenter in semetipso praeferens.<sup>21</sup>

Thus the ultimate nature of all beautiful things is a simple and super-natural element common to them all and manifested in them all. The true beauty of all beautiful things is outside them in God. Dionysius continues:

Simpla enim et superexcellenti omnium bonorum natura omnis pulchritudo et omne bonum uniformiter secundum causam ante subsistit. Ex bono ipso omnibus existentibus esse secundum propriam rationem singula quaeque bona, et per bonum omnium copulationes et amicitiae et societates, et bono omnia adunantur, et principium omnium bonum, velut factivum causale, et movens omnia, et continens ea propriae pulchritudinis amore, et summum omnium et dilectissimum, velut perfectivum causale—propter enim bonum omnia fiunt—et exemplabile, quia secundum ipsum omnia segregantur. Ideo et ad ipsum est optimum bonum, quia bonum et optimum juxta omnem causam omnia concupiscunt, et non est quid existentium, quod non participat bonum et optimum . . . Hoc unum et optimum et bonum singulariter est omnium multorum bonorum et optimorum causale.<sup>22</sup>

By a downward movement, by emanation of the Good, man has his being, life, consciousness and reason,—his personality. By an upward movement, back to the Good, that personality will be transformed. Man's goal in this upward movement is union with God:

Est autem et ecstaticus divinus amor, non sinens seipsos esse amantes, sed amandorum.<sup>23</sup>

The means of arriving at this union is contemplation. The process is well indicated by Dionysius in the beginning of the *Mystica Theologia*:

Tu autem, o amice Timothee, circa mysticas speculationes corroborato itinere et sensus desere, et intellectuales operationes, et sensibilia, et invisibilia, et omne non ens, et ens; et ad unitatem, ut possibile, inscius restituere ipsius, qui est super omnem essentiam et scientiam. Ea enim teipso et omnibus immensurabili et absoluto pure mentis excessu ad superessentialem divinarum tenebrarum radium, omnia deserens et ab omnibus absolutus ascendes.<sup>24</sup>

As indicated, then there are two paths that one must climb: one a stripping of self, of sense and intellect, of all that is in the world; the other, a spiritual concentration of the soul, a spiritual activity.

The first is a *via negativa* of which Dionysius speaks in the *Theologia Mystica*, a way of purification.<sup>25</sup> The ground plan of the negative way is a process, so to speak, from the particular to the universal. Man knows God not in His

<sup>21</sup> Ch. IV, PL 122, 1132A-C; Rolt IV, 7, pp. 95-96.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, PL 122, 1132C-1133A; Rolt *ibid.* pp. 96-97.

<sup>23</sup> Ch. IV, PL 122, 1136A; IV, 13, p. 105.

<sup>24</sup> Ch. I, PL 122, 1173A; Rolt I, p. 191.

<sup>25</sup> Ch. II, PL 122, 1174B-C; Rolt, II, pp. 195-196.

nature, but as He is revealed to man through creation. His conception of God is built up from what he perceives and by what his mind is able to grasp from the data of sense perceptions. These are aids to mount higher in the knowledge of God by man who is spurred on by his yearning for God:

Cum vero animus per sensibilia reformari festinat ad contemplabiles invisibilitates, pretiosiores omnibus sunt clariores sensibus proventus, lucidiora verba planiora visibilibus, sicut cum non plana sint accumbentia sensibus, neque ipsa anima assistere sensibilia bene poterunt.<sup>26</sup>

And farther on, Dionysius describes the use of sense perception in the ascent of the soul:

Numquid itaque est verum dicere, quia Deum cognoscimus non ex sua natura—incognoscibile enim hoc, et omnem rationem et intellectum superans—sed ex omnium existentium ordinatione, ex ipso praetenta, et imagines quasdam et similitudines divinorum ejus paradigmatum habente, in summum omnium vita et ordine secundum virtutem redeundum omnium ablatione, et eminentia, in omnium causa.<sup>27</sup>

By negation of attributes of creatures, by conceiving the transcendence of God above all created attributes, the mind builds up by discursive reasoning a concept of God wholly immaterial and immutable. In that state the soul contemplates God under the titles of the names described by Dionysius.

Having cast away all that it may draw from outside it, the soul still yearns to pierce the cloud that still hides its goal—the super-essential One. That lies beyond the powers of discursive reasoning, of deduction. The veil is pierced by contemplation whereby the soul seeks to go out of itself, out of its created being into the uncreated object of its contemplation and so to be merged with it. The soul gathers together its powers to achieve the unity it must possess to be like the super-essential One as is possible. In this state akin to that of the angels, it receives a divine intuition that enables it to catch a glimpse of the Super-Essence it desires:

Per quam animae largissimas suas rationes intelligentes, et ad unam intellectualem congregatae puritatem, progrediuntur proprie sibimet via et ordine per immaterialem et impartibilem intelligentiam in unitatem super intellectam.<sup>28</sup>

Through that intuition, and having left behind sense, reasoning and even self, it catches a glimpse of God:

Nunc autem, ut nobis possibile, necessariis quidem in divina symbolis utimur, et ex ipsis iterum in simplam et unitam invisibilium contemplationum veritatem proportionaliter intendimus, et post omnem secundum nos deiformium intelligentiam requiescentes nostras intellectuales operationes, in superessentialem radium, secundum quod justum est, immittemus, in quo omnes fines omnium cognitionum superarcane ante substituti sunt, quem neque intelligere possibile est, neque dicere, neque omnino quomodo contemplari, propter quod omnibus ipse remotus sit et superincognitus . . . Si enim scientiae omnes existentium sunt, et

<sup>26</sup> Ch. IV, PL 122, 1135A-B; Rolt, IV, 11, 151-152.  
p. 103.

<sup>27</sup> Ch. VII, PL 122, 1155B; Rolt VII, 3, pp.

<sup>28</sup> Ch. XI, PL 122, 1165C; Rolt XI, 2, p. 175.

in ea, quae sunt, finem habent, ipsa omni essentia summitas, et omni scientia est remota.<sup>29</sup>

This transcendent spiritual activity that reaches that which is beyond all being is Unknowing. It is the activity whereby the true initiate

in caliginem ignorantiae occidit vere mysticam, per quam docet omnes gnosticas receptiones, in qua omne relucet, et invisibili innascitur qm̄nis, qui est in omnium summitate, et a nullo, neque a seipso, neque altero, omnino autem ignoto omni scientia in otio per id quod melius est intellectus, et nihil cognoscendum super animum sic cognoscentium.<sup>30</sup>

In this state of darkness which is above and beyond every intellect, the distinction of the object and subject of the soul's contemplation vanishes. In knowledge there is the distinction of the thinking subject and the object thought. But in the darkness of Unknowing, that distinction is transcended, and in this state of spiritual reflection the soul is transformed and becomes one with God. Thus in ecstasy the soul accomplishes its quest that its yearning demands.

The likeness between the Plotinian doctrine and the teaching of pseudo-Dionysius on the ascent of the soul to God is striking. God is conceived as the Absolute, the One, the Good, the origin and source of all things. In created things, there is an insatiable yearning to return to that principle. This return is accomplished by contemplation and results in ecstasy wherein the soul is united to God. The preliminary step to contemplation is purification of self and of all sensible things whereby the soul approaches its pristine unity. In that unity, wherein the soul meditates as it were, on the intelligible world and whereby it turns to the simple unity of the One, the soul recollects its powers. In that recollection of its powers which is contemplation, the soul receives an illumination from above and glimpses the One it desires. As a result, the soul rises and in ecstasy is united to God, the source of all virtue and good and is merged with Him. Thus, in both teachings emerges the same thought-pattern: the rise of the soul to God, the yearning of the soul to do so, the union of the soul with God as a result of contemplation.

As we have noted before, that thought-pattern is that of the essential features of Courtly Love. The central idea of Courtly Love is the elevation of the lover to the beloved, the yearning and desire for elevation and eventual union with the beloved, the elimination by the lover of all that might impede the fulfilment of that desire, the ennobling force of love as the source and origin of virtue and good. Parallel to this thought-pattern in Plotinus and Dionysius is the wide separation between creatures and God and the inborn desire of the creature for union with Him. This takes the form of striving to rise out of the world of sense to the contemplation of and union with the Creator. This striving and yearning is accompanied by a process of purification which draws the soul away from the less perfect things of earth to make it apt for union with God, the Beautiful and the Good. A comparison of the mechanics of the thought-pattern shows their identity.

## V. ALBIGENSIANISM

There was another influence that prevailed in the South of France at the time of the appearance of Courtly Love, an influence that went far in forming

<sup>29</sup> Ch. I, PL 122, 1115D-1116A-B; Rolt I, 4, pp. 58-59.

<sup>30</sup> *Theologia Mystica* I, PL 122, 1174A; Rolt I, p. 194.



the mind of the troubadours. It took the form of a heresy that had as its basis the duality of spirit and matter. Albigensianism raged during the whole of the period of the troubadours and affected the religious beliefs, morality and society of the times. Before the Crusade under Simon de Montfort, it dominated the South of France,<sup>1</sup> and penetrated especially into the noble class, clerics and eventually the common people.<sup>2</sup> Under the name Albigensianism are commonly grouped two sects: the *Cathari*, the adherents of an anti-Christian religion based on the dualism of a good and evil principle; the *Waldenses*, an anti-Catholic Christianity founded on absolute poverty and hatred for the temporal power of the Church. It is with the *Cathari* that we are concerned.

Theologians and inquisitors of the Middle Ages agree in referring to this heresy as Neo-Manicheism.<sup>3</sup> Points of contact between the two in doctrine and practice point unmistakably to filiation whether direct or indirect. Jean Guirard characterized Catharism as a direct continuation of the ancient heresy<sup>4</sup> with its roots in paganism and Greek and Eastern philosophy.<sup>5</sup> Whatever its origins or the road it traced into Southern France, Catharism reached the height of its power and influence in the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries. How much earlier it appeared there is uncertain, but its teachings are in evidence at Orléans at least in 1022 when Robert the Pious condemned to death certain Canons whose errors smacked of Manicheism.<sup>6</sup> In 1119, Calixtus II at the Council of Toulouse denounced as heretical those who denied the Sacraments of Holy Orders, Baptism, Marriage and the Blessed Eucharist, as well as those who followed that teaching.<sup>7</sup> The heresy had reached such strength that Saint Bernard, whose aid had been enlisted by Cardinal Alberic whom Pope Eugene III had charged to combat the heresy, was able to write to Alphonse, Count of Toulouse and Saint Gilles:

Basilicae sine plebibus, plebes sine sacerdotibus, sacerdotes sine debita reverentia sunt, et sine Christo denique Christiani: Sacramenta non sacra censentur . . . Moriuntur homines in peccatis suis: rapiuntur animae passim ad tribunal terrificum, heu! nec poenitentia reconciliati, nec sancta communione muniti. Parvulis Christianorum Christi intercluditur vita, dum Baptismi negatur gratia . . . O infelicissimum populum!<sup>8</sup>

These were the conditions Saint Bernard found at Toulouse, Albi and other centres of Provence. In 1163 Alexander III at the Council of Tours denounced the wide spread heresy in these words:

<sup>1</sup> L'hérésie était pratiquée ouvertement dans tout le Languedoc; son culte y était public, on pourrait presque dire officiel. Jean Guirard, *Histoire de l'inquisition au moyen âge I* (Paris, 1935), p. 261.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Jean Guirard, *op. cit.*, pp. 279-300.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Bernard Gui: *Manuel de l'Inquisiteur*, II, 1: *De erroribus Manicheorum moderni temporis*. Ed. Guillaume Mollat, I (Paris, 1926), p. 10.

<sup>4</sup> Non seulement une résurrection, mais la continuation ininterrompue à travers les siècles, avec ses rites, sa morale, sa théologie et sa philosophie, du manichéisme lui-même. *Revue des questions historiques* LXXV (1904), p. 112.

<sup>5</sup> Le Catharisme n'était donc pas une secte ou une hérésie chrétienne: mais bien la continuation directe et authentique d'un vaste courant religieux dont les origines les plus reculées se perdent dans les époques et dans les régions les plus lointaines. Le bouddhisme et le mazdéisme, le système de Pythagoras et la philosophie alexandrine, la gnose égyptienne grecque et syrienne des

premiers siècles, le manichéisme primitif, sont les ancêtres directs . . . Sa longue fréquentation avec l'Eglise, au milieu de laquelle vécurent longtemps la Gnose et Manès, ainsi que les Parfaits, donnèrent au Catharisme un vernis de Christianisme . . . de bonne foi, sans doute, les Parfaits se croyaient Chrétiens et successeurs des Apôtres. Mais c'étaient là des accidents dans la vie et l'organisation de la secte: bien qu'elle n'en eût plus conscience, le fond de la doctrine était païen. *Cartulaire de Notre-Dame de Prouille précédé d'une étude sur l'albigisme languedocien aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles I* (Paris, 1907), p. ccxxiii.

<sup>6</sup> Jean Guirard, *Histoire de l'inquisition au moyen âge I* (Paris, 1935), p. 2.

<sup>7</sup> Joannes Dominicus Mansi, *Sacrorum Conciliorum Collectio XXI* (Venice, 1776), 226-227.

<sup>8</sup> *Epistola CCXLI, ad Hidelfonsum comitem Sancti Aegidii, de Henrico Haeretico*, PL 182, 434.

In partibus Tolosae damnanda haeresis dudum emersit, quae paulatim more cancri ad vicina loca se diffundens, per Guasconiam et alias provincias quam plurimas jam infect.<sup>9</sup>

By 1177 Raymond V, count of Toulouse described the situation that obtained in his lands—total domination of Catharism:

Elle a pénétré partout. Elle a jeté la discorde dans toutes les familles, divisant le mari et la femme, le fils et le père, la belle-fille et la belle-mère. Les prêtres eux-mêmes cèdent à la contagion. Les églises sont désertes et tombent en ruines. Pour moi, je fais tout le possible pour arrêter un pareil fléau; mais je sens mes forces au-dessous de cette tâche. Les personnages les plus importants de ma terre se sont laissés corrompre. La foule a suivi leur exemple et abandonné la foi, ce qui fait que je n'ose ne puis réprimer le mal.<sup>10</sup>

As explained by Plotinus and pseudo-Dionysius, there was a unity in the Universe. Such unity existed because of a unique principle and goal of all things, establishing the mutual connection and interdependence of all things. But the Catharists reasoned that one must conclude the nature of a cause from its effects and from the nature of these effects go back to the nature of the cause. If the cause is invariable, then the effects must be also. What relation, therefore, can there be between the divinity which is by nature infinite, perfect and eternal, and matter which is essentially finite, imperfect and perishable? How could matter come from the divine? Is it possible that corruption arise from the Incorruptible, the finite from the Infinite, evil from the Good? If creatures are ephemeral and vain, how could they have had a permanent and absolute creator? If they came from a God who is good, why then are they not good as He is good? From this line of reasoning, the Catharists drew this conclusion: it is impossible and even inconceivable that God created this world, whence the necessity of an evil principle to explain the origin and existence of this world of matter, an evil God who has created an evil world. Bernard Gui has defined this doctrine:

Sectatores duos Deos aut duos Dominos asserunt et fatentur, *benignum Deum videlicet et malignum, creationem omnium rerum visibilium et corporalium asserentes non esse factam a Deo Patre celesti, quem dicunt Deum benignum, sed a dyabolo et Sathana, malo Deo, quia ipsum vocant Deum malignum et Deum hujus seculi et principium hujus mundi. Sicque duos ponunt creatores, Deum videlicet et dyabolum, et duas creationes, unam scilicet rerum invisibilium et incorporalium et alteram visibilium et corporalium.*<sup>11</sup>

The *Liber de duobus principiis*, whose principle object is to prove the existence of two principles founds the doctrine on rational and theological grounds:

De duobus autem principiis ad honorem patris sanctissimi volui inchoare, sententiam unius principii reprobando, quamvis hoc sit fere contra omnes religiosos. Sed primo sic. Aut unum tantum est principium principale aut plura uno. Si autem unum fuerit et non plura, ut aiunt imperiti,

<sup>9</sup> Mansi, *Sacrorum Conciliorum Collectio* XXI, 1177.

<sup>10</sup> Quoted from Achille Luchaire, *Innocent III et la croisade des Albigeois* (Paris, 1911),

pp. 7-8.

<sup>11</sup> Bernard Gui, ed. Guillaume Mollat, I, p. 11.

tunc bonum erit necessario sive malum. Malum vero non, quia ipso iam procederent tantum mala et non bona, sicut Christus in evangelio beati Mathei ait: "Mala autem arbor fructus malos facit, non potest arbor bona fructus malos facere, neque arbor mala fructus bonos facere."<sup>12</sup>

Thus from all eternity by natural necessity there have been two worlds: first the heavenly kingdom beyond the sun and the moon where the good God reigns over an infinity of purely spiritual creatures created by Him and sharing in His nature. That is the invisible and supra-sensible world of the blessed. Secondly, there is the sensible, material, terrestrial world created by the evil God. Here it is necessary to make a distinction among the Catharists, a distinction that is important for our inquiry. Certain sects were absolutely dualistic in the sense that they affirmed the eternal coexistence of the two principles, equal in power and each with its own domain and creation. Never could the two meet or be reconciled. On the other hand, there were the partisans of a mitigated dualism who held the existence of the two principles but taught the victory of the good principle at the end of time and thereby saved the unity of God. The first were pagans, the second approached Christianity because they believed in a single God to whose almighty power was reserved the final victory.<sup>13</sup> It is with the second group that we are especially concerned and it is with them that we shall deal mainly.

The Catharists conceived the supra-sensible world, the divine world more or less according to the Neo-Platonic conception. In the *Summa auctoritatum*, a guide to preachers and to inquisitors resuming the doctrine of the heretics and the manner of confronting them, we read:

Au lieu de donner naissance au sein de l'éternité à un Fils unique, la génération du Père avait produit dans sa fécondité infinie une infinité d'êtres éternels comme Lui. Il y avait donc un nombre illimité de Fils de Dieu parmi lesquels étaient l'Esprit-Saint, le plus puissant messager de la cour céleste, qui méritait d'être appelé Dieu puisqu'il procédait éternellement de Dieu, mais qui, d'autre part, était inférieur au Père comme étant sorti de lui pour vivre sous ses ordres, et Jésus-Christ, lui aussi d'origine divine, sans toutefois prétendre à la Toute-Puissance de Dieu. Il en était de même des esprits bienheureux qui formaient la cour céleste et de ceux qui étaient assignés à chaque homme pour les protéger: chérubins, séraphins, anges gardiens, tous au même titre que le Saint-Esprit et Jésus émanations hypostatiques de la substance divine, et fils de Dieu.<sup>14</sup>

Below this invisible world, there was nothing of the divine. Here is the sensible world of matter, of evil, of darkness created by the God of evil and bearing His evil imprint. How then did these two worlds come into contact?

<sup>12</sup> *Un Traité néo-manichéen du XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle, le Liber de duobus principiis*, ed. Antoine Dondaine (Rome, 1939), p. 81. There is an excellent exposition of the doctrine of the Albigensians, pp. 16-26.

<sup>13</sup> Guiraud points out that both sects were opposed to the Catholic Church with equal ardor and that in practice it was difficult to distinguish between them. Their ways of acting were similar and often it was only the leaders and preachers of the heresy who distinguished between the two beliefs. Their great aim was to present a united front against the Catholic Church and they pre-

ferred to insist upon the practices that united them rather than on the theological beliefs that separated them. In the same way, the Inquisition was interested in what separated the heretics from orthodoxy rather than in what separated them from each other. *Histoire de l'Inquisition*, p. 38.

<sup>14</sup> *La Somme des autorités à l'usage des prédicateurs méridionaux*, ed. Célestin Douais (Paris 1896), p. 118. Cf. Jean Guiraud, *Histoire de l'Inquisition*, p. 40. The *Summa* was a guide to preachers and inquisitors resuming the doctrines of the heretics and the manner of confronting them.

the Good with the evil, the Absolute and the relative, the Infinite with the finite? It was through Satan who is identified as the God of evil, the prince of this world. By means of myths the Catharists taught that Satan seduced angelic spirits of the heavenly kingdom by pride and luxury, warred against the God of good, and descended to this world to found his kingdom of evil.

In explaining the creation of the world, the adherents of absolute dualism taught creation *ex nihilo* by Satan. As matter, the world must have a beginning and as evil it must take its origin from an evil principle. Thus the devil alone and without aid drew the world from the four elements. There was and could be no collaboration between the Good God and the evil in the creation of a world fundamentally evil. The mitigated dualists, however, professed a different doctrine. They tried to reconcile the existence of a good and evil principle in the work of creation by subordinating the latter to the former:

Ils disent et enseignent que la substance des quatre éléments visibles, à savoir le feu, l'air, l'eau et la terre, n'a pas eu de commencement et n'aura pas de fin. Le prince de ce monde, qui est Satan, ou l'antique serpent, a séparé ces quatre éléments visibles et les a décorés d'un soleil, d'une lune et d'étoiles, comme nous le montrent les yeux du corps . . . De ces éléments inférieurs, le diable, prince de ce monde, a fait et continue de faire, chaque jour, tous les corps sensibles, ceux des hommes comme ceux de toutes choses . . . La nature visible est née et naît chaque jour de ces éléments inférieurs par la vertu, la puissance et la crainte de ce Dieu mauvais.<sup>15</sup>

There are two elements in creation,—a formless, eternal matter and an evil being which informs it. This evil God does not appear as a creating God but as a Demiurge. The evil God has not drawn the world from Himself but from a matter coexistent with Himself. Hence the superiority of the Good God over the evil one. In the *Summa auctoritatum* it is stated directly that Satan has been but the instrument or the agent of creation through the permission and concession of God:

Et maxima eorum multitudo confitentur Deum omnipotentem fecisse hec omnia, non per se sed per diabolum tanquam per ministrum. Et dicunt quod diabolus, cum sapientia et virtute sibi collata ab Omnipotente in creatione, hec omnia fecisse concessione Dei.<sup>16</sup>

They resort again to myths to show that the world came into existence through the devil working in collaboration with God.

The Catharists recognized man as a union of body and soul. Through his body he belonged to the world of matter over which Satan reigned; by his soul to the world of spirit which proceeded from God. The Catharist doctrine concerning the union of body and soul is not very different from that of the Neo-Platonists. The soul is in the body as a prisoner without being a principle of unity. Body and soul which constitute man can never be reconciled in substantial union any more than other contraries such as good and evil, God and Satan. How then did such a union of diametrically opposed elements come about? Again the Catharists have recourse to myths. In their various attempts to explain man's origin, there is always the body formed by Satan requiring the soul to vivify it. For some, that soul was an angelic spirit of the celestial world trapped and imprisoned in the body by Satan; for others, the soul was

<sup>15</sup> *La Somme des autorités*, ed. cit., pp. 115-116. Cf. Jean Guiraud, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.* p. 124. Cf. Jean Guiraud, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

sent to the body by God at the request of Satan. In both explanations subsequent souls were generated from these spirits in the same way as is the body. For another group, God as punishment placed angels who had rebelled against Him before the creation of man into bodies created by Satan to vivify them and also to give these angels an opportunity to repent through penance. Finally, there was the explanation that Satan imprisoned these rebellious spirits into bodies without God's permission and in order to stifle their longing to return to their celestial home:

Isti spiritus, qui recordantur de gloria, quam perdiderunt, propterea rogant Patrem s., ut eis misereatur, ego dabo eis tunicas, quibus induti non recordabuntur de cetero de gloria, quam perdiderunt.<sup>17</sup>

Thus the soul keeping its divine nature and its regret for its lost glory is in fact a God fallen from the heavens. That soul yearns to return to its celestial home through penance. To keep his prey, Satan blinds it and incarcerates it in the material prison of its body, a prison that impedes its escape towards God. God in His mercy wishes to aid these imprisoned souls by giving them an opportunity of expiating and repairing their crime.

Thus, the great business of life was to assure the soul its escape from the body on one hand, and secondly to avoid all impurity which might sink the body deeper into its natural impurity. Life becomes a time of purification and of trial. Should the soul be surprised by death before it has accomplished its purification, provision was made in the doctrine of the Catharists for its continuance in further bodies by metempsychosis:

animae quae non servaverunt mandata Dei nec compleverunt justitiam sunt de corpore in corpus, donec complerint justitiam, quae completa, omnes redibunt ad gloriam Dei Patris.<sup>18</sup>

When the soul had accomplished the cycle of its purification, it detached itself from the body to regain its lost glory and escaped from the domination of Satan to return to its first principle. The essence of purification was to separate the soul from the body, from matter, to free the soul from that impurity which was a bar to its return to its heavenly home. The soul in the body was a captive and in torment. It could find peace again only in regaining its spiritual life, and that by separating itself from its body. Thus the divorce of these two irreconcilable elements was the gateway to happiness. Death was looked upon as a deliverance from this prison. All that preceded death, all that retarded it was to be avoided. Human actions, actions of a corrupted body, bore in themselves the stigmata of its corruption. Besides natural death, there were two other means that insured the freedom of the soul: suicide, a means of the physical order; nirvana, of the spiritual order. Those who wished to attain their happiness quickly and decisively might do so through suicide. Since death freed the soul, naturally it would be desired with the least delay; it would be sought for and, if it eluded one, would be self-inflicted. Hence suicide was looked upon as the surest means towards spiritual perfection. There are records of many methods of suicide, but the *endura*, hunger strike, seems to have been favored.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>17</sup> *Dokumente vornehmlich für Geschichte der Valdesier und Katharer*, ed. Ign. v. Döllinger in *Beiträge zur Sektengeschichte des Mittelalters*, zweiter Teil, (Munich, 1890), p. 151. Cf. also *Somme des autorités*, ed. cit., p. 118.

<sup>18</sup> *Dokumente vornehmlich für Geschichte der Valdesier und Katharer*, p. 31.

<sup>19</sup> Guiraud rightly remarks that though suicide was the logical outcome of their doctrine, its practice does not seem to have been general. It is not even mentioned in

There was a method advocated by the Catharists of reaching the happiness they sought even in this life,—nirvana. Abstracting themselves from the body through loss of sensibility of the exterior world, even of consciousness of their own existence, they lived the life of a pure spirit, untrammelled by the material life and exigencies of the body they abhorred. In that state, the soul tasted the delights that were destined to it in the heavenly world of its destiny. That was to consummate even in this life the divorce of the body and soul. If in reality the soul was still joined to the body in that state, at least they were not conscious of the union. Such as attained to this state were looked upon as saints and models to be copied.

But this perfection was not for the generality of men. Theirs was rather a more leisurely, less heroic mode of life. They were aware that their destiny consisted in this, namely that their soul should finally be reintegrated in the beatitude it had lost through its fall into its material body, and that this world was a time of purification for that soul to be accomplished in this life. It behoved them, then, to work out their salvation through purification, either by the most rigid asceticism as did the *Perfecti*, or by the more or less faithful adherence to the abstinence affected by the simple believers. The essence of this asceticism lay in the abstinence from anything that might sink the soul deeper into impurity and the use of all that might facilitate the freeing of the soul from the body.

To that end, therefore, they abstained from all food that was the result of physical generation: meats, eggs, milk, etc.:

Asserunt praefati haeretici, carnibus vesci esse mortale peccatum.<sup>20</sup>

Food arisen from such an act was essentially impure, first since generation of matter was impure and, secondly, such food not only rendered the soul impure but excited it to concupiscence and impurity:

Caro descendit a carne sensitiva, immunditia, per luxuriam; immundis autem non est utendum. Item, caro praebet fomentum luxuriae, et ideo a carnibus abstinendum est, quia ab omnibus quae praebent incitamenta peccati, abstinendum est.<sup>21</sup>

Moreover in animals might be souls who in the process of metempsychosis were undergoing purification. To kill animals was as great a crime as killing a man. Not only did they follow a vegetarian regime, but they fasted assiduously, severely, and frequently. Fasting, too, was an aid toward preserving absolute chastity.

Original sin was, in reality, the selfish satisfaction of passion; that was the forbidden fruit of paradise, and man must repair the fault by abstaining from luxury of every kind. In fact, fornication and adultery were not so great sins as marriage, because marriage was a state of sin. They condemned marriage because through marriage and the procreation of children man and woman contributed to and continued the work of Satan. Impurity is secret, is ephemeral, but in marriage the sin is open; one does not think of giving it up, so it is permanent. All sexual intercourse was evil, but concubinage was less evil and more tolerable than marriage.

the various *Summa* that list the errors of the heretics (except for an allusion to it in Bernard Gui's *Manuel*). He concludes that the Catharists, while recognizing the beauty of suicide, did not dare to preach its general practice and that the inherent love of life and a fatalistic conception of

life limited its practice. Cf. *Histoire de l'Inquisition*, p. 82 and *Cartulaire de Notre-Dame de Prouille*, p. lxiii.

<sup>20</sup> Alanus de Insulis, *Contra Hereticos*, I, 74, PL 210, 376.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*

Catharist asceticism implied suffering, struggle, self-renunciation, sacrifice. Its object was to free oneself from the domination of matter and to free the soul from its prison. Purification is physical, moral and spiritual, a result of their conception of this world, their metaphysics and theology. This purification does not result in the rupture of the will with the evil that has captivated its desire, but it consists in the physical and spiritual detachment which forcefully and sacrificially separates two elements one of which obscures the vision of the other. There is indeed moral renunciation, efforts toward liberation with a view to moral perfection. But even with these results, the purification is a static thing in so far as the soul remains unchanged. Angelic and divine before its fall into matter, it remains angelic and divine to the same degree after its purification.

In the philosophy, theology and consequent morality of the Albigensians we see emerge once more the thought-pattern characteristic of Neo-Platonism and of Courtly Love. We have the soul, of divine origin, imprisoned in its material body, whose whole object is to free itself of the body, the source of evil, to return to its permanent abode, the source of all good. One of the essentials steps towards that return is purification, abstention from all material things and cultivation of purity in living and thinking. That will facilitate the return of the soul. Leaving aside the question whether Catharist dualism was inspired by Plotinian Neo-Platonism, the two systems have much in common in their conclusions on the composition of the universe, the notion of purification, the union of body and soul and the final end of the soul. If, for Plotinus, the dominant problem is to assimilate all beings to the One, while for the Catharists it is to reconcile the notion of the Infinite with the finite, the Good to evil, for both the problem is based on the idea they have of the world. If for Plotinus purification of the soul is a result of dialectics while for the Catharists it is self-denial, for both it is metaphysically necessary. If for Plotinus the union of body and soul is juxtaposition while for the Catharists it is a reception, for both that union is effected at the expense of the soul. For both the problem of life is to free the soul from the dominance of the material world and to return it to its origin and source. To that end there is a yearning and desire of the soul for its origin and source.

## VI. ARABIC MYSTICISM: SUFISM

There is little agreement on the extent of the influence of Arabic poetry on the formation of the Provencal lyric. Opinions range from that of Jeanroy<sup>1</sup> who denies any influence to that of a critic such as Ecker<sup>2</sup> who believes that the troubadour lyric is simply a transplanting and logical continuation of the

<sup>1</sup> Alfred Jeanroy, *La Poésie lyrique des troubadours I* (Paris, 1934), pp. 75-76 and II, p. 367. Cf., however, A. R. Nykl, *Troubadour Studies, a Critical Survey of Recent Books Published in this Field* (Cambridge, Mass., 1944), p. 15. Nykl indicates that Jeanroy, in a private talk with the author, showed himself to be much less dogmatic and had softened his views on Arabic influence considerably.

<sup>2</sup> Lawrence Ecker, *Arabischer, provenzalischer und deutscher Minnesang* (Berlin, 1934). Die Wahrscheinlichkeit der Entlehnung wird sich sogar zugunsten des Arabischen erhöhen, wenn es durch Untersuchungen wie die vorliegende gelingt, das christliche Minnesangssystem als eine Verpflanzung und logische Fortsetzung des arabischen zu erweisen, da mit dem System

auch einzelne dichterische Gedanken oder Bilder fast unvermeidlich mit übernommen werden mussten. Pp. 107-108.

Cf. the review of this work by Joseph Hell in *Orientalische Literaturzeitung* XXXVIII (1935), pp. 139 ff. Ecker's assertion of the continuity of the Arabic lyric from the time of Bedouin poetry is not accepted. Pre-Islamic love poetry is essentially sensual, centred on the possession of the beloved. Later love poetry, which begins after 900 is more spiritual in character. A distinction, too, must be made between those motifs that are essential to the love lyric and those that are human and universal and so unessential and unimportant in pointing to relationship. Cf. Käthe Axhausen, *Ueber den Ursprung der provenzalischen Lyrik* (Diss. Marburg, 1937), pp. 71-75.

Arabic. As in most questions, possibly the truth would seem to lie midway between the two extremes.<sup>3</sup> It is generally conceded that the troubadour lyric has in common with the Arabic a large number of situations, parallels and conceits. For some, that is an indication of relationship and influence.<sup>4</sup> The influence of the Andalusian popular lyric form on the verse of the earlier troubadours seems fairly certain;<sup>5</sup> less apparent and more contested is the influence of Andalusian music on the troubadours.<sup>6</sup>

We are concerned, however, not with the origin of the exterior form and literary framework of the Provencal lyric, but with the origin or formation of the troubadour conception of love. To evaluate the part that Arabic literature has played on that formation and the extent of its influence, our surest guide will be again the thought-pattern or scheme of ideas essential to Courtly Love. The question resolves itself into this: is Arabic love poetry and literature characterized by the ennobling power of love, the elevation of the beloved above the lover, the surge upwards of the lover to the beloved, the idea of love as desire? If Arabic love poetry and literature fit into the mold characteristic of Provencal love poetry, if the ideas essential to Courtly Love are to be found in Arabian literature, then the latter undoubtedly influenced the former and contributed to the formation of its ideas of love. That mold is too specialized, those ideas are too novel to be common to both. If it does not, then it must be true that this novel conception of love and its formation is native to the troubadours.

Our examination of the materials is limited of necessity to translations and secondary sources. It is, then, of necessity sketchy, incomplete and uncertain, open to correction and guidance. On that basis, then, we have found that with the exception of the theme of love as desire, although characteristics of the essential features of Courtly Love occur sporadically in Arabic literature, they are by no means constant nor dominant enough to have influenced the formation of Courtly Love.

In his collection of parallels, Ecker limits himself to a sole example of the ennobling power of love:

Aber meine Natur ist durch die Liebe edel geworden und es kann nach fragen und nachforschen, wer will (nämlich, um die Wahrheit meiner Behauptung zu kontrollieren). (Mustratraf, II, 157.)<sup>7</sup>

Indirectly the power of love to ennoble emerges from one of the excerpts collected by Ecker to show the fruitfulness of suing for love:

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Carl Appel, review of A. R. Nykl's *The Dove's Neck-Ring* in *Zeitschrift für romanische Philologie* LII (1932), pp. 770-791.

<sup>4</sup> Even if we disregard a large number of coincidences as belonging to the common stock of human experience in matters of love, the 'greifbare Uebergänge' and 'konkrete Spuren' are strong enough to point decisively to Arabic, and especially Andalusian-Arabic influence. A. R. Nykl, *The Dove's Neck-Ring* (Paris, 1931), p. ciii.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Ramon Menéndez Pidal, 'Poesia araba y poesia europea', *Bulletin Hispanique* XL (1938), pp. 337-391 and A. R. Nykl, *op. cit.*, pp. xc-ci.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Julian Ribera y Tarrago, *La Musica andaluza medieval en Europea* in *Disertaciones y Opusculas* II (Madrid, 1928), pp. 17 ff. His views are hardily opposed in

two reviews, one by Hans Spanke in *Volkstum und Kultur der Romanen* III (1929), pp. 257-278, the other by Amédée Gastoué in *Revue de Musicologie* VII (1928), p. 81 ff. Cf. also Higini Anglès, *Historia de la musica espanola* in Johan Wolf, *Historia de la musica* (Barcelona, 1934), pp. 348 ff.

<sup>7</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 150. Ecker seems constrained to note that the Arabic root-word in question, *Karīm*, means 'edel von Charakter' and that *Karumat* means 'edel, gütig, freigebig geworden' equal in meaning to MHG *milten*. He notes further that 'edel' and 'freigebig' are almost synonymous for the German and Arabic mentality (n. 113). It is possible, then, that love has made the lover's nature 'freigebig' rather than 'edel von Charakter',—which would make a difference.



Schön, wo nur die Scham nicht wäre! soll ich meine Liebe dorthin stets,  
wo Ehre nicht zu hoffen ist, verschwenden? (Rückert, Hamāsa, Nr. 573.)<sup>8</sup>

Much more to the point are the verses of Al-'Abbās ibn al-Ahnaf, a poet and singer at the court of Harun ar-Rasid, who died in the first decade of the ninth century:

Es ist keine Schande an der Liebe: Siehe, die Liebe ist eine edle Tugend.  
(70.6)<sup>9</sup>

and also:

Nur das sind Menschen, die verliebt sind und voll Liebesverlangen, und  
nichts gutes ist an dem, der nicht liebt und nicht verliebt ist. (112.3).<sup>10</sup>

The poet Ibn Zaidoun who was born in Cordova in 1003 and died in 1071, says of himself in relation to his love for the nobly born Ouallada:

Il ne nous a point nui que nous n'ayons pas été son égal en noblesse,  
car dans l'affection, il y a des raisons suffisantes d'égalité réciproque.<sup>11</sup>

In speaking of the 'Signs of Love', Ibn Hazm reviews the symptoms of love,—the continuous look, the rapt attention of the lover to the conversation of the beloved, the anxiety of the lover for her company and so on. Then comes the selection generally quoted to indicate the ennobling force of love in Arabic literature on the personal habits, dispositions and virtues of the lover:

Then comes the effort of man to do with all his power what he was incapable of doing before, as if he were the one to whom (something) was being given and for whose happiness he was working; all this in order to show his good qualities and to make himself desirable. And how many a stingy one became generous, and a gloomy one became bright-faced, and a coward became brave, and a grouchy-dispositioned one became gay, and an ignoramus became clever, and a slovenly one in his personal appearance "dolled up", and an ill-shaped one became handsome, and an aged one became youthfully sprightly, and a pious one foolhardily broke his vows, and a chaste one was covered with shame.<sup>12</sup>

In the quotation, there are several points to be noted. First, these efforts that the man makes have as their object "to show his good qualities and to make himself desirable", that is, to win the lady of his choice. Secondly, as Ibn Hazm continues:

<sup>8</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 121.

<sup>9</sup> Joseph Hell, 'Al-'Abbās ibn al-Ahnaf, der Minnesänger am Hofe Harun ar-Rasid's', *Islamica* II (1926), p. 295.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.* p. 294. Cf. Bernard de Ventadour, 'ben es mortz qui d'amor non sen' etc., ed. C. Appel, p. 186.

<sup>11</sup> Quoted from Henri Pérès, *La poésie andalouse en arabe classique au XI<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Paris, 1937), p. 427. Auguste Cour in his edition translates the same passage thus: Il ne nous a point nui que nous n'ayons pas été son égal en noblesse; car, dans la passion, l'abandon mutuel d'amour suffit. *Un poète arabe d'Andalousie Ibn Zaidoun* (Constantine, 1920), p. 72; 1. 18. As Cour translates it, the passage does not argue the ennobling power of love but rather

that inequality of birth is no obstacle to the mutual giving of self. Pérès translation is used as later and as a correction of Cour. Ibn Zaidoun's idea of the characteristic of noble birth emerges in his statement: l'être bien né est celui qui traite équitablement comme il a été traité. *Ibid.* p. 74, 1. 44.

<sup>12</sup> A. R. Nykl, *op. cit.* p. 16. In 'The Latest in Troubadour Studies', *Archivum Romanicum* XIX (1935), pp. 226-236, Nykl offers this quotation in rebuttal of Alfred Jeanroy's contention: il n'a, par exemple, aucune trace, chez Ibn-Hazm, ni du pouvoir ennoblissant de l'amour, ni du vasselage amoureux, ni de la supériorité de la dame sur l'amant. *La poésie lyrique des troubadours* II (Paris, 1934), p. 367.

All these signs will occur before the fire of love spreads, and its heat becomes burning, and its ardor is kindled and burns, and its flames shoot out far: but when it takes possession and hold of its victim, then you will see secret talk, and turning aside from all present, except the beloved one.<sup>13</sup>

Taken in their context, the signs that Ibn Hazm notes are not the ennobling effects of love, but rather, as he states, the prior efforts of the man to attract the lady by his good points. Thirdly, it is to be noted that some of these signs are not ameliorations of character or virtues at all but rather the contrary: the pious one who foolhardily breaks his vows and the chaste one who is covered with shame. Ibn Hazm's symptoms, in spite of their superficial likeness in expression, cannot be understood in the same way nor equated to the power of requited or unrequited love for good or ill that we find, for example, in Guillaume IX<sup>14</sup> or in Cercamon.<sup>15</sup>

Concerning the elevation of the beloved in Provençal lyrics, Ecker states:

Aber die Hoheit der Geliebten ist an und für sich kein sehr gewöhnliches Minnemotiv.<sup>16</sup>

On the contrary, the sovereignty of the lady is an essential characteristic of their poetry. Moreover, to emphasize the inequality of status, the troubadours invariably addressed their lyrics to married ladies. Love may make equal but it is love which raises the lover to the beloved's higher status to arrive at that equality. As Pérès has pointed out, the women of Islam, especially in Andalusia of the eleventh century, were relatively free and married women were often the objects of the poets' verse.<sup>17</sup> But it is characteristic of their poetry and literature that by far the greater majority of it and its expressions of love are directed to slave girls and to maidens.<sup>18</sup> Joseph Hell has indicated that the Old Arabic word for slave girl had lost its pejorative sense and that he has rendered the word by 'Dame'. In the case of the beloved of Ibn Ahnaf it is clear that the lady in question was not a slave girl,—perhaps a favored courtesan.<sup>19</sup> But it is doubtful whether the slave girl of Arabic love poetry in general may be so interpreted.<sup>20</sup> The Arabic conception of womankind may be gathered from the eulogy of Ibn Zaidoun on the mother of Abou 'l Qualed:

Elle était femme! Mais l'âme n'est-elle point quelque chose de précieux quoique de genre féminin?<sup>21</sup>

Much is made of the virtue of humility and submission on the part of the lover in Arabic literature to show the exaltation of the beloved.<sup>22</sup> Pérès has collected texts wherein the lover declares himself to be the slave of the beloved.<sup>23</sup> Al-Ahnaf likens his submission to his lady to the relationship of a

<sup>13</sup> A. R. Nykl, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-17.

<sup>14</sup> *Ed. cit.*, IX, 25-30, p. 23.

<sup>15</sup> *Ed. cit.*, I, 51-54, p. 2.

<sup>16</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 81. Ecker takes as his authority for the statement not the lyrics of the troubadours but Wechsler's sole quotation in his gatherings of texts. Cf. *Kultur des Minnesangs*, p. 184.

<sup>17</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 398-400, and especially pp. 419, 428. Cf. Ecker, *op. cit.*, pp. 199-209. Cf. however, *The Dove's Neck-Ring*, p. 125.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. A. R. Nykl, *op. cit.*, p. 33 where the tale concerns 'a woman of high education and high rank.'

<sup>19</sup> Joseph Hell, *op. cit.*, pp. 277-278. Cf. also A. R. Sykl, *Archivum Romanicum*, p. 235.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. A. R. Nykl, p. 31: He said to her: My lady, are you free or a slave? She said: "A slave". Cf. also his experience p. 39, p. 43 etc.; and the beloved of his youth, "a slave girl who had been brought up in our house", p. 157.

<sup>21</sup> *Un poète arabe d'Andalousie: Ibn Zaidoun*, ed. Auguste Cour, p. 91, l. 18.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Ecker, *op. cit.*, pp. 152 ff.

<sup>23</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 411-412.

child to its father, of a slave to his mistress, of a serf to his queen.<sup>24</sup> It is al-Ahnaf who says to his beloved:

Tue uns übles oder gutes! Sie findet keinen Tadeln bei uns and keinen Hass, (auch) wenn sie hasset.<sup>25</sup>

Ibn Hazm suggests that patience and submission to the beloved have their roots in the frailty and weakness of women:

And let no one say, please, that the lover's patience with the sweetheart's ignoble acts is a baseness of the soul, for he would be in error: because we know that the beloved is not his compeer or equal in strength, so that she should be repaid according to her deserts for her wrongs.<sup>26</sup>

And further:

The beloved is not to be considered your equal (in strength), so that your patience, if you bear it patiently, would be vile.<sup>27</sup>

Certainly the story of the submission of Said b. Mundir b. Said to the faithless slave girl he has freed so that she might become his wife and who, when freed, refuses him to marry his brother<sup>28</sup> is not characteristic of the submission of the troubadours to their ladies. That submissiveness was based on the consciousness of the beloved's superiority whether of birth or worth and their acknowledgment of it. It was not based on hope of reward or on the consciousness of their superiority in strength. For them submissiveness was a virtue to be practiced and not a device to win their way over feminine frailty, caprice and fancy.

Ouallada, the daughter of the Caliph of Cordoba, is usually taken as the type of Arabian noble maiden celebrated for beauty and talent. She is generally held up as the prototype of the beloved of the troubadours. Yet her character is very different. After her father's death, she set up a literary circle in Cordoba. There she lived a life untrammelled by the usual conventions with which Muslin women were surrounded.<sup>29</sup> It was a rich, brilliant court characteristic of the Cordoba of her times. Ibn Zaïdoun, the poet, (born 1003), fell in love with her and made her the object of his verses. There are some points of comparison between the poems he addressed to her and the troubadour lyrics,—avoidance of detractors who suspect them, his submission to her, his expressions of desire and longing for her and his sorrow when they are parted.<sup>30</sup> On the other hand, there are many points that distinguish them sharply: the facile winning of Ouallada,<sup>31</sup> her quick tiring of him,<sup>32</sup> their mutual recriminations of infidelity, he with a black slave girl of Ouallada<sup>33</sup> and she with the wealthy bourgeois Ibn Abdous.<sup>34</sup> The beloved of the troubadours, so hard to win, so cold and disdainful would scarcely write to her lover in answer to his letter of assignation:

Attends, à l'heure où les ombres de la nuit seront obscures, ma visite; car, pour moi, la nuit est le meilleur moyen de cacher le secret.  
De ta part j'ai éprouvé une fascination telle que si la lune l'avait

<sup>24</sup> Joseph Hell, *ed. cit.*, pp. 298-301.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.* p. 299.

<sup>26</sup> *Ed. cit.*, p. 61.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.* p. 62.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.* p. 63.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. *ed. Cour.*, pp. 22-31.

<sup>30</sup> *Ed. cit.*, pp. 52-53.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.* p. 23.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.* p. 28.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.* p. 28.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.* p. 32.

éprouvée, elle n'apparaîtrait jamais, si la nuit l'avait éprouvée, elle ne viendrait plus couvrir la terre de son ombre, si l'étoile l'avait éprouvée, elle ne voyagerait plus dans la nuit.<sup>35</sup>

Nor could we imagine her describing her lover as Ouallada did Ibn Zaïdoun after their break:

Tu as été surnommé l'homme aux six qualités; c'est un qualificatif qui ne te quittera plus alors même que te quitterait la vie.

Tu es un sodomiste, un émasculé, un fornicateur, l'être le plus vil, un cornard, un voleur.<sup>36</sup>

Except for her noble birth, beauty and talent, Ouallada does appear as the antithesis of the lady of the troubadours.

There was a conception of pure love among the Arab poets. Ibn Hazm speaks of the union of souls that is a thousand times finer in its effects than that of bodies.<sup>37</sup> Yet his idea of women and womankind ill befits the apologist of pure love.<sup>38</sup> Pérès has gathered texts to illustrate chaste love among the Arab poets<sup>39</sup> but it is with sensual love and physical union that the stories from which the texts are drawn generally deal. Ibn Zaïdoun's desires and longings are those of a man who has been deprived of the physical satisfaction that love brings. In fact, it is not the poet Ibn Zaïdoun nor the writer of love Ibn Hazm, both of Andalusia and within a few years of being contemporaries of the troubadours, who come closest to the spirit of the Provencal lyrics and the troubadour conception of love, but the ninth century poet of Bagdad al-Ahnaïf. It is he who conceives of love as an ennobling force, as a union of souls between the lover and the beloved who is far superior to him in worth and before whom he stands as a serf before his queen.<sup>40</sup> It was in Arabia too that the theme of pure love was celebrated by the mythical Bedouin poets of the tribe of Odhrah. It was a theme which as Massignon says:

probably was invented by the Yemeni colonists of the *djund* of Kufa, and celebrates an ideal Bedouin tribe, in which, carrying to its extreme refinement of tenderness from delicacy of feeling and vows of chastity, lovers die rather than place a hand on the beloved object.<sup>41</sup>

It was this ideal of the highest type of profane love that the poets of Bagdad had given form to in the early ninth century. Ibn Dawoud (died 909), Zahirite jurisconsult and poet, incorporated this ideal in his *Kitab al-Zahrah* (*the Book of the Flower*).<sup>42</sup> The following lines perhaps best reveal his doctrine of love:

Quand bien même la chasteté des amants, leur éloignement pour les souillures, et le soin de leur pureté ne seraient pas protégés par les préceptes des lois religieuses, et le préjugé des coutumes,—certes, ce serait encore le devoir de chacun de rester chaste: afin d'éterniser le

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.* p. 23.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.* p. 50, n. 7.

<sup>37</sup> *Ed. cit.*, p. 7-10.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 71; And I do not know the cause of why this nature gets the upper hand in women, except that their minds are free from any sort of preoccupation except about marital union and its motives, and in courtship and its causes, and intimate companionship and its aspects: they have no other thing to busy themselves in, and they

were not born for anything but that. Cf. also, pp. 178, 179, 180.

<sup>39</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 423-428.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. Joseph Hell, *ed. cit.*, pp. 294-302.

<sup>41</sup> *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, IV<sup>2</sup> (London, 1929), art. Udhri, p. 990.

<sup>42</sup> Ed. A. R. Nykl and I. Tuqan, University of Chicago Press, 1932, *Studies in Ancient Oriental Civilization*, 6. A translation is promised forthcoming.

désir qui le possède avec le désir qu'il inspire.—

Et Ahmad Ibn Yahyā m'a récité, d'après Zobayr, d'après Mohammad Ibn Ishaq, d'après Moûmil Ibn Taloût, des gens de Wād al Qorā,—ces vers de Hamzah Ibn Abi Dayham:

Nous sommes restés tous deux, cette nuit, en arrière des tentes de ceux de la tribu,—sans demeurer près d'eux ni rejoindre l'ennemi.

Et nous nous sommes annuités, immobiles, tandis que l'ombre tombait, puis la rosée,—sous un manteau du Yémen, plein de parfum.

Ecartant, à la pensée de Dieu, loin de nous, la folle ardeur de la jeunesse,—lorsque nos coeurs, en nous, se prenaient à battre.

Et nous sommes revenus, abreuvés de chaste retenue,—ayant à peine calmé la soif de l'âme entre nos lèvres.<sup>43</sup>

Ibn Dawoud describes the plan of his book and his intentions in the Preface:

J'y ai placé *cent chapitres*,—et, dans chaque chapitre, *cent vers*; dans les cinquante premiers chapitres je rappelle les aspects de l'amour, ses lois, ses variations, et ses cas;—dans les cinquante autres, je fais mémoire des autres genres de poésie . . . L'amour est le fait d'une élite, le privilège des caractères délicats; c'est une affinité intellectuelle . . . au début, la nature de l'amour et ses causes: j'ai insisté, ensuite, sur les états amoureux qui suivent le moment où l'amour s'est affermi, dans l'abandon même et la séparation, et j'ai indiqué jusqu'où porte la fougue du désir partagé et de la tendresse:—j'ai terminé en faisant mention de la fidélité après la mort; après avoir dit ce qu'est la fidélité pendant la vie.<sup>44</sup>

Such was the opinion of cultured and educated people of Bagdad on the subject of human love; a love that was perfectly pure, devoid of sensuality, spiritual, a love that was desire. That conception was of a chaste love but it was not that of the troubadours. It lacked as yet the cult, the elevation of the beloved, the ennobling force of love and the surge upwards of the lover to the status of the beloved through the force of love. Though it comes very near the spirit of Courtly Love, the chaste love of the poets of Bagdad of the late ninth and early tenth centuries has not supplied or inspired the schema or thought-pattern of Courtly Love. That is to be sought, as is its own conception of love, in Arabian mysticism and philosophy of the ninth and tenth centuries.

Massignon rightly remarks that this chaste conception of love to which he refers as Platonic love really has its source in Arabian mysticism. It is an inversion of the divine love of the Sufis, especially as taught by al-Hallaj, a conception of love based and built upon the framework of the love of God.<sup>45</sup> For the Zahirites, those who accepted, taught and defended the literal interpretation of the Koran, there could be no love of God since love implies reciprocity and union. What man is to give to God is praise and that according to the formulae and rites prescribed by revelation. God created man to adore Him. He is transcendent, incomprehensible and inaccessible. Thus man may love one of His attributes but not God Himself. There is an unbridgable chasm between the Creator and His creatures. For Ibn Dawoud the only love that can exist is human love; it cannot be the imperfect symbol of divine love since divine love does not exist. For him, the highest type of human love does

<sup>43</sup> Quoted from Louis Massignon, *La Passion d'Al-Hallāj* (Paris, 1914-1921), pp. 175-176.

<sup>44</sup> Louis Massignon, *op. cit.*, pp. 170-171. The titles of the first fifty chapters are given by

Louis Massignon, *op. cit.*, p. 172 and by A. R. Nykl, *The Dove's Neck-Ring*, pp. cv-cvi.

<sup>45</sup> Louis Massignon, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

not consist in mutual possession which unites the lovers but in the renunciation of each other whereby their mutual desire is perpetuated. When al-Hallaj, therefore, taught that love of God was an integral part of life and living, that man's happiness and end consisted in union with God, that man seeks and desires that union, that that union was accomplished in the knowledge and contemplation of the divine essence, he was accused of heresy, tried, condemned and martyred in 922.

Sufism is the name applied in general to the mysticism of Islam. A sufi is a man who devotes his life to the mystic life. As such, Sufism is the religious philosophy and the popular religion of Islam. The word first appears in the second half of the eighth century and within fifty years it denoted all the mystics of Irak. Two centuries later it was applied to the whole body of Muslim mystics.<sup>48</sup> The etymology of the word is uncertain; the one generally accepted is that it is derived from the word for wool (çouf) because of the woolen robe chosen by the first Muslim ascetics as a distinctive garb.<sup>49</sup> There are various sects of Sufism but there exists a core of common doctrine and common purpose: contact with the divine. "The Sufis aimed at defining the ultimate goal when triumphing over the attachment to the flesh, the soul finds the true God to whom it is aspiring, the Real".<sup>50</sup>

In general, primitive and orthodox Sufism is ascetical and quietist in character. It aimed at an emptying of self by mortification and internal purification, inspired by the consciousness of sin and the dread of retribution. In the ninth century, Sufism assumed a new character,—an aspiration towards union with God through knowledge and love, a union wherein self died to live in God. They worked out a theory and practice of mystical religion, they traced out an itinerary to God of stages and ascending steps.<sup>51</sup> The unorthodox and heretical pantheism inherent in this type of Sufism was kept generally well in check in an attempt to harmonize mysticism and religion and to hold themselves within the Koran and the tradition of the Prophets. The doctrine of the transforming union with God, deification, first appears in Abou Yazid Bistami (d.875). Al-Hallaj was one of its foremost exponents. It was al-Ghazzali (born 1058) who finally returns Sufism back to Muslim orthodoxy by attacking its pantheism and providing its mysticism with a philosophical basis, and by reconciling it with religion.<sup>52</sup> Massignon holds that Arabian mysticism is purely Mohammedan in origin and combats vigorously the theories of outside influences.<sup>53</sup> Others hold that Sufism is a natural development of the ascetical tendencies which are essentially Mohammedan though not entirely independent of Christianity. To these tendencies were added in the ninth

<sup>48</sup> Louis Massignon, *Encyclopedia of Islam*, IV<sup>2</sup> (London, 1929), art. Tasawwuf, pp. 681-682. A concise explanation of the origin, development and doctrine of Sufism. Cf. also, I. Goldhizer, *Le Dogme et la loi de l'Islam* (Paris, 1920), pp. 111-155.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. Massignon, *op. cit.*, p. 681 and Emile Dermenghem, *L'Eloge du Vin*, (Al Khamriya) preceded by a study on Sufism (Paris, 1931), pp. 33-34 for other etymologies. The various etymologies are all listed in the most ancient Persian treatise on Sufism, *The Kashf Al-Mahjub* by Ali b. 'Uthman al-Jullabi al-Hujwiri (d. ca. 1072) tr. R. A. Nicholson (London, 1911, Gibb Memorial, vol. XVII), p. 30.

<sup>50</sup> *Encyclopedia of Islam*, p. 683.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. for example *The Kashf Al-Mahjub*, the *Oldest Persian Treatise on Sufism* by Ali b. 'Uthman al-Jullabi al-Hujwiri trans-

lated by R. A. Nicholson (London, 1911, Gibb Memorial vol. XVII), pp. 267-420; *The Doctrine of the Sufis (Kitab al-Ta'arruf limadhib ahl al-Tasawwuf)* translated by A. J. Arberry (Cambridge, 1935), pp. 78-79.

<sup>52</sup> Le mysticisme de Ghazali a été une attitude et non pas une doctrine; attitude pour atteindre la béatitude suprême et non pas une doctrine mystique d'identification avec la divinité, telle que la concevait, par exemple, un Halladj. C'est un soufi orthodoxe qui combat les soufis quand ils délaissent les pratiques religieuses et il se constitue l'ennemi juré du panthéisme mystique. Moussa Bérroukhim, *La Pensée iranienne à travers l'histoire*. (Paris, 1938), p. 174.

<sup>53</sup> Louis Massignon, *Essai sur les origines du lexique technique de la mystique musulmane* (Paris, 1914-1922), pp. 27-80.

century influences from Greek philosophy, Neo-Platonism and Gnosticism.<sup>52</sup> Others, such as Moussa Bérroukhim, claim that Muslim mysticism is essentially Persian in origin and influenced by Manicheism, Neo-Platonism and Christian mysticism.<sup>53</sup>

Sufism of the late ninth century is thus described by Schmölders:

Il n'est pas un système philosophique, il ne forme pas non plus une secte religieuse . . . c'est une manière de vivre, une sorte d'ordre monastique, si l'on veut, et rien de plus. Le soufi suppose que la vérité divine se manifeste immédiatement à l'homme qui la veut obtenir, pourvu que retiré du monde, détaché de toutes les passions humaines, il se voue uniquement à la vie contemplative.<sup>54</sup>

While the orthodox sufi had contented himself with striving to rid himself of his human instincts and desires and to rid himself from the exigencies of life to devote himself to prayer and contemplation, the pantheistic sufi had reached the highest stage of mysticism, the identification of the creature with his Creator, a union, wherein the soul, dead to self, is deified. As a result its actions, thoughts and desires are those of God. There is no longer a duality of the soul and God; they become one, an indissoluble union of the soul with God.

By purification the heart is purged of all that is not God. Prayers are the means and the object is absorption in God. Al-Hallaj is the exponent of pantheistic Sufism. Massignon has analyzed and studied his teaching on mystical and dogmatic theology.<sup>55</sup> We reproduce from that monumental work only what is essential to our study. In his doctrine, in pantheistic Sufism generally, we meet the framework of ideas we have encountered in Neo-Platonism and Albigenianism: the innate desire of the soul to rise to God, the purification of the soul that is required before it may unite with Him, the surge upwards of the soul towards that union, and finally, the transforming union itself.

Man is a composite creature of body and soul. United to a body, he is of the flesh, material doomed to the servitude of matter. But he is united to an immaterial principle, the created Spirit of God, which is the form of man. It is the created spirit that longs for and desires the uncreated Spirit of God.<sup>56</sup> Under the allegory of the butterfly, he describes that desire:

Le papillon volette, autour de la lampe, jusqu'à ce que vient l'aube. Alors il revient vers ses pareils, pour leur faire part de son état, au moyen des phrases les plus suaves. Puis il repart jouer avec la familiarité de la grâce (de la flamme), dans son désir d'arriver à la joie parfaite.<sup>57</sup>

Again, in speaking of the names of God as veils that clothe His reality:

<sup>52</sup> A. R. Nicholson, 'Origin and Development of Sufism', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 1906, pp. 303-348 especially 329-330. Cf. also Emile Dermenghem, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-52. Asin Palacios holds that originally Sufism was an imitation, more or less conscious, of Christian oriental monasticism and that later its pantheistic elements derived from Neo-Platonism: *Abenmasarra y su escuela, orígenes de la filosofía Hispano-Musulmann* (Madrid, 1914), pp. 13-16.

<sup>53</sup> Moussa Bérroukhim, *op. cit.*, pp. 103-109. It is interesting to note that Neo-Platonism and Manicheism converge in Islam in the ninth century as they do later in the

eleventh and twelfth centuries in the South of France.

<sup>54</sup> A. Schmölders, *Essai sur les écoles philosophiques chez les Arabes et notamment sur la doctrine d'al-Gazzali* (Paris, 1842), pp. 206-207.

<sup>55</sup> Louis Massignon, *La Passion d'Al-Hallāj* (Paris, 1914-1921), pp. 464-471.

<sup>56</sup> S'il oriente par des effusions d'amour tous ses desirs vers Dieu, c'est pour attester que l'Esprit divin seul peut "réaliser" ces desirs, les vivifier par ce don surnaturel de soi. Louis Massignon, *op. cit.*, p. 468.

<sup>57</sup> Quoted from Louis Massignon, *op. cit.*, pp. 840-841.

Le voile? C'est un rideau, interposé entre le chercheur et son objet, entre le novice et son désir, entre le tireur et son but . . . Et il ajouta: "Ton voile, c'est ton infatuation". Puis il récita:

Je me'étonne, et de Toi, et de moi,—ô Voeu de mon désir! Tu m'avais rapproché de Toi, au point—que j'ai cru que Tu étais mon 'moi',  
Puis Tu T'es dérobé dans l'extase,—au point que tu m'as privé de mon 'moi', en Toi.

O mon bonheur, durant ma vie,—ô mon repos après mon ensevelissement!  
Il n'est plus pour moi, fors que Toi, de liesse,—si j'en juge par ma crainte et ma confiance,

Ah! dans les jardins de Tes intentions, j'ai embrassé toute science.  
Et si je désire encore un chose,—c'est Toi, tout mon désir.<sup>38</sup>

Al-Hallaj sought suffering as a purifying agent, as a sanctifying test of divine love. Suffering is a sign of election; the elite of God are called to suffer for it is a proof of the love of God:

Je te désire, je ne te désire pas pour la récompense (des Elus).

Non, mais je te désire, pour le supplice (des damnés).

Tous les biens qui m'étaient nécessaires, oui, je les ai reçus.

Sauf Celui qui réjouirait mon extase, par les tourments.<sup>39</sup>

Ibn 'Ata, friend, defender and expounder of al-Hallaj<sup>40</sup> (d. 922), comments thus on this passage:

Cela exprime le tourment grandissant du désir, le transport de l'affection, l'incendie de la passion, de désir de l'Amour. Quand il s'est purifié et parfait, il s'élève jusqu'à cette citerne d'onde pure, où Dieu pleut, perdurable, l'eau vive.<sup>41</sup>

Before the soul may experience union with God, it must be purified. The point of departure of al-Hallaj's doctrine on the transforming union is a rule or way of life that leads to God. This appears from an analysis of his doctrine

<sup>38</sup> Quoted from Louis Massignon, *op. cit.*, p. 700.

<sup>39</sup> Quoted from Louis Massignon, *op. cit.*, pp. 622-623.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. Louis Massignon, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-47.

<sup>41</sup> Quoted from Louis Massignon, *op. cit.*, p. 623. Cf. the poetic imagery of the Sufi Bayazid of Bistam (d. 874), quoted by Nicholson in 'Origin and Development of Sufism,' *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1906, p. 324, especially: Desire is the capital of the Lover's kingdom. In that capital there is set a throne of the torment of parting, and there is drawn a sword of the terror of separation, and there is laid on the hand of hope a branch of the narcissus of union; and every moment a thousand heads fall by that sword. And seven thousand years (said he) have passed, and that narcissus is still fresh and blooming: never has the hand of any hope attained thereto.

Love as desire in Sufism is readily seen in the following extract from the orthodox *Kashf al-Mahjub*, ed. cit., p. 307-308: Man's love towards God is a quality which manifests itself in the heart of the pious believer, in the form of veneration and mag-

nification, so that he seeks to satisfy his Beloved and becomes impatient and restless in his desire for vision of Him, and cannot rest with anyone except Him, and grows familiar with the remembrance (dhikr) of Him, and abjures the remembrance of everything besides. Repose becomes unlawful to him and rest flees from him. He is cut off from all habits and associations, and renounces sensual passion and turns towards the court of love and submits to the law of love and knows God by His attributes of perfection. It is impossible that Man's love of God should be similar in kind to the love of His creatures towards one another, for the former is desire to comprehend and attain the beloved object, while the latter is the property of bodies . . . Love, then, is of two kinds—(1) the love of like towards like, which is a desire instigated by the lower soul and which seeks the essence (dhat) of the beloved object by means of sexual intercourse; (2) the love of one who is unlike the object of his love and who seeks to become intimately attached to an attribute of that object.



made by one of his contemporaries, a theologian opposed to him and to his teaching:

[Al-Hallaj a soutenu que] celui qui dresse son corps par l'obéissance aux rites, s'occupe son coeur aux oeuvres pies, endure les privations des plaisirs, et possède son âme en s'interdisant les désirs,—s'élève ainsi jusqu' à la station de 'ceux qui sont approchés' (de Dieu).—Et qu'ensuite, il ne cesse de descendre doucement les degrés des distances, jusqu'à ce que sa nature soit purifiée de ce qui est charnel.—Et puis, s'il ne reste plus d'attache charnelle en lui,—lors descend en lui cet Esprit de Dieu.<sup>62</sup>

The whole point of al-Hallaj's doctrine appears in his words:

Entre moi et Toi (il traîne) un 'c'est moi!' (qui) me tourmente. Ah! enlève, de grâce, ce 'c'est moi!' d'entre nous.<sup>63</sup>

His rule of life was designed to eliminate that egoism that prevented the rise of the soul to union with God.

That purification and ascension was a progression. It was based on the psychology of the Koran. Massignon thus summarized its essentials:<sup>64</sup>

*Qalb*—the heart. The essential of man is a movement set within a morsel of flesh placed in the central hollow of his body. The heart is the secret and hidden place, *sirr*, of his conscience.

*Nafs*—the soul. Within this secret and hidden place is an incoherent and obscure mass of illusions, thoughts and desires, an accumulation arising from acts and sensations. These have in common a perpetual inconstancy imprinted on them by the individual movement of the heart. This is the soul, 'moi'.

*Sharh al sadr*—the dilation of the breast. By divine intervention, a breathing in of the Spirit, the soul, an embryonic immortal personality is stabilized. God lays the heart bare, dispels its veils by faith. Faith transfigures the soul, gives it unity and coherence, recalls to man his pre-eternal vocation as a believer and the divine predetermination of his acts.<sup>65</sup>

Man's heart is the organ prepared by God for contemplation. Its purification will consist of man's total renunciation of it, and its immortalisation by God. Ascetics had subdivided the heart into a series of compartments, envelopes which God visits as man renounces them. Al-Hallaj follows that practice and the progress of interior purification is measured until the last envelope, the *sirr*, man's latent personality which, when renounced, is informed and made fruitful by God.<sup>66</sup> Thus the soul arrives at the transforming union with God:

<sup>62</sup> Quoted from Louis Massignon, *op. cit.*, p. 515.

<sup>63</sup> Quoted from Louis Massignon, *op. cit.*, p. 525.

<sup>64</sup> Louis Massignon, *op. cit.*, pp. 477-479.

<sup>65</sup> L'homme est saisi par le Qor'an dans l'unité même de son mouvement, dans l'ébauche inachevée de son geste, dans la démarche même de son acte, au point d'insertion de l'esprit dans la matière, cela qui est le coeur, *qalb*, d'où le mouvement surgit comme d'une source pour tonaliser les déplacements des membres dans le "mode de passage" particulier à chacun. Louis Massignon, *op. cit.*, p. 479.

<sup>66</sup> Al Hallâj a tenté de décrire cette dernière opération; l'ultime enveloppe du coeur, au dedans de la *nafs*, appétit concupiscible, c'est le *sirr*, personnalité latente, conscience implicite, subconscient profond, cellule secrète murée à toute creature 'vierge inviolée'. Tant que Dieu n'a pas visité le *sirr*, la personnalité latente de l'homme reste informe: c'est la *sarîrah*, sorte de "pronom personnel" incertain, de "je" provisoire: une heccéité une illéité. Lorsque l'homme accepte de renoncer à cette ultime enveloppe du coeur, Dieu la féconde, y fait pénétrer le *damîr*, sa personnalité explicite définitive, son "pronom

Je suis devenu Celui que j'aime, et Celui que j'aime est devenu moi!  
 Nous sommes deux esprits, infondus en un (seul) corps.  
 Aussi me voir, c'est Le voir,  
 Et Le voir, c'est nous voir.<sup>67</sup>

Al-Hallâj resumes the mystical life into three phases:

Renoncer à ce bas monde, c'est l'ascèse du sens;—renoncer à l'autre vie (i.e. à ses joies créées), c'est l'ascèse du coeur; renoncer à soi-même, c'est l'ascèse de l'Esprit.<sup>68</sup>

First there is a term of asceticism. The ascetic is the *morîd*, he who desires God. Then comes passive purification. The purified is the *morâd*, he whom God desires. Finally, there is the life of union:

Ton Esprit s'est emmêlé à mon esprit, tout ainsi  
 Que se mélange le vin avec l'eau pure.  
 Aussi, qu'une chose Te touche, elle me touche.  
 Voici que 'Toi', c'est 'moi', en tout!<sup>69</sup>

That divine union is made operative by the *fiat* of God whereby the divine Spirit comes to the soul.<sup>70</sup>

At Bagdad, in the late ninth and early tenth century, contemporary with the poets of pure love, there was a pantheistic mystical doctrine, unorthodox but widespread. This doctrine, competent men hold, betrays the influence of Neo-Platonism, Manicheism and to a less extent Christianity. An analysis of that doctrine as taught by one of its foremost exponents reveals a thought-pattern or mold of ideas similar to that of Courtly Love, namely, the idea of love as desire, the surge upwards of the lover to the beloved, the necessity of purification as a prerequisite to union of the beloved and the lover, the union of the beloved and the lover.

There are no records of Spanish Sufism before the twelfth century. There can be no question of any direct influence of their doctrine on the troubadours. There may well be an indirect influence comprised in the thought and culture of Islam that was already spreading over Western Europe in the century that preceded that of the troubadours. Thorndike has shown that in the scientific

personnel" légitime le droit de dire "Je": droit qui unit le saint à la source même de la parole divine, à son "fiat". Louis Massignon, *op. cit.* pp. 486-487.

<sup>67</sup> Quoted from Louis Massignon, *op. cit.*, p. 518. Un des signes de Sa toute-puissance est qu'il envoie les brises de Sa pitié vers les coeurs de ses amoureux, leur portant la belle nouvelle que les voiles de la réserve vont s'écarter, pour qu'ils parcourent sans crainte toute l'étendue de l'amour: et qu'il les abreuve aussi largement du breuvage de la joie. Et les souffles de Sa générosité passent sur eux,—ils les bannissent de leurs qualités et les ressuscitent en Ses qualités et Ses attributs même, car nul ne peut fouler le tapis étendu de la Vérité, tant qu'il demeure au seuil de la séparation, tant qu'il ne voit en toutes les essences une seule Essence, tant qu'il ne voit ce qui passe comme périssant, et Celui qui demeure comme Sub-sistant. Quoted from Louis Massignon, *op. cit.*, p. 517.

<sup>68</sup> Quoted from Louis Massignon, *op. cit.*, p. 516.

<sup>69</sup> Quoted from Louis Massignon, *op. cit.*, p. 517. For other texts illustrating the transforming union with God: *ibid.*, pp. 518-519; 524-525.

<sup>70</sup> L'union mystique d'al Hallâj s'opère donc, sur le type même de celle que le Qor'ân attribue à Jésus, par l'union au *Kon!* "fiat" divin, obtenue par le moyen d'une adhésion de plus en plus étroite et fervente de l'intelligence aux commandements de Dieu que la volonté aime en premier. Et le résultat de cette acceptation permanente du "fiat" divin est la venue dans l'âme du mystique, de l'Esprit divin, lequel provient du commandement de mon Seigneur et fait désormais, de chacun des actes de cet homme, des actes véritablement divins; et qui en particulier donnera aux paroles de son coeur, l'articulation, l'énonciation et l'application voulues de Dieu. Louis Massignon, *op. cit.*, pp. 520-521.

field there are numerous signs of Arabic influence in the eleventh and even tenth century. He is inclined to place the period of that influence on Western Latin learning somewhat earlier than is generally accepted.<sup>71</sup> We have a definite example in Gerbert of Aurillac (Sylvester II) of a link between Christian Europe and Muslim Spain in the tenth century. Between 967-980 he lived with Hatton, bishop of Vich. Though it is denied that he studied with the Arabs at Cordoba, it is incontestable that he carried back with him evidences of their influence, particularly in mathematics and music.<sup>72</sup> The thought and culture of the Islamic world were as it has been put 'in the air'<sup>73</sup> and that is not surprising considering the immense superiority of Arabic culture from the second half of the eighth century to the second half of the eleventh. That superiority was acknowledged by the leading thinkers and scholars of twelfth and thirteenth century Christendom.<sup>74</sup>

The bridges over which might come the thought and culture of Islam to Southern France were many and varied. They have been excellently well detailed by Miguel Asin Palacios.<sup>75</sup> One contact between the two civilizations of Christianity and Islam was that of commerce. From the eighth century to the eleventh there was an important trade carried on by the East over the Northern water route with the countries of Northern Europe. The counter-attack of the Christians in the eleventh century opened up the Mediterranean again to the Christians of the West as a medium of trade and travel. Even before then from the eighth century on, there was trade between the East and the West through Byzantium. The Byzantine fleet managed to keep open the Mediterranean about Southern Italy, the Adriatic and the Aegean Seas. It was the Venetians who carried on trade from the ports on these seas until, by the eleventh century, they enjoyed a virtual monopoly on transport in all the provinces of Europe and Asia still held by the rulers of Constantinople. At first the latter city and the Christian ports of the East were the greatest centres of export. Soon commerce spread to Africa and Syria. From the end of the ninth century on, in spite of the differences in race and religion, business relations and connections increased steadily with Africa, Syria and Egypt. Contact with the East for Southern France, until the Crusades and the opening of the Mediterranean, through these channels would come by the overland route from Northern Italy, especially from Genoa and Venice. It was by that route that the heresy of Manicheism had come to them. It was by that same route that Muslim thought, culture and their intellectual outlook on life could come also.

The exchanges of culture and civilization between the East and West occasioned by the Crusades<sup>76</sup> are roughly contemporary with the early troubadours. As such, they may have contributed to the forces that fashioned their mentality. But in the centuries that preceded the Crusades, Christian and Muslim had personal contact, opportunity to know and study each other's culture and customs through the pilgrimages made by the Christians to the Holy Lands. Soon after the early conquests of Islam,<sup>77</sup> lay folk and cleric from

<sup>71</sup> Lynn Thorndike, *A History of Magic and Experimental Science I*, (New York, 1929), pp. 697-698.

<sup>72</sup> François Picavet, *Gerbert, un pape philosophe* (Paris, 1897), pp. 30-37.

<sup>73</sup> A. R. Nykl, *The Dove's Neck-Ring* (Paris, 1931), p. lxxxiv.

<sup>74</sup> George Sarton, 'Review of Miguel Asin, *Islam and the Divine Comedy*', *Isis* X (1929), p. 67-68.

<sup>75</sup> *La Escatologia musulmana en la Divina Comedia* (Madrid, 1919), pp. 299-308. This work has been translated: *Islam and the*

*Divine Comedy*, by Harold Sunderland (London, 1926), pp. 239-246.

<sup>76</sup> Cf. Louis Bréhier, *L'Eglise et l'Orient au moyen âge* (Paris, 1907), pp. 89-100.

<sup>77</sup> Le mouvement qui portait les Occidentaux à entreprendre le pèlerinage d'Orient fut donc arrêté brusquement au VII<sup>e</sup> siècle; il ne cesse pourtant pas complètement et si les Occidentaux ne furent plus attirés en Orient, comme naguère, par le désir de s'instruire, l'intérêt qui s'attachait toujours à la visite des lieux saints suffit à maintenir des rapports dont la continuité est

all the Christian countries of Europe began again to wend their way to Jerusalem. Their number increased rapidly during the ninth, tenth and eleventh centuries, especially after Charlemagne established a protectorate over the Christian churches there.<sup>78</sup>

The nearest and most constant channel of communication between the Eastern and Western cultures was Muslim Spain. Spain was the first country in Christian Europe to enter into intimate contact with Islam. Christian and Muslim lived side by side, learned and knew each other's language, customs, mode of life. Mozarabs, assimilated Christians and Mudejars, assimilated Muslims, were the natural intermediaries of the exchange and assimilation of the East and West:

Durante un larguísimo lapso de cinco siglos, desde el VIII al XIII . . . las dos poblaciones cristiana y mahometana habían convivido en la guerra y en la paz. Los mozárabes, después de la conquista islámica, son el lazo que primeramente anuda a ambos pueblos. La convivencia tué borrando presto las antipatías entre vencedores y vencidos. La lengua, la literatura, los costumbres, los trajes, hasta los vicios, creencias y supersticiones de aquéllos, adoptáronse por muchos de éstos. Ya en el siglo IX, cristianos de Córdoba tenían a gala el uso de la lengua árabe, desdeñando el de la latina; vestían como los musulmanes; algunos tenían harén y se circuncidaban, a estilo de los musulimes; deleitábanse con los versos y novelas arábicas, se consagraban al estudio de las doctrinas filosóficas y teológicas del islam, con una avidez y entusiasmo que no sentían hacia la literatura cristiana, preterida y olvidada, y hasta competían con los musulmanes en la poesía árabe . . . Y si esto acaecía ya en los primos siglos de la conquista, bien puede sospecharse cómo iriase intensificando y extendiendo el contagio, con el transcurso del tiempo que lima asperezas en el trato y concilia las más irreductibles aversiones. Así, con intervalos de luchas pasajeras entre ambos pueblos, el diario comercio con los musulmanes hizo que los mismos mozárabes de Toledo, antigua cortes de los visigodos, empleasen la lengua y la escritura árabe de sus opresores para la redacción de instrumentos publicos, contratos, testamentos, etc., aun después de la reconquista de la ciudad por Alfonso VI a principio del siglo XII. Y que estos cristianos arabizados pudieron comunicar a sus hermanos del norte de la península y aun a los del resto de Europa algún reflejo de la cultura islámica que concocían, es hipótesis bien verosímil, como basada en el hecho histórico de los continuos viajes y emigraciones, individuales y colectivas, que los mozárabes andaluces hubieron de emprender, bien para huir de las cruentas persecuciones religiosas, movidas por algunos de los primeros emires de Córdoba, bien con fines literarios y mercantiles.<sup>79</sup>

Such too were the remnants of Goths who outwardly had adapted themselves to changed conditions and surroundings, but had preserved their original spirit;<sup>80</sup> the Christians from Spain and from all of Europe who had served as slaves of the Muslims in the army and at court and had been later freed or

attestée par quelques témoignages. Louis Bréhier, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

<sup>78</sup> Miguel Asín Palacios, *op. cit.*, p. 301. Durante los siglos IX, X y XI, las peregrinaciones se hacen mucho mas frecuentes y dejan de ser individuales para convertirse en colectivas, llegando a adquirir el caracter de verdaderas emigraciones en

masa . . . algunas alcanzan la fabulosa cifra de doce mil peregrinos y son ya como precursoras y anuncio de las cruzadas.

<sup>79</sup> Miguel Asín Palacios, *op. cit.*, pp. 304-305. Cf. also F. J. Simonet, *Historia de los Mozarabes de Espana* (Madrid, 1903), pp. 216-19, 252, 273, 292, 368, 384, 690.

<sup>80</sup> Cf. Lawrence Ecker, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

ransomed or allowed to return to their homeland in their old age;<sup>81</sup> the Jews who carried on a regular commerce in the Mediterranean from the Carolingian era. The majority of them reached Western and Northern Europe through Spain from the Muslim countries of the Mediterranean.<sup>82</sup> Their contact with the East, their own culture, their facility with languages and science formed a channel through which might pass the thought and culture of the Muslim and Jewish world:

Los mercaderes judíos que con su comercio internacional, activísimo y extenso, y su aptitud natural para las lenguas y las ciencias, anudaban entre la España musulmana y las ciudades principales de la Europa cristiana nexos de todo especie, así materiales como espirituales.<sup>83</sup>

One of the most fruitful channels of Islamic thought and culture to Southern France was the series of attacks made by the Arabs and Christians upon each other in the Iberian Peninsula and across the Pyrenees from the ninth through the tenth and eleventh centuries. Nykl has well summed up the importance of these attacks:

We can briefly summarize the principle events to corroborate the fact that the constant stirring up of the various elements of population caused incessant currents of ideas to flow up and beyond the Pyrenees, back and forth, similar to the aforesaid *karr* and *farr* tactics, so popular in Iberian warfare. With each attack and counter-attack something new was seen and heard, slaves and prisoners were captured on either side, who thus spread thorough familiarity with the Muslim and non-Muslim ways and tastes. No doubt interpreters and intelligence officers were being employed then as now, often of the neutral Jewish race, similar in character to Moses Sephardi, alias Petrus Alphonsus, of Huesca . . . along the *camino francés* this knowledge of Muslim ways and tastes crossed the Pyrenees among a population which was racially akin to that on the Spanish side and consequently predisposed to feel and to respond in the same way . . . On the other hand, no marked antipathy existed between the Basque and the Catalan connecting groups straddling the Pyrenees and the population using the various dialects of the *lingua romana*, now known as Old Provençal. The repercussions of the *karr* and *farr* movements on the Iberian peninsula was naturally felt across the Pyrenees, with the only difference that in French territory they had no devastating influence. The Aquitanians and Toulousains, those of Rousillon and Narbonne, only heard of what was going on from pilgrims, merchants, Jewish slave-dealers and itinerant jongleurs, between 850-1050. But after 1060 A.D., their counts occasionally did make an excursion into Spain to help the Aragonese and Leonese.<sup>84</sup>

It was through these channels, varied and many, that the mysticism of Islam, especially pantheistic in type, might have reached the South of France in the century that preceded the appearance of Courtly Love. Through these same channels from the East and from Spain might have come the philosophy of Islam to influence them in their thinking and in the formation of their minds.

Courtly Love was already establishing itself as a doctrine by the time that

<sup>81</sup> Miguel Asin Palacios, *op. cit.*, p. 305, and Lawrence Ecker, *op. cit.*, pp. 229-232.

<sup>82</sup> Cf. Henri Pirenne, *Economic and Social History of Mediaeval Europe* (New York,

1937), p. 11.

<sup>83</sup> Miguel Asin Palacios, *op. cit.*, p. 305.

<sup>84</sup> A. R. Nykl, *op. cit.*, pp. xxxv-xxxvi.

the great translations of Jewish and Muslim philosophy were being made. It was during the Archiepiscopate of Raymond I (1126-1151) that John of Spain and Gundisalvo at Toledo translated and introduced into Latin Christendom the *Liber de Causis*, the writings of al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, Ibn Gabirol, al-Ghazzali. Guillaume IX had just died, Marcabrun, Cercamon and Jaufré Rudel were engaged in writing their poems and Bernard de Ventadour was inaugurating the Golden Age of troubadour poetry. Chronologically it is barely possible to admit of direct influence of the philosophy of Islam, if not on the formative period of Courtly Love, then on its subsequent evolution with Bernard. That direct influence is improbable nor is there any evidence to support a theory of direct influence. There was, however, an indirect influence of the thought and culture of Islam on the formation of the ideas and ideals of the doctrine of Courtly Love. Arabic philosophy shows the same thought-pattern that we have seen emerge from Neo-Platonism, from Albigensianism, and from Muslim pantheistic mysticism. Together with these, Arabian philosophy helped to form the mind of the troubadours who introduced Courtly Love to the literary world of Southern France.

## VII. ARABIC PHILOSOPHY: AVICENNA

The influences that shaped Arabian philosophy came mainly from Syria. It is sufficient for our purposes to give in broad outline the salient facts of the transmission by them of Greek thought to the Arabs. A detailed introduction to the formation of Arabic thought,—an impossibility here,—would necessitate the inclusion of a study of the bringing of Greek wisdom into Syria and Mesopotamia by early Christian missionaries, of the activities of the schools set up by them there especially that of Edessa founded by St. Ephrem in the middle of the fourth century, of the direct contact of Islam with Christianity before and after the Hegira, of the practical consequences of the eastern migration of scholars following upon Justinian's decree of 529 closing their philosophical school at Athens, of the patronage enjoyed by their successors under the Caliphs, of the founding by one of them of the school of translators at Bagdad about the middle of the ninth century.<sup>1</sup>

In 750, Syrian scholars were invited by the Abbasid rulers to their court at Bagdad. There, at first under the protection of Al-Mansour, they worked at translating Greek philosophy and science into Arabic. For five centuries before the Arab invasion of their country, the Syrians had been in contact with Greek thought mainly through Christianity.<sup>2</sup> Their principal school had been at Edessa and when that school was dispersed by Zeno in 489, others had been set up in various centres of Syria and Persia by the Nestorians and Monophysites. It was from these schools that came translations and commentaries on the works of Aristotle and on those attributed to him, and on the Neo-Platonists, especially Porphyry. It was, too, in Syria, as well as in Persia and Byzantium, that the Neo-Platonists sought refuge when banished from Athens in 529 by Justinian and driven from Alexandria in 640 by the Arabs. It was these trans-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Le Baron Bernard Carra de Vaux, *Avicenne* (Paris, 1900), pp. 37-73; Friederich Ueberwegs *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*: zweiter Teil, *Die Patristische und Scholastische Philosophie* hrsg. von Bernhard Geyer (Berlin, 1928), pp. 287-301.

<sup>2</sup> Ainsi pendant cinq siècles les Syriens s'étaient tenus au contact de la science grecque, s'étaient assimilé sa tradition, en avaient traduit et interprété les textes, et avaient produit eux-mêmes des œuvres

importantes dans le domaine de la philosophie théologique . . . L'esprit, les œuvres, la tradition de l'hellénisme se trouvaient donc transportés déjà, au moment où parut l'Islam, dans un monde apparenté au monde arabe. Nous verrons bientôt les savants mahométans s'initier à la culture grecque sous la direction des Syriens Jacobites et Nestoriens. Carra de Vaux, *op. cit.*, pp. 44-45. Cf. also p. 39.

lations and commentaries, as well as the fruit of the continued efforts of the Neo-Platonists, that the Syrian scholars brought to the court at Bagdad; there they translated and commented upon them and so gave to Arabian philosophy its first impetus and orientation. The Caliph Al-Mamoun pursued the work begun by his predecessor Al-Mansour. About 832, he established at Bagdad a school of translators and placed it under the direction of Honain Ben Isaac (d. 873). From this school, along with translations of Greek works on science and medicine, came the bulk of translations of all the great works of Aristotle, the commentaries of Alexander of Aphrodisias, Porphyry, Themistius, Ammonius, much of the works of Plato,—the Republic, Laws, Timaeus,—as well as original treatises on them.<sup>3</sup>

There are two works of primary importance in the history of the transmission of Greek thought to Islam: the *Liber de Causis* and the *Theologia Aristotelis*. Both of them were attributed to Aristotle who, of all the Greek philosophers, was held in the highest repute by the Arabs; both of them had enormous vogue and exerted the widest influence on subsequent Arabic thought; both of them reflected the aim and ambition of the late Greek philosophers to reconcile the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle. As such they fell into a mold not too different from that of the Neo-Platonists.<sup>4</sup>

The *Liber de Causis*<sup>5</sup> was written by an Arab about 850 and is, in reality, composed of extracts from the *Institutio Theologica* of Proclus. It is a systematic treatment of the teaching of the Neo-Platonists. It deals in Euclidian fashion with the nature and properties of the One, the Intelligence and the World Soul, with the emanation of all things from the One and the return of all things to their First Principle.<sup>6</sup> It is one of the most influential books in the transmission of Greek thought to Islam.<sup>7</sup>

The second work in question, the *Theologia Aristotelis*, was written by an unknown author about the sixth century and was translated from the Greek by Ibn Abdallah Naïma of Emessa about the middle of the ninth century.<sup>8</sup> Although it bore the name of Aristotle, it is really a collection of extracts from the *Enneads* of Plotinus.<sup>9</sup> The *Theologia* proposes to study the origin of the four

<sup>3</sup> Antérieurement au temps d'Avicenne, les Orientaux étaient en possession d'une littérature philosophique très riche et un peu mêlée. Aristote y dominait; il y figurait par ses œuvres propres et par ses commentateurs, Alexandre d'Aphrodise, Thémistius, Ammonius, Jean Philoponus . . . Après Aristote vient Plato, dont la philosophie plus difficile à saisir, moins matérialisée, moins bien conservée par la tradition des écoles, a certainement été moins connue des Arabes que celle de son successeur. Au-dessous de ces deux maîtres se place un cortège un peu disparate où l'on distingue le néoplatonicien Porphyre, le médecin Galien, le Persé Manès, le gnostique Marcion et bien d'autres. De cet ensemble résultait une tradition philosophique synchrétique, qui se rapprochait beaucoup en somme de celle du néoplatonisme. Carra de Vaux, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-72.

<sup>4</sup> Jamais Aristote n'eût conquis, auprès des penseurs arabes . . . la prodigieuse autorité dont il a joui, si tout l'effet de l'œuvre conciliatrice accomplie par les Néoplatoniciens ne lui avait été attribué par ceux qui avaient mis sous son nom la *Theologie* et le *Livre des Causes*. La *Theologie d'Aristote*, donc et le *Livre des Causes*, qu'Al Farabi, Avicenne et Al Gazali ont successivement commentés, sont,

avec les écrits de Platon et d'Aristote, avec les commentaires d'Alexandre d'Aphrodisias, de Thémistius, de Jean Philoponus et de Simplicius, les sources de la Philosophie néoplatonicienne des Arabes. Pierre Duhem, *Le Système du monde*, IV (Paris, 1916), p. 405.

<sup>5</sup> Die pseudo-aristotelische Schrift ueber das reine Gut bekannt unter dem Namen *Liber de Causis*, Otto Bardenhewer (Freiburg i. Breisgau, 1882).

<sup>6</sup> Pierre Duhem, *op. cit.*, pp. 333-347, analyzes and gives a running commentary of the *Liber de Causis*.

<sup>7</sup> Extrait de l'*Institution théologique* de Proclus, mais extrait assurément et commenté par quelque philosophe judicieux et pénétrant, ce livre a distillé aux Arabes et aux Chrétiens du Moyen Age l'essence la plus pure et la plus précieuse du Néoplatonisme hellénique. Pierre Duhem, *op. cit.*, p. 347.

<sup>8</sup> Die sogenannte *Theologie des Aristoteles* (Die Philosophie der Araber im IX und X Jahrhundert aus der *Theologie des Aristoteles*, den *Abhandlungen Alfarabis* und den *Schriften der lauten Brüder*, XII, Leipzig, 1883), hrsg. und übers. von Fr. Dieterici.

<sup>9</sup> For a correspondance of its ten books to the *Enneads* and a short summary of

causes: the final cause which is God, the formal cause which is the Intelligence, the efficient cause which is the Soul and the material cause which is nature.<sup>10</sup> As such it is a study of the emanation of all things from the One and in its essentials coincides with the doctrine of Plotinus already analyzed. Likewise it teaches the inherent desire in all things to return to God and the ascending movement of all things to Him.<sup>11</sup> The end of this desire on the part of creatures is absorption or identification with God.<sup>12</sup> It is the vision of Him that is the soul's final end.<sup>13</sup>

The Arabian philosophers with whom we have to deal are Al-Kindi, Alfarabi and Avicenna. Chronologically, they are the ones whose teaching and influence might have reached the South of France in time to help shape the philosophy of life and the mentality of the first troubadours.<sup>14</sup> All three of them were born, taught and died in Eastern Islam: Al-Kindi was born in Basrah, taught in Bagdad and died in 873; Alfarabi, his pupil and successor, after teaching and working at Bagdad and Aleppo, died in 950; Avicenna, 'the prince of philosophers', was born in 980 and died in 1037.<sup>15</sup> It is these three philosophers

the subject matter of them, cf. Emile Bréhier, *La Philosophie du moyen âge* (Paris, 1937), pp. 84-86.

<sup>10</sup> Unser Ziel in diesem Buch ist somit die Grundlehre und Erklärung von der Gottherrschaft; dass sie der Urgrund sei, dass Zeit und Ewigkeit unter ihr stehn, dass sie die Ursach der Ursachen (Grundursach) sei und dieselben in einer Art von Neuschöpfung hervorrufe; dass die Lichtkraft von Gott auf den Geist ausstrahle und dann von Gott durch Vermittlung des Geistes auf die himmlische Allseele übergehe; vom Geist aber durch Vermittlung der Seele auf die Natur; und von der Seele aus durch Vermittlung der Natur auf die entstehenden und vergehenden Dinge wirke. *Theologie Aristotelis*, ed. cit., pp. 3-4.

<sup>11</sup> Diese That geschieht von Gott zwar ohne eine Bewegung, jedoch geht die Bewegung aller Dinge von ihm aus und findet sie seinetwegen statt. Es bewegen sich die Dinge durch eine Art von Sehnsucht und Schwungkraft ihm zu. *Theologie Aristotelis*, ed. cit., p. 4.

Wir müssen nämlich wissen, dass von den Naturdingen das eine am anderen hängt; vergeht eins, so steigt es zu seinem Genossen nach oben, bis es zu den himmlischen Körpern und von da zur Seele und dann zum Geist gelangt. Die Dinge alle bestehen fest im Geist, und der Geist ist festbestehend in der ersten Ursache, und die erste Ursache ist Anfang aller Dinge und ihre Ende. Von ihr nehmen alle ihren Anfang und zu ihr gehen sie zurück, wie wir die schon öfters behaupteten. *Ibid.* p. 142.

<sup>12</sup> Wer wissen will, wie der Eine, Wahre die vielen Dinge hervorrief, der werfe seinen Blick auf den Einen, Wahren einzig und allein, er kümmere sich nicht um alle Dinge, die ausserhalb seiner sind, und wende sich zur Betrachtung seines (Gottes) Wesens und bleibe dabei stehen, alsdann sieht er in seinem Geiste ihn, den Einen, Wahren, ruhend, stehend, erhaben über alle Dinge, sowohl geistige als sinnliche. Er sieht dann alle Dinge gleichsam als Bilder, die überall hin zerstreut sind und zu ihm zurück sich wenden. In dieser Weise bewegen sich alle Dinge ihm zu. Denn für alles, was sich bewegt, giebt es

irgend etwas, dem zu es sich bewegt; wo nicht, ist es überhaupt sich nicht bewegend. Das sich Bewegende bewegt sich aber nur aus Sehnsucht zu dem hin, von dem es stammt, denn es erstrebt ja nur, dies zu erreichen und sich ihm zu verähnlichen, und deshalb wirft es seinen Blick darauf und wird dies nothwendig Bewegungsursache. *Ibid.* pp. 112-113.

<sup>13</sup> Oefters war ich allein mit meiner Seele beschäftigt. Da entkleidete ich mich des Leibes, liess ihn bei Seit und ward, wie wenn ich eine blosser Substanz ohne Leib wäre. Da trat ich denn ein in mein Wesen, indem ich zu demselben frei von allen Dingen zurückkehrte. Ich war Wissen, wissend und gewusst zugleich. Da sah ich denn in meinem Wesen so viel der Schönheit, Anmuth und des Glanzes, dass ich darob verwundert und verwirrt blieb, und wusste dann, dass ich ein Theil der erhabenen, vorzüglichen, göttlichen Hochwelt und mit einem schaffenden Leben begabt sei. Als ich dies sicher wusste, erhob ich mich in meinem Wesen von dieser Welt und Gottwelt empor, da war es mir als sei ich eingereiht unter die Theile derselben und zu ihnen gehörig. Ich war über der ganzen Geistwelt und sah mich, als ob ich auf dem erhabenen göttlichen Stand stünde und erblickte dort an Licht und Anmuth, was nimmer die Zungen beschreiben noch die Ohren vernehmen können. *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

<sup>14</sup> Omitted here for this reason is the fourth member of Eastern Arabian philosophy. Al Gazali, 1059-1111, and the three of the Western Arabian school, Avempace d. 1138, Abubacer ca. 1100-1185 and Averroes 1126-1198. All of the latter three were born and worked in Sain.

<sup>15</sup> For biographical data and a cursory study of the doctrine of Al-Kindi and Alfarabi, cf. Emile Bréhier, *op. cit.*, pp. 90-100; T. J. de Boer, *Geschichte der Philosophie im Islam* (Stuttgart, 1901), pp. 90-132; Carra de Vaux, *Avicenne*, pp. 80-116. The best study is to be found in Maur Burbach O.S.B., *The Theory of Beatitude in Latin-Arabian Philosophy and its initial Impact on Christian Thought* (Thesis, Toronto, 1944), pp. 1-52.



who personify Arabian Neo-Platonism, whose teaching covers almost uninterruptedly some two hundred and fifty years.<sup>16</sup> The task of analyzing their teaching that touches on our inquiry is made easier, fortunately, because fundamentally their doctrine is the same and they vary only in secondary points and according to their own personality.<sup>17</sup> As time progressed, each developed and enlarged the doctrine he had received from his predecessor, evolved it, clarified its obscurities and strengthened its weaknesses with new arguments.<sup>18</sup> Thus in analyzing the teaching of Avicenna, the greatest of the Eastern Arabian philosophers, we are at the same time following the tradition and doctrine he had received from those who had gone before him.<sup>19</sup>

The biography and bibliographical data connected with Avicenna need not delay us; that may be better found elsewhere.<sup>20</sup> It is with his teaching that we are concerned. One of the fundamentals of that teaching is its dualism. In man, the body and soul are not substantially united<sup>21</sup> but the soul is joined to the body for which it was created and to which it was individually adapted by a sort of natural affection. This affection inclines the soul to adhere to that particular body and to direct it. The soul gives being to the body, causes it to act and live and maintains it in its individuality.<sup>22</sup> On the other hand, the body is made for the soul, organized by the soul and for it with a view to facilitating its higher spiritual life.<sup>23</sup> Sometimes, in fact, the body may be an obstacle to

<sup>16</sup> Quatre noms vont personnifier, pour nous, ce Néoplatonisme arabe; ce sont ceux d'Al-Kindi, d'Al Fârâbi, d'Avicenne et d'Al Gazâli. Ces quatre philosophes se sont succédé dans le temps de telle façon que la vie de l'un commençât à peu près lorsque la vie de l'autre venait de finir; leur enseignement a, de la sorte, rempli près de trois siècles. Pierre Duhem, *op. cit.*, p. 402.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Carra de Vaux, *Les Penseurs de l'Islam*, IV (Paris, 1923), p. 2.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Pierre Duhem, *op. cit.*, pp. 405-495. The author has taken certain theses,—the relation of the human soul to the active intelligence, the procession of the heavenly bodies from God, God and His nature, the theory of causality,—and has traced them through the writings of Al-Kindi, Alfarabi and Avicenna: Cette analyse nous a permis de reconnaître la multiplicité et la solidité des liens qui rattachaient les uns aux autres les réponses données à ces trois questions. *Op. cit.*, p. 495.

<sup>19</sup> Mention must be made here of the Brethren of Purity (Ikhwan as-Safa') whose philosophical encyclopedia was completed before 983. (Ed. Fr. Dieterici, *Die Abhandlungen der Ikhwan as-Safa' in Auswahl* (Leipzig, 1883-86). The chief aim of the Brethren was to further the salvation of their souls by mutual assistance and by every means, especially purifying knowledge. The central point of their doctrine is the heavenly origin and return of the soul to God. The world is derived from God by emanation and individual souls return to the World Soul at death, and the World Soul to God on the Last Day. (Cf. T. J. de Boer, *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, art. Ikhwan as-Safa', II (London, 1927), 459-461). Their teaching was eclectic, mainly Neo-Platonic. Through their organization and encyclopedia, their doctrine was able to reach the common people as opposed to the philosophers and scholars of the courts: Vorzugsweise in dieser Form hat sich

griechische Weisheit im Osten acclimatieren können, während die aristotelische Schulphilosophie fast nur im Treibhause fürstlicher Gönner gedeihen wollte (T. J. de Boer, *Geschichte der Philosophie im Islam*, p. 89). In this they were popularisers and propagandists of Neo-Platonism and thus helped in an important way to shape the mentality of their followers and those with whom they came into contact (cf. Carra de Vaux, *Avicenne*, p. 117).

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Carra de Vaux, *Avicenne*, pp. 127-156; Maur Burbach, *op. cit.*, pp. 53-92.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. T. J. de Boer, *Geschichte der Philosophie in Islam*, p. 125: Seine Anthropologie ist dualistisch. Körper und Seelen gehören nicht wesentlich zusammen.

<sup>22</sup> Sed in substantia animae quae incipit esse cum aliquo corpore propter quod debuit creari, inest ex primis principiis affectio inclinationis naturalis ad occupandum se circa illud et ad regendum illud et providendum ei in omnibus, et adhaerendum ei, et per haec omnia fit ejus propria, et alienatur ab aliis corporibus circa illud tantum. *De Anima* V, 3, fol. 24b. All quotations are from the Venice edition of 1508 entitled *Avicenne perhypatetici philosophi et medicorum facile primi opera in lucem redacta: Logyca, Sufficientia, De celo et mundo, De anima, De animalibus, De intelligentiis, Alpharabius de intelligentiis, Philosophia prima*.

Et quia oportet quod proprietates animae in corpore sit quasi affectio quaedam in eo, occupans illam circa gubernationem sui corporis et curam ipsius, quae est in ea propter debitum corporis. Cujus curae anima est causa, quae non habet esse nisi cum habet esse ejus corpus proprium cum officio suo et complexione. *Op. cit.* V, 2, fol. 24a.

<sup>23</sup> Obligatio enim animae cum corpore, sicut postea adhuc declarabitur, est propter hoc ut perficiatur intellectus contemplativus et sanctificetur et mundetur. *Op. cit.* I, 5, fol. 6a.

that life and then the soul is forced to vindicate its independence.<sup>24</sup> The soul, though the perfection of the body, is in no way a form imprinted in matter,<sup>25</sup> but is a solitary substance which acts independently of the body.<sup>26</sup> Its being is independent of the body even considered as a material cause; rather the body is something accidental to the soul.<sup>27</sup>

Thus the soul, a solitary and self-sufficient substance joined to the body by a natural affection, is situated between two worlds,—the intelligible world and the world of matter.<sup>28</sup> Because of its position between these two worlds, the soul itself is submitted to a certain dualism, being related to the higher world by the speculative intellect and to the lower world by the active intellect. The active intellect give the soul an aptitude for dealing with the world of sense, of avoiding impediments to its higher activity and of acting as well as it can while in union with the body. The active intellect needs the body and corporeal powers and is the medium between the body and the soul. By it the soul rules the body. Below the active intellect are the other powers which flow from it insofar as the body is capable of receiving them and of profiting by them. The contemplative intellect, on the other hand, is the medium between the soul and the intelligible world and through it the soul is acted upon by that world. The contemplative intellect needs the body and its powers but not for all its activities at all times. Moreover it gives the soul an aptitude towards a perfection dispensing it from the need of such instruments.<sup>29</sup> The function of the contemplative intellect is to apprehend separated forms, those, that is, that are already free from all matter and those which it must first

<sup>24</sup> Anima autem humana juvatur corpore ad acquirendum principia illa consentiendi et intelligendi; deinde cum adquisierit, redibit ad seipsam. Si autem obstiterint aliquae virtutum quae sunt infra eam et impederint eam aliquibus dispositionibus coram positis, retrahent eam a sua actione. Si vero impedita non fuerit, non egebit eo postea in suis propriis actionibus nisi in aliquibus tantum . . . Cum autem perficitur anima et roboratur sola per se operatur actiones suas absolute. *Op. cit.*, V, 3, fol. 24a.

<sup>25</sup> Dicemus igitur quod substantia, quae est subiectum intelligibile, non est corpus neque habens esse propter corpus ullo modo eo quod est virtus in eo aut forma ejus. *De Anima*, V, 2, fol. 22d.

Ergo impossibile est eam esse in corpore. *Op. cit.* V, 2, fol. 23b. Impossibile igitur est ut essentia quae format intelligibilia sit existens in corpore aliquo modo. *Op. cit.* V, 2, fol. 23bc. Patet ergo ex praedictis quod anima non est impressa in corpore neque habet esse per corpus. *Op. cit.* V, 2, fol. 24a.

<sup>26</sup> Sed anima est id quod habet alias virtutes et est, sicut postea declarabimus, substantia solitaria, id est per se, quae habet aptitudinem ad actiones. *Op. cit.*, V, 1, fol. 22d. Cf. M.-D. Roland-Gosselin, 'Sur les relations de l'âme et du corps d'après Avicenne', *Mélanges Mandonnet* II (Paris, 1930), pp. 47-54.

<sup>27</sup> Jam enim probavimus et ostendimus quod anima non est impressa in corpore aliquo modo. Ergo corpus non est formatum forma animae rationalis neque ad modum compositionis neque ad modum simplicitatis . . . Ergo non pendet anima ex corpore ut causatum ex sua causa essentiali, quamvis complexio et corpus causae sint animae accidentales . . . At-

tribuens autem animae esse non est corpus neque virtus corporalis, sed sine dubio essentia existens nuda a materiis et mensuris . . . Neque est corpus nisi causa accidentalis. *De Anima* V, 4, fol. 24cd.

<sup>28</sup> Anima humana, sicut postea scies, est una substantia habens comparationem ad duo, quorum unum est supra eam et alterum infra eam, sed secundum unumquodque istorum habet vim per quam ordinatur habitudo quae est inter ipsam et illud. *Op. cit.* I, 5, fol. 5c.

<sup>29</sup> Intellectus vero activus eget corpore et virtutibus corporalibus ad omnes actiones suas. Contemplativus vero intellectus eget corpore et virtutibus ejus, sed neque semper neque omni modo. Sufficit enim ipse sibi per seipsum. Nihil autem horum anima est humana, sed anima est id quod habet alias virtutes et est, sicut postea declarabimus, substantia solitaria, id est per se, quae habet aptitudinem ad actiones quarum quaedam sunt quae non perficiuntur nisi per instrumenta et per usum eorum aliquo modo: quaedam vero sunt quibus non sunt necessaria instrumenta aliquo modo . . . Sed substantia humanae animae ex seipsa est apta perfici aliquo modo perfectionis, ita ut non sit ei aliquid necessarium extra ipsam. Hanc autem aptitudinem habet ab illo qui vocatur intellectus contemplativus. Et iterum est apta ad conservandum se ab impediendis sibi accidentibus ex consortio . . . et ut in consortio sic agat prout melius poterit. Hanc autem aptitudinem habet ex intellectu qui vocatur activus qui est principalis inter alias virtutes quas habet circa corpus. Infra hanc autem sunt virtutes fluentes ab ipsa eo quod corpus aptum est recipere alias et proficere per illas. *Op. cit.*, V, 1, fol. 22d.

disengage from all ties with matter. Thus it is primarily a receptive power.<sup>30</sup> One might characterize the difference between the intellects in question by saying that whereas the contemplative intellect concerns itself with universals, the active intellect concerns itself with particulars.<sup>31</sup> The soul, therefore, has, as it were, two faces, one turned on high towards the Intelligence whence it receives ideas or forms, the other turned below towards the body on which it acts and whose services it uses in many ways.<sup>32</sup>

The avicennian dualism and doctrine of the soul with its double-faced power arises from his conception of the universe. In general, Avicenna's teaching on the structure of the universe is not too different from that of Plotinus. It consists of a series of emanations beginning with the First Principle and extending to the materials out of which the corporeal world is fashioned. The Supreme Being is one and necessary, indivisible and uncaused. Since He is pure intelligence, He knows Himself and by that one and simple creative act of thinking is engendered a one and simple created being. This is the First Intelligence, likewise one and simple because from the one and simple can proceed only what is one and simple. It is free from all matter, animates no body but is the intermediary by means of which will be derived all particular beings.<sup>33</sup> It is necessary insofar as derived from God, possible since nothing constrained God to cause it.<sup>34</sup> The act by which this First Intelligence necessarily knows God engenders the Intelligence which is inferior to it; the act by which it knows itself as necessary in virtue of the First Being engenders the soul of the highest sphere; the act by which it knows itself as possible in itself engenders the body of that same sphere. Then the second Intelligence, the Intelligence of the sphere of Saturn engenders in turn the third Intelligence, that of Jupiter, by the act in which it knows the First Being; insofar as it knows itself as necessary, it engenders the sphere of Saturn, and insofar as it knows itself as possible it engenders the body of Saturn.<sup>35</sup> Thus is the process

<sup>30</sup> Sed virtus contemplativa est virtus quae solet informari a forma universali nuda a materia; si autem fuerit nuda in se, apprehendere suam formam in se facilius erit. Si autem non fuerit nuda, fiet tamen nuda quia ipsa denudabit eam ita ut de omnibus affectionibus ejus cum materia nihil remaneat in ea. *Op. cit.*, I, 5, fol. 5c.

<sup>31</sup> Homo ergo habet virtutem quae propria est conceptionum universalium et alia quae est propria ad cogitandum de rebus singularibus. *De Anima*, V, 1, fol. 22c.

<sup>32</sup> Haec autem virtus activa est virtus quam habet anima propter debitum quod debet ei quod est infra eam, scilicet corpus ad regendum aliquid, sed virtus contemplativa est illa virtus quam habet anima propter debitum quod debet ei quod est supra ipsam ut patiatu ab eo et perficiat per illud et recipiat ab illo tamquam anima nostra habeat duas facies, faciem scilicet deorsum ad corpus quam oportet nullatenus recipere aliquam effectonem generis debiti naturae corporis; et aliam faciem sursum versus principia altissima quam oportet semper recipere aliquid ab eo quod est illic et affici ab illo. *Op. cit.* I, 5, fol. 5c. On the theory of the two faces of the soul, cf. J. Rohmer, 'Sur la doctrine franciscaine des deux faces de l'âme', *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* II (1927), pp. 73-77, and A. M. Goichon, *La distinction de l'essence et de l'existence d'après Ibn Sina* (Paris, 1937), p. 326.

<sup>33</sup> Manifestum est igitur quod primum eorum quae sunt a causa prima unum numero est, et ejus essentia et ejus quidditas est unitas non in materia. Unde nihil corporum vel formarum quae sunt perfectiones corporum est causatum ejus propinquum quia primum causatum est intelligentia pura quia est forma non in materia, et ipsa est prima intelligentiarum separatarum quas numeravimus. *Meta.* IX, 4, fol. 104c.

<sup>34</sup> Intelligentiis enim separatis non potest esse aliqua multitudo nisi quemadmodum dicam: quantum causatum per se est possibile esse in seipso, propter primum autem est necessarium esse. Sed necessitas sui esse est secundum quod est intelligentia et intelligit seipsum et intelligit primum necessario; unde oportet ut sit in eo multitudo ex hoc quod intelligit se, quod est possibile esse quantum in se; et ex hoc quod intelligit necessitatem sui esse a primo, quod est intellectum per se. Non est autem ei multitudo ex primo, nam possibilitas sui esse est ei quoddam propter se non propter primum; sed est ei a primo necessitas sui esse et deinde multiplicatur per hoc quod intelligit primum et propter hoc quod intelligit seipsum, tali multiplicatione quae est comitans esse suae unitatis ex primo. *Op. cit.*, IX, 4, fol. 104d.

<sup>35</sup> Sub unaquaque autem intelligentia est coelum cum sua materia et sua forma, quae est anima, et intelligentia inferior ea. Igitur sub omni intelligentia sunt tria in esse

down the levels of Intelligences, souls and celestial bodies of graded nobility until is reached the sphere of the Moon. The Intelligence of the Moon engenders a tenth and last Intelligence, the Agent Intelligence, which instead of engendering the body and soul of a sphere by its creative act of thinking, produces the human souls and the four elements subject to generation and corruption of the finite world. It is this last Intelligence that presides over the creation of the informed elements; the materials submissive to generation and corruption, which prepares the materials for the reception of their forms, which contains the forms actively and produces them in matter whose role is that of simple recipient.<sup>35</sup> Such is the hierarchy of the universe wherein man is situated midway between the living spheres and their souls and the material world.<sup>37</sup>

Balancing this process of emanation from the First Principle is an ascending movement motivated by the desire of perfection, by the desire of each soul to return to its proper mover.<sup>38</sup> The Supreme Good, the first object of love, is the first mover of the spheres as a whole but each sphere has a proximate and proper mover.<sup>39</sup> The proper mover of the particular sphere is the soul of that sphere produced by a superior Intelligence. In comprehending the Intelligence it is moved and attracted to it by desire and love. Thus the Intelligence is the indirect mover.<sup>40</sup> What the soul seeks is to resemble the good sought, that is the Intelligence, in the measure possible for therein lies its perfection.<sup>41</sup>

Unde oportet ut possibilitas essendi haec tria sit ab intelligentia prima in creatione propter ternitatem quae est nominata in eam; et nobile sequitur ex nobiliore multis modis. Igitur ex prima intelligentia, in quantum intelligit primum, sequitur esse alterius intelligentiae inferioris ea; et in quantum intelligit seipsam sequitur ex ea forma coeli ultimi et ejus perfectio et haec est anima; et propter naturam essendi possibilem quae est ejus, quae est retenta in quantum intelligit seipsam, est etiam corporeitas coeli ultimi. . . . Similiter est dispositio in intelligentia et intelligentia, et in coelo et coelo quousque pervenitur ad intelligentiam agentem quae gubernat nostras animas. *Meta.* IX, 4, fol. 104d-105a. Avicenna points out that this procession cannot go *ad infinitum*, *ibid.* fol. 105a. For the reasons, cf. D. Saliba, *Études sur la métaphysique d'Avicenne* (Paris, 1926, pp. 133-146).

<sup>36</sup> Et sequitur semper intelligentia post intelligentiam quousque fiat sphaera Lunae, et deinde fiant elementa et aptantur recipere impressionem unam in specie, multam numero, ab intelligentia ultima. Si enim causa multitudinis non fuerit in agente debet esse necessario in patiente. Oportet igitur ut ex unaquaque intelligentia fiat intelligentia inferior ea, et cesset tunc quousque possint fieri substantiae intelligibiles, divisibiles, multae numero propter multitudinem causarum et usque huc perveniunt. *Meta.* IX, 4, fol. 105b.

<sup>37</sup> Postquam autem esse cepit a primo, tunc quicquid consequitur aliud est inferius in ordine suo priore, nec cessat descendere per gradus. In hoc autem primus gradus est angelorum spiritualium spoliatorum qui vocantur intelligentiae; post haec est ordo angelorum spiritualium quae vocantur animae, et hi sunt angeli administratores. Postea est ordo corporum coelestium ex quibus aliud est nobilior alio. Sic usquequo perveniatur ad ultimum eorum. Post hoc autem incipit esse materiae recipientis

formas generatas corruptibiles quae primo investitur formis elementorum et deinde gradatim informatur formis aliorum. Primum igitur esse quod est inter illa est id quod vilius et inferius est eo quod sequitur. Quod autem est vilius inter ea est materia, postea elementa, deinde composita congelata, postea vegetabilia, deinde animalia bruta, postea homo. Ex his autem nobilior est homo et postea animalia, deinde vegetabilia. *Meta.* X, 1, fol. 107d.

<sup>38</sup> Videtur autem ipsa (prima intelligentia) esse principium movens corpus ultimum secundum viam desiderii. *Meta.*, IX, 4, fol. 104cd. Gilson notes that the *corpus ultimum* in this connection as elsewhere designates 'le corps situé le plus loin de nous, et, par conséquent, aussi le plus près du premier moteur'. Cf. 'Pourquoi saint Thomas a critiqué saint Augustin', *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* I (1926), p. 36, n. 2.

<sup>39</sup> Item tu scies quod substantia hujus bonitatis amatae primae una est nec potest esse ut motor primus universitatis coelorum sit plus quam unus; quia igitur unaquaque sperarum coelorum habeat motorem proprium propinquum et desideratum amatum proprium. *Meta.* IX, 2, fol. 103b.

<sup>40</sup> Cum igitur delectatio pervenerit ad intelligendum primum principium et ad id quod intelligitur de eo vel apprehenditur de eo secundum modum intelligibilem vel animale, tunc occupata circa hoc, retrahetur ab omni alia re et ab omni alio modo; sed tamen proveniet ex hoc id quod est inferius eo in ordine et hoc est desiderium assimilari ei secundum possibilitatem. Sequitur igitur inquisitio motus non in quantum ipse est motus sed in quantum est id quod dixerimus. Et sequitur hoc desiderium amor et delectatio quae fluunt ab eo et haec perfectio fuit a desiderio. Igitur secundum hunc modum primum principium movet corpus celi. *Meta.* IX, 2, fol. 103b.

<sup>41</sup> Factus est igitur motus retinens de hac

This movement of knowledge, love and union extends through the entire series of the spheres which are by this ascending movement linked in a chain of knowledge and desire, just as they are linked in the descending scale by the streams of influence descending from the First Being.<sup>42</sup>

Having determined that the motion of the individual sphere cannot arise from its nature or from violence but is an effect of a will which is the property of a soul, Avicenna shows that the proximate mover of the sphere is the soul, the perfection and form of the sphere produced by a superior Intelligence.<sup>43</sup> But such a mover needs a certain infinite power which the corporeal and variable soul has not. This power is communicated to the soul indirectly from the infinite Intelligence and thus the Intelligence moves the heavens in the manner that a mover moves an object by means of another motor. This other motor is the object of its love—the Supreme Good. Invariable and therefore without desire, it intends the loved as loved, the goodness which it already has by emanation.<sup>44</sup>

The soul moves the heavenly body because it seeks and desires something, and what it seeks and desires is its own good and that by deliberation and election. Deliberation and election of its good is therefore the principle of the motion of the soul.<sup>45</sup> The good that the soul seeks cannot be such that it can

perfectione id quod fuit possibile cujus principium est desiderium assimilandi bonitati ultimae in permanendo in perfectione ultima secundum possibilitatem suam. Principium autem huius desiderii est id quod intelligitur de eo. Cum autem tu consideraveris dispositionem corporum naturalium in suo desiderio naturali ad essendum in effectu et in suo ubi, nec miraberis esse corpus desiderans tali desiderio ut sit in aliquo suorum situum in quo potest esse ipsum esse et ut sit virtutis qua perfectior esse potest et ut sit motum et proprie. *Op. cit.* IX, 2, fol. 103b.

<sup>42</sup> Vaste hiérarchie, stable et fixe, allant de Dieu aux êtres sublunaires, en passant par les cieus et leurs intelligences motrices, et faisant voir la destinée de l'âme humaine dans un retour vers les Intelligences dont elle est issue'. E. Bréhier, *La philosophie du moyen âge* (Paris, 1937), p. 212. Cf. also D. Saliba, *op. cit.*, p. 207.

<sup>43</sup> Igitur secundum omnes dispositiones necessarium est ut virtus animalis sit principium propinquum motui quamvis nos non negamus ibi etiam esse virtutem intelligibilem quae moveatur hac transmutatione intelligibili sed postquam innititur similitudini imaginationis. Sed potentia intelligibili spoliatae omnibus modis variationis intellectum semper est praesens sive intellectus ejus sit universale de universali sive sit universale de particulari quemadmodum ostendimus. Si autem fuerit in re, tunc coelum movetur per animam et anima est propinquum principium sui motus . . . et ipsa aestimat se habere apprehensionem rerum variabilium particularium et voluntatem essendi ipsas res particulares et ipsa est perfectio corporis coeli et ejus forma. Si autem non esset sic sed esset existens per se animi modo, tunc esset intelligentia pure quae non variaretur nec permutaretur nec admisceretur ei aliquid quod est in potentia. *Meta.*, IX, 2, fol. 102d.

<sup>44</sup> Proximus autem motor coeli quamvis non sit intelligentia, oportet tamen ut sit prius eo intelligentia quae est prior causa motus coeli. Jam autem nosti quod hic

motor indiget virtute infinita spoliata a materia quae non movetur nec per intentionem. Anima vero quae movet coelum est, sicut jam notum est tibi, corporalis, convertibilis, variabilis, nec est spoliata a materia cujus comparatio ad coelum est sicut comparatio nostrae animae animalis ad nos, cui est ut intelligat aliquo modo intelligibilitate, scilicet commixta materiae et omnino suae aestimationes, vel quae videntur aestimationes, sunt certae et ejus imaginationes et quae universaliter imaginationes sunt sicut est intellectus activus in nobis qui omnino innititur corpori. Sed primus motor ejus est virtus libera a materia omnino et omni modo et postquam non est possibile eam moveri ullo modo in quantum ipsa movetur et facit varietates et est libera sicut jam tibi innotuit haec. Tunc oportet ut et ipsa moveat quemadmodum motor movet mediante motu alterius motoris qui est actor motus ab initio suo qui variatur propter eam. Et hic est motus qui movet motor motoris. Id autem quod movet motorem sine variationis sui nec per intentionem nec per desiderium, idem finis et intentio quam intendit id quod movetur, et idem est amatum in quantum est amatum et ipsum est bonitas apud amantem. *Op. cit.*, IX, 2, fol. 102d-103a.

<sup>45</sup> Sed dico quod omne quod movetur motu non violento ad aliquid est, et desiderium alicujus est adeo quod naturae etiam est desiderium rei naturalis. Et haec est perfectio essentialis corpori vel in sua forma vel in suo ubi vel in suo situ. Desiderium vero voluntatis est aliquid voluntarium vel voluntas alicujus rei quaesitae sensibilis sicut suavitas, vel aestimabilis imaginabilis sicut victoria, vel opinabilis sicut bonitas putativa. Inquisitor autem suavitatis est voluptas, et inquisitor victoriae est ira, et inquisitor vero bonitatis putativae est opinio. Inquisitor vero bonitatis purae et verae est intellectus et haec inquisitio vocatur electio. Voluptas vero et ira non sunt convenientia substantiae corporis quod non variatur nec patitur quia

be obtained by motion because then the motion would cease in attainment. Nor can the good be a perfection attainable by motion for then the perfection would be less noble than the soul; for the effect receives its perfection from the action of the cause. The good sought must be one whose substance cannot be attained in any way because it is something remote. The soul strives and seeks that unattainable good by the means left to it,—by assimilating itself to it in so far as possible.<sup>46</sup> To be assimilated to the Supreme Good is to know the essence of the Supreme Good in its eternal perfection, to assimilate what is possible to it considering its power, and then to strive to remain in that state in so far as it is possible to it. This it does by movement.<sup>47</sup> The soul is *quoad substantiam* quasi infinite and in act by the virtue and power that flows to it from the Supreme Good; *quoad speciem* it is immersed in matter and *in potentia* as to place and therefore finite. Thus in a permanent way it apprehends and possesses the Supreme Good in an imperfect way and the desire of assimilating itself to the Supreme Good in a perfect way is the cause of its eternal motion.<sup>48</sup>

This desire of assimilation to the Supreme Good insofar as it is act is the cause of motion. But since, as it has been said, the individual soul cannot directly attain it since it is finite, this inquisition must be accomplished successively,—*per fluxum*. That is, the individual will always be *in potentia* to that assimilation and there results eternal desire and therefore eternal motion. So the prime or first desire of the soul is its Supreme Good; other desires, of different and particular dispositions, are indirect and follow from the prime desire and are ordained to it.<sup>49</sup> Thus the principle of motion is will and desire primarily of the Supreme Good, secondarily and *in via et cursu* as regards

non convertitur ad dispositionem inconvenientem, ut ab ea iterum rediens ad dispositionem convenientem, delectetur aut ut velit ulcisci propter id quod imaginat. Unde irascitur praesertim cum omnis motus ad suavitatem vel ad victoriam finitus sit et etiam quia plura earum quae putantur non permanent putata semper. Necesse est igitur ut principium hujus motus sit electio vel voluntas bonitatis verae. *Ibid.* fol. 103a.

<sup>46</sup> Restat igitur ut bonitas inquisita per motum sit existens per se cujus natura non est ut apprehendatur. Omnem autem bonitatem cujus haec est natura non inquireret intellectus nisi ut assimiletur ei secundum quod sibi possibile est. *Meta.* IX, 4, fol. 103a.

<sup>47</sup> Assimilari vero ei est intelligere de se quod non est illi simile et ideo oportet ut permaneat semper secundum quod perfectionis est esse substantiae ejus in suis dispositionibus et comitantibus ad modum illius cui potuit acquiri sua perfectio ultima initio suo, et deinde assimilatur ei in perseverantia. Cui autem non potuit acquiri sua perfectio in initio suo completur in ejus assimilatione per motum. *Op. cit.*, IX, 2, fol. 103a.

<sup>48</sup> Certitudo autem hujus est quod motor coelestis corporis movetur a virtute infinita. Virtus autem quae est suae animae corporeae finita est. In quantum autem intelligit primum, fluit de ejus flumine et virtute super eam semper et fit ipsa quasi habens virtutem infinitam; secundum intellectum de cujus lumine et virtute fluit super corpus coeleste, est in substantia sua secundum perfectionem ultimam eo quod

non remansit in sua substantia aliquid quod sit in potentia. Similiter est et hoc in quantitate sua et qualitate; sed in suo ubi et situ secundum quod principium secutum est suum esse de sitibus, stabile non est . . . Cum enim fuerit in una parte in effectu, erit in alia parte in potentia . . . Assimilatio vero bonitati ultimae facit debere semper permanere in perfectione quae plenior esse potest rei semper. Et quia hoc non fuit possibile corpore coelesti in uno, tamen retinuit in specie et per successionem. Factus est igitur motus retinens de hac perfectione id quod fuit possibile cujus principium est desiderium assimilandi bonitati ultimae in permanendo in perfectione ultima secundum possibilitatem suam. Principium autem hujus desiderii est id quod intelligit de eo. *Meta.*, IX, 2, fol. 103ab.

<sup>49</sup> Sed quia hoc non est ei possibile in uno individuo, ideo est per successionem et hoc est motus. Cum enim unum individuum duratur, non acquiritur ei aliud consimile sed hoc permanent semper in potentia. Motus igitur sequitur illam imaginationem secundum hunc modum non quod hoc sit ejus intentio principalis, quamvis illam imaginationem unam sequantur imaginationes particulares quas dicimus et distinguimus secundum quod proveniunt non secundum intentionem principalem, et illas imaginationes particulares sequentur motus quibus permutantur situs. Motus autem est perfectio quae major hoc esse potest. Igitur desiderium primum est id quod diximus. Cetera vero quae sequuntur illud sunt fluxus. *Op. cit.*, IX, 2, fol. 103b.

other and inferior goods. Thus according to its power and possibility is it assimilated to the Supreme Good through them.<sup>50</sup>

To sum up: the proximate mover of each sphere is the soul of that sphere, its perfection and form, itself the product of a superior Intelligence. The principle of this motion is the desire, deliberative and elective, of the soul to attain its good. This good which is the substance of the Intelligence above it, cannot be attained wholly by the soul in its corporeal state. Therefore the soul strives, yearns and seeks for this unattainable union. This it accomplishes by assimilating itself to the Intelligence insofar as it can, according to its individualized and finite power. It strives ever and ever towards a more perfect assimilation by its nature always *in potentia* toward that which is perfect and in act. The Supreme Good is the ultimate cause of all the motion of the spheres but this movement is exercised through the hierarchically organized celestial world so that the individual soul of the spheres is in each case the proximate mover of the sphere immediately below it.

The status of the human soul is not unlike the souls of the heavenly spheres. It is the proximate mover of the human body; the principle of its movement is the desire for the Agent Intelligence which has engendered it. It is towards union with that Agent Intelligence that it strives while joined to the body and, in union with that body, all that it can do is to desire and strive to assimilate itself to the Agent Intelligence according to its power.

The perfection ever desired by the human soul while in union with the body is assimilation or union with the Agent Intelligence. The nature of this union is described by Avicenna.<sup>51</sup> Union with the Agent Intelligence opens up to the soul a new world,—the world of Intelligence. By it the soul has association with the true universe and acquires the form which converts the soul by successive stages into the universe itself. This union gives it contact with absolute beauty, absolute goodness and true elegance.<sup>52</sup>

The aptitude for union of the soul with the Agent Intelligence is actualized by learning, knowledge or science. While joined to the body, learning or the formation of knowledge consists in a series of operations. They are best described by Gilson:<sup>53</sup>

former un intelligible consiste pour nous à considérer les images sensibles que nous avons amassées, ce qui est un mouvement vers l'inférieur, et adapter notre intellect à s'unir à l'Intelligence agente, ce qui nous tourne vers le supérieur. Intellect en puissance d'une part, intellect en act grâce à l'Intelligence agente d'autre part, voilà les deux pôles de

<sup>50</sup> Cum igitur delectatio pervenerit ad intelligendum primum principium et ad id quod intelligitur de eo, vel apprehenditur de eo secundum modum intelligibilem vel animalem, tunc occupata circa hoc, retrahetur ab omni alia re et ab omni alio modo. Sed tamen proveniet ex hoc id quod est inferius eo in ordine et hoc est desiderium assimilari ei secundum possibilitatem. Sequitur igitur inquisitio motus non in quantum ipse est motus sed in quantum est quod dixerimus. Et sequitur hoc desiderium amor et delectatio quae fluunt ab eo et haec perfectio fluit a desiderio. Igitur secundum hoc modum primum principium movet corpus coeli. *Met.*, IX, 2, fol. 103b.

<sup>51</sup> Dico igitur quod sua perfectio animae rationalis est ut fiat saeculum intelligibile et describatur in ea forma totius, et ordo intellectus in toto, et bonitas fluens in esse, et ut incipiens a principio totius procedat

ad substantias excellentiores spiritales absolute, et deinde ad spiritales pendentes aliquo modo ex corporibus, et deinde ad animas moventes corpora, et postea ad corpora coelestia, et deinde ut haec omnia sunt descripta in anima secundum dispositiones et vires eorum quousque perficiatur in ea dispositio esse universitatis, et sic transeat in saeculum intellectum instar esse totius mundi, cernens id quod est pulchritudo absolute, et bonitas absolute, et decor verus fiat unum cum ea insculpta exemplo ejus et dispositione ejus et incedens secundum viam ejus conversa in similitudinem substantiae ejus. *Meta.*, IX, 7, fol. 107a.

<sup>52</sup> Cf. note 31.

<sup>53</sup> E. Gilson, 'Les sources gréco-arabes de l'Augustinisme avicennisant', *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire* IV (1929), p. 73.



l'opération; quant à la forme intelligible elle-même que l'âme reçoit de l'Intelligence agente, c'est elle que l'on désigne du nom d'intellect acquis: *intellectus adeptus*, c'est à dire: du dehors, puisque c'est l'Intelligence agente qui la confère à notre intellect.

On the one hand, from the active intellect the soul has gathered particularized images through the senses. These are preserved in the imagination. The forms of these images are particularized and individualized by matter and keep their stamp of materiality. On the other hand, there is the hierarchy of intellects. In the hierarchy of intellects of the soul which are turned towards the intelligible world, the lowest is the material intellect, or intellect *in potentia* in relation to the idea or thought. Now it is axiomatic that what goes from potency to act must do so under the operation of a cause already in act. The sole cause which is by definition perfectly in act as regards that idea is the Agent Intelligence. It is the work of the Agent Intelligence to denude the sensible forms of the images preserved in the imagination of the data of the senses and material characteristics, to imprint that form on the material intellect. Thus it becomes the intellect in act. This is done by a sort of illumination by which the Agent Intelligence, which contains the models and principles of the intelligible world, confers the denuded form on the soul. This is the *intellectus adeptus*. The Agent Intelligence may be said to be in relation to the soul as the sun is to sight. Just as the sun is actually visible in itself and makes actually visible by its light what was visible only *in potentia*, so the Agent Intelligence is actually intelligible in itself and makes intelligible what was only intelligible *in potentia*. Knowledge then is a process of abstraction. But abstraction is not to be understood as a process by which the form which was in the imagination is brought to the intellect, nor in the sense that the sensible form denuded of its material characteristics produces a like form in the material intellect, but in this sense that the soul considers the images it possesses, compares and examines them and this operation prepares it to receive the abstraction operated by the Agent Intelligence. Thus the form is received from outside and abstraction is an emanation from the Agent Intelligence.<sup>54</sup>

Union with the Agent Intelligence is not an abiding one, nor is the illumination of the Agent Intelligence permanent. Considering the possibilities

<sup>54</sup> Dicemus quod anima humana prius est intelligens in potentia, deinde fit intelligens in effectu. Omne autem quod exit de potentia ad effectum, non exit nisi per causam quae habet illud in effectu, et extrahit ad illum. Ergo haec est causa per quam animae nostrae in rebus intelligibilibus exeunt de potentia ad effectum. Sed causa dandi formam intelligibilem non est nisi intelligentia in effectu penes quam sunt principia formarum intelligibilium abstractarum; cuius comparatio ad animas nostras est sicut comparatio solis ad visus nostros, quia sicut sol videtur per se in effectu, et videtur luce ipsius in effectu, quod non videbatur in effectu, sic est dispositio hujus intelligentiae quantum ad nostras animas. Virtus enim rationalis cum considerat singula quae sunt in imaginatione, et illuminatur luce intelligentiae agentis in nos quam praediximus, fiunt nuda a materia et ab ejus penditiis, et imprimuntur in anima rationali, non quasi ipsa de imaginatione mutetur ad intellectum nostrum, neque quia intentio pendens ex multis, cum ipsa in se sit considerata nuda,

per se faciat similem sibi, sed quia ex consideratione eorum aptatur anima ut emanet in eam ab intelligentia agente abstractio. Cogitationes enim et considerationes motus sunt aptantes animam ad recipiendum emanationem, sicut termini medii praeparant ad recipiendum conclusiones necessarias, quamvis illud fiat uno modo et hoc alio, sicut postea scies. Cum autem accidit animae rationali comparari ad hanc formam nudam mediante luce intelligentiae agentis, contigit in anima ex forma quodam quod secundum aliquid est sui generis, et secundum aliud non est sui generis. Sicut cum lux cadit super colorata et fit in visu ex illa luce operatio quae non est similis ei ex omni parte, imaginabilia vero sunt intelligibilia in potentia, et fiunt intelligibilia in effectu non ipsa eadem, sed quae excipiuntur ex illis; immo sicut operatio quae apparet ex formis sensibilibus, non ipsae formae mediante luce, sed aliquid aliud quod habet comparisonem ad illas, quod fit mediante luce in receptibili recte opposito. *De Anima*, V, 5, fol. 25b.



involved, Avicenna concludes that union depends on the human will.<sup>55</sup> When the aptitude for beholding the Agent Intelligence is perfected, it is the will that turns the soul towards this Intelligence from which emanates the acquired intellect which perfects the soul.<sup>56</sup> According to Avicenna true beatitude for the soul consists in that union.<sup>57</sup>

While the soul is bound in union with the body, it must exercise the operations which belong to the active intellect—*ad infra*—so that the contemplative intellect may be perfected, sanctified and cleansed.<sup>58</sup> When finally the soul is liberated from the body and its accidents, it will find intelligible beauty and perennial delight by union with the Agent Intelligence.<sup>59</sup> While the soul is united to the body, it cannot unite itself immediately and permanently with the Agent Intelligence. It must prepare itself for that union by the acquisition of a disposition towards it so that the act of the will to turn towards the Agent Intelligence may be habitual. A soul unprepared for its proper delight is, as it were, paralyzed. Only when this paralysis is removed by proper dispositions can the soul experience that delight that is more excellent than any other. Unless this disposition is acquired, the soul can find only misery. The disposition consists in this that the soul apprehend the quiddity of the universe and this is possible only to those who have acquired a desire for perfection through intellectual virtue. The soul does not have an innate desire for perfection. Rather the soul and its powers are as material subjects to this desire until the soul has acquired some actual knowledge and perfection. This desire is present in the substance of the soul only after a knowledge has been acquired. Neither is speculative knowledge innate to the soul but must be acquired through the body. Once acquired, desire follows immediately.<sup>60</sup> Therefore the soul must be disposed to receive union by a disposition which consists in a desire for it necessarily consequent on a demonstrative knowledge of the nature of the soul and its end, the order in the universe, and its relation to the universal

<sup>55</sup> Cum enim dicitur: Plato est sciens intelligibile, hic sensus est ut cum voluerit, revocet formam ad mentem suam. Cujus etiam sensus est ut cum voluerit possit conjungi intelligentiae agenti, ita ut ab ea in ipsum formetur ipsum intellectum. *De Anima*, V, 6, fol. 26c.

<sup>56</sup> Hic enim modus intelligendi in potentia est virtus quae acquirit animae intelligere cum voluerit conjungi intelligentiae a qua emanat in eam forma intellecta, quae forma est intellectus adeptus verissime. *Op. cit.*, V, 6, fol. 26c.

<sup>57</sup> Dom Maur Burbach, *The Theory of Beatitude in Latin-Arabian Philosophy and its Initial Impact on Christian Thought* (Toronto, Thesis, 1944), pp. 70-78.

<sup>58</sup> Obligatio enim animae cum corpore, sicut postea adhuc declarabitur, est propter hoc ut perficiatur intellectus contemplativus et sanctificetur et mundetur. *De Anima*, I, 4, fol. 6a.

<sup>59</sup> Cum autem anima liberabitur a corpore et ab accidentibus corporis, tunc poterit conjungi intelligentiae agenti, et tunc inveniet in ea pulchritudinem intelligibilem et delectationem perennem, sicut dicemus postea loco suo. *Op. cit.*, V, 6, fol. 26c.

<sup>60</sup> Si vero removetur paralysis ab eo, statim speculatur maximam delectationem; sed illa delectatio non est de genere delectionis sensibilis et animalis ullo modo, immo est delectatio conveniens dispositioni naturali

quae est substantiis vivis puris, et excellentior et nobilior omni delectatione et haec est felicitas. Illa vero alia est labor et infelicitas. Sed hic labor non erit uniuscujusque imperfecti sed eorum qui per virtutem intelligibilem acquisierunt desiderium suae perfectionis ex hoc quod jam probatum est apud eos de natura animae suae esse ut apprehendat quidditatem universitatis per adeptionem ignoti ex noto et perfectionis in effectu, et quod hoc non est sibi ex natura prima nec etiam ex ceteris virtutibus, sed perceperunt quod hae perfectiones non fiunt nisi post aliquas causas; animae vero et vires simplices purae sunt quasi yle subjecta cum non acquirunt ullo modo hoc desiderium. Hoc enim desiderium non fit nec sigillatur in substantia animae nisi postquam probatum est ei haec esse res quarum scientia non acquiritur nisi per terminos medios, sicut tu nosti; ante hoc autem non erat eo quod hoc desiderium sequitur sententias quae non sunt animae sententia prima sed sententia adepta. Cum igitur hi assequuntur hanc sententiam, comitatur animam necessario hoc desiderium. Quae postquam fuerit separata si nondum adepta fuit id quo post separationem perveniat ad perfectionem, incidet in hanc maneriam laboris aeterni, eo quod principia habitus scientialis non acquiruntur nisi per corpus tantum, sed corpus jam non est. *Meta.* IX, 7, fol. 107b.

order. The more perfect this speculative knowledge, the more perfect will be the soul's aptitude for union.<sup>61</sup>

Although the acquisition of an aptitude for union is largely a matter of cognition, it is not exclusively so. The preparation of this aptitude is shared by that part of the soul which is known as practical. This is the domain of moral virtue or habits which make it possible to elicit acts easily and without premeditation. Moral virtue is a virtue of mediocrity, proper to rational man who is set at the confluence—the *medium*—of the two worlds. It is acquired by choosing the mean between extremes and is called *habitus universitatis vel mediocritatis*. This virtue is found in both the rational and animal parts of the soul; in the animal part when it has acquired the disposition of submission to the rational part of the soul; in the rational part when it has acquired the aptitude to receive, *dispositio aptitudinis et patiendi*. This aptitude is the conversion of the soul to the Agent Intelligence for receiving the acquired intellect.

But the due order can be perverted. If the animal powers are excessively strengthened, they acquire the habit of dominating the rational soul, of creating in it a disposition of subjection and thus of binding the soul too closely to the body and rendering the soul excessively subject to it. The *habitus mediocritatis* must be understood as a liberation of man from dispositions that tend to subject him unduly to the body, as a habit which conserves the soul according to its nature, that is, to tend upwards and to avoid the inclination in the direction of the body.<sup>62</sup>

In last analysis, the course of preparation and disposition towards aptitude for union of the soul and the Agent Intelligence is a liberation of the soul from the body. But that liberation cannot be effected without the body because the body is a necessary instrument in the process of intellection. The powers of the animal soul must be governed by moral virtue which sets them in proper relation to the rational soul. In fact, order must obtain in the whole complicated machinery of the lower powers of intellection, so that suitable images may be provided to the speculative intellect. The perfected actual intellect has some knowledge of the ultimate end and perfection of the soul—the *apprehensio quidditatis universitatis*. Between the actual intellect and union a final aptitude or disposition must intervene—the *desiderium perfectionis*. The whole ordered system of intellection is subordinated to this desire for the actual intellect does not effect union. That union is achieved when the soul now completely prepared desires perfection and turns, *cum voluerit*, towards the Agent Intelligence whence emanates the true acquired intellect. Then is union effected, a union obtainable only by very noble souls, and perfectly only after the soul has been completely separated from the body.

<sup>61</sup> Speculator quanto plus addiderit speculationis, tanto plus addetur aptitudo ad felicitatem. *Meta*. IX, 7, fol. 107c.

<sup>62</sup> Dico etiam quod haec verissima felicitas non perficitur nisi propter rectitudinem illius partis animae quae est practica, et praeponom ad hanc propositionem quamvis jam dixerimus haec in praedictis. Dico igitur quod mores sunt habitus propter quem facile perveniunt ab anima aliqua actiones absque praemeditatione. Jam autem praepceptum est in libro de moribus ut teneatur mediocritas et acquiratur habitus universitatis vel mediocritatis. Habitus autem mediocritatis habet esse in virtute rationali et virtute animali, sed in virtute animali est cum acquiratur ei dispositio subjectionis. In virtute vero animali est

cum acquiratur ei dispositio aptitudinis et patiendi . . . Cum enim confortatur virtus animalis et acquiritur habitus dominandi, fit in anima rationali dispositio subjectionis et impressio passionis infligitur in anima rationali cujus natura est ponere animam nimis ligatam cum corpore et nimis affectam circa illud; habitus vero mediocritatis intelligitur esse liberatio hominis a dispositionibus subjectilibus qui conservat animam rationalem secundum naturam suam cum acquisitione dispositionis erigendi se et despiciendi hoc quod non est contrarium suae substantiae, nec est inclinans ad eam ad partem corporis, sed a parte ejus. Mediocritas enim semper removet ab ea duo extrema. *Meta*. IX, 7, fol. 107c.

Dom Maur Burbach's words best summarize Avicenna's teaching germane to our study:<sup>63</sup>

I think it may be said that the doctrine of "the two faces" is a sort of key to the whole structure of his thought. Avicenna refers again and again to the antinomy and antithesis which he finds between the higher world of intelligibility and the lower world of matter, of generation and corruption. The soul is situated and torn between these two worlds. To submit to the interest of the lower face which is directed towards material things among which is included the body, brings the soul to misery. Happiness can be found only in the ascent of escape from the lower world.

This ascent then must be man's chief concern. The ascent is an ascent of knowledge. The body and the senses are needed when the soul begins its climb but they become less and less necessary and in the end prove an obstacle to union with the Agent Intelligence in which the delight of happiness is said to consist. The summit of intellectual achievement is realized in an emanation from the Agent Intelligence, an emanation which all but identifies the soul with this separated representative of the intelligible world. Intermittent during life, the union effected by this emanation becomes enduring after death . . .

The soul is conducted into this world by the beneficent activity of the Agent Intelligence, the lowest of the separated substances, but for all that far superior to anything existing in the world of generation and corruption. That the soul has a proper contribution to make to the ultimate beatitude it is destined to enjoy is hard to see. Avicenna does indeed stress the role of the will, but the activity of the will, too, ascends by a necessary chain of causation to the first principle of all which is necessary being—*necesse-esse*. But necessary or free, the will must provide the aptitude or disposition prerequisite to the emanation from the Agent Intelligence. Knowledge and desire play alternate roles on the road to happiness. Growth in speculative knowledge is complemented by increased desire for union with the Agent Intelligence. When speculative truths, or at least most of them, are finally mastered, the aptitude has been perfected. The soul has reached its limit. An act of the will, an effective desire, can now turn it towards the Agent Intelligence for that emanation which fills the soul with knowledge of a new order, a knowledge generically different from what has up to this point been acquired, a knowledge proper to the separated substances of the heavenly world.

Once again we meet the pattern with which we are already familiar. Man's soul, an emanation of the divine, is situated between the spiritual world of intelligence and the material world of creation. Unhappy and unsatisfied in its present union with the body, its perfection consists in an ascent from this lower world to the divine world wherein is its Supreme Good. A knowledge of that Good awakens in it an insatiable desire to attain it. It seeks to acquire its perfection by assimilating itself to the Good in so far as it can. Its aim, therefore, is to divest itself of all that is material and to acquire a habitual disposition of turning to the Agent Intellect, the lowest of the separated intelligences. There it finds its perfection and beatitude in the contemplation of eternal goodness, eternal truth and eternal beauty.

<sup>63</sup> Dom Maur Burbach, *op. cit.*, pp. 104-106.

## VIII. RECAPITULATION

The currents of philosophical and heterodox mystical thought that reached the South of France from the late tenth to the early twelfth century were Neo-Platonism, Albigensianism, Arabic Neo-Platonism and Arabic mysticism. Neo-Platonism and Albigensianism were certainly there at the time of the first troubadours; Arabic philosophy and mysticism could have been there through the channels already indicated. These were the elements that helped to fashion the mentality and shape the mind of the South of France of that age not only in the courts and at the schools, but among the people themselves. These were the factors that, so to speak, made that age Neo-Platonically minded. We do not know where the first troubadours went to school nor by whom they were trained; we do know that wherever they went and under whomever they studied, they were exposed to these influences. The very intellectual atmosphere in which they lived and moved was saturated with them. Their poetry shows that they were trained men, at least in the art of composing verse and melody; their subtlety and delicacy go far in showing that they were intellectually keen and conversant with the trends and movements of their day.

With one exception, the philosophy and religious thought that we have passed in review were pantheistic in character, in the sense that all of them taught that the end of life and the aim of living lay in the assimilation of the soul to God, its first principle. Man's perfection consisted in the disappearance of his personality and in his substantial unity with divine being. The one exception that we have noted is the teaching of the pseudo-Dionysius. Both he and his translator, John Scotus Eriugena, have been generally accused of pantheism.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, the writings of Eriugena were condemned by the Church as not only liable to that interpretation but were so interpreted by the heretics who used them to further their pantheistic heresy.<sup>2</sup> Common to all these

<sup>1</sup>The *De Divinis Nominibus* is replete with texts susceptible of pantheistic interpretation. In his Commentary on that work, Saint Thomas takes occasion to put his readers on guard some seventy times against such a danger. For examples of such texts from the *De Divinis Nominibus* and from Eriugena's translation, cf. G. Théry, 'Scot Erigène, introducteur de Denys', *The New Scholasticism* VII (1933), pp. 106-107, n. 3. Eriugena's translation does nothing to lessen the danger but increases it. Cf. G. Théry, 'Scot Erigène traducteur de Denys', *Bulletin Du Cange* VI (1931), p. 73. The charge of pantheism is due to a misinterpretation and perversion of their writings. Cf. Albericus Trium Fontium: dampnationem incurrit propter novos Albigenses et falsos theologos qui verba bene forsitan suo tempore prolata et antiquis simpliciter intellecta male intelligendo pervertebant et ex eis suam heresim confirmabant. (*Chronica Albrici Monachi Trium Fontium*, ed. Paulus Scheffer-Boichorst in MGH, SS XXIII, p. 915). William of Malmesbury in his defence of John Scotus exonerates him of the charge and holds him up as a martyr. (*De Gestis Pontificum Anglorum*, 5, 240; PL 179, 1652D). Cf. also Etienne Gilson, 'Maxime, Erigène, S. Bernard', *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters* Supplementband III (1935), pp. 188-195.

<sup>2</sup>In 1210, at the Council of Paris, the followers of Amalric of Bena were condemned to the stake and their books ordered to be burnt (*Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* I (Paris, 1889), p. 70). Among their errors was that of pantheism: *Omnia unum, quia quicquid est, est Deus* (*ibid.*, p. 71). It is true that the *De Divisione Naturae* is not mentioned specifically, but Honorius III in his letter of January 23, 1225, in which it is condemned by name, says that the book had been already proscribed at the synod of the province of Sens: *Nuper siquidem, sicut nobis significavit venerabilis frater noster . . . Parisiensis episcopus, est quidam liber, qui periftis titulatur, inventus totus scatens vernibus heretice pravitatis. Unde a venerabili patre nostro . . . archiepiscopo Senonensi et suffraganeis ejus in provinciali congregatis justo est judicio reprobatus* (*ibid.*, pp. 106-107). This provincial synod of Sens is identified with the Council of Paris, 1210 (cf. Maieul Cappyuns, *Jean Scot Erigène* (Louvain, 1933), p. 243, n. 1). On the authority of Odo Tusculanus, episcopal chancellor at Paris at the time of the heresy, Cardinal Henry of Ostia says that the source of Amalric's errors were drawn from Eriugena's *De Divisione Naturae* and that the greatest error was that of pantheism: *Impii Almarici dogma istud colligitur in libro magistri Johannis Scoti qui dicitur*

doctrines is the teaching that the soul of man is divine. Man is divine through his soul and stands at the bottom of the hierarchical order of spiritual beings; because of his body, he stands at the top of the order of material nature. Divine through his soul, material because of his body, man cannot rise to the perfection to which his soul aspires and which his union with the body prevents. Dissatisfied and unhappy in that condition, knowing that there exists the Good in which he may find his perfection, man yearns for and desires that beatitude. Only his repatriation into the divine may accomplish his happiness. His purpose, then, in this life is to divest himself of the material, of all that prevents his union with God, and to purify himself in order to reacquire his pristine beauty and simplicity. All his efforts and desires are directed towards that end. He attains that union in the assimilation to the divine by the contemplation and vision of God.

In skeleton outline, this view of the body and soul, according to which the true nature of the soul is found and realized in union with God, resolves itself into the surge upwards of the soul through desire to union with a being superior to it and in the purification of the soul. That is, too, the skeleton outline of Courtly Love,—the surge of the lover towards his beloved through desire of union with her and the ennobling power of love. Courtly Love was an invention and like any invention it had its source and model in some fact or thought-pattern that preceded it. That source and model is found in the teaching that the soul is a divine being and the chain of ideas implied, a teaching that was prevalent and common to the age of the first troubadours, a thought-pattern that pervaded the philosophical and religious thought of their own age and the ages preceding theirs. I do not say that Courtly Love is Neo-Platonic,<sup>3</sup> that it is Albigenian,<sup>4</sup> that it is Arabic, that it is philosophical<sup>5</sup>

Periphysion, id est, De Natura. Quem secutus est iste Almaricus, de quo hic loquitur, sed et dictus Johannes in eodem libro auctoritates cujusdam magistri graeci nomine Maximi introduxit. In quo libro qui et per magistros damnatus fuit Parisiis, multae haereses continentur. De quibus gratia exempli sufficiat tangere tres errores. Primus et summus error est quod omnia sunt Deus; unde dicit: Motum Deo dare non possum. Et sequitur; cum in ipso sint omnia et cum ipse sit omnia. Et alibi in eodem libro dicitur, non facile posse negari creaturam et creatorem idem esse (quoted from Johannes Huber, *Johannes Scotus Erigena* (Munich, 1861), pp. 435-436).

<sup>3</sup> Käte Axhausen recognizes the "striking conceptual correspondence of the Provencal and Arabic love lyric" and ascribes it to the fact that "both rest in the same measure on the reception of Neo-Platonic ideas that were assimilated by both cultures in like manner" (*Die Theorien über den Ursprung der provenzalischen Lyrik*, p. 79). These ideas are summarized,—the ascent of the soul to the One, the teaching of the various kinds of eros, union of the soul with the One in the ecstasy of vision. "These stimuli were received in Arabic territory earlier and were built up into a complete theory of love there" (p. 80). Under the influence of these ideas, there arose that spiritual conception of love seen in the tenth century poets of Bagdad and partly in the writings of Ibn Hazm (994-1063). How this spiritual conception of love was transmitted to the troubadours she does not say, unless through the agency of Ibn Hazm.

As has been indicated, these tendencies, especially in Ibn Hazm, are neither constant nor complete (cf. Section VI). There is a similarity in the structure of the Arabic and Provencal love lyric and even in certain phases of their conception of love, but there is not identity. The essential characteristics of Courtly Love and its thought-pattern are best explained, not by its Neo-Platonism, but by its adoption of the framework of a chain of ideas resting on the conception that the soul is divine. Neo-Platonism was but one of currents of thought that contributed to form that frame of mind in the South of France. It was not the Arabian poets or Andalusian writers on love that were the other influences, but rather the Arabian Neo-Platonists and mystics together with the Albigenians.

<sup>4</sup> It is Denis de Rougemont's thesis that "the passionate love which the myth [of Tristan and Iseult] celebrates actually became in the twelfth century—the moment when first it began to be cultivated—a religion in the full sense of the word, and in particular a Christian heresy historically determined" *Love in the Western World* (New York, 1940), p. 111, translated by Montgomery Beligmon from *L'Amour et l'Occident* (Paris, 1939). That thesis is interesting because de Rougemont identifies passionate love and Courtly Love (p. 71). Thus Courtly Love is a religion and in particular Albigenianism.

Passionate love, frenzied, ever unsatisfied, unhappy, sometimes chaste, desirous of death, had its origin in the culture and secret doctrines of the Catharist Church (p. 78); it was at least inspired by the

or mystical;<sup>6</sup> I do say that these provided the thought framework for it. I do not say that the first troubadours were Neo-Platonists, that they were Albigensians, that they were followers of Arabian philosophy or mysticism; I do say that they found the thought-pattern of their conception of human love in those systems that concurred in the South of France of their age. It was these systems that taught them to follow along the line of thought that they had in common,—that the soul of man is divine,—with all its implications. When they came to write their lyric poetry,—under what inspiration and social conditions we do not know,—their poetry addressed to women took on the characteristics and pattern which they had at hand, with which they were familiar and in which they had been trained.

mysticism of the Catharists (p. 93); the troubadours were the bards of that heresy (p. 78). Catharist and troubadour, for example, glorified a love perpetually unsatisfied and extolled the virtue of chastity. In the doctrines of the one and in the rhetoric of the other were a series of themes and motifs that could not, according to de Rougemont, be pure coincidences (pp. 79-85).

There is no doubt that Courtly Love arose against a background that was heretical and that the troubadours, if not infected with Catharism, at least knew it and were familiar with its doctrine and practices. Passionate love, as de Rougemont describes it, may well have had its origin in that background, although it is difficult to see how such a love, as described by him and as exemplified in the myth of Tristan and Iseult, differs very much from the tragic carnal love that is a human frailty, which the Greeks called a madness and sickness, from which Dido wasted away and from which maidens pray that the gods may protect them (Euripides, *Medea*, 630; *Hippolytus*, 529). The fact is that de Rougemont's thesis rests on a very erroneous equation of passionate love and Courtly Love. Passion, as he understands it, lacks the very essentials of Courtly Love,—the cult of the beloved and the ennobling force of love. The very origin of the love of Tristan and Iseult is contrary to the tenets of Courtly Love,—it is awakened by a wholly extraneous element, a love potion, and not *ex visu et immoderata contemplatione formae alterius sexus*. If Tristan and Iseult are not in love—and they say they are not (p. 33)—then they are not courtly lovers; if they seek death that they may be released from their unhappy love—as the goal and end of their passion (p. 36)—and not as an alternative to unrequited or unfulfilled love, then they are not courtly lovers; if in indulging their adulterous love, they are conscious of sin, then they are not courtly lovers.

De Rougemont's scholarship and labor would have been much better repaid had he gone in search of the nature of Courtly Love to the early troubadours in whose writings it first appears and not to the myth of Tristan and Iseult. *Tristan et Iseult* has a veneer of courtliness and courtly practices and that is all. The story or the myth of Tristan and Iseult, as de Rougemont chooses to call it, is simply a tragic story of adultery of Celtic origin adapted somewhat imperfectly to French

tastes and to a French audience of the twelfth century (Cf. *Tristan and Isolt, a Study of the Sources of the Romance*, Gertrude Schoepperle, II vols. (London, 1913) especially II, pp. 469-473).

The heresy of Albigensianism did make a contribution to the formation of Courtly Love, but not at all as a religion. Its contribution was its fundamental doctrine that the soul is divine and that, imprisoned in the material and evil body, it is unhappy, years incessantly to be reunited to its spiritual and good principle, and accomplishes this reunion by purification of all that is material and evil even to the death of the body. That doctrine joined the general tradition on the divinity of the soul taught by the Neo-Platonists and by the Arabian philosophers and mystics. It is on this tradition that the general framework of Courtly Love is grounded.

<sup>6</sup>Mario Casella has sought the origin of Courtly Love in a specialized philosophic teaching of Saint Augustine: 'Poesia e Storia. I Il piu antico trovatore', *Archivio storico italiano* XCVI (1938), pp. 3-63; 'Poesia e Storia. II Jaufré Rudel', *ibid.*, pp. 153-199. (For a rather unfavorable review cf. Grace Frank, *Modern Language Notes* LVII (1942).

In a revulsion from the historical empiricism of philologists who have dealt with the earlier troubadours and hence with the origins of Courtly Love, Mario Casella turns to a purely objective interpretation of their poetry on the basis of their poetry itself. For him, poetry is a personal, intimate history of an individual living an exterior life in the midst of surroundings that condition that life (p. 29); poems are the lyric intuitions of pictures emanated from the natural love of ourselves, *naturalis dilectio* (p. 61). In the case of Guillaume IX and Jaufré Rudel, the philosophic tradition that conditioned their lives was Platonic Augustinianism (p. 30). Their poetry is simply the expression of *naturalis dilectio*, an ontological and substantial inclination common to all nature. In the case of man, it is a love which emanates from himself and makes him conscious of himself; which takes himself as object according to the spiritual *esse* of love and according to the intentional *esse* of knowledge, little by little going from one state of act to another, little by little proceeding from one perfection to another and greater perfection (p. 50). In making Courtly Love an purely immanent activity and lyric poetry a sensible representation

I do not pretend that this inquiry completely solves the question of the origins and the formation of Courtly Love. Problems of this kind are never capable of any one solution. The conditions under which it arose, material and spiritual, are much too complex for that. A complete solution would have to consider, for example, such questions as the amorality of Courtly Love in a civilization that was essentially Christian; it would have to determine whether Courtly Love was a theoretical thing or whether it was actually lived; it would have to know intimately the social, moral and economic conditions of the period that saw its formation. This study does, however, offer an explanation of the origins of its essential characteristics formed from the cultural and philosophic thought of the age. It explains the skeleton of Courtly Love around which the troubadours were able to build up their verse and music themselves drawn from many and varied sources.

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of love of self, Casella is forced to destroy the objectivity of the love of the troubadours, to make their poems dreams and visions, their beloved the *verbum mentale* (p. 38), or the exterior manifestation of their natural dilection (p. 42).

What is especially unacceptable in Casella's interpretation is, of course, his idea of poetry and his generalization of it as applicable to Guillaume IX and Jaufré Rudel. This has led to his arbitrary interpretation of the purpose of individual poems (cf. for example, pp. 23-24); the insertion of paraphrases in his translations whose only purpose is to further his own conceptions (cf. for example, p. 168); misinterpretation of passages of poetry (cf. for example, p. 173); and finally the incorrect translation of other passages (cf. for example, pp. 176, 180).

Courtly Love is not a philosophic idea nor is the courtly lyric a vehicle to portray a philosophical idea; it is a medium used by a poet to convey his love and service to a particular lady whom he venerates as superior to him and as the source of his good and virtue. There is this element of truth in Casella's interpretation: Courtly Love does owe its origin and formation to a philosophic chain of ideas. But that chain of ideas is not to be found in Augustinianism, but in a Neo-Platonic tradition prevalent in the South of France and common to the philosophy of the age of the troubadours, to Arabian philosophy and mysticism and to the heresy of Albigensianism.

\*Realizing the impossibility of a direct influence of the mysticism of Saint Bernard on the formation of Courtly Love, Mme. Myrrha Lot-Borodine seeks their common origin in the writings of the pseudo-Dionysius from which stem the ideas and senti-

ments of mystical theology ('Sur les origines et les fins du service d'amour', *Mélanges de linguistique et de littérature offerts à M. Alfred Jeanroy par ses élèves et ses amis* (Paris, 1928), pp. 223-242). It was in the atmosphere of these ideas and sentiments that the troubadours indirectly and as though intuitively fashioned their novel conception of human love. The decisive factor in the *De Divinis Nominibus* for both Saint Bernard and for the troubadours was the primacy of love, the *dilectio sine modo*. Whereas the service of love led Saint Bernard through the appearances of beauty and goodness of creation to the knowledge and love and vision of the Creator, the troubadours humanized and rationalized the primacy of love of the sensible world and found their ideal of Beauty and Goodness in woman. It is she who concentrates in herself all the scattered beauties of this world and is the image incarnate of terrestrial beauty.

If Mme. Lot-Borodine means by the service of love the Eros of Neo-Platonic doctrine, we entirely agree with her on the importance of the writings of pseudo-Dionysius in the formation of Courtly Love. But we should like to point out that that idea, adapted to Christianity by him, explains but one of the essential characteristics of Courtly Love. If Mme. Lot-Borodine means by the service of love the whole Neo-Platonic tradition that centres about the divinity of the soul, then we should like to point out that the *De Divinis Nominibus* was but one of the currents that made that tradition a familiar common-place to the world of the troubadours. The others were Arabian philosophy and mysticism and the heresy of Albigensianism.

# The Writ of Prohibition to Court Christian in the Thirteenth Century

G. B. FLAHIFF C.S.B.

WITH the reign of Henry II, England saw the beginning of a legal development, so rapid and so thoroughgoing that it has no counterpart in Western Europe in the Middle Ages. An extraordinary evolution in royal tribunals, in law and in legislation produced in less than a century a centralization and uniformity of monarchical authority that was truly remarkable for the time. This was achieved at the expense of the local courts, of feudal and seignorial courts, and of the courts christian, when much that had hitherto fallen within the jurisdiction of these courts was transferred gradually but relentlessly to those of the king. The process was more delicate where the Church's tribunals were concerned than in the case of rival secular courts, since there was admittedly a whole sphere of spiritual and quasi-spiritual jurisdiction over which no secular authority, not even that of the king, claimed any rights. Nevertheless, between purely spiritual and purely temporal lay a borderland that was shadowy and ill-defined. And it was along this frontier that the king steadily gained ground by asserting the non-spiritual character of certain pleas being entertained in ecclesiastical courts. Entirely in keeping with this procedure was the means evolved for achieving the end, namely, the writ of prohibition: an order in the king's name forbidding some ecclesiastical court to take further cognizance of a particular case where the Church's right to judge the matter at issue had been questioned. Teeth were given to the writ by the subsequent action in the king's court, known as a plea of prohibition, against anyone who failed to obey it. Without any frontal attack being launched, the Church's jurisdiction came in practice to be limited considerably as a result of the unremitting pressure exerted by the writ of prohibition. The subsequent plea in the royal court played its part likewise, since it gave to the king's justices a further opportunity of expounding and putting into effect their views as to what was spiritual and what temporal.<sup>1</sup> One may safely say that it was the writ of prohibition that determined, in the concrete, the dividing line between the two jurisdictions.

Despite its obvious importance, the writ of prohibition has never been made the object of an extensive study; indeed it has received but scant attention of any kind from scholars.<sup>2</sup> It is the purpose of this article, and of two others

<sup>1</sup> If the prohibition was respected, no 'plea of prohibition' followed. One of two things would happen: either the case in court christian would be dropped altogether, or else the judges would seek a writ of consultation authorizing them to proceed after an examination by the king's justices had revealed that the matter really was of a spiritual nature. But, if the ecclesiastical action was continued in spite of the prohibition,—and this would appear to have been the commoner case,—then, on the defendant's complaint, judges and plaintiff would be summoned before the king's court. It was the resulting plea of prohibition that provided the occasion for an examination of the original case in court

christian; if it proved to be a truly spiritual matter, the case would be returned to the competent court; if the contrary was shown, the offenders would be fined and the prohibition renewed with a marked air of finality. A detailed account of the whole procedure will be given in a subsequent article.

<sup>2</sup> The best and fullest treatment of the subject is the article of Miss Norma Adams, 'The Writ of Prohibition to Court Christian,' *Minnesota Law Review*, XX (1936) 272-293. Some account of prohibitions is given in my article, 'The Use of Prohibitions by Clerics against Ecclesiastical Courts in England,' *Mediaeval Studies*, III (1941) 101-116; also in the essay of Professor H. D.



to follow, to study it in some detail down to the end of the thirteenth century.<sup>3</sup> The present article is divided into two parts, the first of which seeks to define the exact nature of the writ of prohibition and to classify the various forms it could take, while the second part treats of the conflict between royal and ecclesiastical authorities that resulted from differences of opinion over use and abuse of prohibitions. Questions relating to the actual functioning of the writ itself and to procedure in the courts will be left over for the second article. The third will deal with the limits of the two jurisdictions as seen from a study of writs and pleas of prohibition.

## I.

### A. The Writ in general

A brief consideration of the nature of writs in general will permit us to see first of all those characteristics which the specific writ of prohibition holds in common with all other writs.

'Writ' (in Latin, *breve*), as the word itself implies, denoted originally any written document characterized by its brevity. In the science of diplomatics, however, the term writ is applied in England to a brief royal mandate, written on parchment and sealed with the king's seal, addressed to some official, or to an individual or individuals, commanding the performance or the nonperformance of some well specified act, and requiring in most cases the sending of a report on the matter back to the king.<sup>4</sup> Such an instrument is of early

Hazeltine, 'The Early History of English Equity,' *Essays in Legal History*, ed. Paul Vinogradoff (Oxford, 1913), pp. 270-284; and in E. Friedberg, *Die Grenze zwischen Staat und Kirche und die Garantien gegen deren Verletzung*, 3 Abt. (Tübingen, 1872), pp. 741 ff; Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England* (5th ed., London, 1773), III, 113-114. A glance at the index in each case will indicate the incidental information to be found scattered through such general works as: Pollock and Maitland, *History of English Law* (Cambridge, 1898); W. S. Holdsworth, *History of English Law*, vols. I-III (3rd-5th ed., London, 1923-1931); W. Stubbs, *Constitutional History of England* (London, 1896); F. Makower, *The Constitutional History and Constitution of the Church of England* (London, 1895).

<sup>3</sup> This choice of a stopping point for the articles is less arbitrary than might at first appear. The writ *Circumspecte Agatis* in 1286 (cf. n. 74 below) represents an official declaration of the limits of jurisdiction and of the application of prohibitions; the Church comes to regard it almost as a charter of liberties, and, although it does not put an end to controversy, it marks nevertheless a summing up of the first and most critical period. Moreover, it will be noted in regard to registers of writs that the end of the thirteenth century is the high-water mark for specifically new writs of prohibition; one may say that their formative period is over. I think this date can be taken as something of a turning point.

<sup>4</sup> E. Jenks, *A Short History of English Law* (4th ed., London, 1928), pp. 43-45; A. T. Carter, *A History of the English Courts* (London, 1927), pp. 25-26.

In diplomatics the writ is to be contrasted with the charter. The latter corresponds in England to the *diplôme* of the

Merovingian and Carolingian kings in France, being distinguished especially by its pompous formulae, its list of witnesses and its pendant seal. After the Norman Conquest, the charter tends to become less solemn and results finally in the charter-writ. The writ, on the contrary, is noted for its direct style, its lack of verbiage, and is attested, from the time of Richard I at the latest, by the king alone. In the thirteenth century, the formula *Teste meipso* of the king provides a touchstone for distinguishing the ordinary writ from the charter-writ, which all the while continues to grow yet simpler in form.

Materially, the writ is a strip of parchment, much longer (in the direction of the writing) than wide, issued under the form either of a letter patent or of a letter close. The former has a general formula of address; its final clause is introduced by the words *In cuius rei memoriam*, and its seal is annexed in pendant fashion by means of a double strip of parchment. The letter close, of a more private nature, is addressed to an individual or to a well specified group of individuals, is folded, and its seal is annexed by a single strip of parchment in such a manner that the seal must be broken before the letter can be unfolded.

Until the end of the twelfth century there was no other royal seal than the Great Seal. Even in the thirteenth century, writs were supposed to be sealed with the Great Seal, although the Privy Seal was also used for this purpose. For later developments, see E. Dénrez, *Études de diplomatique anglaise* (1272-1485). I. *Le Sceau-privé, le sceau secret, le signet* (Paris, 1908), and the more general work of H. Hall, *A Formula Book of English Official Historical Documents* (Cambridge, 1908). T. F. Tout, *Chapters in the Administrative History of Mediaeval England*, vol. I (Man-

use in England, dating back to Anglo-Saxon times. Many of the better known Anglo-Norman writs are in fact little more than a translation into Latin of the Anglo-Saxon formulae. What constitutes an innovation after the Conquest is the much wider use made of the writ, a fact readily accounted for by the advent of a more solidly established royal authority. Early writs are concerned with business of all kinds. Those relating to administrative affairs are particularly numerous. Thanks, however, to the important part taken by the king personally in matters of justice, writs of a judicial nature come to occupy an increasingly prominent place. Another fact, too, helps to explain their growing number: writs, which were destined originally to serve the king's interests only, are very soon placed at the disposal of his subjects, and it is above all in seeking justice that these latter find them most useful. As a result the writ, which in the beginning had no specifically judicial character, comes at length to be linked intimately, if not exclusively, with the practice of the law courts, where we still find it to-day.

Of its very nature every writ must at first have depended directly upon the royal will and prerogative. But very early in the development writs of a slightly different type appear, namely those which become integral parts of the normal routine of government, and more especially of justice. They are still issued in the king's name but they represent less and less a direct intervention of the royal will. The best example of this type of writ is undoubtedly the writ of summons before the king's court.<sup>5</sup> Other writs preserve more of the exceptional character, being used to achieve a result which cannot be obtained by any of the methods that have become routine. In this case, the exercise of the royal prerogative is more obvious. It has been remarked in connection with this distinction that 'the writ may be regarded, in form at least, and perhaps in more than form, as a bridge or connecting link between the regular action and the prerogative action of the Anglo-Norman government.'<sup>6</sup> The observation is true, not only in so far as the writ is the instrument common to these two sorts of action, but also in that there is an evolution from the one to the other, writs of a 'prerogative' nature passing gradually to the state of regular use. This evolution is of considerable importance in the development of English law.

It is well known that the Norman kings of England were willing to intervene at the request of a subject who complained of unjust treatment and to order the sheriff or some feudal lord to do him justice.<sup>7</sup> These and other interventions grew more frequent under Henry II. Certain writs were accorded so easily that it was merely a question of asking and paying for them. They became, as the expression goes, *de cursu*. The very form of the writs reflects this evolution; for, as they grew more common, they dropped the lengthy details describing individual cases, many of which were almost identical, and evolved a general formula covering a whole group of cases. The scribes, in drawing up their documents, followed precedents with the result that an extensive formulary of writs came into being which provided likewise a classification of writs, usually according to their subject-matter. It was the beginning of a register of writs.

Henry II's possessory actions or assizes (*novel disseisin*, *mort d'ancestor* and *darrein presentment*) accentuated the tendency towards a definite classification, since each of these actions had a procedure peculiar to itself, initiated by a

chester, 1930) is also useful, especially pp. 35-40, 140 ff. Tout notes (p. 141) that the seals of judicial bodies appear rather late in England.

<sup>5</sup> M. M. Bigelow, *History of Procedure in*

*England* (London, 1880), pp. 148-150.

<sup>6</sup> G. B. Adams, *Origin of the English Constitution* (New Haven, 1912), p. 97.

<sup>7</sup> Some examples may be found in M. M. Bigelow, *op. cit.*, pp. 156-183, 192-193.

royal writ and characterized by set formulae in both writ and procedure. Each action formed a class by itself.

Glanvill's treatise<sup>9</sup> on the law of his time (ca. 1187) bears witness to a clear-cut classification of actions quite distinct from one another, so much so that Maitland could represent the king's justice of that time as 'consisting of many various commodities each of which is kept in a different receptacle. Between these the would-be litigant must make his choice; he must choose an appropriate writ and with it an appropriate form of action.' The number of writs available was already quite large in Glanvill's day, but in the course of the thirteenth century it was swelled considerably. The royal prerogative continued to create new writs as new cases or new circumstances demanded, and the new writs continued sooner or later to take their place among the older ones as *de cursu* writs. The collections of formulae for the royal chancery up to Edward I's reign, all too few of which unfortunately are preserved, mark the progressive development just described. Before the end of the century, Parliament, already self-conscious, was beginning to contest the king's right to create new writs at pleasure. This did not, however, interrupt the growth of what was to be the future *Registrum Brevium*. There were fewer innovations in the fourteenth century, but there certainly were numerous additions, particularly by way of variations of already existing types of writs. The general outline of the Register may have been fixed by the reign of Edward I, but it continued to expand and only at the end of the fourteenth century reached its final form.<sup>10</sup>

The *Registrum* as such and its history are not the object of this study. Rather, it is with one particular writ, or with one group of the writs comprising the *Registrum*, that we are concerned, namely, the writ of prohibition. The reason for referring to it as a group of writs is that its evolution parallels that of the *Registrum* as a whole; for, just as there was a progressive multiplication of the general classes of writs, so too was there a ramification of writs within that one single class. The definitive *Registrum Brevium* contains a host of writs under the title *Prohibition*.

## B. The Writ of Prohibition

In a broad sense, any writ that forbids the doing of anything whatsoever

<sup>9</sup> Although Glanvill's authorship is far from generally admitted, the treatise has been known traditionally under his name; use of the name in the present article is merely a device for referring briefly to the treatise itself. On the questions of authorship and date, see the note in George E. Woodbine's edition, *Glanvill De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Regni Angliae* (New Haven, 1932), p. 183.

<sup>10</sup> Pollock and Maitland, *History of English Law* (London, 1899), I, 151. It is important to notice the role of the writ in the judicial action, for it is the writ which begins the action and gives it its direction; hence the name of 'original writs' given to that group which thus originate legal proceedings. The justices must not act until they are in possession of the original writ; that is why such importance is attached to the 'return' of the writ, for which the sheriff is responsible. (Writs issued in the course of, and to further, proceedings are distinguished from those which originate action; they are known as judicial writs). Bigelow points out that this intimate link between writ

and form of action had not always existed; nor does he consider it as complete in Glanvill's time, but only in the thirteenth century (*op. cit.*, pp. 147-148).

<sup>10</sup> The history of the development of the *Registrum Brevium* is really that of the English Common Law also, just as the *Registrum* as a book constitutes the principal manual of the Common Law. Maitland has made this point, so characteristic of English mediaeval law, in his article, 'The History of the Register of Original Writs,' *Harvard Law Review*, III (1889-1890) 97-115, 167-178, 212-225, which has been published by H. A. L. Fisher in *Collected Papers of Frederick William Maitland* (Cambridge, 1911), II, 110-173. Holdsworth has resumed the facts in his *History of English Law*, vol. II (3rd ed., London, 1923), pp. 512-519; see also Holdsworth, *The Sources and Literature of English Law* (London, 1926), pp. 113 ff. There still remains much to be done on fourteenth century registers, as Maitland suggested in his articles.

might be termed a writ of prohibition. It is to be expected that writs of a prohibitory nature would be as old as the use of writs. Certainly, when we come to the period where documents are more abundant, we have innumerable examples. The Patent, and more especially the Close, Rolls yield frequent instances of such formulae as: *prohibemus, facias prohiberi, vobis mandamus quod non faciatis*, etc. The injunction is sometimes administrative in character, sometimes political, sometimes judicial. The king prohibits the holding of a certain fair which is prejudicial to one of more ancient date in a neighbouring place;<sup>11</sup> he prohibits hunting in such and such a forest,<sup>12</sup> or a tournament in such and such a town.<sup>13</sup> He forbids anyone to molest the men of a manor that enjoys his special protection,<sup>14</sup> to encroach on the fief of some bishop,<sup>15</sup> to interfere with certain Jews.<sup>16</sup> Again he may forbid the harbouring of Jews within some city.<sup>17</sup> Of a more strictly political nature are the formal prohibitions against fortifying a castle,<sup>18</sup> against armed attacks,<sup>19</sup> against the sale of provisions to the Welsh.<sup>20</sup> At London, the king forbids the teaching of the *Leges*, that is to say, of Roman Civil Law.<sup>21</sup> A well nigh endless list of such prohibitions might be drawn up to illustrate the exercise of the king's sovereign power in widely varying domains. Nevertheless, they do not have as their effect the setting in motion of a regular machinery of judicial action, and it is not customary to call such orders as these 'writs of prohibition.'

A few writs of prohibitory nature such as the writ of waste and writ of *estrepement* do provide the occasion for setting in motion a regular judicial machinery, but these likewise are not classed as 'writs of prohibition,' lacking as they do the other essential characteristic of being directed against the judicial activity of another court. Both of these writs are intended to prevent waste, the one to prevent a tenant in dower from committing waste, the other to prevent any possessor from committing waste during the course of judicial process. If the prohibited party fails to obey the order, he will be impleaded in the king's court and justice will be done the aggrieved party, but nothing in the whole procedure has to do with restraining the action of another court.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>11</sup> *Rotuli Litterarum Clausarum*, I, 527 (an. 1222). It will suffice here to give references to only one or two cases of each of these injunctions, although the records contain a great many of them.

<sup>12</sup> *Close Rolls* (1231-1234), p. 339 (an. 1233).

<sup>13</sup> *Calendar of Patent Rolls* (1232-1247), pp. 20, 57, 62, etc.

<sup>14</sup> Public Record Office (London), KB 26/121 m. 20 (an. 1241): 'summonitus . . . ad ostendendum quare vexat homines de manerio de Rihal . . . contra libertates hominum et contra prohibitionem ipsius domini regis.' (The shelf-mark, KB 26/, is the one used to designate the manuscript plea rolls of the Curia Regis down to the end of Henry III's reign.)

<sup>15</sup> W. Prynn, *An Exact Chronological Vin-dication* . . . (London, 1666), III, 7. (This work will be cited as *Records*, according to the usual practice.)

<sup>16</sup> *Close Rolls* (1234-1237), p. 329.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 425; the marginal note reads: 'prohibitio regis.'

<sup>18</sup> *Rot. Litt. Claus.*, I, 436-437 (an. 1220).

<sup>19</sup> KB 27/33 m. 18d (an. 1277): 'de placito quare cum dudum auctoritate regis per totum regnum regis fuerit . . . inhibitu ne qui cum equis et armis vel alio modo armati inciderent vel super aliquem currerent . . .' (From the reign of Edward I on, a distinction is made between the plea

rolls of the Court of King's Bench, KB 27/, and those of the Court of Common Pleas, CP 40/).

<sup>20</sup> *Close Rolls* (1231-1234), p. 542.

<sup>21</sup> *Close Rolls* (1234-1237), p. 26 (11 December 1234): 'Mandatum est majori et vicecomitibus Londoniensibus quod per totam civitatem Londoniensem clamari faciant et firmiter prohiberi, ne aliquis scholas regens de legibus in eadem civitate decetero ibidem leges doceat.' Prynn went to considerable trouble to show that it could not be a question of the Common Law at this date, and concluded therefore that the teaching of Canon Law, especially of the Decretals was prohibited (*Records*, III, 86-87). He did not even consider the possibility of Roman civil law being meant; yet this is what was ordinarily signified by the term *leges*; ecclesiastical law was referred to rather as *canones*, *decretum* or *decretales*.

<sup>22</sup> Professor Hazeltine (*art. cit.* above in n. 2) links these two with the writ of prohibition among various early instances of the exercise of an equitable jurisdiction in English courts. They do all share the common quality of providing special remedy or relief for an aggrieved party, but only the writ of prohibition to court christian limits in any way another jurisdiction.

And this latter feature is always present in the case of the writ to which the term 'writ of prohibition' is applied with its technical significance.

'Prohibition (*prohibitio*),' wrote Cowell in the seventeenth century, 'is a writ framed for the forbidding of any court, either spiritual or secular, to proceed in any cause there depending, upon suggestion that the cognition thereof belongeth not to the said court, but is most usually taken, especially in these days, for that writ which lyeth for one that is impleaded in the Court Christian for a cause belonging to the temporal jurisdiction or the cognisance of the king's court, whereby as well the partie and his counsell, as the judge himself and the register are forbidden to proceed any farder in that cause.'<sup>23</sup>

The present study will be limited to the narrower sense of *prohibition*, which Cowell states to have been the more usual acceptation in his time: the writ to an ecclesiastical court. Nor is it for his time only that it is the usual acceptation; we have but to consult the treatise of Bracton to be convinced that in the thirteenth century too the writ of prohibition was understood ordinarily to mean a prohibition addressed to court christian.<sup>24</sup> This is the classic sense of the term, although instances are certainly to be found of prohibitions against cases in secular courts, whether shrieval, baronial or even royal. Thus, the writ of peace (*de pace habenda*) is in reality a prohibition bidding the sheriff proceed no further, or restrain the lord of a manorial court from proceeding further, in a case where a tenant has put himself on the grand assize of the king.<sup>25</sup> The Close Rolls contain frequent royal letters addressed to feudal lords, both lay and ecclesiastical, to forbid some judicial action in their courts.<sup>26</sup> In the second half of the thirteenth century, pretensions of the Exchequer to a wider jurisdiction are checked by means of prohibitions.<sup>27</sup> As already noted, however, prohibitions to secular courts do not form a part of the regular group of 'writs of prohibition' and do not enter therefore into the subject matter of this work which is concerned primarily with those to courts christian.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>23</sup> John Cowell, *The Record Interpreter* (Cambridge, 1607), at the word Prohibition.

<sup>24</sup> *De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae*, ed. G. E. Woodbine, vol. IV (New Haven, 1942), pp. 251 ff. (With this fourth volume, the definitive text in Woodbine's magnificent edition is now complete; references throughout these articles will be given always according to his edition). All the writs in this 'prohibition section' of Bracton are addressed to courts christian. At the close of the century (about 1290), the evidence of the treatise *Fleta seu Commentarius Juris Anglicani* is similar; see pp. 429-430 (2nd ed., London, 1685).

<sup>25</sup> Glanvill, lib. II, c. 8, ed. Woodbine, p. 63; Bracton, ed. Woodbine, IV, 55-57; *Rot. Litt. Claus.*, I, 428 etc. Cf. Norma Adams, 'The Writ of Prohibition . . .', *Minnesota Law Review*, XX (1936) 273, especially n. 6. The plea roll for Trinity 1225 provides an interesting case somewhat different from this one, where a certain Alice is amerced for having sued another party in the county court (*in comitatu*) after a decision has been given before the king's justices (KB 26/90 m. 3).

<sup>26</sup> *Rot. Litt. Claus.*, I, 103: letter of 5 February 1208 against an action in the feudal court of Bury St. Edmunds; Prynn, *Records*, III, 41: letter of 1219 to prevent the son of the Earl of Cornwall from holding assizes of mort d'ancestor; *Close Rolls* (1227-1231), p. 236: letter of 1229 to stop an action relative to succession in the court

of William Marshal, earl of Pembroke. Cf. the principle given by Bracton, *De Legibus*, ed. Woodbine, IV, 279: 'Item excipitur contra jurisdictionem inferioris justitiarum, ubi praefertur jurisdictio jurisdictioni, ut si quis implacitatus fuerit de una et eadem re ab uno vel diversis in diversis curiis, sicut in curia domini regis et in curia baronis vel alicujus alterius inferioris, quo casu majus auditorium praeferrere debet minori. Et si in majori curia ostenderit tenens quod de eadem re in minori curia fuerit implacitatus, prohibebitur ex parte regis quod in placito illo in inferiori curia non procedatur.'

<sup>27</sup> H. Jenkinson and B. Formoy, Introduction to their edition of *Select Cases in the Exchequer of Pleas* (Publications of the Selden Society, London, 1932), pp. xciv-xcviii.

<sup>28</sup> One last distinction needs to be made by noting that the writ of prohibition is essentially an injunction against the *judicial* activity of the Church. Hence we here leave aside the multiple interventions of the king in purely administrative affairs of the Church. By royal letters, similar in many ways to writs of prohibition, ordinaries of dioceses are forbidden to interfere in exempt royal chapels, or to refuse a clerk in the king's service the fruits of his benefice because of non-residence; or again an election which threatens to be prejudicial to his interests is impeded, the work of a synod is halted or circumscribed, the voting of

The writ of prohibition having been defined and the exact extension of the term fixed, a classification of the different writs which come under this definition may now be attempted. The most satisfactory classification will be a logical one according to subject matter. There are, nevertheless, other points of view from which a distinction among writs can be made and two of these will be noted before proceeding to the logical classification.

### 1. *De cursu* and *de precepto* writs of prohibition

In speaking of the evolution of the writ in general, a difference was remarked between those writs which have become *de cursu* and those others which require a more immediate exercise of the royal prerogative, a more direct command, whence the name given to them eventually of *de precepto* writs. Writs of prohibition likewise fall into these two groups. In the time of Glanvill's treatise, the first category had already begun to be constituted. It consisted, in that work, of the prohibition against a plea of advowson in an ecclesiastical court<sup>29</sup> and the prohibition against a plea of lay fee.<sup>30</sup> Soon after, the writ forbidding proceedings in court christian about debts and chattels of a non-testamentary and non-matrimonial nature was added.<sup>31</sup> These three were to remain throughout most of the thirteenth century the *de cursu* writs par excellence, as is attested by a significant note in a register of writs dating from the early years of Edward I's reign. After giving the formulae for these three writs, and before adding other prohibitions to court christian, the scribe has inserted the following: 'Ostensis formulis prohibitionum quae sunt de cursu, patebit de cetero de eis quae sunt quaedam prohibitiones in suis casibus formatae et sunt de precepto.'<sup>32</sup> His transitional note informs us not only that the three writs mentioned above were the classic *de cursu* ones but also that a technical distinction was now clearly recognized between the two types of writs. Although this appears to be the earliest allusion in a register to a class of *de precepto* writs, there is evidence that the distinction was being made nearly half a century before. A register of the year 1240 or thereabouts, while not referring explicitly to *de precepto* writs, implies a distinction when it is careful in one case to point out that a certain new writ is *de cursu*.<sup>33</sup> Moreover, there is a striking difference between entries in the judicial rolls recording pleas that result from one of the three classic *de cursu* prohibitions and those recording other prohibition pleas. In the former case, the entries are quite stereotyped, characterized by the same set formulae as occur in the writs themselves: 'de placito quare tenuit (secutus fuit) placitum in curia christianitatis de laico feodo (de advocacione, de catallis) contra prohibitionem domini regis.' In the other case, however, the entries suggest a writ and an action that are less usual; for instance: 'de placito quare contra prohibitionem

certain financial aids to the Pope is prohibited. These and many other letters, which abound in the Patent and Close Rolls, may throw valuable light on the general relations between royal and ecclesiastical authorities, but, since they are not directed specifically against judicial proceedings, which feature is essential to the technical 'writ of prohibition,' they lie outside the subject of this article.

<sup>29</sup> Lib. IV, c. 13; ed. Woodbine, pp. 82-83.

<sup>30</sup> Lib. XII, c. 21; ed. Woodbine, p. 156.

<sup>31</sup> This writ is found in a collection of writs for the early part of Henry III's reign; see Holdsworth, *Hist. of Eng. Law*, II, Appendix V, pp. 607-608, no. 30. The writ is undoubtedly of somewhat earlier

origin; see below p. 277.

<sup>32</sup> British Museum, *Additional Manuscript* 38821, fol. 9v; cf. Holdsworth, *Hist. of Eng. Law*, II, 614. Several other registers of approximately the same date contain the same note: Brit. Mus., *Lansdowne Ms.* 564, fol. 59v; *Add. Ms.* 34194, fol. 12v; Bodleian Library, *Rawlinson Ms. C* 331, fol. v; Cambridge Univ. Libr., *Ms. Ee. I. 1*, fol. 198v; *Ms. Mm. I. 27*, fol. 14. This separation of the two classes of writs is made in all later registers.

<sup>33</sup> 'Novum breve factum per W. de Ralee de redisseisina super disseisinam quod est de cursu' (Cambr. Univ. Libr. *Ms. Kk. V. 33*, fol. 85; cf. fol. 85v).

domini regis traxit ipsos in placitum in curia christianitatis de eo quod ipsum ceperunt occasione incendii domorum Galfredi de Jarpenvilla et . . . fractionis parci ejusdem Galfredi . . . contra pacem domini regis.<sup>734</sup> Obviously the scribe in the second case had no ready made formula to cover the matter at hand, probably because the writ of prohibition was not *de cursu* but *in suo casu formatum*, having issued as the result of a special order for the particular case. In other words, it would be a *de precepto* writ.<sup>35</sup> It has been shown recently that by 1259 at the latest the chancery clerks themselves were either *de precepto* clerks or *de cursu* clerks, according as they dealt with one or the other type of writ.<sup>36</sup> Surely such an organization implies that the distinction between the writs from this particular point of view was not something altogether new; if special clerks were required to issue *de precepto* writs alone, it must be that the latter had been in use long enough for their number to become considerable.<sup>37</sup> One can safely place the origin of a technical distinction between the two types earlier than the year 1240.

The various *de precepto* writs of prohibition will be listed in the classification according to subject matter. Meanwhile a word might well be said on the king's own personal use of these two types of prohibitions.

If it is the direct command of the king, the more immediate exercise of the royal will,<sup>38</sup> that characterizes *de precepto* writs, we might readily expect that, when the king intervenes by means of a prohibition in his own personal interest, the writ would by this very fact be *de precepto*. Such is not, however, the case; at least, as far as the form of the writ and the entry in the plea rolls are concerned. For the king too there are *de cursu* and *de precepto* writs, that is to say, some writs that are issued according to usual set formulae and others whose form is determined by the circumstances peculiar to the particular case. In the *de cursu* group the one of which most frequent, not to say exclusive, use is made by the king is the advowson writ to stay proceedings in an ecclesiastical court where the king's own right of presentation is in question; if the prohibition is not obeyed, the king is plaintiff in the ensuing plea.<sup>39</sup> *De precepto* writs are used in the less routine cases, usually to hinder an ecclesiastical action which threatens prejudice to the king's sovereignty, his prerogative, or some special privilege he enjoys. Examples are: a writ forbidding the citation of his subjects to answer before the Roman curia;<sup>40</sup> a prohibition against the cognizance by ecclesiastical judges of any plea that is of royal jurisdiction, even though both parties to the plea may have agreed to go before a spiritual

<sup>34</sup> KB 26/121 m. 10 (Michaelmas, 1240). This is the first example that I have seen in the plea rolls. Almost at once mention of such writs is made quite frequently, especially of the writ prohibiting an action in court christian against a royal officer for anything he may have done in the exercise of his duties (e.g. the arrest of a cleric).

<sup>35</sup> A distinction between the two types is recognizable among the prohibitions given by Bracton, although he does not employ the term *de precepto*.

<sup>36</sup> A. E. Stamp, 'The Court and Chancery of Henry III,' *Historical Essays in Honour of James Tait*, ed. Edwards, Galbraith, Jacobs (Manchester, 1933), pp. 306-308.

<sup>37</sup> This conclusion seems to follow even though there is another reason also to account for a marked increase of *de precepto* writs in the 1250's: the period is one of strained relations between the king and his barons, when, according to the complaint of the latter, the sovereign was acting altogether too much on his own initiative. Cf. Stamp, *art. cit.*

<sup>38</sup> See latter part of n. 42 below.

<sup>39</sup> The question of the king as plaintiff in his own court is an intriguing one and will be dealt with in the second of these articles in connection with matters of procedure.

<sup>40</sup> In 1260 a prohibition is addressed to the bishop of Bath and Wells to prevent him from citing the abbot of Glastonbury before the Roman curia (*Placitorum Abbreviatio*, Record ed., London, 1811, p. 152); in the following year the official of the archbishop of Canterbury is forbidden to have certain clerics of Winchester summoned without the realm (*Close Rolls*, 1259-1261, p. 466). The Close Roll for the year 1248 provides a variation of this procedure: the king begs a certain delegate judge to adjourn until Easter the plea he is hearing, and at the same time warns the judge that the case must not be taken meanwhile before the court of Rome, since this would involve the summoning of an English subject without the realm (*Close Rolls*, 1247-1251, p. 109).

court;<sup>41</sup> a writ prohibiting the continuation of an action against some prelate, when it can be foreseen that a decision unfavorable to the said prelate might eventually prove detrimental to the sovereign's regalian rights.<sup>42</sup>

## 2. Interlocutory and final writs of prohibition

In the vast majority of cases, a writ of prohibition is final in nature; the king summarily forbids the court christian to take cognizance of a plea because his tribunal alone is competent in the matter. It is tantamount to a claim of exclusive jurisdiction. Such is the classic writ of prohibition; abundant examples of it will be seen throughout this study. It will be sufficient at this point merely to indicate that certain prohibitions, on the other hand, lack this air of finality and are only of an interlocutory nature. In the case of these latter the king's court makes no claim whatsoever to jurisdiction over the matter at issue; the prohibition is of a temporary sort, interrupting proceedings in court christian only until some collateral issue, which might jeopardize the royal authority, has been settled. One or two examples will illustrate the case.

The writ *Indicavit* is the one that occurs most frequently. If two clerics are in dispute before the ecclesiastical court over a same church which both of them claim, this writ will lie to halt proceedings *until* it has first been determined in the king's court who has the advowson in the said church, the reason being that a decision in the church court could prove prejudicial to the rights of the lawful patron.<sup>43</sup> The question of bastardy is another that gives rise to an

<sup>41</sup> Delegate judges are several times forbidden to hear the case between the monks of Canterbury and their archbishop, Edmund Rich, relating to the temporalities of the see of Canterbury (*Close Rolls*, 1234-1237, pp. 356, 524, 540).

<sup>42</sup> The king forbids the monastery of St. Albans to continue its action against the archbishop of Canterbury in the matter of certain revenues which have fallen into the archbishop's hands as a result of the vacancy of the see of Rochester. If the two sees of Canterbury and Rochester should happen to be vacant both at the same time, the said revenues would revert to the king; hence the present dispute has a bearing upon the future right of the king (*Prynne, Records*, II, 479, an. 1237; see the formula of a similar writ given by Bracton, *De Legibus*, IV, 256-257). About the same time the king forbids the abbot of Shrewsbury to have the subprior of Coventry summoned *ad partes remotas*, since the king has entrusted the administration of the monastery of Coventry to the subprior during a vacancy (*Close Rolls*, 1247-1251, p. 565).

It should perhaps be noted that when reference is made to the king as issuing a prohibition, the king in person is not necessarily meant, but rather the royal authority represented by the justices of the two Benches or by the itinerant justices. Hale, while recalling that the right to prohibit an action in court christian has its source in one of the royal prerogatives (*potestas jurisdictionis*), declares that the king does not exercise this right by his immediate authority but through the intermediary of his courts, which act in virtue of a power derived from him; see *History of the Common Law* (5th ed., London, 1794), II, 17. The statement should be made

less categorical in regard to the thirteenth century, for it is certain that the king did occasionally intervene personally at that time. The fact that he sometimes issues a prohibition by word of mouth is proof thereof. Thus, at the parliament of Reading (1241), the king forbids Robert Grosseteste, bishop of Lincoln (1235-1253), to pursue a plea against the members of his chapter. The king's procurator in the ensuing action against the bishop recounts the event thus: "... cum dominus rex ore suo proprio prohibuisset predicto episcopo Lincolnensi apud Radinge ... ne sequeretur predictum placitum ..." (KB 26/123 m. 7). Similarly, in 1260, the king, in the presence of his council, repeats a prohibition to the bishop of Bath and Wells in order to impede the latter's action against the abbot of Glastonbury (KB 26/168 m. 11d).

<sup>43</sup> See n. 70 below for references to this writ. Rather similar to it, although not directed against judicial proceedings and therefore not a writ of prohibition in the strict sense, is the writ *Ne admittas* prohibiting a bishop to induct to a church *until* the king's court has first determined who has the right of presenting to that church. This writ seems to have been made necessary by the decision of the Third Lateran Council in 1179 which conferred upon ordinaries the right of presenting to any benefice in their dioceses vacant for more than six months, if during this time the patron had not exercised his right to present (*Mansi, Concilia*, XXII, 222, can. 8). Frequently enough disputes between rival claimants to the advowson dragged on for more than six months; the writ therefore was intended to protect the patron's right. A letter of the king to the archbishop of York in 1224 makes allusion to the writ as also to the decision of the



interlocutory prohibition, for, although it is admittedly of spiritual jurisdiction, the king's order may block an ecclesiastical action temporarily at least, whenever church authorities proceeded to an inquiry on this subject without an order to do so from the king's court.<sup>44</sup> Likewise, a testamentary case may be the object of such a temporary prohibition, not to question the Church's competence in such matters, but merely to suspend proceedings for a particular reason, for instance, until some debt owed by the testator to the king has first been paid.<sup>45</sup>

Somewhat intermediary in character between the interlocutory and the final writ of prohibition of the usual type are those which are final in so far as they do forbid outright any further proceedings in court christian but which do not claim for the secular courts any authority in the matter in question. Thus the king forbids the ordinary of a diocese to take cognizance of pleas relating to royal chapels, since the latter are by special favour exempt and directly subject to the pope alone.<sup>46</sup> At other times he forestalls a decision about tithes or dependent chapels where such a decision might affect materially the value of the advowson in some church.<sup>47</sup> Perhaps injunctions against drawing any of the king's subjects into a plea at Rome might better be placed here, since they too do not actually claim jurisdiction for the sovereign but merely forbid taking the action out of the realm.<sup>48</sup>

Lateran Council (*Rot. Litt. Claus.*, I, 655). The earliest formula of the writ occurs in a register sent to Ireland in 1227 for the benefit of royal justices in that country (*Br. Mus., Cotton Ms. Julius D, II, fol. 144*; cf. *Collected Papers of F. W. Maitland*, ed. H. A. L. Fisher, II, 131, no. 10).

A register of the year 1273 or thereabouts clearly recognizes the ordinary's right to present after six months, except in the case where the king is one of the claimants, for the sovereign's rights are imprescriptible. The words of the register are worth quoting: 'Prohibitio ad archiepiscopum vel episcopum ne admittat personam ad ecclesiam de N. quae vacat et de cuius advocacione controversia mota est in curia domini regis inter ipsum dominum regem et aliquem alium; et sic semper habet locum quia nullum tempus currit domino regi quominus ejus praesentatus evicto jure patronatus admittatur. Sed, si controversia mota fuerit in curia domini regis inter A. et B. de advocacione alicujus ecclesiae, non habet locum; patronis indultum est quod praesentent et ut eorum praesentati per idem tempus admitti possint; post lapsum autem temporis sexmestris nulli valebit nisi tantum domino regi quin diocesanus eam possit conferre . . .' (*Br. Mus., Add. Ms. 38821, fol. 31*).

<sup>44</sup>The reason for such a prohibition is that a decision regarding bastardy might virtually settle a question of disputed property, since in the Middle Ages bastards could not inherit; hence, the inquiry as to bastardy was to be made only upon the order of the king or his judges, when the property issue had already arisen before the royal court. Bracton gives three forms of the writ varying according to particular circumstances: see *De Legibus*, IV, 259-261.

<sup>45</sup>*Close Rolls (1247-1251)*, p. 535; see also H. Jenkinson and B. Formoy, Introduction to their edition of *Select Cases in the Exchequer of Pleas*, pp. lv-lvi, where the principle governing such cases is formulated.

<sup>46</sup>The principle is stated clearly in a case of the year 1253 concerning St. Mary's at Stafford: ' . . . ita quod dominus papa nec aliquis alius iudex ecclesiasticus jurisdictionem aliquem in ea habet' (*KB 26/151 m. 8*). Pope Innocent IV had but a few years previously confirmed again the exemption of royal chapels from the ordinary diocesan authority (*Close Rolls, 1247-1251*, p. 226; the papal bull itself is entered on the same roll, *ibid.*, p. 99). Quite likely bishops were not too happy to renounce the advantages they would otherwise enjoy in these chapels through visitation and the administration of justice. In any case, the plea rolls bear witness to many a prohibition being issued against the intervention of diocesan authorities in the affairs of exempt royal chapels. But there were abuses on the other side as well: churches were known to evade the proper diocesan authority by an unjustified claim to being royal chapels; Innocent IV had on one occasion to condemn a pretention of this sort on the part of several churches in the diocese of Coventry-Lichfield (*Annales de Burton in Annales Monastici*, ed. H. R. Luard, *Rolls Series*, London, 1864, I, 275-276).

That the king himself made no claim to jurisdiction over the affairs of these chapels is clearly proven by the fact that he threatens to appeal to Rome against ecclesiastical judges who do not defer to his prohibition (e.g. Prynne, *Records*, III, 62-63, an. 1225).

<sup>47</sup>This is the subject of a bitter complaint on the part of Grosseteste. The cause of justice suffers much, says he, on account of such prohibitions: secular judges dare not deal with these truly spiritual matters, while ecclesiastical judges are prevented from doing so by the king's order; as a result, justice cannot be rendered. See *Epistolae Roberti Grosseteste*, ed. H. R. Luard (*Rolls Series*, London, 1861), n° LXXII\*, pp. 225-226.

<sup>48</sup>See n. 40 above.

Interlocutory writs and even this latter group of final writs lack something of the full character of the writ of prohibition, at least as defined above. They are prohibitory, it is true; they do halt proceedings in court christian; but they do not claim that the question at issue is of royal and not of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. And while, historically, they may have had a very real nuisance value in checking the activities of the Church's courts, they do not rank among those writs of prohibition which play an important part in determining the line of demarcation between the two jurisdictions by contesting the Church's right to hear pleas in certain matters. It is these particular matters which will now serve as the basis for a logical classification of the various writs of prohibition.

### 3. Prohibitions classified according to subject matter

The earliest forms of writs of prohibition and likewise the first classification are to be found in the treatise on the laws and customs of England attributed to Glanvill (about 1187). That the author was here copying forms of writs that were already of current use is quite certain; their clear and precise formulae bear a strong resemblance to those of the writs of novel disseisin and mort d'ancestor, which, while likewise found here for the first time in their actual form, are known to have been of earlier origin.<sup>49</sup> Moreover, entries in the Pipe Rolls for the years 1182-1183 bear witness to the use of prohibitions at that time when they record that men were amerced for suing pleas of a secular nature in court christian.<sup>50</sup> The problem of the exact date of origin for the writ of prohibition is as vexed as for many other writs. One cannot question the probability that there are precedents of a kind reaching back beyond the reign of Henry II; but these would be extremely difficult to trace. Certainly there is no evidence before his reign of anything like the regular procedure which has developed by the time of his death. Whatever allowance is to be made for precedents in the form of royal writs prohibiting some specific thing or action,<sup>51</sup> it is extremely likely that the systematic application, if not the creation, of the writ of prohibition is to be attributed to that monarch. Good reasons can be adduced to support an hypothesis that, as a regular part of judicial machinery, it originated at about the same time as others of Henry's new writs, that is, around the years 1165-1170. In the first place, there is no trace of any such *institution* in the previous reigns. Henry II's own first years were busily taken up with external affairs. Once solidly established, however, the new king was not slow to manifest his intention of reclaiming from the Church certain jurisdiction that he considered to have been usurped during

<sup>49</sup> Pollock and Maitland, *Hist. of Eng. Law*, I, 145-148. Opinions differ as to whether Glanvill borrowed the form of his writs from some previously existing register. Maitland held that it is quite possible (*Collected Papers* . . . , II, 126-127). But Holdsworth, while admitting its bare possibility, is sceptical on the point (*Hist. of Eng. Law*, II, 194, 514); he is of the opinion that the scribes of the late twelfth century had still a considerable degree of liberty in the formulation of writs. Whatever be the truth in the case, one thing is certain: there is no positive trace of a register of writs at this date. The earliest known one is the register sent to Ireland in 1227 (see above n. 43).

<sup>50</sup> *The Great Roll of the Pipe of the Twenty-Ninth Year of the Reign of King Henry II*, Publications of the Pipe Roll Society, vol. XXXII (London, 1911), pp.

12, 15. There is no specific reference to a prohibition in these entries, but their similarity to entries of a few years later which do make such reference permits us to infer that these amercements too are for suing a plea contrary to the king's prohibition.

<sup>51</sup> Bigelow has shown that the form of the writ of right and several other writs given by Glanvill is not only no new creation but the result of a natural development whose beginnings go back, in some cases, to the first years of the twelfth century and even further; see M. M. Bigelow, *History of Procedure in England* (London, 1880), pp. 156-191. The case could be the same for the writ of prohibition; yet Bigelow himself in referring to the latter writ goes no further than to say: 'a writ in use from the time at least of Glanvill, and probably earlier' (*ibid.*, p. 53).

the time of Stephen. Witness the celebrated Constitutions of Clarendon. It is worthy of particular note that three of the constitutions claim specifically for the king jurisdiction over those matters which were to form the subject of the first writs of prohibition: advowsons (c. 1), lay fee (c. 9) and lay debts (c. 15). Would it not be the natural thing to follow this up with some sort of arm calculated to make good such a claim and to hinder ecclesiastical courts from taking cognizance of these matters?

Moreover, it is just at this time that an important group of writs destined to draw pleas concerning land and immovables into the king's court begins to appear. There is nothing brutal about the procedure. The writs (e.g. novel disseisin, mort d'ancestor) and the ensuing action in each case are only possessory, not proprietary; but they come gradually to settle the question of right as well as that of possession. Likewise, they are merely placed at the service of the king's subjects who are free to avail themselves thereof or not, as they see fit; but their doing so results unobtrusively in a considerable gain for the royal courts to the detriment of feudal ones. Now, the writ of prohibition, when we are able to observe it at work, has just these same characteristics: it stays proceedings but without claiming at all to settle the case; and it is merely placed at the disposal of the king's subjects to be used by them, only if they wish it. The family resemblance is strong. The chief difference is that the writ of prohibition is directed against the activity of ecclesiastical courts. Is it too hazardous to suggest that all of these writs may well have been parts of a same *plan d'ensemble* for strengthening royal jurisdiction at the expense of its chief rivals? And since the probable date of the first of these other writs (novel disseisin) is 1166, that of the writ of prohibition ought to be about the same; before 1170 rather than after would seem likely, since one would hardly look for an innovation of this character during the years immediately following the murder of Becket and the king's submission.

The voluminous correspondence in connection with the struggle between the archbishop and the king contains no specific reference to writs of prohibition as such; but there are repeated complaints on the part of ecclesiastics that the king is interfering with the Church's cognizance of cases of perjury and breach of faith, while lay judges are daring to hear pleas relating to churches and tithes. Such interference even at that time may have been by writs of prohibition, as it certainly would have been some years later.<sup>32</sup> In any case, if it does not strengthen, it certainly does not weaken the hypothesis already proposed that the inauguration of writs of prohibition to courts christian as a part of the judicial machinery is to be placed around the years 1165-1170, even though proof positive of their use is not to be had before the early 1180's, and the first actual form of a writ of prohibition is to be found only in Glanvill's treatise a few years later. He has included two: the prohibition against a plea of lay fee in court christian and that against a plea of advowson. It is with these then that we begin our classification.

#### (a) Prohibitions *de laico feodo*

The first of Glanvill's writs is a model of simplicity, clarity and finality: a spiritual court must halt proceedings in a case of lay fee which has been brought before it because such pleas belong exclusively to the king's crown and dignity.<sup>33</sup> This earliest known form of the writ is already fixed, and it

<sup>32</sup> See below pp. 290, 297.

<sup>33</sup> 'Rex illis iudicibus ecclesiasticis salutem. Prohibeo vobis ne teneatis placitum in curia christianitatis, quod est inter R. et N. de laico feodo praedicti R., unde ipse queritur quod praedictus N. eum trahit in

placitum in curia christianitatis coram vobis, quia placitum illud spectat ad coronam et dignitatem meam. Teste etc.' (*De Legibus*, lib. XII, c. 21; ed. Woodbine, p. 156).

remains constantly the same not only in Bracton's treatise<sup>54</sup> but even a hundred years after Glanvill in the registers of Edward I's time.<sup>55</sup> Nevertheless, whereas Glanvill gives only the writ of prohibition addressed to the ecclesiastical judges, the form of the corresponding writ sent out directly to the plaintiff in the action is likewise inserted in the thirteenth century collections. The first known example is that of the year 1227;<sup>56</sup> it is found again in Bracton about the middle of the century<sup>57</sup> and in all later registers.<sup>58</sup>

One observation only need be made on this writ, namely that the word fee (*feodum*) is understood in a very broad sense, being well nigh a synonym for *immovable*, as is the case frequently in Normandy also. The writ *de laico feodo* covers not only manors, lands, pastures for which there are abundant examples, not only woods<sup>59</sup> and marshes,<sup>60</sup> but also houses,<sup>61</sup> grain standing in the field,<sup>62</sup> the right of pasturage,<sup>63</sup> and the services and customary dues on certain land.<sup>64</sup> One defendant before an ecclesiastical court procures from the king's justices a writ of prohibition *de laico feodo* on complaining of an action *de hereditate sua*,<sup>65</sup> an association of *hereditas* and *feodum* which recalls the later English use of *hereditaments* for *immovables*.<sup>66</sup>

In Henry II's time, it is the purely *lay* character of the fee that is insisted

<sup>54</sup> *De Legibus*, ed. Woodbine, IV, 252.

<sup>55</sup> Brit. Mus. Add. Ms. 38821, fol. 9v.

<sup>56</sup> 'Rex tali salutem. Prohibemus tibi ne sequaris placitum in curia christianitatis de laico feodo R., unde queritur quod eum trahis in causam vel placitum in curia christianitatis coram iudicibus ecclesiasticis, quia huiusmodi etc.' (Brit. Mus. Cotton Ms. Julius D, II, fol. 147).

<sup>57</sup> *De Legibus*, IV, 253. Bracton explains in another connection (IV, 261-262) that, while a prohibition to either the judges or the party would seem to suffice, nevertheless it is better to send one to both lest either proceed further with impunity (Melius tamen erit quod omnibus fiat generaliter ne iudices vel querens impune possent procedere). He is envisaging the possibility of the writ not being deferred to, in which case either the judges or the plaintiff would be able to escape a plea of prohibition on the ground that only one had received a writ.

Glanvill had already given a writ which resembles in many ways a prohibition to the plaintiff in court christian, with the notable exception that it is not addressed directly to the party (*in personam*), but to the sheriff ordering the latter to restrain the plaintiff from suing further. It follows the writ to the judges (lib. XII, c. 22) and runs as follows: 'Rex vicecomiti salutem. Prohibe R. ne sequatur placitum in curia christianitatis . . . de laico feodo . . . coram iudicibus illis. Et si praeatus R. fecerit te securum de clamore suo prosequendo, tunc pone per vadium et salvos plegios N. quod sit coram me . . . ostensurus quare traxit eum in placitum in curia christianitatis . . .' Certainly this writ starts off like a prohibition, but the second part proves its true nature: it is undoubtedly a writ of attachment to bring into the king's court someone who has already sued a plea in court christian in spite of a former writ of prohibition; otherwise there would be no action resulting in the royal court. Moreover, if we compare the form of this writ with the corresponding one which follows the writ of prohibition for advowson

(lib. IV, c. 14) and where it is stated categorically that a writ of prohibition had already been sent, we are forced to conclude that it is the same here in the case of lay fee. In thirteenth century writs of attachment, the prohibitory clause, it is true, does not occur, but its presence in this more or less hybrid form of the late twelfth century is not too surprising.

<sup>58</sup> By the last quarter of the thirteenth century the registers have evolved a regular little group of writs connected with prohibition against a plea of lay fee. We find the writ addressed to the judges and that to the plaintiff, then the writ of attachment proper to each; all are indicated at least (e.g. Brit. Mus. Lansdowne Ms. 564, fol. 59v; ca. 1277). Before the close of the century one other type is added to the little group, namely, the writ to both judges and plaintiff in *ex relatu plurium* form meant for the use of clerics and so worded that the ecclesiastical defendant is not named and the complaint represented as coming to the king *ex relatu plurium*. (e.g. Cambridge Univ. Trinity Coll., Ms. O. 2. 58, fol. 94v-95). On writs of this last type see Flahiff, 'The Use of Prohibitions by Clerics . . .', *Mediaeval Studies*, III (1941), pp. 109-114.

Let it suffice to mention here that what is said of the development of a group of writs around the prohibition concerning lay fee applies equally to the other *de cursu* writs: advowson and lay chattels and eventually trespass as well.

<sup>59</sup> *Bracton's Note Book*, ed. Maitland (London, 1887), III, 526, no. 680 (1225).

<sup>60</sup> KB 26/106 m. 10 (1230).

<sup>61</sup> . . . de quadam domo (KB 26/89 m. 9: 1225).

<sup>62</sup> . . . de blado suo in terra (*Bracton's Note Book*, III, 361, no. 1409: 1220).

<sup>63</sup> *Bracton's Note Book*, II, 424, no. 547 (1231): p. 625, no. 517 (1223).

<sup>64</sup> KB 26/77 m. 26 (1220).

<sup>65</sup> KB 26/72 m. 21 (1220).

<sup>66</sup> Pollock and Maitland, *Hist. of Eng. Law*, II, 2.

upon and a relatively large part is granted to the Church in its claims to jurisdiction over certain immovables. In the Constitutions of Clarendon (c. 9), the sovereign recognizes that if there be a dispute over any tenement that is acknowledged to have been given to a church in free alms (*frankalmoin*, *libera elemosina*), the plea will go forward in court christian, because all litigation concerning such land belongs by right to the ecclesiastical jurisdiction. By the middle of the thirteenth century, this is no longer the case; the assize *Utrum*, which had been in the Constitution of Clarendon and in Glanvill only a preliminary proceeding settling the competence of courts, has been converted into a proprietary action deciding a question of title to land. This evolution is a part of the development whereby the king's court asserts and makes good its claim to exclusive jurisdiction in matters of real property. The writ prohibiting ecclesiastical courts from touching lay fee contributed very effectively to this process. In the time of Glanvill, it envisaged only the Church's cognizance of *lay* tenements in a strict sense of the word, but in the thirteenth century it is forbidding spiritual judges to hear pleas concerning real property, even though it is held in free alms. This latter fact, according to Bracton, does not lift it out of the class of lay fee. The contrast to lay fee is no longer *elemosina*, but consecrated soil, church sites and churchyards. The Church's interference with land has been reduced to its narrowest limits.<sup>67</sup> The comparatively small number of prohibition pleas arising out of a lay fee in the middle and latter part of the thirteenth century bears witness to the success achieved by the king's courts.<sup>68</sup> Their success owes much to the use of this writ of prohibition, but would not have been won nevertheless, had it not been for the efficient procedure evolved by the royal court in litigation over land.<sup>69</sup>

#### (b) Prohibitions *de advocacione*

The second formula in Glanvill forbidding proceedings in an ecclesiastical court has to do with pleas relating to the right of advowson. The particular one there given is not a final prohibition, but is of an interlocutory nature only and lacks therefore the trenchant quality of the writ in matter of lay fees. It is the writ already referred to, whereby an action between two clerics who claim a same church in virtue of presentation by two different patrons is suspended until such time as the king's court shall have determined which of the supposed patrons is actually the lawful one. The writ is known as *Indicavit* from the first word of its formula relating that the patron of one of the clerics has informed the king (*indicavit mihi*) of the plea being heard in court christian.<sup>70</sup> It should be noted that this original case before spiritual

<sup>67</sup> On this whole question see Pollock and Maitland, *op. cit.*, I, 240-251 and Maitland, 'Frankalmoin in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries,' *Collected Papers* . . . , II, 205-222. It will be considered again in a subsequent article where the exact limits between the two jurisdictions will be examined.

<sup>68</sup> See below p. 310.

<sup>69</sup> See below pp. 278-279.

<sup>70</sup> *De Legibus*, lib. IV, c. 13; ed. Woodbine, pp. 82-83: 'Rex iudicibus illis ecclesiasticis salutem. Indicavit mihi R. quod, cum J. clericus suus teneat ecclesiam in villa illa per suam praesentationem quae de sua advocacione est, ut dicit, N. clericus, eandem petens ex advocacione M. militis, ipsum J. coram vobis in curia christianitatis inde trahit in placitum. Si vero praefatus N. ecclesiam illam dirationaret ex advocacione

praedicti M., palam est quod jam dictus R. jacturam inde incurreret de advocacione sua. Et quoniam lites de advocacionibus ecclesiarum ad coronam et dignitatem meam pertineant, vobis prohibeo ne in causa illa procedatis donec dirationatum fuerit in curia mea ad quem illorum advocatio illius ecclesiae pertineat. Teste etc.' (For an early instance of a prohibition plea arising out of the writ see *Curia Regis Rolls*, I, 352; Michaelmas, 1200). The form of the writ is the same in Bracton (IV, 253-254) and remains so in the registers; one development typical of the increasing formalism is that provision is made for the case where the writ will be addressed to judges delegate as well as that to judges ordinary (e.g. *Brit. Mus. Cotton Ms. Julius D II*, fol. 144v, an. 1227; *Add. Ms. 35179*, fol. 75, ca. 1248, etc.).

judges is not professedly one to settle a question of advowson; the latter enters in only in so far as a decision in favour of one or other of the clerics would be tantamount to confirming his patron's claim to the right of presenting.

Ecclesiastical courts, however, certainly did entertain pleas touching directly the advowson of a church. The writ following immediately upon the *Indicavit* one in Glanvill, while it is of a hybrid form, half prohibition and half writ of attachment, envisages an action where the advowson itself is contested. For the thirteenth century the case is quite clear: the simple, direct prohibition against an advowson plea occurs, characterized by the same conciseness, the same tone of finality as is the writ *de laico feodo*.<sup>71</sup> Clearly the king will not hear of the spiritual authorities deciding the question of who is the lawful patron of a given church, for the simple reason that the patron's right of advowson is classed in England as an immovable, that is as real property, jurisdiction over which belongs exclusively to the royal courts.<sup>72</sup> On the whole, the Church in England appears, in practice at least, to acquiesce in this view; the records give evidence of an extremely small number of prohibitions against a clear case of right of advowson being tried in court christian.

The commoner case by far is that of a prohibition against ecclesiastical proceedings which involve only indirectly the right of advowson. We have seen that the writ *Indicavit* is of this sort. Of greater importance, however, and of more frequent occurrence than the original *Indicavit* is another advowson prohibition which grew apparently out of it. The first *Indicavit* writ was aimed at a dispute between clerics over the possession of a church; the later form of the writ presupposes a quarrel over the tithes of a church. Not that the secular power lays claim to jurisdiction in matter of tithes; but a dispute over any considerable portion of the tithes would, from a practical point of view, be equivalent to a dispute over the living and a dispute over the living involves indirectly again the patron's right to present.<sup>73</sup> Hence custom comes to determine that a contention over more than one-sixth of the tithes of a given church affects the advowson of that church. The king's court is not slow to evolve a writ of prohibition to halt an action concerning this amount of tithes *until* that court shall have settled the previous question of advowson.<sup>74</sup> No register before Bracton's time contains such a writ, but there is evidence that it is, in substance at least, of earlier origin. Already in 1230 the plea rolls record cases involving

As in the case of prohibitions for lay fee, so here Glanvill gives only the writ addressed to the judges, although he adds a writ of attachment addressed to the sheriff which concerns the party as well as the judges (cf. n. 57 above). It is again Bracton who speaks first of a prohibition addressed directly to the party (IV, 254) and it too remains constant thereafter.

<sup>71</sup> The formula given by Glanvill (lib. IV, c. 14, ed. Woodbine, p. 83) is the one referred to in the previous note as a writ of attachment. Bracton's formulae are perfectly clear-cut: a prohibition to the judges and one to the party to forbid an action *de advocacione ecclesiae* (*De Legibus*, IV, 252-253). Plea rolls prior to this date make frequent mention of a *placitum de advocacione in curia christianitatis contra prohibitionem*; but wherever further details permit to judge, it turns out to be a prohibition of the *Indicavit* type.

The following form of the writ is taken from a register of a few years later (ca. 1273): 'Rex tali iudici vel talibus iudicibus

salutem. Prohibemus vobis ne teneatis placitum in curia christianitatis de advocacione ecclesiae de G. unde T. queritur quod H. de M. trahit eum coram vobis in curia christianitatis auctoritate litterarum domini papae vel sine auctoritate, quia placita de advocacionibus ecclesiarum spectant ad coronam et dignitatem nostram. Teste etc.' (Brit. Mus. Add. Ms. 38821, fol. 8).

<sup>72</sup> Cf. above p. 274.

<sup>73</sup> 'Nota quod qui sequitur de decimis et oblationibus per consequens sequitur de advocacione' (*Bracton's Note Book*, II, 360-361, no. 453).

<sup>74</sup> Bracton, *De Legibus*, IV, 254. In form this writ does not differ essentially from the older *Indicavit* one (see n. 70), except in one detail: the original action in court christian has been over a portion of the tithes, not over the church itself. *Circumspecte Agatis*, in 1286, places the minimum amount at one-fourth instead of one-sixth (E. B. Graves, 'Circumspecte Agatis,' *Engl. Hist. Rev.*, XLIII, 1928, pp. 15-16).

prohibitions *de advocatione* where it is obviously a question of tithes and oblations.<sup>70</sup>

To sum up, the type of advowson prohibition most frequently met with is not one against a plea in court christian to decide who should have the right of advowson,—although this form of prohibition is to be found sometimes—but rather the prohibition known as *Indicavit* for a case where the advowson is indirectly brought into question by a dispute over the possession of a church, or more frequently over a portion of the tithes due to the church. Other writs included under the rubric *De advocatione* in the 'prohibition section' of the register of writs or given by Bracton are either not truly prohibitions but only annexed thereto,<sup>71</sup> or else prohibitions of a very exceptional character.<sup>72</sup>

<sup>70</sup>KB 26/104 m. 8d (Hilary term), KB 26/107 m. 12 (Michaelmas). Typical examples for the following years may be found in *Bracton's Note Book*, II, 419, no. 536 (1231); p. 578, n° 874 (1232); p. 555, n° 725 (1233). These are the first cases of this sort that I have seen, and perhaps the very first that occurred, because it is noteworthy that ecclesiastical opposition to just this policy of the royal courts begins to take form immediately after this date. Grosseteste, elected bishop of Lincoln in 1235, leads this opposition; see *Epistolae Roberti Grosseteste*, n° LXXII\* pp. 225-226 (probably of the year 1236) and the protest of the English clergy in 1237 against the practice recorded in the above-mentioned plea rolls (*Annales de Burton*, in *Annales Monastici*, I, 225). The clergy add in their complaint: 'nolunt iudiciarii domini regis iudicare quota pars decimarum peti possit vel debeat coram iudice ecclesiastico.' The protest would seem to have had little effect: Matthew Paris' chronicle gives the following as a new 'statute' of the year 1241: 'Prohibentur clerici per breve domini regis instituere actiones suas coram iudice ecclesiastico super decimis; et appellatur illud breve *Indicavit*' (*Chronica Majora*, IV, 614). The chronicler is wrong in considering this as new in 1241, unless it be that a special writ for the case of tithes was created in that year and became *de cursu*. At any rate it is certain that prohibitions in one form or another against pleas for tithes had been issued earlier. Appended to a Cambridge register and dating from about 1240 is this writ: 'Rex A. salutem. Ostendit nobis rector ecclesiae talis quod, cum teneat ecclesiam talem ex dono nostro quod cuius ecclesiae advocatio ad nos pertinet, vos trahitis eum in placitum in curia christianitatis coram iudicibus auctoritate litterarum domini papae petendo ab eo sepulturas mortuorum et decimas gerbarum, unde, si ea quae in curia christianitatis petitis optineretis, advocationem nostram amitteremus; et ideo vobis prohibemus ne placitum illud sequamini in curia christianitatis, quia huiusmodi placita de advocationibus spectant ad coronam et dignitatem nostram. Teste etc.' (Cambridge Univ. Libr. Ms. Kk. V. 33, fol. 90). The rubric of another writ in the same register reads: 'De prohibitione breve est de novo pro decimis' (fol. 86); here again it is a rather exceptional writ, but one where the collation of the tithes of a church is considered as equivalent to the right of advowson. Both these writs would seem to be forerunners of the final writ as given by Bracton.

On the question of tithes, see the very useful article of Norma Adams, 'The Judicial Conflict over Tithes,' *Engl. Hist. Rev.*, LII (1937) 1-22.

<sup>71</sup>Such are the well known writ *Ne admittas* to prevent a bishop from inducting any cleric to a church, the advowson of which is in dispute before the king's court (see n. 43), and the subsequent writ ordering the bishop to 'disencumber' the said church if, contrary to the royal order, an incumbent has been inducted. The latter writ is found for the first time in the register sent to Ireland in 1227 (Brit. Mus., Cotton Ms. Julius D, II, fol. 144v) and occurs regularly thereafter.

<sup>72</sup>The 'advowson writs' already discussed are the only ones which appear in a register of about 1273 as *de cursu* (Brit. Mus., Add. Ms. 38821, fol. 8-9). Bracton gives some other rather exceptional ones which it will suffice to mention; they would certainly be in the *de precepto* group, if the distinction were made by Bracton. When the patron of a church has already proven his right in the king's court against a pretended patron, the presentee of the latter must under no circumstances take action in court christian against the presentee of the real patron; such an action will immediately be prohibited since it is virtually a challenge to the decision of the royal justices (*De Legibus*, IV, 254-256; three variations of the writ are to be found, all of which emphasize the general principle that nothing must be attempted in a court christian to the prejudice of a previous decision in the king's court; see also on this same point *Fleta*, London, 1685, p. 331 and *Britton*, ed. Nichols, Oxford, 1865, II, 204-205). Another of the writs in Bracton's treatise prohibits the attempt of a newly elected prior to annul a presentation made by the king during the time that the priory was in his hands because of the vacancy (IV, 258). Somewhat similar to this last writ is one in a Cambridge register which prohibits an advowson case on the ground that the conferring of the church in question might at some time be in the king's hands (Cambridge Univ. Libr., Ms. Kk. V. 33, fol. 86-86v).

Under the *ex relatu plurium* type of advowson prohibition (cf. n. 58) several new writs are added in fourteenth century registers, but they are merely variations to meet the specific cases of a vicarage, a chapel, a hospital, a prebend (Bodleian Libr., Rawlinson Ms. C. 292, fol. 21v-22; Brit. Mus., Harley Ms. 858, fol. 128-128v; both are of the first years of the century).



(c) Prohibitions *de cattallis et debitis*

The third of the early *de cursu* writs of prohibition is that against any case in court christian relating to debts or chattels, unless derived from marriage or last will and testament (*de debitis vel cattallis nisi sint de testamento vel matrimonio*). The formula of this writ is not to be found in Glanvill, nor does it occur in the register of writs sent to Ireland in 1227.<sup>78</sup> The first known example is in another register of Henry III's reign preserved at Cambridge, in date not later than 1234.<sup>79</sup> The writ is still lacking even in some later registers,<sup>80</sup> but it occurs in Bracton and is constant from that time on.<sup>81</sup> Its absence from the registers of the first part of the century is not easy to account for, since as early as 1201 actions are instituted against ecclesiastical judges who entertain pleas of debts or chattels contrary to a royal prohibition.<sup>82</sup> The explanation must be that the writ had not yet become *de cursu*, which hypothesis is strengthened by the fact that the characteristic formula, *nisi de testamento vel matrimonio*, does not appear before 1219<sup>83</sup> and by the further fact that prohibition pleas arising out of debts and chattels are relatively few during the first years of the thirteenth century. By 1220, however, of 54 pleas of prohibition recorded on the rolls of the king's court, 13 have to do with debts or chattels or both,<sup>84</sup> and in all but three of these cases the characteristic formula is added. In 1230, the proportion is still higher and the formula is never lacking; the writ must have become *de cursu* therefore roughly between the years 1220 and 1230.

Its use grows still more frequent as the century advances. In 1250, pleas growing out of a prohibition of debts and chattels far surpass in number those relating to lay fee and advowson. It would appear that before the middle of the century the royal authority has been almost completely successful in establishing its claim to exclusive jurisdiction over these latter two questions; the number of prohibition pleas relating to them is insignificant after the year 1250. In the matter of debts and chattels, however, the struggle between spiritual and secular authorities still goes on, as may be seen at a glance when the nature of prohibition pleas in the later years of the century is examined.<sup>85</sup>

It is not difficult to understand how disputes as to competence could arise

<sup>78</sup> Mentioned in n. 43, 76.

<sup>79</sup> Univ. Libr. Ms. II. VI. 13, fol. 59v; cf. Holdsworth, *Hist. of Engl. Law*, II, App. V, p. 68, no. 30 and for the argument as to the date of the register, see the original article of Maitland, 'The History of the Register of Original Writs,' *Collected Papers* . . . , II, 135.

<sup>80</sup> Brit. Mus., *Add. Ms.* 35179, fol. 74-83v (about 1248).

<sup>81</sup> *De Legibus*, IV, 252. Its very style resembles so closely that of the other two classic *de cursu* writs that it is easily identified as a member of the group. The form remains the same in later registers and there are always found the writ to the judges and that to the party as well as the writ of attachment and eventually the *ex relatu plurium* form for clerics. The following form of the writ is the standard type (Brit. Mus., *Add. Ms.* 38821, fol. 9): 'Rex archidiacono Londoniensi et ejus officiali salutem. Prohibemus vobis ne teneatis placitum in curia christianitatis de cattallis vel debitis, unde P. de C. clericus queritur quod R. de H. trahit eum in placitum coram vobis in curia christianitatis, nisi catalla illa vel debita sint de testamento vel matrimonio, quia placita illa de cattallis vel debitis quae non sunt de

testamento vel matrimonio spectant ad coronam etc. Teste etc.'

<sup>82</sup> *Curia Regis Rolls*, I, 433; II, 28: ' . . . quare traxit Willelmum Russellum in curiam christianitatis de debito XX marcarum contra prohibitionem' (1201). Norma Adams has listed a number of these early cases, 'The Writ of Prohibition,' *Minnesota Law Review*, XX (1936) 276, n. 16.

<sup>83</sup> Norma Adams, *loc. cit.*

<sup>84</sup> All formulae of the writ in registers give the two terms together: either *de debitis et cattallis* or *de debitis vel cattallis*. But the individual writ, when issued, would be more precise; in 1222, the plaintiff loses his plea of prohibition before the king's court for speaking of chattels when the writ of prohibition had mentioned debt only (*Bracton's Note Book*, II, 126, n. 152).

<sup>85</sup> See table on p. 310. The predominance of the writ for debts and chattels is perhaps to be expected, since it would have to do with cases involving even small sums and arising therefore more frequently than cases of lay fee or advowson. Norma Adams suggests that the increase is due in part to the increased amount of money in circulation in the early thirteenth century (*loc. cit.*).



in regard to debts and chattels, when we recall that the Church's jurisdiction in some of these cases was clearly recognized. Indeed, from Glanvill down to the end of the thirteenth century and much later, the right of courts christian to hear pleas of debts and chattels connected with matrimony or last will and testament was not only admitted but reiterated time and again both by jurists and in legal practice.<sup>86</sup> Other chattels, too, could in certain circumstances come under ecclesiastical jurisdiction: tithes, for instance, oblations, goods seized violently from a cleric and so on.<sup>87</sup> But doubtful cases will always arise. Take an example: a creditor has willed to his heir a sum of money owed to him by another person. One might well expect that the heir could sue the debtor in court christian, but this is so only if the debt has been formally recognized during the lifetime of the original creditor; otherwise, the secular courts will be competent as in the case of ordinary debts. In short, everything depends on whether the existence of the debt before the creditor's death can be proven. This is but one of many circumstances that contribute to make the question of jurisdiction over debts and chattels an involved one, quite apart from any deliberate intent to evade the competent court.

That this deliberate intent was sometimes present, is quite certain. Holdsworth explains why it should be so, especially in regard to debts and chattels. The actions of debt and contract constitute one of the weak points of English mediaeval law.<sup>88</sup> To begin with, they were costly and slow.<sup>89</sup> The law, moreover, offered quite inadequate sanctions for the enforcement of contracts, with the result that men sought sanctions other than those provided by law. One of these was confirmation of the contract by a solemn oath. But, in the eyes of the Church, a contract or pact strengthened by a pledge of faith was brought by this very fact within the cognizance of spiritual tribunals so that, if the original contract was not fulfilled, the aggrieved party could have recourse to the church courts. The king never admitted that the *laesio fidei* could bring the matter of the contract itself under spiritual jurisdiction<sup>90</sup> and therefore combatted such a pretention by mean of prohibitions. Nevertheless, as will be seen later in dealing with procedure, the initiative in procuring a writ of prohibition had ordinarily to be taken by the defendant in the ecclesiastical action, not by the king. Many of these defendants did seek prohibitions, but it is extremely likely that still more submitted to the justice of the Church, because they hoped for a speedier and more equitable action there, or because they deemed themselves bound by the 'interposition of faith' to go before spiritual judges. If a majority were not submitting, recourse to the ecclesiastical courts would soon have lost its efficacy in this matter as in others. Yet, it is just the contrary that happened, for, as late as the second half of the fifteenth century, the secular power was still obliged, after repeated declarations throughout the preceding centuries, to protest vigorously that breach of faith did not justify an action in court christian over a non-spiritual contract.<sup>91</sup>

In short, the writ of prohibition *de catallis vel debitis* is the only one of the three *de cursu* writs that continues to be of frequent use, the reason for this being that on this ground ecclesiastical justice remains an effective rival of secular justice, thanks particularly to the weakness of actions of debt and

<sup>86</sup> It is sufficient to refer the reader to the numerous texts collected by Makower, *The Constitutional History and Constitution of the Church of England* (London, 1895), section 60, n. 82-84, n. 104-117 (pp. 420-427).

<sup>87</sup> Bracton, *De Legibus*, IV, 266-269.

<sup>88</sup> Holdsworth, *Hist. of Eng. Law*, III (3rd ed., London, 1923), 423-424.

<sup>89</sup> Pollock and Maitland, *Hist. of Eng. Law*, II, 205; 200, n. 1.

<sup>90</sup> Constitutions of Clarendon, c. 15.

<sup>91</sup> Holdsworth, *op. cit.*, II, 305, especially n. 5-6; Fitzherbert, *La Graunde Abridgement* (London, 1568), li. III, fol. 32v: 'Si home sue auter pro lesione fidei en court christien, quel serement aiuge sur temporal contract ou cause, il aura prohibition, etc.' See also the texts given by Pollock and Maitland, *op. cit.*, II, 201, n. 3-4.

contract in the king's court. Prohibitions relative to lay fee and advowson, on the other hand, decrease in number for the good reason that the royal courts by perfecting their procedure for 'immovables' draw such actions to themselves and annul the rivalry of the church courts in these matters.

(d) Prohibitions *de transgressione* (trespass).

By their very nature the *de precepto* writs are harder to classify than the *de cursu* ones, since they are intended primarily to meet a situation more or less exceptional, not provided for by the ordinary judicial machinery. Nevertheless, it will be remembered that, when a situation of this kind has arisen several times and been treated in each case almost identically, a new jurisprudence begins to cover the point; in other words, a new type of action and its accompanying writ tends to become part of the normal machinery of the courts; the final stage of the development is reached when a writ that was *de precepto* or *in casu suo formatum* becomes *de cursu*.<sup>92</sup> In the course of the thirteenth century the prohibition to court christian concerning a plea of trespass of the peace (*de transgressione contra pacem*) provides an excellent example of this evolution.

The prohibition touching trespass is of a very particular nature and requires some explanation. Ordinarily, ecclesiastical courts could claim no jurisdiction over breaches of the public peace. They did assert such a claim, however, when the offender proved to be a cleric. Moreover, since Henry II's reconciliation after the death of Becket, the right of the Church alone to try criminous clerics had been recognized. What was still debatable was whether the king's officers had the right to arrest clerics found breaking the peace. Clerics thus arrested were known to institute an action in court christian against the officers who had laid hands upon them and had thereby violated their clerical privilege.<sup>93</sup> The first prohibitions concerning trespass aimed at stopping actions of this sort against the king's ministers; by 1260 they were becoming of frequent occurrence. Bracton has included such a writ in his treatise.<sup>94</sup> The first register containing

<sup>92</sup> See above p. 267.

<sup>93</sup> For a brief sketch of the question of the *privilegium fori* in England in the thirteenth century, see L. C. Gabel, *Benefit of Clergy in England in the Later Middle Ages* (Northampton, Mass., 1929), ch. I and II. It is certain that in practice the king's ministers did arrest criminous clerics, handing them over to ecclesiastical authorities at the request of the ordinary. Before long, moreover, the secular power began to make an inquiry of its own upon which depended the delivery of the cleric to the bishop. Thus, if the man was found to be guilty, he was turned over to the Church; but if his innocence was established, he was exonerated without going before the ecclesiastical tribunal.

<sup>94</sup> *De Legibus*, IV, 258-259: 'Rex talibus iudicibus salutem. Monstravit nobis talis vicecomes, major, praepositus talis villae, vel ballivus quilibet, quod, cum A. clericum tanquam malefactorem et reatum de roberia et societate latronum, vel inventum tali loco in conventu et societate latronum et certa suspicione notatum, pro officii sui debito et pro pace nostra per legem terrae secundum regni nostri consuetudinem, nuper arrestari fecisset, quem etiam postmodum tali episcopo qui ipsum petiit sibi liberari tanquam clericum a

carcere et custodia nostra fecimus liberari, idem A. clericus praefatum ballivum nostrum occasione praedicta trahit in placitum coram vobis auctoritate litterarum domini papae. Et quoniam hoc est manifeste contra coronam et dignitatem nostram et etiam contra pacem nostram, quod aliquis ballivus noster occasione ministerii sui, vel pro aliquo quod ad conservationem pacis nostrae pertineat vel pro justitia facienda, trahatur in placitum in curia christianitatis, cum eorum facta nostra reputemus in hac parte, vobis prohibemus districte ne placitum illud ulterius tenere praesumatis. Teste etc.'

The earliest case in the plea rolls occurs in 1240 (Michaelmas). There is an action in court christian against three men who have arrested a certain Hilary (seemingly a cleric, although the record does not say so expressly) in connection with a fire the responsibility for which has been laid to Hilary. Thereupon a writ of prohibition is issued against this action to prevent the ecclesiastical judges from taking cognizance of a case *de transgressione contra pacem* (KB 26/121 m. 10). By 1250 there are numerous examples of similar cases where the party against whom the prohibition is issued is said definitely to be a cleric (KB 26/143 m. 20; KB 26/147B m.

a prohibition touching 'trespass dates from about 1272.<sup>65</sup> Here the writ, though placed among the 'exceptional ones in the collection, has taken a more general form. There is no precise mention of arrest of a cleric by royal officers; the writ merely states that pleas of trespass belong exclusively to the king's court and that therefore the plea before ecclesiastical judges must stop. Practical cases show that generally a cleric has been haled before the royal courts for a trespass and that he in turn has begun an action in court christian to prevent his adversary's suit.<sup>66</sup>

Before the end of the thirteenth century the writ of prohibition *de transgressionem* has begun to be classed among the *de cursu* writs of the register, so general has its use become. Its wording now alludes to a case of trespass in court christian where the parties are both laymen.<sup>67</sup> Does this indicate that the church courts are clearly exceeding the limits of their jurisdiction? It is difficult to say. That this particular formula speaks of the two parties as *laici* does not prove that such was the general rule. Moreover, the formula of prohibition would not, of course, mention on what grounds the Church claimed cognizance of the case.<sup>68</sup>

As far as the form of the writ is concerned, what is to be noticed here is that the prohibition *de transgressionem* is in use before the middle of the thirteenth century as an exceptional writ. The earliest registers consider it as *de precepto*, although the form they give is already free of specific details. By 1294 at the latest, it finds its place, along with the three classic prohibitions of lay fee, advowson and debts and chattels, among the *de cursu* writs. Fourteenth century registers continue to class it thus.<sup>69</sup>

8d; KB 26/149 m. 2d; CP 40/9 m. 10). The arrest has been made each time *pro pace domini regis conservanda*. A curious complication creeps into a case of this sort in 1250. As usual, a cleric is attached for suing a plea in court christian against two sheriffs in spite of a royal prohibition. It turns out that the sheriffs had arrested him as an obstinate excommunicate upon the denunciation of the archbishop of Canterbury (KB 26/143 m. 30).

<sup>65</sup> British Museum, *Lansdowne Ms.* 564, fol. 59v.

<sup>66</sup> The following entry is from the plea roll for Michaelmas, 1285: 'Magister Robertus de Ros archidiaconus Londoniensis optulit se quarto die versus Rogerum Crok' de placito quare, cum idem Rogerus secundum legem et consuetudinem regni regis prae-fatum Robertum hic implicaverit de quadam transgressionem eidem Rogero per prae-fatum Robertum illata etc., idem Robertus traxit ipsum Rogerum in placitum in curia christianitatis' (CP 40/60 m. 18).

<sup>67</sup> The first example found of a register listing this writ in its *de cursu* group is that contained in Cambridge University Library Ms. Ll. IV. 17, fol. 260-315v (ca. 1294); the prohibition *de transgressionem* (fol. 271v) says of the plea in court christian: '... W. de F. laycum R. laycum super hujusmodi transgressionibus trahit in placitum coram te in curia christianitatis ...' That lay persons did sometimes sue a plea designated as *de transgressionem* before ecclesiastical judges is clearly proven by the fact that in 1280 (Michael-

mas) a woman is found doing this, which leaves no possibility of the party's here being a cleric (CP 40/36 m. 74).

<sup>68</sup> The plea roll for Easter 1280 records an action against an ecclesiastical judge who has heard a plea *de transgressionem* contrary to a royal prohibition. It appears from the entry that the original trespass consisted in a thrashing administered to William de Somerville by a certain Gervase FitzHugh before the archdeacon of Nottingham's official. This sounds very much as though Gervase had set upon William during the session of the official's court; and, since such courts were normally held in a church, there may very well have been the added circumstance of sacrilege to justify William's plea in court christian (CP 40/33 m. 56).

<sup>69</sup> Cambridge University, Trinity College, Ms. O. 2. 58, fol. 95v (ca. 1299) and Ms. O. 3. 20, fol. 7 (first years of fourteenth century); Brit. Mus., *Harley Ms.* 575, fol. 153 (ca. 1292) and *Harley Ms.* 858, fol. 130 (after 1300); Bodleian Library, *Rawlinson Ms.* C. 612B, fol. 96v-97 (ca. 1305), *Rawlinson Ms.* C. 310, fol. 42v (before 1330), *Rawlinson Ms.* C. 666, fol. 140v (ca. 1327). As in the case of the other *de cursu* writs, a prohibition to judges and party are both included, also the writ of attachment and the special *ex relatu plurium* form for clerics. Nevertheless, as late as the beginning of Edward III's reign, a register may exceptionally place the prohibition touching trespass among the *de precepto* writs (e.g. Bodleian Libr., *Western Ms.* 3712, fol. 28).

(e) Prohibitions *de diffamacione*

After the prohibition touching trespass, that relating to defamation of character is the best known of the *de precepto* writs in the thirteenth century. It does not occur in Bracton, but is to be found in a register that Maitland considers prior to 1259.<sup>100</sup> It appears regularly in a group of registers whose prototype dates from the extreme end of the reign of Henry III.<sup>101</sup> It is classed among the *de precepto* writs, and, although repeated almost without exception in later registers, it never seems to pass into the *de cursu* group, which is closed with the inclusion of the trespass prohibition. The small number of cases in the plea rolls resulting from the defamation writ would indicate that its use was not of common occurrence.

Just as the prohibition touching trespass has to do with a particular type of trespass, so too the prohibition *de diffamacione* is concerned with one sort of defamation only. Indeed, ordinary cases of defamation of character were recognized as of spiritual jurisdiction.<sup>102</sup> The king's prohibition was intended to impede only those actions of defamation which were instituted as a result of an accusation made or of evidence given in the royal courts. The formula of the writ as found in the registers indicates this clearly,<sup>103</sup> as do also the records dealing with pleas of prohibition which result from this particular writ.<sup>104</sup> As to

<sup>100</sup> Cambridge Univ. Libr., Ms. Kk. V. 33, fol. 69-91; cf. Maitland's article in *Collected Papers*, II, 141-148.

<sup>101</sup> Bodleian Libr., *Rawlinson Ms. C. 331*, fol. Vv; Brit. Mus., *Add. Ms. 38821*, fol. 10. Other registers of this same group include: Brit. Mus., *Add. Ms. 34194*, fol. 1-40, *Lansdowne Ms. 564*, fol. 51-80v; Cambridge Univ. Libr., *Ms. Ll. IV. 18*, fol. 94-146, *Ms. Ee. I. 1*, fol. 194-211, *Ms. Mm. I. 27*, fol. 7-28v. As in the case of the prohibition touching trespass, so here the records bear witness to pleas in the king's court growing out of the prohibition of defamation actions in court christian some years before the writ itself is found in any register; see the cases in n. 104 below.

<sup>102</sup> Maitland observes as much in his edition of *Bracton's Note Book*, II, 479, no. 629, note 1.

<sup>103</sup> In one case it is alleged defamation in connection with an assize of novel disseisin: 'Rex talibus iudicibus salutem. Monstravit nobis talis quod, cum ipse coram iusticiariis nostris ultimo itinerantibus in comitatu tali arrainiasset per preceptum nostrum quamdam assisam novae disseisinae versus talem de tali tenemento in tali villa et per recognitionem ejusdem assisae seysinam suam inde recuperasset versus eundem talem, idem talis, inponens ei quod personam et statum suum ex hoc diffamavit coram iusticiariis praedictis, trahit eum in placitum coram vobis in curia christianitatis auctoritate literarum domini papae. Quia vero manifeste est contra coronam et dignitatem nostram quod aliquis super hiis, quae in curia nostra facta sunt et terminata, trahatur in placitum in curia christianitatis, vobis prohibemus etc.' (Brit. Mus. *Add. Ms. 38821*, fol. 10; ca. 1273). In another writ from this same register (fol. 9v-10) which is commonly repeated in fourteenth century registers, the defamation is alleged to have occurred in connection with an inquest at the royal exchange: 'Rex archidiacono Londoniensi

salutem. Monstravit nobis N. le Long, minister cambii nostri Londoniensis, quod, cum ipse una cum aliis ad hoc electis testimonium perhibuisset veritati in quadam inquisitione, quam nuper fecimus de ministris et statu cambii nostri praedicti, et nos per inquisitionem illam amoveri fecissemus ab eodem cambio H. de N. et quosdam alios, idem H., asserens pro hoc diffamari, trahit eum inde in placitum coram vobis in curia christianitatis, vobis prohibemus ne placitum illud ulterius teneatis in curia christianitatis etc. Teste etc.'

<sup>104</sup> The earliest case I have found of an action concerned with defamation is from the Trinity roll for 1230. The party, who has sued a plea in court christian in spite of a prohibition and has to answer for this in the king's court, comes and admits '... quod praedicti Galfridus et Petronilla fecerunt eum attachiari in curia laica de placito raptus, furto et aliis infamiis, et ille super illis infamiis inplacitavit eos' (KB 26/106 m. 15d). Curiously, the prohibition was not one for defamation but for chattels; very probably an indemnity had been demanded in court christian with the result that the writ of prohibition could refer to the action as one of chattels (cf. below p. 291, where the canonist William of Drogheda cautions against any mention of damages lest the action encounter a royal prohibition). This would seem to indicate that a prohibition to cover the specific case of defamation was not yet in existence.

In a dowry action of the year 1243 (KB 26/127 m. 17), the legitimacy of a certain woman's marriage is brought into question by her adversaries, whereupon she sues them in court christian for defamation only to have this plea meet with a writ of prohibition: the writ is not obeyed and there results a plea of prohibition. The record does not mention the exact terms of the writ other than to say that it was to prevent an action in court christian regarding what had transpired in the king's

the king's pretensions in the matter therefore, he makes no claim whatsoever to take cognizance of pleas of defamation; but he does assert that the matter of the original plea before his justices is so exclusively of his jurisdiction that nothing happening in the course of the plea itself can be considered as grounds for an action of defamation in court christian.

(f) Miscellaneous prohibitions

The prohibition concerning defamation is in reality based upon a broad general principle which underlies also a number of other *de precepto* writs. The principle might be stated as follows: 'What transpires in the king's court or what is done by his order or that of his justices or according to recognized custom may not be the grounds of an action in court christian.' One of the defamation writs puts it: 'Quia vero manifeste est contra coronam et dignitatem nostram quod aliquis super hiis quae in curia nostra facta sunt et terminata trahatur in placitum in curia christianitatis, vobis prohibemus . . .'<sup>105</sup> In very similar terms the formula of the prohibition which is listed in the registers as *de appello* says it is contrary to the royal dignity and crown 'quod trahatur (aliquis) in placitum in curia christianitatis pro eo quod jus suum dicto modo in curia nostra prosequatur . . .'<sup>106</sup> The appeal alluded to is one instituted on grounds of mayhem and breach of peace; should the appellee sue a plea in court christian, there will be room for a writ of prohibition. Not only this one but all the other *de precepto* prohibitions commonly repeated in the registers will be found to come under this general heading.

Thus, the more exceptional advowson writs given by Bracton find their justification in the claim made by the principle stated above, since the king is there forbidding actions in ecclesiastical courts which might bring into question a previous decision in his court.<sup>107</sup> Similarly he will not permit anyone to sue a plea against his officers for what they have done in the exercise of their duty. Extra-judicial distress permitted by English law as of custom is likewise protected by a prohibition should the party who is distrained, being a cleric or for any other reason, seek to make this the matter of an action in court christian;<sup>108</sup> the impounding of beasts in order to oblige a tenant to service

court. But, since it was aimed at a defamation action, we undoubtedly have here an instance of a prohibition *de diffamatione*, and one of the very first; once the *de cursu* writs, like that for chattels, could no longer be stretched to cover the case, it would require a *de precepto* one to meet the specific circumstances.

Again in 1279, Robert de Picheford sues a plea of defamation in court christian against certain members of a jury which has rendered a verdict causing him to lose an action *de terra* in the king's court. But, since jurors must not be haled before an ecclesiastical court for a verdict rendered by them, Robert is brought anew before the royal justices and amerced for his offence. This case would seem to be based on a prohibition like the first one given in n. 103. Norma Adams has noted this case in her article in *Minnesota Law Review*, XX (1936) 276, n. 15; it is not however, as she suggests, the only thirteenth century case based on the defamation form of the writ of prohibition.

<sup>105</sup> See above n. 103.

<sup>106</sup> Bodleian Library, Rawlinson Ms. C. 331, fol. v (ca. 1270). This is the earliest example of the writ that I have found;

from the time of Edward I on, however, it is one of the most common in the registers. Although it is always classed as *de precepto*, it never seems to be lacking in any collection which gives writs of this type at all.

<sup>107</sup> See above n. 77.

<sup>108</sup> The writ is found for the first time in British Museum Add. Ms. 38821, fol. 10 (ca. 1273): 'Rex magistro W. de G. et B. de B. salutem. Monstraverunt nobis R. de N. et N. de F., ballivi Hugonis de Ver comitis Oxoniensis, quod cum placita de districtionibus injuste factis in feodis laycalibus pertineant ad coronam et dignitatem nostram, vos occasione cujusdam districtionis, quam nuper fecerunt pro quibusdam consuetudinibus et serviciis debitis praefato comiti de quodam tenemento in tali villa, trahitis eos in placitum in curia christianitatis, quia hujusmodi placita etc. Teste etc.' Very close to the same time (1275) is the first plea in the king's court based on this form of writ. It is the Dean of Arches at London who must answer 'de placito quare, cum placita de districtionibus factis in feodis laicalibus ad coronam et dignitatem regis pertineant, ac dictus Walterus, ballivus Eudonis la Zuche, . . . Robertum le Blund hominem

due is a common example of such distress<sup>109</sup> and a writ of prohibition based on this case is included in registers from the late thirteenth century on.<sup>110</sup>

With this last group we have exhausted the list of prohibitions to be found in thirteenth, and even early fourteenth, century registers. What may look at first sight like an unusual writ of prohibition in some registers turns out to be but a variation of the types already treated above.<sup>111</sup> The *de cursu* group is definitely closed at four: lay fee, advowson, lay debts and chattels, and trespass; no others are added to the group in the fourteenth century. Indeed even in the *de precepto* class, the number of distinctively new writs after the year 1300 is extremely small. Only one occurs with any regularity, namely, the prohibition against a plea of rape in court christian.<sup>112</sup>

To resume briefly, the first prohibitions had appeared before 1187; three became *de cursu* and remained the only writs of prohibition until almost the middle of the thirteenth century. *De precepto* writs, distinguished as such, first

abbatis de Bello . . . prout ad officium suum pertinet distringi fecisset, dictus magister . . . tenuit inde placitum in curia christianitatis contra prohibitionem etc.' (CP 40/9 m. 44d). If the distraint is alleged to be unjust, as the form of the writ usually foresees, then redress is to be sought in the king's court, not in court christian.

<sup>109</sup> In 1244, a certain Thomas Patrik has to answer in the king's court 'de placito quare contra prohibitionem etc. traxit eos in placitum in curia christianitatis ad loca diversa, eo quod inparcaverant equum suum . . . secundum consuetudinem regni' (KB 26/134B m. 2d). On the subject of this particular usage, see Pollock and Maitland, *Hist. of Eng. Law*, II, 575-576.

<sup>110</sup> Rex archidiacono Wyntoniensi vel ejus officiali salutem. Monstravit nobis J. de Camera quod, cum ipse averia prioris de N. pro quibusdam consuetudinibus et serviciis sibi debitis de quodam tenemento quod idem prior de eo tenet in N. cepisset et imparcasset secundum legem et consuetudinem regni nostri, ac praedictus prior parcum illud fregisset et dicta averia vi et armis abduxisset contra pacem nostram propter quod idem J. eundem priorem inde implacitavit in comitatu Wygorniensis, idem prior ipsum super hoc trahit in placitum in curia christianitatis pro eo quod placitum hujusmodi dicto modo in curia nostra prosequatur; vobis prohibemus ne placitum illud teneatis . . . (Brit. Mus., *Add. Ms.* 38821, fol. 9v). This writ is in an intermediary stage of evolution: as it is repeated from register to register, proper names give way to initials and usually these latter give way to a mere *N* or *talis*.

<sup>111</sup> The rubrics in the registers sometimes obscure this fact. What seems according to the title to be a new writ is found on closer examination to be but a particular application of an already well known prohibition. For example, in a collection of writs dating from about 1325, at the end of the usual list of *de cursu* and *de precepto* prohibitions are found two others designated as 'special prohibitions,' the one headed: 'ne quis trahatur in placitum in curia christianitatis pro contentis in scripto obligatorio quod non tangit testamentum neque matrimonium,' the other: 'Ne quis trahatur in placitum in curia christianitatis pro recognitione facta in

eadem curia non tangente testamentum vel matrimonium' (Brit. Mus., *Cotton Ms.* Titus D. XXIII, fol. 37v). These are after all but variations of the ordinary prohibition touching debts and chattels. The circumstances may have been exceptional enough to require *prohibitiones in suis casibus formatae*, but the real nature of the prohibitions is not new. The second of these 'special prohibitions' appears frequently in later registers: Bodleian Libr., *Western Ms.* 3712, fol. 28; *Rawlinson Ms.* C. 454, fol. 328; *Rawlinson Ms.* C. 897, fol. 40, etc.).

In the last of the manuscripts just mentioned (fol. 45) is a prohibition under the intriguing rubric: 'Prohibitio . . . quando quis trahitur etc. eo quod asseruit se contrefecisse (sic) sigillum etc.' The actual case as brought out in the writ is as follows: A certain abbot owes 100 pounds to a neighbouring parson; one of the former's monks forges the latter's seal in order to acquit the abbot of the debt. Whereupon the parson has the monk attached by the king's bailiffs, only to have the abbot and monastery sue a plea in court christian against the parson for laying violent hands upon the monk; hence the prohibition, but of a type which has been familiar for nearly a century before the time of this register.

<sup>112</sup> A writ of this kind in a register of about 1300 is the first example I have noted: Brit. Mus., *Harley Ms.* 853, fol. 131v; see among the later registers Bodl. Libr., *Rawlinson Ms.* C. 310, fol. 44v (1310 or 1329), *Rawlinson Ms.* C. 666, fol. 141v (ca. 1327) etc. It is not sure that this is an entirely novel writ, since in each case a plea *de raptu et pace fracta* has been begun in the king's court and thereafter a plea sued in court christian; perhaps it is in reality only another version of the writ touching defamation, or even that touching trespass. On the other hand, it is possible that the ecclesiastical judges were trying to take cognizance of the original crime; such a thing had happened in 1241, the crime being represented to them as adultery and not rape (*Placitorum Abbreviatio*, p. 107); the sin of adultery would of course come under their cognizance, whereas the felony of rape would be strictly of royal jurisdiction.

made their appearance at that time, more than half a century after the earlier ones. This fact causes a certain surprise, especially when it is realized that the situations which gave rise to the *de precepto* writs were not new in the years around 1240. I suggest the following explanation: that up until this time the first three writs were interpreted broadly enough to cover even rather exceptional cases that might arise.<sup>113</sup> Then with the growth of 'legal practice' and of finer distinctions, so characteristic of the development of English law in the thirteenth century, the old formulae were no longer sufficient, leaving too many loopholes; a more exact definition of particular cases became necessary, hence the development of *de precepto* writs (*in suis casibus formata*) during the second half of the thirteenth century. The tendency was for these to pass to the state of *de cursu* writs as happened with the prohibition touching trespass. Nevertheless, the growth of *de precepto* prohibitions soon met with obstacles. The Church was not slow to show her displeasure. She must have been in the vanguard of the opposition which led before the end of the thirteenth century to a decided limitation being placed on the king's right to create arbitrarily new writs of any sort whatsoever.<sup>114</sup> As early as 1257 her representatives at the Council of London were complaining of recent innovations in the matter of writs.<sup>115</sup> In 1280 the prelates gave voice to the suspicion aroused in them by the least modifications on this point.<sup>116</sup> In any case, whatever their role may have been, it is notably true that few really new writs of prohibition appeared after the last quarter of the thirteenth century. Indeed the 'ecclesiastical group' of writs in the definitive *Registrum Brevium* does not differ substantially from what it was at this date.<sup>117</sup>

One last question might perhaps best be put here in the section dealing with the definition and classification of prohibitions. Could prohibitions be issued in any other form than that of a writ? Yes, the king is known to have forbidden by word of mouth certain ecclesiastical actions, as has been seen already.<sup>118</sup> Moreover, it would appear that the sovereign could have his officers prohibit in the same manner.<sup>119</sup> While this would obviously not constitute

<sup>113</sup> See for example a case of the year 1225 (*Bracton's Note Book*, III, 98, no. 1073) having to do with impounding beasts which had strayed on to a man's property; later in the century this would certainly have required a *de precepto* writ of the kind seen in n. 110, but in 1225 a prohibition *de laico feodo* was sufficient to halt the ecclesiastical action. See also the first case cited in n. 104 (an. 1230) where a defamation plea in court christian was stopped by means of a prohibition *de cattallis*.

<sup>114</sup> See above p. 264.

<sup>115</sup> Wilkins, *Concilia*, I, 729, according to the account of Matthew Paris (cf. *Chronica Majora*, an. 1257; ed. Rolls Series, London, 1873, VI, 363).

<sup>116</sup> *Articuli Cleri*, no. I, II, IX; see Raine, *Historical Papers and Letters from Northern Registers* (Rolls Series, London, 1873), pp. 70-71, 73. In the same year, the archbishop of York, having received a prohibition under an unusual form is suspicious of some innovation. It requires a letter from the bishop of Bath and Wells, chancellor of the realm, to reassure him that 'hoc ad novam prohibitionis regiae invencionem imputare non debetis, set scriptoris culpam arguere in hac parte'; see *The Register of William Wickwane* (Publications of the Surtees Society, CXIV, Durham, 1907), p. 244.

<sup>117</sup> One noteworthy exception is the ad-

dition of writs of consultation as a remedy against unjust prohibitions. Curiously enough these writs do not appear in the register before the fourteenth century; the first one I have seen is in a register at the Bodleian Library, dating from the middle of Edward II's reign (*Rawlinson Ms. 292*, fol. 25v-26). Bracton had given some examples more than half a century before; cf. Norma Adams, 'The Writ of Prohibition,' *Minnesota Law Review*, XX (1936) 291-292, also Flahiff, art. cit. in *Mediaeval Studies*, III, (1941) 114, n. 68.

<sup>118</sup> Above n. 42. A further example may be added from the year 1250. The bishop of Worcester has, according to the king, sued a plea against the sheriff of Worcester 'contra prohibitionem nostram sibi factam expresse tam viva voce quam litteris' (*Close Rolls*, 1247-1251, p. 525).

<sup>119</sup> A case preserved by Prynné (*Records*, II, 479) relates the sending of royal agents on March 13, 1237 to prohibit certain ecclesiastical judges; on March 14, a writ of prohibition is issued for the same purpose. Moreover, when the clergy are found complaining in 1285 of the great number of prohibitions both oral and written (*prohibitiones literarum vel verborum*), it may well be concluded that the oral ones are not all delivered by the king in person, but rather by his officers (Wilkins, *Concilia*, II, 118).



a writ of prohibition, its judicial consequences could nevertheless be the same and result in a plea of prohibition if the order was disobeyed.

Finally, a prohibition might be given under form of a proclamation. The English clergy complain in 1237 that 'laici faciunt clamare Londoniae voce praeconia, ne quis tractet causam in foro ecclesiae . . . nisi tantum super testamento et matrimonio.'<sup>120</sup> Matthew Paris speaks of similar measures of the year 1247 as a statute or proclamation.<sup>121</sup> The case is probably clearest in 1285 when the bishops complain of just such an edict as an abusive departure from the ordinary system of writs of prohibition.<sup>122</sup> All this is interesting in so far as it leaves open the possibility that allusions in the plea rolls to ecclesiastical actions *contra prohibitionem* may sometimes refer not to a particular writ but to a more general measure like a proclamation. Such is not the normal case, as will be seen when the question of procedure is treated, but it may nevertheless arise occasionally.

## II.

The writ of prohibition has been defined and the various forms that it may take have been described. Already it will have been observed that the king and the Church look upon the writ from different points of view. The exact stand taken by each in regard to prohibition ought now therefore to be considered in detail and made quite clear. King and Church both have their opinions as to rights and limitations in the matter; it is the general theory or point of view of each that will be presented first. These theories, compatible for the most part as long as they remain theories, lead frequently to conflicts when they are translated into practice; hence, the second half of this part of our article will be devoted to a sketch of the historical struggle between secular and spiritual authorities over the question of prohibitions in the course of the thirteenth century. Attention has never been drawn to the prominence of the writ of prohibition among the issues that occupied the stage of national ecclesiastical politics in England at this time.

### A. General Attitude of King and Church to Prohibitions

#### 1. The King

The king's right to prohibit an action in a judicial court other than his own flows from the royal prerogative in matter of justice, or, in other words, from his *potestas jurisdictionis*.<sup>1</sup> We should be on our guard, however, against forming a false notion of the royal prerogative as it was understood at the end of the twelfth century. Needless to say, FitzNeal and Glanvill, servants of the king, attribute to him an almost unbounded power; even John of Salisbury, an ecclesiastic of independent mind, puts few limits upon the royal authority except where it touches the Church; Roman theories of sovereignty reaching England from Italy exalt yet further the notion of royal prerogative in the

<sup>120</sup> *Annales de Burton*, an. 1237 (*Annales Monastici*, Rolls Series, London, 1864, I, 256).

<sup>121</sup> *Chronica Majora*, IV, 614; cf. above n. 75.

<sup>122</sup> 'Inprimis, cum a tempore cujus memoria non existit fuerit ecclesia in possessione pacifica cognoscendi de omnibus causis spiritualibus et pluribus civilibus,

donec inhibito regia porrigeretur iudici vel praelato, his temporibus ministri regiae majestatis inhibent ordinariis generali edicto, ne cognoscant de aliquibus laicis nisi tantum de matrimonio vel testamento; et sic est ecclesia libertate pristina spoliata' (*Wilkins, Concilia*, II, 117).

<sup>1</sup> M. Hale, *The History of the Common Law* (5th ed., London, 1794), I, (17).



thirteenth century.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, Henry II, the reigning king around whom ideas of this sort were being expounded, exercised already a power that contemporary monarchs might envy him but which was in no way created by royal jurists. His power was derived, not from a sort of mysticism revering the king as the *fons et origo iustitiae*, but from the *fait accompli* of a victory over his adversaries. During the century which followed the Conquest a struggle was waged between several rival theories of justice: the royal theory, the popular theory, the seigneurial theory and the ecclesiastical theory.<sup>3</sup> If in the time of Henry II the royal theory was already in the ascendant, it is because of the energy of the first three Norman kings, especially of Henry I, and yet more because of the Plantagenet's own work whereby the royal authority weakened under Stephen was reestablished and materially strengthened. Indeed, it is this same work of his which continued to increase the king's power even in the thirteenth century, for his judicial administration went on expanding and in the hands of certain remarkable justices reached a fuller development in spite of the failure of Henry III himself to contribute to the effort.

However this may be, it is certainly in virtue of his prerogative as monarch that the king intervenes to forbid this or that plea in court christian. And yet, not exclusively by this title; he bases his right as well on the argument *par excellence* of the Middle Ages, namely, custom. Here is a formula taken from a letter of the year 1225 which expresses admirably the king's pretention:

Cum igitur tam regni nostri consuetudinis quam regiae sit potestatis eorum inhibere processum, quae in dignitatis nostrae praejudicium vertuntur, vobis inhibemus . . .<sup>4</sup>

A text of seventeen years later manifests yet more clearly this appeal to tradition; at the same time it is more explicit as to the exact aim of the writ of prohibition. The text is a passage from the record of a plea against the bishop of Lincoln who has refused, in spite of a royal prohibition, to abandon his action in court christian against certain members of his chapter:

Unde (Magister Odo qui sequitur pro rege) petit quod tam manifesta transgressio ad emendationem domini regis emendetur, maxime cum dominus rex toto tempore suo et Johannes rex pater suus et rex Ricardus avunculus suus et rex Henricus avus suus et omnes antecessores sui reges Angliae talem habuerunt seisinam et libertatem de omnibus placitis quae spectant ad coronam et dignitatem suam, quod quicumque sequeretur vel teneret hujusmodi placita semper ad prohibitionem regiam supersedisset et detulisset prohibitioni suae, quousque discuteretur coram domino rege vel coram iusticiariis suis utrum placitum hujusmodi spectaret ad curiam regiam vel ad forum ecclesiasticum.<sup>5</sup>

Clearer expression could hardly be given to the king's pretensions in the matter of prohibitions. He is seen here expressly to claim the right: 1) to prohibit any action in court christian which appears to be of royal jurisdiction or which may in some way prejudice his authority; 2) to decide for himself whether the action is really of royal cognizance or ecclesiastical; 3) to cause all activity

<sup>2</sup>For an interesting account of theories of the English monarchy, with references to the works of contemporary writers, see C. Petit-Dutaillis, *The Feudal Monarchy in France and England from the Tenth to the Thirteenth Century* (London, 1936), pp. 113-124.

<sup>3</sup>E. Jenks' review of the book of F. A. Inderwick, *The King's Peace in English Historical Review*, XII (1897) 146.

<sup>4</sup>*Rotuli Litterarum Clausarum* (London, 1835), II, 80.

<sup>5</sup>KB 26/123 m. 7.

on the part of the judges and the party in court christian to be suspended until this decision has been taken; 4) to sue a plea, as the very action itself here testifies, against anyone who does not defer to the royal prohibition. In practice the application of these claims varies slightly according as the king is involved as litigant in the matter or according as both parties are subjects. In the second of these cases, the king regularly does not act on his own initiative, but leaves this to the parties concerned. He places at their disposal, it is true, his writ of prohibition, but it is they who must seek the writ, deliver it and institute an action against him who does not obey the king's order.<sup>6</sup>

## 2. The Church

Such then is the royal theory as to the king's rights in the use of prohibitions. To what extent does the Church admit, to what extent does she contest these rights? The best answer to the question is provided by a document preserved in the archives of the Exchequer, but emanating originally from an ecclesiastical authority. It seems to have been written during the last quarter of the thirteenth century and may, with a considerable degree of probability, be attributed to John Pecham, archbishop of Canterbury (1279-1292). It amounts to a very precise statement of the Church's attitude towards the prohibitions issued by the king to courts christian and it sums up admirably what will be found to have been the position adopted in practice by the majority of the English hierarchy throughout the thirteenth century.<sup>7</sup>

Prohibitions of three kinds are there distinguished. (1) The first are those which are meant to impede actions which, because of the matter or persons involved, belong really to the king's court; such prohibitions are termed *prohibitiones mere licitae* and to them ecclesiastics owe respect and obedience. (2) The second class forms an intermediary group: in appearance these prohibitions are directed against pleas that are of royal cognizance, but in reality they touch pleas of a purely spiritual kind, the bad faith of an interested party having misrepresented their true nature in order to procure the prohibition; these writs, though licit as far as their formula and the king's intention go, are rendered illicit by the unjust use made of them by the party, and ecclesiastical judges, far from deferring to such prohibitions, are to proceed with the original business before them and at the same time impose upon the person who has sued the writ falsely the canonical penalties proper to his state of layman or cleric; the officers of the royal chancery are deemed to have acted in good faith, hence no penalties are to be pronounced against them. (3) Finally there are prohibitions notoriously abusive, seeking to impede purely spiritual actions or at least actions annexed to the spiritual; ecclesiastical judges are ordered to reject such prohibitions altogether; all persons having anything to do with the issue of the writ (*scriptores, dictatores, consiliatores, sigillatores*) come under the Church's censure, while yet more pains are meted out to the party who has sued the writ even though this has been done indirectly by the intervention of some third party.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>6</sup> This question will be treated more in detail in the following article on procedure and the working of the writ of prohibition.

<sup>7</sup> H. Cole, *Documents Illustrative of English History in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries* (London, 1844), pp. 367-368. Because of its importance to this article, I have included it in an appendix. While the document is not dated, it is found in the only known manuscript copy (Public Record Office, *Treasurer's Remembrancer, Diplomatic Documents*, E 30/1576) between

two other documents of Pecham of the year 1279; it follows, moreover, immediately upon the list of excommunications pronounced by Pecham at the council of Reading in 1279, the first of which was directed against the abuse of prohibitions, so that our document has the air of a commentary on this particular excommunication.

<sup>8</sup> On the use of this subterfuge, especially by clerics, see Flahiff, 'The Use of Prohibitions by Clerics . . .', *Mediaeval Studies*, III (1941) 109-115.

The document thus constitutes an ecclesiastical manifesto. It should be noted that the king is not refused the right to prohibit certain actions in court christian,<sup>9</sup> but a strong stand is taken against the abuse of this right whether on the part of the person seeking the writ or on the part of the king himself. The principles set forth here are identical with those expressed in the councils of the middle and second half of the thirteenth century, so that they may well be considered the official attitude of the English Church.<sup>10</sup>

One fundamental question of principle is left untouched in this document, namely: who is to decide in a given case whether the particular prohibition is fraudulent or not? The Church seems to assume that the judges who receive a writ of prohibition will decide for themselves and act accordingly; the king, on the other hand, claims this as his exclusive right and requires deference to the prohibition, at least until he or his justices, on being consulted, have given a decision as to the liceity of the writ. It is not difficult to see how, given this difference of opinion, conflicts could arise between royal and ecclesiastical authorities over writs of prohibition. Moreover, while apart from this one case questions of principle are perhaps seldom in dispute, questions of fact are constantly so. The canons of councils bear witness to the struggle that goes on: they protest against the abuses practised by means of prohibitions, hurl excommunications against the guilty ones, forbid ecclesiastical judges to pay heed to the unjust summonses issued in connection with prohibitions. There is evidently a campaign waged on both sides, a campaign in which the Church appears to be for the most part on the defensive. It is the various stages of this campaign that will be examined in the second part of this section.

Before proceeding, however, to this examination, there remains to call attention to an ecclesiastical opinion on prohibition which, though rather extremist, carries a certain weight since it is the opinion of Robert Grosseteste, outstanding churchman of the middle of the thirteenth century, mouthpiece in many things of the mind of the clergy.<sup>11</sup> Not only does Grosseteste condemn those prohibitions directed against truly ecclesiastical cases,<sup>12</sup> but he goes so far as to question the king's right to issue any prohibitions whatever to spiritual courts; for, says he, it is not to the king that complaint is to be made when one is drawn into a non-ecclesiastical action in court christian, but to a higher spiritual tribunal by way of appeal; the latter tribunal will then disseise the lower one and send the case into the royal court. Clerics, moreover, should not accede to citations to answer *quare tenuerunt* (or *secuti sunt*) *placitum contra prohibitionem*. Grosseteste foresees the objection that will be made to him, namely that the king has long enjoyed the right to cite people in this way and cannot be deprived thereof without a judgment; his reply is after the manner of the schools. Sin, says he, being in reality a privation of good, is purely negative; it is indeed 'nothing' (*peccatum nihil est*), as is also an act of sin; therefore, since it is 'nothing,' one cannot be truly possessed of what is a sin. Now, obliging clerics, contrary to the liberties and canons of the Church, to submit to a lay jurisdiction is a sinful act. Therefore, the king cannot truly possess the right to do this since it is a sin and so is 'nothing.'

<sup>9</sup> Cf. below n. 14.

<sup>10</sup> London, 1257 (Wilkins, *Concilia*, I, 728); Merton, 1258 (*ibid.*, I, 738); Lambeth, 1261 (*ibid.*, I, 747-751); Lambeth 1281 (*ibid.*, II, 56). The chief difference between earlier pronouncements and this one attributed to Pecham is that the latter makes clearer and finer distinctions, undoubtedly as a result of the controversy that had been going on.

<sup>11</sup> *Epistolae Roberti Grosseteste*, ed. H. Luard (Rolls Series, London, 1861), no. lxxii\*, pp. 223-224.

<sup>12</sup> He urges the ecclesiastical judge, nevertheless, to write to the king to acquaint him with the abuse. The reverence due to the sovereign demands such a gesture (*ibid.*, p. 224).

So, likewise, a cleric does not deprive the king of any right when he refuses to obey a royal citation before secular judges.<sup>13</sup>

The doctrine of Grosseteste on royal prohibitions to court christian is not shared by all, as is evident from the text already cited and attributed to Pecham. Moreover, even were this particular text not Pecham's, there are passages in his letters which show him to be clearly on the side of the principles laid down in the text. He expressly approves the king's right to issue certain prohibitions, contenting himself with a protest against abuses of the right.<sup>14</sup>

## B. *Conflicts of Opinion Over Prohibitions*

The statements just recorded as representing the opinion of the king on the one hand and of the Church on the other regarding the use of prohibitions are in part the cause and in part the result of the conflicts arising in practice over the use of such writs. They are the cause in so far as rival theories once fixed tend to produce rivalry in practice. They are the result in so far as conflicts of opinion had already taken place as a result of which the two authorities had been able to state with greater precision their respective claims on the subject. Hence the importance of tracing such conflicts and such rivalries, since bald theories may be easily misinterpreted unless compared with the practice which produces them or in which they are applied.

Although the writ of prohibition is certainly in use by the beginning of the last quarter of the twelfth century, and probably earlier, it is necessary to wait some fifty years before finding any clear statement expressing the king's claims for this writ or the Church's position against it. Nor is this surprising. Like so many other mediaeval institutions, the writ of prohibition was originally a practical expedient; it is not likely that the king or his advisers had any preconceived notion of just how or when or to what extent they would use it. These questions came to be answered only with the development of the institution. Similarly, the Church was not in the habit of formulating an expression of her attitude towards a newly begun practice. She might oppose what was done in a particular case as abusive, but only when the repetition of particular cases made manifest the development of a regular institution would she think of stating in some detail her position on the question.

It is significant that the date from which one can trace continuously the conflict between Church and king over the writ of prohibition coincides with the beginning of the episcopate of Robert Grosseteste. That there had been opposition on the part of the Church previous to this time is well nigh certain, despite the lack of documentary evidence;<sup>15</sup> but it is quite possible that the first concerted action by ecclesiastics to check what they deemed an abuse

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.* Grosseteste is not alone in his protest against the fact of such citations; they are a frequent subject of complaint voiced in Church councils or addressed to the king.

<sup>14</sup> *Registrum Epistolarum Fratris Johannis Peckham Archiepiscopi Cantuariensis*, ed. C. T. Martin, vol. II (Rolls Series, London, 1884), p. 687: '... quamquam dicta domini regis cancellaria juste concedat literas quae petuntur, impetrantes tamen justa regalis curiae liberalitate injustissime et nequiter in nostra curia abutuntur'; cf. *ibid.*, II, 418-419.

<sup>15</sup> The sources for ecclesiastical history during the period 1170-1235 are indeed meagre; it is perhaps for this reason that

evidence of earlier protestations on the part of Church authorities against writs of prohibition has not come to light. The chronicles of the period, though valuable for other questions relating to ecclesiastical affairs, provide nothing on the subject of prohibitions. Wilkins has found very few documents for these years in his collection for the history of English councils. The series of episcopal registers, so important for the later history of the Church in England, has scarcely begun; the two which do exist for this period, those of Hugh of Wells, bishop of Lincoln (1209-1235), and Walter Gray, archbishop of York (1225-1255), contribute nothing to our problem.

of the royal power dates from the early years of Grosseteste's career as a bishop.<sup>16</sup> His figure dominates the middle of the thirteenth century; he is the virtual leader of the English Church. Moreover, he is concerned in ecclesiastical affairs with questions that are more local and more peculiarly English than was his great predecessor Stephen Langton. Many a time during his tenure of office he attacks abuses of all sorts, and more than once he finds himself in disagreement with the royal authority. His opinion on the encroachments of the secular power in spiritual matters has already been cited.<sup>17</sup>

Grosseteste does not content himself with merely enunciating principles; he takes action. As early as the year 1236, the king is obliged to rebuke the bishop for preventing clerics of the diocese of Lincoln from appearing before the king's court to answer for having pleaded in court christian in spite of a royal prohibition.<sup>18</sup> This very point of clerics appearing in a secular court to answer to such a charge is one that Grosseteste emphasizes as an abuse in the letter just referred to. In the following year, 1237, a list of grievances addressed to the king by the English clergy deals again with the complaints which Grosseteste had voiced in this same letter. The grievances seem to have been drawn up as a sequel to the council of London (1237), at which the bishop of Lincoln had figured prominently, and were very probably inspired by him.<sup>19</sup> They merit consideration.

Having protested against the failure of the king's officers to respect the *privilegium fori* of clerics, the grievances treat of the question of prohibition. The writs of prohibition concerning advowson are the chief cause of complaint, especially those aimed against cases relating to the tithes or the dependent chapels of a church, cases which, as has been seen, are assimilated to advowson. Protest is made likewise against the practice of forcing clerics who have sued, or judges who have held, pleas contrary to the injunctions of a prohibition to answer before secular courts and even to take an oath there. Finally, the clergy urge ecclesiastical authorities to take sanctions against clerics who make use of royal prohibitions.

These complaints bear witness to an active effort on the part of the secular power to limit the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts. Indeed one of the grievances of the clergy is precisely that secular judges take it upon themselves alone to determine whether a given case comes under their authority or belongs to the cognizance of the Church.<sup>20</sup> Lay persons, the clergy allege in another place, have had it proclaimed in London that perjury, breach of faith, usury, simony and defamation are insufficient grounds for bringing a case before ecclesiastical judges; plaintiffs who attempt this in future are to be imprisoned; cases relating to marriage and to last wills alone may be brought into court christian.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Just possibly, too, there had been activity on the other side which stirred the vigilance of churchmen just at this time. It is at least a striking coincidence that the preceding ten or fifteen years had seen two important writs of prohibition become *de cursu*, namely, the writ for lay chattels and that form of the *Indicavit* writ covering a dispute over tithes (see above pp. 277, 275), and that the same period saw much of the activity of what Dr. Hermann Kantorowicz picturesquely termed 'the Simon-Martin-William-Henry dynasty.' Simon and Martin Patishall, William Raleigh and Henry Bracton are largely responsible for the shaping of English law at this time; the first three had already been busily at work and it would not be at all surprising if their zealous use and develop-

ment of the writ of prohibition made it the very practical instrument it turned out to be and at the same time aroused in just these years the serious and organized opposition of the clergy.

<sup>17</sup> *Epistolae Roberti Grosseteste*, no. lxxii\*, pp. 205-234. The editor gives 1236 as the probable date of this letter.

<sup>18</sup> *Close Rolls (1234-1237)*, p. 360.

<sup>19</sup> *Annales de Burton*, an. 1237 (*Annales Monastici*, ed. Luard, Rolls Series, London, 1864, I, 254-257).

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 254: 'Item (petunt archiepiscopi, episcopi et clerici) quod per solos iudices saeculares non determinetur de aliqua causa, utrum debeat dici ecclesiastica vel saecularis.'

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 256.

So sweeping a limitation of spiritual jurisdiction at this early date is at first sight surprising. Did the secular power actually pretend that the Church had no authority over the various offences listed above, all of which have a spiritual character in so far as they are sins? Probably not. The king's officers were likely trying to prevent certain abuses in connection with the Church's right to try such cases. That there were abuses is clear from the writings of an important canonist who at this very time was teaching at Oxford.

William of Drogheda was the foremost canon lawyer of his day in England.<sup>22</sup> He taught at Oxford in the thirties of the century and continued until his death in 1245. His unfinished treatise on the procedure of the ecclesiastical courts may have been in circulation as early as 1239;<sup>23</sup> there was a second issue of it before 1245, but of the six books of the work planned by the author even the first one was not completed.

From our point of view, it is regrettable that Drogheda does not treat professedly the question of royal prohibitions. But his work is on ecclesiastical procedure and it is, moreover, eminently a practitioner's book; when he has occasion to mention the writ of prohibition it is not by way of offering any general theory about its use but to deal with its impact on a particular action in court christian. In doing so, however, he throws valuable light on certain practices of the Church courts which may account for the strong stand taken by the royal authorities. Brief though the pertinent passage is, it permits us to catch a fleeting glimpse of the other half of the picture of prohibitions as a practical issue. On both sides, lawyers and practitioners are less concerned with questions of principle than with removing the obstacles with which their rivals threaten to hem in their activity. But let us see what Drogheda has to tell us.

In that part of his work where he is treating of the preparation of the *libellus* by the plaintiff (*actor*), Drogheda, who has already mentioned in his preface that he is dealing primarily with practice in England,<sup>24</sup> is sharp enough to foresee the possibility of the case in court christian meeting with a royal writ of prohibition. Against this eventuality he advises the plaintiff to use extreme care in setting down the nature of the case. For instance, if it be a plea resulting from injuries received, whereas normally a money estimate of the amount of the damages should be made, it will be found preferable in England to omit such an estimate for fear of the king's writ of prohibition.<sup>25</sup> Shortly after, the author develops this point to cover other cases as well. Whenever, he goes on, the action in court christian is against a layman, unless it be one of matrimony or last will and testament, great caution should be taken in wording the *libellus*, lest it leave room for a royal prohibition; the words should be well weighed and the case stated with all possible shrewdness. Above all, no mention should be made of suing for money by way of damages; rather it should be represented that the offender is by his act in the state of sin and his repentance is being sought. The astute lawyer then observes that one will not lose thereby; indirectly at least damages will be recovered, since the sin cannot be forgiven without the offender's making reparation for the wrong he has done.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Our best account of him is in the article of F. de Zulueta, 'William of Drogheda,' *Mélanges de droit romain offerts à Georges Cornil* (Ghent, Paris, 1926), pp. 641-657 (also published apart); see likewise F. W. Maitland, 'William of Drogheda and the Universal Ordinary,' *Engl. Hist. Rev.*, XII (1897) 625 ff. and H. G. Richardson, 'Azo, Drogheda and Bracton,' *Engl. Hist. Rev.*, LIX (1944) 22-47, esp. 22-23, 38-40. This last article shows Drogheda in a much more favorable light again after the belittling remarks of Kantorowicz (p. 28).

<sup>23</sup> H. G. Richardson, *art. cit.*, pp. 38-39, 43.

<sup>24</sup> *Summa Aurea*, ed. L. Wahrmund (Quellen zur Geschichte des Römisch-Kanonischen Processes im Mittelalter, Band 2, Heft 2, Innsbruck, 1914), p. 2.

<sup>25</sup> 'Et melius fecerit, si non aestimet in Anglia propter litteras regias (var. propter regias prohibitiones) ut infra dicam, cum maliciis hominum non sit indulgendum' (*ibid.*, p. 65).

<sup>26</sup> 'Si actio fuerit intenta contra laicum, exceptis causis matrimonialibus et testamentariis, caute componat libellum ne

It is quite possible that many cases were thus drawn into court christian under the pretext of leading a sinner to repentance. On the other hand, ecclesiastical authorities may have found themselves obliged to stress this aspect of a case in order to escape an unjust prohibition against a plea which they claimed to be of their cognizance anyway. However this may be, the fact that ecclesiastics did use this particular device would certainly tend to arouse the suspicions of the secular courts in regard to all cases labelled as perjury, simony, breach of faith and the like, and would account for the issue of prohibitions even against these cases, the very thing about which the clergy and Grosseteste were complaining in the year 1237.

The bishop of Lincoln again manifests his opposition to the use of unjust royal prohibitions on the occasion of his long drawn out quarrel with his chapter over the question of the bishop's right to visit and reform the chapter. Arbitration having failed in the early stages of the dispute, recourse is had to Rome by way of appeal. Delegate judges are appointed in the year 1239, but the action drags on over a period of two years. Finally, the canons procure a writ of prohibition in virtue, says Matthew Paris, of a forged document which appears to justify them as against their bishop.<sup>27</sup> Grosseteste is not slow to condemn their use of a royal prohibition;<sup>28</sup> shortly after, he goes so far as to excommunicate the chapter's proctor for contumacy. The latter has recourse once more to the expedient of prohibition to prevent this new action of the bishop.<sup>29</sup> Cited before the king's court, Grosseteste fails to appear: a new writ of summons is issued.<sup>30</sup> Meanwhile, he is not idle. In a letter to Walter of Cantilupe, bishop of Worcester, one of the delegate judges, he urges this latter to continue to ignore the prohibition which has been sent to the judges as well as to Grosseteste himself.<sup>31</sup> The two bishops stand fast. At Martinmas, 1243, their attorneys come into the king's court, but refuse to reply to the self-styled proctor of the king.<sup>32</sup> On May 12 of the following year, the case is postponed once more.<sup>33</sup> Thereafter, there is no further mention available of the action in connection with the failure to obey the royal prohibition. The dispute between Grosseteste and his chapter is finally terminated in favour of the bishop, on the occasion of the latter's visit to Lyons to take part in the oecumenical council of the year 1245.<sup>34</sup> As far as the case can be followed, Grosseteste remained true to his principles in the matter of prohibition.

The years 1246-1247 constitute a critical period for the Church in certain parts of Europe. The emperor, Frederick II, angered by his renewed excommunication and deposition pronounced by the Council of Lyons (July 17, 1245),

habeat locum prohibitio regia in Anglia, utendo verbis temperatis, proponens factum subtiliter, non faciens mentionem de aliqua pecunia, . . . sic dicendo: quia ex dicto facto est in mortali peccato, nec quod petit aliquam pecuniam, sed quod reducat ad poenitentiam. Et sic indirecte potest consequi, quod non directe, eo quod non dimittitur peccatum, nisi restituatur ablatum' (*ibid.*, pp. 66-67).

There is other evidence to show that the Church courts did use certain tricks to circumvent royal interference. In the year 1219, for instance, a prohibition is issued against a testamentary action in court christian, because it is question of land bequeathed and not merely of chattels. The ecclesiastical judges proceed thereupon to estimate in money the value of the land, and the plaintiff continues her action before them to recover the money that the land would bring (*de illa aestimatione illius terrae*),

as though it were in reality a matter of testamentary chattels (*Bracton's Note Book*, ed. Maitland, London, 1887, II, 65, no. 73 and note 2).

<sup>27</sup> *Chronica Majora*, ed. Luard (Rolls Series, London, 1873), VI, 154-156. See also F. Stevenson, *Robert Grosseteste* (London, 1899), 196-200, on these same happenings. The forgery is mentioned on p. 200.

<sup>28</sup> *Epistolae*, no. xci, pp. 285-287; no. xcii, p. 288.

<sup>29</sup> *Epistolae*, no. xciv, pp. 291-295.

<sup>30</sup> KB 26/123 m. 7 (Easter 1242).

<sup>31</sup> *Epistolae*, no. xcvi, pp. 300-302. After a first prohibition (*Close Rolls, 1237-1242*, pp. 435-436), the bishop of Worcester is cited to appear in the king's court (*ibid.*, p. 521: 16 October 1242).

<sup>32</sup> KB 26/131 m. 6.

<sup>33</sup> *Close Rolls (1242-1247)*, p. 245.

<sup>34</sup> M. Paris, *Chron. Maj.*, IV, 497-501; cf. *Epistolae R. Grosseteste*, p. 334.



no longer contented himself with carrying on his own strife with the Pope. He now sought to enlist the sympathy of the French king and to stir up the anticlerical feelings of the French barons. The former effort seems to have availed him little, but in the latter he met with a considerable degree of success: a league was formed under the leadership of Pierre Mauclerc, 'count' of Brittany, to oppose alleged ecclesiastical encroachments, particularly in regard to the jurisdiction of Church courts.<sup>35</sup>

These events had their repercussion in England. According to the testimony of Matthew Paris, the example of the emperor, and more especially of the French barons, incited Henry III to take measures hostile to the Church for the purpose, as the St. Albans chronicler puts it, 'of restraining the insatiable cupidity of the Roman Curia'.<sup>36</sup> The king is said to have decreed inviolably that ecclesiastical judges must dare try no cases against laymen except those relating to last will or matrimony. Breach of faith and perjury may not be invoked as grounds for bringing laymen into court christian. Nor may clerics institute action in the same court in connection with tithes; there is, in fact, a royal writ specifically prohibiting an action of this sort, the writ *Indicavit*.<sup>37</sup> This account of Matthew Paris is the only mention we have of a renewal in 1247 of the effort to limit the jurisdiction of Church courts. His is, indeed, little more than a mention; he makes no reference to the impression produced or to the results achieved. There seems no reason to believe that England experienced at this time anything like the sharp tension between lay and ecclesiastical authorities which existed in France and in the Empire, during the years after 1245. What happened in England was apparently no more than a reiteration of what the royal officers had insisted upon some ten years earlier, when a similar act of theirs called forth the clerical complaints of the year 1237.<sup>38</sup>

Need of financial aid has frequently been the occasion of obtaining from the king concessions of liberty or renunciation of abuses. The fact is well known in the political and constitutional history of England. It applies likewise to ecclesiastical history. The extravagance of Henry III and his foreign favourites left the king constantly in straits for money. In 1248 and the following years his needs were particularly acute. Many were the expedients resorted to in order to recoup his finances.<sup>39</sup> Henry's decision to take the cross provided a new pretext for obtaining funds from the clergy, when the Pope, overjoyed at the king's resolve, granted him a tenth of ecclesiastical rents and movables for a period of three years. This Henry was unable to collect. In 1252, he pressed his claim only to meet once more with opposition on the part of the clergy headed by Grosseteste, who demanded as an indispensable condition to their granting the king's request that he confirm their rights and liberties and that he use the money for no other purpose than the crusade for which it was accorded.<sup>40</sup> Henry's needs outlasted his royal fury at the idea of thus 'submitting like a slave.' In January 1253, finding the clergy still adamant, he invited them to draw up a list of their grievances and promised to correct whatever needed correcting.<sup>41</sup> A flare-up at the Easter parliament resulted in

<sup>35</sup> On Pierre Mauclerc, see the excellent biography of Jacques Levron, *Pierre Mauclerc, duc de Bretagne* (Paris, 1935).

<sup>36</sup> *Chron. Maj.*, IV, 614. Paul Fournier has given an account of the various happenings of this time and has cited the important texts in his *Les Officialités au moyen-âge* (Paris, 1880), pp. 101-104.

<sup>37</sup> See above p. 275.

<sup>38</sup> See above p. 290.

<sup>39</sup> H. W. C. Davis, *England under the Normans and Angevins* (9th ed., London, 1928), p. 437; F. A. Gasquet, *Henry the Third and the Church* (London, 1910), pp. 279-280.

<sup>40</sup> Gasquet, *op. cit.*, pp. 308-310.

<sup>41</sup> M. Paris, *Chron. Maj.*, V, 359-360; cf. *Annales Monastici* (Burton), I, 305.



another delay, but two weeks later the tenth was finally granted and on May 13, amid great solemnity, the king confirmed the liberties of the Church.<sup>42</sup>

It might well have been surmised, in view of the clerical complaints shortly before this time, that the question of prohibitions would be among those at issue when the liberties of the Church were discussed in 1253. The Annals of Burton Abbey strengthen this opinion, for, when referring to the refusal of the clergy in January 1253 to grant the king's demand for the tenth, the annalist records that a series of *gravamina* was submitted concerning current abuses, some of which, he adds, have been already noted above for the year 1237.<sup>43</sup> The grievances voiced by the clergy in that year did contain, as has been seen, several protests against the invasion of ecclesiastical liberties practised by means of the writ of prohibition.<sup>44</sup>

It is, however, no longer necessary to surmise only about this question, provided we can trust the date assigned in a Durham register to an interesting document copied there. The document, which seems hitherto to have escaped notice, provides in some detail an account of what was discussed at a meeting of the bishops and archbishops held in 1253 in the presence of the king himself for the purpose of settling certain points of controversy between the king and the clergy.<sup>45</sup> Several of the disputed questions have to do with prohibitions. This meeting is in all probability the one referred to by the Burton annalist,<sup>46</sup> the same undoubtedly as that described at greater length by Matthew Paris, as taking place before the Easter parliament when the tenth was finally granted to King Henry.<sup>47</sup> At the meeting, according to the chronicler, the bishops begged the king to desist from the many injuries he was inflicting on the Church. The reply to their request was favorable indeed: they were to take counsel and draw up in writing after careful deliberation a list of the reforms deemed necessary; the king went so far as to appoint a day for the reading of the articles to be drawn up in order that he might proceed to correct the abuses. No further mention is made in Matthew Paris of these particular articles; they are not alluded to in the account of the Easter parliament; there the ecclesiastical liberty considered as most important and spoken of as such is freedom of elections.<sup>48</sup> It does not seem too bold, nevertheless, to suppose that the articles which the king instructed the clergy to set down in writing are the ones, or some of them, preserved in the manuscript already referred to.<sup>49</sup>

<sup>42</sup> M. Paris, *Chron. Maj.*, V, 373-378; Gasquet's account of this final ceremony is very complete, *op. cit.*, pp. 313-316.

<sup>43</sup> . . . sed eisdem (archiepiscopis, episcopis, abbatibus, comitibus et baronibus) viriliter resistentibus et contradicentibus, petebant pleraque gravamina quae fiebant in regno contra libertates ecclesiae et regni in chartis ejusdem regis contentas prius emendari. Quorum quaedam notantur superius anno Domini MCCXXXVII' (*Annales Monastici*, I, 305).

<sup>44</sup> The text of these grievances is found likewise in the Burton Annals; cf. above, p. 290.

<sup>45</sup> British Museum, *Stowe Ms.* 930, fol. 54-54v; the piece is entitled: 'Concilium archiepiscoporum et episcoporum Angliae. Anno Domini M CC quinquagesimo tertio, presente rege Henrico,' and in a later hand above: 'Concordantia controversiarum inter regem et clerum.'

<sup>46</sup> Above n. 43.

<sup>47</sup> *Chron. Maj.* V, 359-360.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 373.

<sup>49</sup> The one thing which arouses suspicion concerning the date of the articles in the *Stowe* manuscript is that identically the

same articles, with the addition of one or two others, appear in the Burton Annals as put forward at the council of London in 1257 (*Ann. Mon.*, I, 406-407). This, however, by no means disproves the date given in the *Stowe* manuscript, since it was common enough to present the same complaints at a later council especially if no satisfaction had been obtained the first time. Besides there are reasons for putting faith in the date given: the manuscript is a register of the Cathedral Priory at Durham which is in general reliable, and not only is the exact year written out fully (. . . quinquagesimo tertio) thus lessening the possibility of scribal error, but the document occurs in the proper order before others for the year 1254. Moreover, that there was actually question of a list of grievances in 1253 is certain from the narrative sources cited in the preceding notes. In any case, for the purposes of this article, it matters little; whether these particular complaints belong to the council of 1253 or to that of 1257 or to both, they witness to the preoccupation about the abuse of prohibitions during these years.

Obviously the abuse of royal prohibitions and in general the question of ecclesiastical jurisdiction was prominent in the minds of those present at the council of 1253 when they talked of the Church's liberties. All but one of the seven articles preserved treat of courts christian; three of them relate specifically to prohibitions. The complaints in these latter cases differ but little from those met with at an earlier date, as the Burton Annals remind us: lay judges are drawing actions of tithes into the lay court under colour of pleas of adowson;<sup>50</sup> the Church must be permitted to punish the sin involved in breach of faith or of oath, even when the matter of the contract in question is lay fee or chattels;<sup>51</sup> it is unbecoming the lofty dignity of a prelate to oblige him to clear himself by oath before secular judges of the charge of holding a plea in spite of a prohibition, especially when the evidence against him is merely the testimony of a pair of vagabonds (*ad testimonium duorum ribaldorum*).<sup>52</sup> The other articles have to do with benefit of clergy, the obligation of the faithful to answer enquiries of their prelates about the evils current in a locality, and the encroachment of lay lords upon the spiritual domain whenever ecclesiastical baronies fall into their hands during a vacancy.<sup>53</sup>

As to the attitude of the king, who was present at the council, to all these questions not a word is said in the document. It may be concluded that some sort of promise of reform was given, since the clergy were persuaded to grant the much desired tenth at the Easter parliament. There is no means of knowing, however, whether anything more specific was given in regard to prohibitions than the king's very general undertaking to guarantee anew the liberties of the Church as well as those of the whole nation as contained in the charters.<sup>54</sup> Whatever may have been the promises made, they could have had but little effect in eliminating the abuses inveighed against by the clergy, since the latter were complaining again four years later of the same and many other things. The very grievances listed in our document are repeated word for word with some few additions at the council of London in 1257.<sup>55</sup>

<sup>50</sup> Art. I: 'Petit persona ecclesiastica decimas coram ecclesiastico iudice; judicanti et petenti porrigitur regia prohibicio ratione patroni ecclesie cujus rector convenitur ne super advocacione seu patronatu ecclesie iudex ille cognoscat; si actor prosequatur et iudex judicantis sumat officium, uterque attachiatur. Attachiat veniunt. Consilium tale est quod si iusticiarii causam decimarum sub colore advocacionis ecclesiarum ad se trahere velint et [de] non prosequendo ulterius causam decimarum in foro ecclesiastico a iudice seu a parte securitatem exigant, in nullo eis caveatur. Et si propter hoc arestentur, per loci diocesanum requirantur seu per proprium episcopum; et, si libere non tradantur ecclesie, competenti monicione praemissa, excommunicentur iudicantes et detentores' (Stowe Ms. 930, fol. 54; cf. *Ann. Mon.*, I, 406).

<sup>51</sup> Art. III: 'Ordinarii iudices ad querelam layci de layco feodo vel catalis non cognoscant. Si tamen, super huiusmodi fide data vel sacramento adhibito, de fidei transgressionem seu sacramenti violacione per inquisitionem (sic) seu per facti evidenciam seu alio modo legitime constiterit, mortaliter sic peccans legitime communis ad condignam penitenciam habendam (*corr. agendam*) compellatur' (*ibid.*). Note that ecclesiastical judges are warned by their own superiors not to meddle with such

secular cases; only the sin involved is of their jurisdiction.

<sup>52</sup> Art. VI: 'Attachiatur praelatus ut compareat in foro ostensurus quare tenet placitum contra prohibitionem regiam; comparet et negat; ad testimonium duorum ribaldorum indicitur ei purgacio. Consilium Dei est et omnium praelatorum ut nullo modo juret coram iudice saeculari, cum ratione dignitatis et officii major sit eo. Quid ergo? Arestabitur. Quod pacienter sustineat; quod si princeps vel iudex ille aliquam terram habeat in sua diocesi, illam interdicat; quod si non fuerit liberatus, archiepiscopi et omnes episcopi celeriter et fortiter assurgentes et gladium spiritualem assumentes huiusmodi defensores feriant unanimiter et per interdicti et excommunicationis sententias tam in terris quam in personis coerceant' (*ibid.*).

<sup>53</sup> These will be found in *Ann. Mon.*, I, 406-407 and are reproduced in Wilkins, *Concilia*, I, 725-726. In passing, attention might be drawn to the form of all these articles: a concrete case is first stated giving the circumstances connected therewith, then the opinion of the assembled clergy is given (sometimes introduced by the phrase: *Consilium tale est . . .*), as though a discussion had first taken place.

<sup>54</sup> M. Paris, *Chron. Maj.*, V, 375 ff.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. n. 49, 53 for references.

In the meantime, royal justices were certainly not relaxing their vigilance in preventing courts christian from holding pleas which should go to the king's court. Thus, when itinerant justices were sent in 1255 throughout the whole kingdom, most of whom conducted themselves courteously (*bono modo et curialiter*), Philip Lovel and his companions at Stafford were excessively severe in their enquiries about some twenty or more points, among which was one: 'de viris religiosis et aliis qui compellunt laicos placitare coram iudicibus delegatis, vel ordinariis, de placitis quae pertinent ad coronam domini regis'.<sup>56</sup>

A period of first-rate importance, not only for the political and constitutional history, but also for the ecclesiastical history of England begins about the year 1257. It comprises what is termed the 'period of baronial reform'. Exasperated by the losses sustained, and still more by the money squandered, in the wars against France and Wales and in the Sicilian policy of Henry III which would have placed the king's second son on the throne of Sicily, the barons felt it necessary at last to intervene in order to check the disastrous results of the king's incompetence. What they achieved need not be treated here; suffice it to recall the 'Provisions of Oxford' (1258), a document equally as feudal in character as the Great Charter, being, like the latter, a concession to the demands of the barons, and the 'Provisions of Westminster' (1259), whereby the people who had likewise manifested their discontent were given a measure of satisfaction by the provisional government of the barons. What must be noted, however, is that during this period of complaints and grievances the Church showed herself at one with the nation.<sup>57</sup> Between the years 1257 and 1261 the ecclesiastical province of Canterbury held no less than three provincial synods. Their work consisted almost exclusively in drawing up a long list of *gravamina*. Nevertheless, whereas the barons and 'commons' received some satisfaction, the Church's complaints seem to have gone unheeded.<sup>58</sup> Thus it is that the council of Lambeth of 1261 did nought but reproduce well nigh word for word the grievances of the council of Merton in 1258,<sup>59</sup> which council in its turn had already reiterated a good number of the articles of the London council of the previous year. The barons' government ignored the clerical demands of these years. The demands are, nevertheless, not without interest,

<sup>56</sup> *Annales de Burton*, an. 1255 (*Ann. Mon.*, I, 337).

<sup>57</sup> The important study of Charles Bémont, *Simon de Montfort* (Paris, 1884) and the second edition of the same work, translated into English by E. F. Jacobs (Oxford, 1930), are valuable for the history of this period. More recently R. F. Treharne has undertaken a detailed study of these crowded years; see 'The Personal Rule of Henry III and the Aims of the Baronial Reform of 1258,' *History*, XVI (1931-1932) 336-340, and *The Baronial Plan of Reform, 1258-1263* (Manchester, 1932). On pp. 56-62 of the latter work, the author has summarized those events more strictly concerning the Church which led up to this critical period.

Treharne makes the interesting observation that the grievances of this period give no indication at all of a weak and faltering political system; on the contrary, the various administrations are strong and robust, to such a degree in fact, that, in spite of the king's personal weakness, they go on developing. But they are characterized by a bureaucratic spirit and lend themselves readily to ends opposed to the general interests of the country. (*Baronial Plan* . . .

pp. 40-47). This suggests a remark concerning the writs of prohibition. If these writs continue in the middle of the thirteenth century to hold in check ecclesiastical pretensions to jurisdiction in what appear to be civil and lay matters, it is not the result of the king's efforts, but of those of his justices. To the Patishalls and Raleigh had succeeded Bracton and his contemporaries. The credit for organizing and giving concrete working form to the Common Law system during the most critical period of its formation goes chiefly to practitioners like them.

<sup>58</sup> A prohibition issued in 1259 by certain barons against an advowson plea is couched in terms much more severe than the usual ones (*Close Rolls*, 1256-1259, pp. 488-489).

<sup>59</sup> See the article of C. R. Cheney, 'Legislation of the Medieval English Church,' *Engl. Hist. Rev.*, L (1935) 402-406 on the relation of these two councils; at Merton a draft of certain articles was drawn up and presented for consideration but the business was left unfinished; only at Lambeth in 1261 were they transformed into formal legislation, with some revision and development.

especially since they have to do largely with the question of ecclesiastical jurisdiction and touch frequently upon royal prohibitions. They provide therefore an important source for this study.

In their complaints the clergy take repeated exception to a practice which might be regarded as the veritable counterpart of that illustrated by William of Drogheda. If, in pursuance of the eminent canonist's advice, the plaintiff in court christian is able to avoid a prohibition by dissimulating the true nature of the action, it would appear that the defendant on his side has little trouble in procuring a writ of prohibition by a misrepresentation in the opposite direction. An action for tithes, the clergy complain, can be prohibited by pretending that the advowson of the church is in question.<sup>60</sup> Cases for the punishment of perjury or breach of faith are represented as pleas for chattels and forbidden as such, just as soon as a fine is to be imposed.<sup>61</sup> Suits against parishioners who fail to contribute to the support of their church and its cemetery, suits against adulterers and other sinners meet with similar prohibitions for similar reasons.<sup>62</sup> Or again, if the Church wishes to punish those who have violated the right of sanctuary and ecclesiastical immunity or who are guilty of other sacrileges, a writ of prohibition to stop such an action is easily obtained by characterizing the action in court christian as *de transgressione subditorum* or *de pace regis infracta*, thereby representing it as of royal jurisdiction.<sup>63</sup> The various subjects of complaint here mentioned are worth noting in so far as many of them are the very ones which Edward I will remedy to some extent by the writ or statute *Circumspecte Agatis* of 1286.<sup>64</sup>

Another very significant aspect of the work of these councils is the attitude they order ecclesiastics to take in regard to abuses of writs of prohibition. Excommunication is to be pronounced publicly against anyone seeking a writ of prohibition under false pretences. Interdict is to be used against such as own land. And these penalties are to be maintained until the offender consents to indemnify his adversary and the ecclesiastical judges for the expenses, inconvenience and so forth they may have incurred.<sup>65</sup> Judges cited before the king's court must refuse to produce the *acta*, or minutes, of the ecclesiastical process; the parties have their copy of the same and, if need be, they may show theirs. Ecclesiastical judges must never take an oath before secular justices to exonerate themselves from the charge of proceeding contrary to a prohibition.<sup>66</sup> Such acts as these are repugnant to the clergy as seeming to imply an inferiority of the Church's jurisdiction.

The reprisals provided for by the councils of Merton and Lambeth are sweeping and reach even the person of the king himself. A long list is drawn up of successive steps to be taken, becoming more severe with each failure of the secular power to heed the Church's warning. First of all, when a bishop or other ecclesiastical dignitary is summoned to answer for what is really of spiritual jurisdiction, he should write to the 'lord king' explaining that he

<sup>60</sup> Wilkins, *Concilia*, I, 725; *Annales de Burton*, an. 1257 (*Ann. Mon.*, I, 406).

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.* Cf. Wilkins, *Concilia*, I, 738 (Merton, 1258) and p. 747 (Lambeth, 1261).

<sup>62</sup> Wilkins, *Concilia*, I, 728 (London, 1257).

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.* Cf. I, 748 (Lambeth, 1261).

<sup>64</sup> See below pp. 307-308.

<sup>65</sup> Wilkins, *Concilia*, I, 738 (Merton, 1258) and p. 751 (Lambeth, 1261). At the earlier council of London (1257), the clergy had complained that even when the judge and the plaintiff in the ecclesiastical court proved their innocence, they received no damages; hence it often happened that judge and parties deferred to a prohibition

in order simply to escape the expense connected with explaining their reasons in the king's court; as a result, justice could not be rendered in these cases, since, being spiritual, they could not be tried in a secular court and yet, because of the troublesome prohibition, they had been abandoned in the spiritual court (*ibid.*, p. 728). Grosseteste had noted this same danger years before (*Epistolae*, no. lxxii,\* p. 227).

<sup>66</sup> Wilkins, *Concilia*, I, 748 (Lambeth, 1261): see likewise the complaint of the council of London, 1257 (*ibid.*, p. 728).

cannot nor should he obey a citation derogatory to the liberties of the Church, and begging the king to withdraw the prohibition and the summons. Should the sovereign be unwilling to accede to this request, the metropolitan, along with two or three other bishops, will go and remonstrate with him. If he still persists, and proceeds to distrain the ecclesiastical judge to appear in his court, then excommunication is to be pronounced against the sheriffs or bailiffs who try to execute the royal order. These officers, should they chance to be at the same time clerics, will be deprived of their benefices if they already have any or, if not, they will be declared ineligible for benefices during a period of five years. All who have dictated, written or signed the writ of prohibition, or taken any part whatsoever in its preparation are to be excommunicated and denounced as such. If, in the face of all these warnings, the king still fails to revoke his order, the bishop who was first cited will place under an interdict all the lands, domains and castles of the king lying within the limits of his diocese. Other bishops will do the same if this measure on the part of the first bishop proves unavailing. Finally, as a last resort, the whole kingdom will fall under the interdict.<sup>67</sup>

The work of these three councils is definitely in the spirit of Bishop Grosseteste. He himself had died, it is true, in 1253, but there must have been present on these occasions associates of his who were really giving voice again to his views. Many of the articles dealing with prohibitions and with the remonstrances to be made to the king recall vividly passages from his letters. Besides, the scribe of the Burton Annals adds to his account of the council of Merton two other documents which he states to be a series of grievances formerly expressed by Grosseteste; like those of the council itself which they resemble, the grievances are chiefly concerned with ecclesiastical jurisdiction and clerical privilege.<sup>68</sup> Several of the decisions of the councils bespeak a vigour and a courage worthy of the great bishop of Lincoln and surpassing the courage and vigour of the English episcopate of the third quarter of the thirteenth century. One is tempted to see in the articles of the councils a continuation of the spirit and influence of Grosseteste rather than a representative expression of the character of the bishops of the years after Grosseteste's death. However this may be, it is a fact that the decisions of the councils had few repercussions and seem to have gained little for the Church. The texts revealing the practice of the secular courts give no evidence of increased concessions or lessened vigilance on the part of the lay authority, although it should perhaps be noted that the minutes of the *curia regis* for the last few years of Henry III's reign can hardly be considered as normal ones. In the first place, the rolls of the *placita coram rege* are more numerous and the majority of prohibition pleas are heard before the bench at Westminster; secondly, the majority of the cases have to do with the troubled conditions of the time. Nevertheless, if it be imprudent to base a judgment on the evidence left for these years, one may certainly say that whatever were the fruits of these councils they could not have been lasting, since from the very beginning of Edward I's reign (1272-1307) the writs of prohibition are as abundant as ever.

The lack of practical results from the work of the councils is an historical fact; but can it be accounted for? Yes, to some extent, at least. As has already been observed, the English bishops of the period were not the equals of Langton or Grosseteste, nor of Pecham who was to come a few years later. On the other hand, the secular authority, whether represented by the baronial government or

<sup>67</sup> Wilkins, *Concilia*, I, 736-737; *Ann. Mon.* (Burton), I, 413-414 (Merton, 1258); Wilkins, *Concilia*, I, 747-748 (Lambeth, 1261). The details of procedure outlined at Lambeth

are the fullest. The sanctions provided for by these councils will be recalled in later ecclesiastical pronouncements (cf. p. 311).

<sup>68</sup> *Ann. Mon.*, I, 422-429.

by the king's justices, proved ever resolute in resisting the least intrusion of spiritual jurisdiction into the temporal realm and in reclaiming what they considered had been usurped by the courts christian. But there is still a further reason. The pope did not give to the English clergy the support that their stand seemed to merit. Urban IV, who succeeded Alexander IV in 1261, assumed an attitude similar to that of his predecessor in supporting the king's authority in England as far as was possible under the circumstances, not only against the barons, but even against the clergy when the latter showed want of deference towards their sovereign. On January 30, 1263, Urban wrote to Henry III in answer to the king's protest that the bishops had failed to obtain the royal licence to publish statutes passed in a provincial synod. The synod referred to is evidently that of the province of Canterbury, held at Lambeth in 1261.<sup>69</sup> Although he recognized the need for these *statuta salubria et honesta* in view of the 'miserable servitude' to which the Church had been reduced by abuse of the lay power, and although he had examined them on the king's complaint that they were prejudicial to his royal dignity only to find nothing unjust or dishonorable in their content, the pope refused, nevertheless, to ratify the synodal statutes purely out of deference to the king who had not been consulted about their promulgation. Urban contented himself with begging Henry to abstain from any violation of ecclesiastical privileges, especially in the matter of jurisdiction.<sup>70</sup> This was to rob the action of the English clergy of most of its power; they had taken, in theory at least, a vigorous stand only to have the head of the Church decline to confirm them in it. Little wonder then that the work of the councils of this period produced so few, if any, results.

The Conciliar texts which have just been considered give a rather complete account of the ecclesiastical attitude towards the writ of prohibition. They provide at the same time a glimpse of the king's pretensions, in so far as the clerical complaints in outlining the abuses against which they protest describe the position of the secular power. This is, however, to see it through the eyes of the opposition. A better index of the royal attitude is to be found in the number of pleas in the king's court against persons failing to obey a writ of prohibition; it is the most practical proof of the king's insistence upon his right to issue prohibitions and to proceed against those who refuse to heed his injunction. If a more complete table of the theory behind this practice be desired it may be found in the treatise of Bracton, written about the year 1256, which though a private work reflects accurately the views of the king's justices.<sup>71</sup> Its value as a source for the history of the writ of prohibition will be evident from the use made of it later in this study when the actual working of the writ will be considered.

It is possible, moreover, that there has been preserved a series of direct answers from the king to many of the claims stated by the clergy in the councils. Henry Cole published, among other documents for English history in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, a series of eighteen articles of the clergy and prelates with the answers of the king to each.<sup>72</sup> They were not dated, but, because of their inclusion in a roll which contained documents relating to the oecumenical council of Lyons in 1245, they have been assigned doubtfully to that year.<sup>73</sup> There is, however, no solid reason whatsoever for maintaining

<sup>69</sup> The king had already formally appealed against the decisions of this synod at the time it was held; see *Gesta Regum Continuata in Historical Works of Gervase of Canterbury*, ed. Stubbs, vol. II (Rolls Series, London, 1880), pp. 212-213.

<sup>70</sup> Wilkins, *Concilia*, I, 759; also in Rymer, *Foedera* (Record ed., London, 1816), I, 424.

<sup>71</sup> *De Legibus* . . . , ed. G. E. Woodbine,

vol. IV (New Haven, 1942), pp. 251 ff., especially 251-252, 264-269 on when prohibitions are, and when they are not, justifiable.

<sup>72</sup> H. Cole, *Documents Illustrative of English History in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries* (London, 1844), pp. 354-357.

<sup>73</sup> Makower, *Constitutional History . . . of the Church of England* (London, 1895), sec. 60, n. 6, p. 394. Norma Adams assigns them

the date of 1245; on the contrary, the very obvious connection between their content and that of the councils of Merton (1258) and Lambeth (1261) makes it extremely probable that they belong to this period. They seem to be the king's answers to the grievances expressed at these two councils, the words of which are reproduced textually in the articles published by Cole.<sup>74</sup>

This constitutes the earliest example extant of a type of document very important for the relations of State and Church in England, and becoming more common during the last quarter of the thirteenth and in the early fourteenth century.<sup>75</sup> The grievances of the clergy are stated point by point, and quite faithfully, reproducing frequently enough the very words of a council; to each of these *articuli cleri* is given a precise answer by the king.

In the present instance, only three or four of the articles touch directly the matter of prohibitions. Two of the others (art. IX-X) relate to the aid to be given by the secular arm against obdurate excommunicates. Six concern the important question of benefit of clergy (art. V, VI, VII, XI, XII, XVI), and a seventh the disputed duty of the ordinary to oblige his clerics to pay fines imposed in the secular courts (art. VIII). Two more have to do with the limit of the king's right to interfere in the collation of benefices (art. I) or in excommunications, suspensions and interdicts pronounced by ecclesiastical authorities (art. II), while yet another deals with the extent to which ordinaries may summon the faithful of their respective dioceses to give evidence at enquiries into the sins and excesses prevalent in certain districts (art. XIII). Among the articles relating more directly to writs of prohibition, two complain that the king's court prevents ecclesiastical judges from holding pleas about spiritual matters (art. III, IV). To which the king replies that he has no desire to interfere in questions which are purely spiritual (*de causis mere spiritualibus*); hence actions for tithes only, and not involving exempt royal chapels or the advowson of a church, are certainly to go to the courts christian, as are likewise actions about the limits of parishes, perjury, breach of faith, and other sins. To such the king will place no obstacle. But he warns the clergy that these matters must not be made the occasion of drawing indirectly cases of royal jurisdiction into the ecclesiastical forum. As to questions of lay fee, there are no exceptions: all such cases are of royal cognizance no matter who the litigants may be, cleric and layman or even two clerics (art. XVII). Similarly, all transgressions against the peace, violence and other enormities are breaches of the king's peace and as such have always pertained to and will pertain to the crown (art. XVIII). The clergy had complained that they were prevented by secular authority from inflicting the proper canonical punishment on offenders; the king's answer to this is simply that, if the punishments remain purely spiritual (fasting, almsgiving, whipping and the like), no interference need be feared, but that pecuniary pains may not be

to the year 1247, linking them with Matthew Paris' account of royal efforts in that year to check ecclesiastical jurisdiction ('The Writ of Prohibition . . .', *Minnesota Law Review*, XX (1936) 291, n. 84).

<sup>74</sup> The manuscript roll from which Cole published these articles contains documents from various parts of the thirteenth century. The two membranes which contain the articles are separate from the two other membranes which contain most of the documents relating to the council at Lyons in 1245. Two letters of Innocent IV dated 1245, which are crowded into the space left at the bottom of the second membrane containing the articles, prove nothing, since they are

so obviously later additions put in where space could be found. On the other hand, we have only to place the articles published by Cole alongside the account of either council, Merton or Lambeth (Wilkins, *Concilia*, I, 736-737, 747-748), to see at a glance that the articles reproduce the very matters considered in these councils, and often in *exactly the same words*. The resemblance is altogether too striking to permit of any other conclusion than that we have here the chief items of the councils, to which the king at some time or other made replies.

<sup>75</sup> Makower lists a number of these, *loc. cit.*; cf. sec. 55, n. 23, p. 375 and sec. 4, n. 104, pp. 39-40.

imposed upon serfs (*per penas pecuniarias servos punire*), since they belong person and goods to their lord (art. XIII).

Of another series of *articuli cleri* dating from the year 1267, there remains but a mere fragment which yields no information on the subject of prohibitions.<sup>76</sup> However, the foregoing ones are evidence of the king's views on the subject. He maintains and justifies his use of prohibitions; but he has come to make an important distinction between the sin and the secular matter involved in one and the same case. While he does claim cognizance of the latter, he makes no claim to jurisdiction over the former and leaves it to spiritual authorities, who may exercise it without fear of prohibition and may impose penalties, which however must be spiritual ones, not pecuniary, for this latter circumstance would immediately make it a question of chattels. Thus, at the close of Henry III's reign, while the use and abuse of writs of prohibition are still a subject of contention between secular and religious authorities in England, both sides are arriving at a clearer definition of their claims. Differences of opinion have to do, not with fundamental principles, but rather with interpretation and with questions of fact. Each side admits the existence of a domain belonging properly to the other. Disputes arise only over cases which, viewed by one side, are open to a certain interpretation and, viewed by the other, are open to a different interpretation, without there being question, however, of the secular deliberately invading the spiritual sphere or vice versa. The decision as to who shall handle such disputed cases seems to lie in practice with the royal power, as might be surmised, since it is able to exert a more direct pressure; although the right of the king to decide such cases is never admitted by the Church, on the contrary.

The question is still a live one at the beginning of Edward I's reign. Coke has published a statement of the king's pretensions in matter of jurisdiction which he attributes to the early years of the new reign.<sup>77</sup> He even supposes that this document represents the royal reply to the *articuli cleri* of 1267 already mentioned above, of which a mere fragment remains. The statement is general in tone, claiming for the king cognizance of all secular cases, a long list of which are specified. Among these appear cases of advowson, all cases involving money or other debts and chattels except those relating to marriage or last wills. Ecclesiastical judges must refrain from citing laymen in court christian in purely secular matters. There is no positive evidence for placing this particular document in the early years of Edward I's reign; it could as well belong to his father's time as to his. Very soon, however, he did give evidence of his concern over the question of jurisdiction. The special royal commission ordered in October 1274 to inquire into the abuses and usurpations, which had crept in and which needed reform, and whose findings are preserved in the Hundred Rolls, reported among other things that in certain cases ecclesiastical judges were diverting cases from the king's court<sup>78</sup> or hearing pleas which did not come within their authority;<sup>79</sup> in the county of Norfolk, they said, deans and officials collected more in money fines from lay persons than did the county officers.<sup>80</sup> This fact, coming as it does from Norfolk, is of particular interest. The famous writ *Circumspecte Agatis* of 1286 was issued in connection with affairs in Norfolk to check the over-zealous efforts of royal officers of justice to fulfil their duties. It would look indeed as though, between the investigations reported in the Hundred Rolls and the issue of *Circumspecte Agatis*, considerable

<sup>76</sup> Coke, *Institutes of the Laws of England* (London, 1797), II, 599.

<sup>77</sup> *Institutes* . . . , II, 600; cf. Makower, *Const. Hist. . . of the Church of England*, sec. 60, n. 79, p. 418.

<sup>78</sup> *Rotuli Hundredorum* (Record ed., Lon-

don, 1812-1818), I, 31. For information about the Hundred Rolls, consult the work of Helen M. Cam, *The Hundred and the Hundred Rolls* (London, 1930).

<sup>79</sup> *Rot. Hund.*, p. 452.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*



pressure had been brought to bear to limit the activities of the courts christian. In any case, the chief interest of the early years of Edward I's reign, from the point of view of the present study, lies in what led to the writ *Circumspecte Agatis* in 1286.

This writ or statute<sup>81</sup> provides us with the clearest and most detailed official pronouncement on the limits of temporal and spiritual jurisdiction since the Constitutions of Clarendon. Ostensibly it is directed to the county of Norfolk only, but at a very early date it came to be accepted as the official doctrine for the whole country on this question. It is sufficient to consult the long list of copies of the writ as studied by Graves to realize the importance attached to this document in all parts of England.<sup>82</sup> And since the writ treats the question of jurisdiction from the viewpoint of writs of prohibition it is obviously of capital interest here.

Graves has given an excellent account of the events in Norfolk leading up to the issue of the writ *Circumspecte Agatis*, without, nevertheless, neglecting the broader aspect of the question. It will be necessary to repeat certain details already treated by him, but an effort will be made to consider more particularly the ecclesiastical side of the events, a side very lightly touched upon by Graves. The new archbishop of Canterbury, John Pecham (1279-1292) must certainly have played a considerable role in the 'crisis' which led to the writ of 1286. Miss H. Johnstone has shown this in an interesting article relating especially to the council of Lambeth of 1281.<sup>83</sup> Our investigation must of course go beyond this date and enter in greater detail into the particular question of royal prohibitions.

Scarcely had Pecham set foot in England (June 4, 1279) when he began preparations for a council of his province of Canterbury. It is not certain whether the reforming zeal manifested from the very beginning was properly that of Pecham himself, faithful son of St. Francis, or whether the pope Nicholas III, to whose provision he owed his new appointment, had enjoined the carrying out of certain measures. The fact remains in either case that the earliest days of his episcopate are marked by an intense energy expended in the interests of the Church. It is likewise noticeable that the English prelates in general adopt a bolder attitude, as in the days of Grosseteste, and give voice to their protests and claims several times during the following years. Pecham is in great part responsible for this; he is clearly the leader of the ecclesiastical party in England.

At the council of Reading (July 29, 1279) the questions treated were almost exclusively spiritual. Nevertheless, the first canons of this council relative to

<sup>81</sup> The document, as it is preserved in most of the copies and printed in the *Statutes of the Realm*, I, 101-102, is composed of two quite distinct parts. The first of these is the writ sent by Edward I from Paris in June or July 1286, cautioning certain itinerant justices in the county of Norfolk to act circumspectly in the matters they are proceeding to judge. The second part (called 'the addition') appears to be nothing more than the revision of a petition already addressed by the clergy to the king in 1280. The date of the revision is set likewise at 1286, and it too seems to have been written in Paris. Such, at least, are the conclusions of E. B. Graves in his article, 'Circumspecte Agatis,' *Engl. Hist. Rev.*, XLIII (1928) 1-20 (especially p. 15). The writer resumes the various opinions held as to the date and official value of the writ; for it has been looked upon at different times as a writ, a statute, and an act of

parliament. The term writ is here kept as more usual. Some of Graves's conclusions on the official origin of the writ in its present form are questioned by Richardson and Sayles, 'The Early Statutes,' *Law Quarterly Review*, L (1934) 563.

<sup>82</sup> He lists (pp. 18-20) no less than one hundred distinct manuscript copies of it, none of which is later in date than the end of Edward III's reign (1377).

<sup>83</sup> 'Pecham and the Council of Lambeth,' *Essays in Mediaeval History Presented to Thomas Frederick Tout* (London, 1925), pp. 174-187. D. R. Knowles is of the same opinion when he says: 'The writ *Circumspecte Agatis* of 1286 represented a real, if only partial, recognition of his (Pecham's) claims' ('Some Aspects of the Career of Archbishop Pecham,' *Engl. Hist. Rev.*, LVII, 1942, p. 181; this article gives but little space to Pecham's part in opposing secular encroachments).

excommunications to be pronounced do refer to that much disputed borderland which lies between ecclesiastical and secular jurisdiction. The council of Oxford held under Stephen Langton in 1222 had long since fulminated against those infringing the rights or disturbing the liberties of the Church. The council of Reading proceeded to apply this sentence specifically to all who should dare seek out letters from any secular court whatsoever to prevent courts christian from hearing pleas which properly belonged to them.<sup>84</sup> Edward I was not slow to manifest his anger at this particular canon among others of the same council which were not to his taste; and to such good effect that at the Michaelmas parliament of the same year the archbishop was obliged to retract and hold for not pronounced certain decisions of the council of Reading, notably the one concerning persons who sued for letters of prohibition.<sup>85</sup>

The advantage seemed to lie with the king in this his first encounter with the new head of the Church in England. It did not prevent Pecham, however, from inserting prominently among the canons of the council of Lambeth, held two years later in October 1281, an even sharper condemnation of those making an unjust use of prohibitions.<sup>86</sup> The council's action appears all the bolder when it is recalled that immediately before the meeting the king had addressed to all bishops of the realm two letters warning them against taking any decisions at their forthcoming assembly which might prove prejudicial to the sovereign.<sup>87</sup> Far from allowing himself to be intimidated, as appears to have been the case two years before, Pecham had no sooner left the council of Lambeth than he sent off to the king a long letter wherein he defended the liberties of the Church by eloquent arguments drawn alike from the sacred scriptures and the past history of England.<sup>88</sup> There was no reply from Edward. He accepted, as Miss Johnstone puts it, the *fait accompli* of Lambeth.<sup>89</sup>

The vigilance of the archbishop did not relent. His correspondence of the following years shows him protecting jealously the rights of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Clerics who had recourse to the secular forum found themselves sharply reprovèd.<sup>90</sup> A rector who dared seek a writ of prohibition against ecclesiastical judges was cited at once before his superior.<sup>91</sup> The practice of certain parties who, having submitted willingly to a plea in court christian but being on the point of losing the plea, sought to avoid an unfavourable decision by procuring a writ of prohibition, going so far as to misrepresent

<sup>84</sup> Wilkins, *Concilia*, II, 35: 'Ex quo intelligimus vinculo excommunicationis subiacere omnes illos qui literas impetrant, a quacumque curia laicali, ad impediendum processum ecclesiasticorum iudicum in causis quae per sacros canones ad forum ecclesiasticum pertinere noscuntur.'

<sup>85</sup> *Calendar of Close Rolls (1272-1279)*, p. 582; cf. Wilkins, *Concilia*, II, 40: 'Primo deleatur et pro non pronunciata habeatur illa clausula in prima sententia excommunicationis quae facit mentionem de impetrantibus literas regias ad impediendum processum in causis quae per sacros canones etc.'

<sup>86</sup> Wilkins, *Concilia*, II, 56: '... in quo excommunicari intelligimus [praecipue] qui literis aut iuribus curiae laicalis ecclesiasticarum causarum processum impediunt, quae ita ad ecclesiam pertinere noscuntur, quod nullatenus possunt nec consueverunt per seculare iudicium terminari.' On the insertion of this important *praecipue*, see Miss Johnstone's article, *loc. cit.*

<sup>87</sup> *Calendar of Patent Rolls (1272-1281)*, p. 457; Wilkins gives the text of these two

letters, *Concilia*, II, 50-51.

<sup>88</sup> *Registrum . . . Peckham*, ed. C. T. Martin, vol. I (Rolls Series, London, 1882), pp. 239-244.

<sup>89</sup> *Art. cit.*, p. 182. Some chroniclers recount that royal agents present at the council were successful in opposing the adoption of measures to annul the king's competence in cases of adowson and his right to prohibit certain pleas. Their language sounds somewhat exaggerated, however, when they describe the effect these agents are said to have produced on the archbishop: 'Unde factum est ut territus archiepiscopus a sua praesumptione penitus resiliret.' See Osney Annals in *Annales Monastici*, IV, 285-286 and the chronicle of Thomas Wykes, *ibid.* One of the objects of Miss Johnstone's article is to prove that the opinion of Pecham that one might form from this text, an opinion altogether too often repeated, fits in badly with the true facts.

<sup>90</sup> *Registrum . . . Peckham*, I, 15-16, 209-210.

<sup>91</sup> *Registrum*, III, App. II, p. 1064.

the case in order to have it, aroused Pecham's wrath in a special way.<sup>92</sup> This particular expedient, it seems, was a popular one with *advocati* and proctors when they wished to escape a loss of the suit in court christian.<sup>93</sup> Such an attain to the Church's liberty and jurisdiction was to be visited *ipso facto* with a sentence of excommunication; the guilty ones, moreover, were to be suspended from their functions for the space of a month, and for longer if they refused to be reconciled.

It is necessary to go back for a moment. In the year 1280 the English clergy had presented to the king 'in parliament' a series of some twenty petitions seeking the reform of certain abusive practices.<sup>94</sup> The answers given to the complaints have likewise been preserved, and an examination of the whole text will be useful in determining the attitude of the two authorities at this date as well as in observing what new developments are taking place in the use of writs of prohibition.

The very first of the articles objects to a recent innovation whereby a prohibition may now be had without the name of the person seeking it appearing in the formula. Instead of the traditional words, *unde N. queritur*, is to be found the vague formula: *ex relatu plurium intelleximus*.<sup>95</sup> Not only does a writ issued under this form shield from the wrath of the Church the person who is responsible for suing it, but it also makes the case equivalent to one where the king has acted purely on his own initiative in prohibiting a plea in court christian. This is very inconvenient, since the king, whose name is the only one to appear on the writ, will by that fact be the plaintiff in the subsequent action in the *curia regis*, if the prohibition is not obeyed. In his reply to this article the king does not commit himself clearly: '... deinceps inpetrantes talia breviam sine justa ratione puniantur.' Certainly he implies that such writs are not in themselves unjust, and he has no intention of suppressing them, as the ecclesiastics would have desired. The minutes of the king's court bear witness to the habitual use of this writ,<sup>96</sup> and its inclusion in all formula-books of writs from this time forward is abundant proof of its popularity and frequent employ.<sup>97</sup>

The royal answer to the second article must have given more satisfaction to the Church authorities than did that to the first. This time it is stated that, should any person seek by means of a writ of prohibition to impede a truly spiritual plea in court christian (*super decimis, obventionibus, oblationibus, mortuariis, . . . violenta manuum injectione in clericum*), the chancellor will not accede to the request for a writ in this case. If, moreover, anyone obtains a writ under these circumstances by misrepresenting the true state of affairs, he is to be punished.<sup>98</sup>

The complaint of the clergy against writs which prohibit a plea to obtain the tithes of a new mill meets likewise with a clear and favorable reply from the king: writs of this kind, he declares, should certainly not be issued.<sup>99</sup>

<sup>92</sup> *Registrum*, II, 418-419.

<sup>93</sup> *Registrum*, II, 686-688.

<sup>94</sup> *Historical Papers and Letters from the Northern Registers*, ed. J. Raine (Rolls Series, London, 1873), pp. 70-78. The editor gives 1279 and 1284 as the extreme dates possible for the articles; there seems good reason for fixing their date at 1280. The text itself tells us that the articles were presented to the king 'in parliament'; now, in the year 1309, along with certain new articles, the clergy bring once more to the king's attention other articles stated specifically to have been presented to him before in the parliaments of 1280 and 1300 (Wilkins, *Concilia*, II, 315), and among

these are to be found several identical with the articles published by Raine. Hence we conclude that the parliament in which these latter articles were originally presented must have been that of London in 1280.

<sup>95</sup> See Flahiff, 'The Use of Prohibitions by Clerics . . .', *Mediaeval Studies*, III (1941) 112.

<sup>96</sup> CP 40/58 m. 53; 40/59 m. 24; CP 40/59 m. 36, etc. (1285).

<sup>97</sup> Flahiff, *art. cit.*, pp. 113-114.

<sup>98</sup> *Historical Papers* . . . , p. 71. It is the revision of this second reply which constitutes the second part of the writ *Circumspecte Agatis*.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 72: 'Ad quintum respondetur

The sovereign had made fine promises. Their realization seems to have left much to be desired. Thus, in the year 1283, when Edward asked of the clergy the grant of a tenth to help defray the expenses of his campaign against the Welsh, the assembled prelates and clerical representatives opposed any such grant. Nor did they give as their reason merely the reduced state of their revenues or their horror at thus participating in the shedding of Christian blood. They added the further excuse that the king had taken no steps to effect the promised reform of certain abuses; and chief among the abuses was that concerning royal prohibitions, whereby the Church had under the present ruler, been reduced for the first time to a state of thralldom.<sup>100</sup> Two things are here worthy of note: the importance attached once more by the representatives of the Church to the question of prohibitions and the allusion made to the particularly abusive employ of prohibitions in the reign of Edward I. This latter fact would appear to indicate that Edward had launched an unusually strong offensive against the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts, which, in turn, helps to explain why the clergy were so insistent, just at this time and during the few years following, upon checking any abuse of writs of prohibition: the authority of the courts christian, or a part of it at least, was at stake.

During the next two years, however, the national interest in Welsh affairs pushed the whole question into the background. First, it was the war in Wales that occupied the attention of all; then, the ecclesiastical leaders, especially Pecham, were busily engaged with the reform and reorganization of the Welsh Church. Not until 1285 did the tension over relations between the king and the Church make itself felt anew; but when it did the issue was more critical than ever. This time the king made no attempt to avoid it; on the contrary, it was apparently his purpose to put all in order before setting out for France.<sup>101</sup>

Parliament met at Westminster shortly after Easter, 1285. The Second Statute of Westminster which resulted from the assembly deals principally with juridical questions, but the Parliament had likewise to consider the relations between royal and ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The custom of presenting to parliament a series of petitions drawn up by the clergy (*articuli cleri*) was now becoming established; that of 1285 included seventeen articles. Not only have the articles themselves and the king's answer to each been preserved, but also the comment of the clergy upon the king's replies,<sup>102</sup> and then further rejoinders on the part of the sovereign.<sup>103</sup>

The first petition bears upon the working of the writ of prohibition. The king is asked to appoint one or two justices or a baron of the Exchequer who, always present at London, should have power to decide immediately whether writs issued in illegal or doubtful cases are to be obeyed or not, and give the necessary permission to proceed in court christian notwithstanding the prohibition. It might be noted here, in passing, that a writ issued, because of a misrepresentation of the case, against a truly spiritual action is deemed 'not

sic, quod talia brevia non fiunt nec fieri debent. Et si tale aliquod breve impetratum fuerit, ostendatur.' On tithes of new mills, see N. Adams, 'The Judicial Conflict over Tithes,' *Engl. Hist. Rev.*, LII (1937) 19.

<sup>100</sup> . . . quia remedium et levamen, quod dominus rex clero promiserat super quibusdam suis gravaminibus, nondum venerat ad effectum, praecipue super regis prohibitionibus, per quas libertas ecclesiastica sub ipso rege primo coeperat ancillari; praetextu earundem sic humiliatur mater ecclesia, quod in filiis suis vix sit aliquis qui istis temporibus timeat claves ejus' (Dunstable Annals in *Annales Monastici*, III, 295).

<sup>101</sup> H. Johnstone, 'Pecham and the Council of Lambeth,' *Essays . . . Presented to T. F. Tout* (London, 1925), p. 182.

<sup>102</sup> Wilkins, *Concilia*, II, 115-117.

<sup>103</sup> These further rejoinders were not known as a part of this series until H. G. Richardson and G. Sayles published them recently in their article 'The Clergy in the Easter Parliament, 1285,' *Engl. Hist. Rev.*, LII (1937) 232-233; they have also given in the same article (p. 220) an interesting table of three sets of grievances in all, presented by the clergy in the course of this Easter Parliament, with the king's reply in each case.

to have a place;' nevertheless, it is for the king's justices only to determine officially whether the writ has a place or not. Recourse to the royal officers for a decision in such a case is called 'consultation.'<sup>104</sup> Now the *curia regis* met at Westminster but four times a year. The itinerant justices passed through each county only at intervals of several years. Hence the great inconvenience of the system of 'consultation', and the advantage to be derived from the proposed measure of having a permanent 'consultor' at London. To the request, however, the king gives only partial satisfaction: he names four of his justices to whom recourse may be had, but does not leave them permanently at London; anyone having doubts as to the validity of a prohibition will seek out the justice who happens to be then nearest at hand. Besides, the reply adds, one may proceed safely in a case which is purely spiritual. The clerical 'replication' observes bitterly that this disposition will profit little when at the same time a public proclamation limits ecclesiastical jurisdiction barely to testamentary and matrimonial matters.<sup>105</sup> The king's final answer gives no more satisfaction, since it merely repeats that recourse may be had to royal justices.<sup>106</sup>

In his reply to the tenth petition the sovereign states the principle which had been said by the clergy to be the object of a public proclamation: '*Curia intendit quod praelati bene sciant cognoscere quae placita sint de testamento et quae de matrimonio, et súper aliis non cognoscant.*'<sup>107</sup> It is well understood, of course, that the narrow limit put on ecclesiastical jurisdiction regards cases where laymen are pleading; the petition of the clergy makes this clear, referring to *laici litigantes*.

The rest of the articles presented in the Westminster Parliament are concerned with questions of excommunication, benefit of clergy, etc. They are therefore left aside here as not bearing directly on the subject of prohibitions.<sup>108</sup>

The Dunstable chronicler shows once more in his entry for the year 1285 the emphasis placed upon the writ of prohibition. In the rivalry between the secular and Church courts the issue centres largely around it. The frontier between the two jurisdictions is coming to be viewed and defined according to the cases where a writ of prohibition is or is not admittedly valid. When the chronicler refers to the parliament of 1285, and to the efforts thereof of Pecham and other prelates to safeguard the liberties of the Church, he gives first place to their appeal against the abuse of writs of prohibition. At least on this point, they are reported to have petitioned, let some remedy be provided.<sup>109</sup>

<sup>104</sup> Consultation will be dealt with in the article on procedure; meanwhile see Bracton, *De Legibus*, ed. Woodbine, pp. 262-264; I. J. Churchill, *Canterbury Administration* (London, 1933), I, 531-534; Norma Adams, *art. cit.*, pp. 291-292.

<sup>105</sup> Wilkins, *Concilia*, II, 115-116; Richardson and Sayles suppose that the clergy had received some sort of notification of this 'proclamation,' even before it was given out generally (*art. cit.*, p. 222).

<sup>106</sup> Richardson and Sayles, *art. cit.*, p. 232, *Ad primum articulum*. It might be noted that five years later it is permitted to have recourse to the chancellor or to the chief-justice for 'consultation' (*Rotuli Parliamentorum*, I, 47, col. 2).

<sup>107</sup> Wilkins, *Concilia*, II, 116. The Dunstable Annals note the king's insistence upon this point: 'Rex vero quasdam mitigationes fecit clero; attamen non concessit quod in curia christianitatis placitarentur nisi causae matrimonii et testamenti' (*Ann. Monastici*, III, 318). Indeed, in the third set of articles presented before the close of the parliament (cf. below n. 113), the

clergy are found complaining of the unheard-of abuse whereby inquests are held to discover and punish all ecclesiastics who, since the beginning of the reign, have tried cases other than testamentary or matrimonial (Wilkins, *Concilia*, II, 118).

<sup>108</sup> This applies likewise to the second series of articles drawn up by the clergy at this time, which were directed against the Statute of Westminster II (read publicly, it would seem, on June 28). The articles themselves are missing; we know them only through the king's replies as published by Richardson and Sayles (*art. cit.*, pp. 233-234). They contain nothing more than an indirect allusion or two to prohibitions (cf. articles numbered 8, 9 on p. 234).

<sup>109</sup> Frater Johannes Cantuariensis archiepiscopus et totus clerus, plurima ex ipsis statutis ecclesiasticæ libertati attententes derogari, a domino rege super his remedium postulabant; saltem ut literam prohibitionis regiae, quae solito largius a sua curia emanaverat, revocaret' (*Ann. Mon.*, III, 317-318).

There was apparently little intention of this on the part of the king; on the contrary. About the first of July of this same year, according to the chronology established by Graves, with parliament still in session, two royal justices, Richard de Boyland and William de Rothing, were sent into the counties of Norfolk and Suffolk to conduct an inquiry on the subject of ecclesiastical jurisdiction.<sup>110</sup> The writ announcing their coming was addressed to the prelates, archdeacons, officials and other ecclesiastics of the diocese of Norwich. It was more than an announcement: it laid claim for the royal courts to a long list of pleas and prohibited their cognizance by the clergy.<sup>111</sup> In all probability inquiries of a like nature were to have been held in other parts of the realm as well.<sup>112</sup>

The latest research on the point has shown that this letter, dated July 1, 1285, evoked a third set of articles from the prelates at the parliament, which were in their turn presented and which drew forth a very brief comment on the king's part before he left Westminster on July 4.<sup>113</sup> According to this new statement of grievances, the sovereign had deprived the Church of the custom she enjoyed from time immemorial of taking cognizance of certain civil matters, and he had narrowly limited her jurisdiction to testamentary and matrimonial actions. Ecclesiastical judges were, moreover, being prevented by writs of prohibition from hearing even such pleas as defamation, breach of faith and other cases of sin. Edward I had inaugurated yet another abusive practice of seeking out judges who had tried cases other than testamentary and matrimonial, even though no prohibition had been issued against the particular cases in question. The result of all these attacks was an appreciable weakening of the authority of the Church in the eyes of the faithful. Some hard-headed parishioners were pushing things to their logical conclusion by now refusing to contribute to the support of the local church on the pretext that the money involved had nothing to do with marriage or last will and testament and that the Church could not therefore oblige them to contribute. Finally, said the bishops, there was no doubt that anyone thus interfering with ecclesiastical liberties came necessarily under the sentence of excommunication. It was to be feared, they added sorrowfully, that there were for this reason more excommunicates in England than in any other country of the world.

The protests of the clergy achieved but little. To be sure, when Boyland and Rothing aroused further opposition by exceeding the terms of their commission, which was one of inquiry only and did not give them power to *oyer et terminer* as they were doing, the king did accord a measure of satisfaction to the bishop of Norwich and his colleagues by warning the two justices to refrain from meddling in spiritual matters. But, when itinerant justices were appointed early in 1286 to proceed into Norfolk and Suffolk, it was not long before new complaints became general. The king's council was acquainted with the affair, then King Edward himself who was at Paris during the months of June and July. It was from Paris, according to Graves, that the king issued orders to the justices in the diocese of Norwich to proceed circumspectly (*circumspecte agatis*)

<sup>110</sup> 'Circumspecte Agatis,' *Engl. Hist. Rev.*, XLIII (1928) 3.

<sup>111</sup> *Statutes of the Realm*, I, 209.

<sup>112</sup> Graves, *art. cit.*, p. 2, n. 3.

<sup>113</sup> Richardson and Sayles, *art. cit.*, pp. 227, 234; the articles themselves are published by Wilkins, *Concilia*, II, 117-118. Graves had concluded that these articles were presented later in the year, after the justices in Norfolk and Suffolk had gone beyond the terms of their commission (*art. cit.*, pp. 3-4); but, according to Richardson

and Sayles, the articles which seem to allude to the work of the justices in Norfolk and Suffolk refer to similar practices in other counties (*loc. cit.*).

<sup>114</sup> Graves, *art. cit.*, p. 15; his account of the events has been followed here for the most part; abundant references will be found in his article to the chief sources. The text of the writ itself as established by Graves has been included here in an appendix for the sake of convenience.

with regard to the bishop and clergy of the diocese.<sup>114</sup> His letter did not take the form of a mere warning in general terms; it stated precisely the king's position on most of the points which had been in dispute for the past fifty years; it enumerated the cases he admitted to be *mere spiritualia*, including among them many that the clergy had often complained were no longer allowed to be tried in court christian. These are worthy of consideration.

Whereas, in 1285, the king would have limited the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts over layfolk to matrimonial and testamentary cases,<sup>115</sup> now he admitted their right to take cognizance of various other questions, spiritual or connected therewith. Actions aimed at the correction of mortal sins, such as fornication, adultery and others, were naturally to be left to the Church, but the king went so far as to admit the right in some cases to impose a money fine.<sup>116</sup> Parishioners could be sued before ecclesiastical judges to oblige them to contribute to the upkeep of their church and cemetery, and here the penalty was regularly to be pecuniary.<sup>117</sup> The rector of a church could likewise sue his parishioners in court christian for the payment of mortuaries (in those districts where they were accustomed to be paid), customary oblations and tithes,<sup>118</sup> and one rector could take action against another for tithes, provided these did not exceed one-quarter of the value of the church, which would bring into question the right of adowsion. Three other highly controverted matters were dealt with: violent laying of hands upon clerics, defamation, and breach of sworn faith, all of which had a certain secular as well as spiritual aspect. Here the king made a very necessary distinction: the three cases should be of ecclesiastical cognizance in so far as it was sought to bring the sinner to time for his offence; if the plaintiff, on the other hand, sought only an indemnity in money, then the courts christian might not try the case. In the second part of *Circumspecte Agatis*, which Graves calls the 'Addition,' a further distinction was made to the effect that, if one, who had been convicted in court christian of violence against clerks or defamation and sentenced to bodily punishment, wished of his own free will to have this commuted into a payment in money, it could be done without fear of a royal prohibition being issued to stop the action.

The writ concludes with a general summary informing the justices that in all the foregoing and similar cases the ecclesiastical judge has cognizance, and a royal prohibition, even though it be secured and presented to him, does not alter things.<sup>119</sup>

<sup>115</sup> The petition of the bishops addressed to the king among the third set of articles in 1285 stressed this: 'Inprimis, cum a tempore cujus memoria non existit fuerit ecclesia in possessione pacifica cognoscendi de omnibus causis spiritualibus et pluribus civilibus, donec inhibito regia porrigeretur iudici vel praelato, his temporibus ministri regiae majestatis inhibent ordinariis generali edicto ne cognoscant de aliquibus laicis nisi tantum de matrimonio vel testamento' (Wilkins, *Concilia*, II, 117).

<sup>116</sup> '... pro quibus aliquando pena pecuniaria, maxime si convictus de hujusmodi sit liber homo.' The author of *The Mirror of Justices*, commenting a few years later on this article, considers that there is an evident error, since the very fact of a pecuniary penalty would remove the case from the Church courts; see *The Mirror of Justices* (Publications of the Selden Society, no. 7, London, 1895), p. 198. Certainly the general rule, as stated in the 'Addition' to *Circumspecte Agatis*, seems to lead to such a conclusion: 'Item si prelatus

imponat alicui penam pecuniariam pro peccato et petat illam pecuniam, locum habet regia prohibitio, si coram prelatibus vel episcopis pecunia exigatur.' Does it mean that a fine could be imposed, but that no action could be instituted in court christian to recover it, should the party refuse to pay? Or is the *liber homo* to be emphasized here to differentiate this from an earlier royal reply which had forbidden the punishment of *servi* by money penalties, on the ground that both they and their goods belonged to their masters? (Cole, *Documents* . . . , p. 356, art. xiii).

<sup>117</sup> '... in quibus casibus alia pena infligi non potest quam pena pecuniaria.'

<sup>118</sup> The 'Addition' makes a reservation in regard to tithes. Thus, if tithes in the form of produce are sold and an action is instituted in court christian to obtain the payment of the sum realized, then a royal prohibition is justified, 'quia per vendicionem res spirituales fiunt temporales, et decimae transeunt in catallis.'

<sup>119</sup> 'In omnibus casibus predictis et con-

There is nothing either revolutionary or reactionary in the dispositions of *Circumspecte Agatis*. Not for a moment does the king question the traditional right of the Church to exclusive jurisdiction over things spiritual. On the contrary, he goes so far as to admit that in addition to purely spiritual matters there are others so closely allied to the spiritual that they too should come within the cognizance of ecclesiastical courts (for example, obliging parishioners to contribute to the upkeep of their church). And in regard to a third class of cases of mixed character, the Church has full right to handle the spiritual aspect of the matter, just as the king's court has to concern itself with the temporal (thus, violence to clerics is sacrilege in the eyes of the Church and breach of the peace before the king's court). *Circumspecte Agatis* is one more attempt to settle the characteristically mediaeval problem of just where the dividing line between spiritual and temporal lies. Its terms contain nothing new. The Church had been exercising authority in all these matters. What is important about the document is that, whereas during a few decades the temporal power had seemed in practice to be attempting to limit appreciably the cases considered as spiritual, now the king approves in an official document most of those principles on disputed points of jurisdiction which English councils had been repeating since the time of Grosseteste. Yet, he is not actually giving away anything. The truth of the matter is that the disputes of the thirteenth century had resulted in a progressive clarification of the whole issue as to just what belongs to one jurisdiction and what to the other. The absence of any fundamental opposition in regard to principles is more evident than ever.

The statements of *Circumspecte Agatis* are clear, its tone definitive. But it must not be supposed that an end was thereby put to all rivalry between the two jurisdictions. A restatement of theory and a change of practice are two different things. Theory is often restated and theoretical concessions made simply to gain a 'breathing space' or to pacify temporarily a too insistent opposition. Whatever may have been Edward I's true motives in according what he did in *Circumspecte Agatis*, it is undeniable that a very considerable unrest had been stirred up as a result of the alleged encroachments upon the spiritual domain. The very events which led immediately to the issue of the writ make it certain that one of its purposes, if not the chief one, was to calm the situation. The tension in 1286 had existed not in Norfolk and Suffolk only but generally throughout the kingdom.<sup>120</sup> Indeed, it is for this very reason that *Circumspecte Agatis*, as an official pronouncement on the question of jurisdiction, was taken up everywhere and came very quickly to be invoked as a statute instead of an answer directed to a problem in a particular part of the realm only. It came even to be invoked as a charter of ecclesiastical liberties; but like other charters of national liberties it was not always observed. Hardly was it a few years old when complaints were making themselves heard once more. The years 1300 and 1309 provide us with more *articuli cleri* on this point, and, curiously enough, these articles for the most part are little more than a repetition of earlier ones, with the added remark that the promises of reform given on previous occasions have not been made good.<sup>121</sup> Petitions in the *Rotuli Parliamentorum* of this same period furnish like complaints.<sup>122</sup> The episcopal registers, whose great series begins at this time, bear witness on their side to a continued and lively rivalry between royal and ecclesiastical justice.<sup>123</sup>

similibus habet iudex ecclesiasticus cognoscere, non obstante prohibitione licet porrigatur.

<sup>120</sup> There is no positive evidence of any other crisis comparable to that in Norfolk and Suffolk; perhaps, as Graves suggests (*art. cit.*, p. 2, n. 3), Edward refrained from

instituting similar proceedings elsewhere because of the strong opposition encountered immediately from the clergy.

<sup>121</sup> Wilkins, *Concilia*, II, 315.

<sup>122</sup> *Rot. Parl.*, I, 32-33, 47, etc.

<sup>123</sup> I. J. Churchill, *Canterbury Administration*, I, 529.



APPENDIX

I.

PLEAS IN THE KING'S COURT RELATIVE TO WRITS OF PROHIBITION

Year	Total Number of Prohibition Pleas	<i>de laico feodo</i>	<i>de advocatione</i>	<i>de catallis vel debitis</i>	<i>de precepto or undefined</i>
1220	54	35	6	13	..
1230	45	20	8	14	3
1250	47	6	6	33	2
1260	43	4	2	35	2
1275	36	3	2	29	2
1280	60	8	3	37	12 <sup>1</sup>
1285	49	2		45	2

These figures were compiled from the plea rolls of the Curia Regis (KB 26/) for the years 1220, 1230, 1250 and 1260, and from those of the Court of Common Pleas (CP 40/) for 1275, 1280 and 1285. The years were chosen more or less at random to provide soundings through the century; care was taken, however, to select years for which the records for the four judicial terms are complete. It would have been difficult to give significant figures for the time of King John, chiefly because the entries are often not precise enough to determine the exact nature of the prohibition in question.

II.

LICIT AND ILLICIT PROHIBITIONS<sup>2</sup>—ARCHBISHOP PECHAM 1279(?)<sup>3</sup>

Inter prohibitionum regiarum genera merito credimus distinguendum: Aut sunt mere licite utpote quas de rebus et personis ad regium forum mere spectantibus ad iudices ecclesiasticos emanare contigerit; in quo casu a iudicibus easdem suscipiendum decernimus reverenter.

Alie autem que in sua forma juxta propositum concedentis prima facie videntur licite, utpote de quibusdam transgressionibus in genere pro laicis impetrare quas, cum inspecto exitu dum ad usum pertrahuntur, illicita illicitas facit abusio impetrantis. In quo casu scriptorem, dictatorem, consiliarium et sigillatorem ab omni pena excludimus ut quos nullus in hac parte involvit reatus si animum in hac parte innocentem habuerint. Ipse quoque impetrator, si laicus fuerit, non pro impetratione set pro temerario abutendi conatu cum sue malicie complicitibus tanquam ecclesiastice libertatis invasor juxta tenorem Oxoniensis concilii<sup>4</sup> ipso facto publice denunciatur in excommunicationis sententiam incidisse, primo quidem in facie, deinde in locis aliis in quibus iudici

<sup>1</sup> Among these 12 cases, 10 have grown out of a prohibition touching trespass, which is the commonest of the *de precepto* writs. They all have to do with what the Church would consider *perturbatio libertatis ecclesiae* or *violenta manuum injectio in clericum*. I have been able to find no obvious explanation of the unusual number of these pleas in 1280.

<sup>2</sup> Published by H. Cole, *Documents Illustrative of English History in the Thirteenth*

*and Fourteenth Centuries* (Record Commission, London, 1844), pp. 367-368. The present edition, however, is made from the original, Public Record Office, E 30/1576, rot. 2; the text is on the second *rotulus* as they are now gathered, although Cole published it as on rot. 3.

<sup>3</sup> See above p. 287, n. 7.

<sup>4</sup> Provincial council held at Oxford in 1222 under Archbishop Stephen Langton (Wilkins, *Concilia*, I, 585).

videbitur expedire; a nemine prorsus a tali sententia absolvendus, donec reo quem lesit, iudici quem contempsit, ecclesie quam offendit, et regie clemencie cui per abusum huiusmodi derogavit, satisfecerit de premissis; quam sententiam si animo indurato contempserit, contra eum viriliter procedatur ulterius prout in concilio de Lameth<sup>6</sup> superius est expressum. Si autem clericus fuerit huiusmodi regie prohibitionis abusus eo ipso tamquam ecclesiastice libertatis violator juxta tenorem Oxoniensis concilii per dominum Stephanum editi, ut prediximus, sententiam excommunicationis incurrat; attamen nichilominus penam adicimus ut etiam beneficiis ecclesiasticis preoptentis careat ipso jure et etiam per triennium fiat inhabilis ad alia beneficia huiusmodi optinenda, nisi per nos cum eo fuerit misericorditer dispensatum. Nec iudices ecclesiastici talibus prohibitionibus ad usum illicitum per abusionem pertractis aliquatenus deferant, sed eis nequaquam obstantibus in negotio inchoato procedant.

Aut sunt omnino in forma sua illicite utpote si super rebus mere spiritualibus vel officium ecclesiasticum mere contingentibus sunt concepte; in quibus casibus eas ab omnibus iudicibus ecclesiasticis decernimus penitus esse respuendas. Scriptores quoque, dictatores, consiliarios et sigillatores litterarum huiusmodi pro tenore concilii de Lameth<sup>6</sup> decernimus puniendos. Ipsum quoque impetratorem littere regalis huiusmodi sive laicus sive clericus penis superius memoratis decernimus subjacere, licet evidencius in hoc casu quam in superiori delinquere dinoscatur et idcirco majori pena dignus videretur. Et hec ita se habent si aliqua certa persona compareat de qua constet quod ipse eam impetraverit vel mandaverit vel ratum habuerit ex postfacto quod ipsa littera suo nomine vel ad ipsius favorem fuerit impetrata, vel ad abusionem littere, ut est expressum superius, suo nomine sit processum; verum si, ut fieri assolet, litteram talem dissimularet prosequi impetrator seu is in cujus favorem impetrata videtur et solus quidem ballivus litterarum regiarum nuncium se confingens litteram huiusmodi iudici ecclesiastico porrigens quasi rex ex officio suo procedere videatur, si fuerit is presens coram iudice ecclesiastico cui favor per litteram huiusmodi videtur impendi dum littera iudici prefato porrigitur, tunc iudex ipse eidem sacramento imposito, quod ei ex vigore huiusmodi suspensionis prestandi necessitatem imponimus, sub virtute prestiti sacramenti requirat ab eo veritatem utrum talis littera de cancellaria domini regis processit, vel ad usum ipsius littere processum fuerit ad casum illicitum per ipsum vel ipso mandante per alium vel ipso ratum habente impetrationem huiusmodi vel abusum. Quod si coram iudice horum aliquod spontanee sit confessus, puniatur sive sit clericus sive laicus ut superius est expressum; si autem hec omnia diffiteatur omnino, per eundem iudicem jurare cogatur quod ab usu vel ab abusu huiusmodi littere decetero prorsus cessabit, et nec per se nec per alium prosequetur eandem, et pro viribus impediet prosequentes, nec impedimentum negotii quod coram iudice agitur aliquod procurabit quominus coram eodem suo marte procedat, nec distractionem vel capcionem iudicis aut dampnum ipsius per curiam regis impetrabit aut quantum in eo fuerit impetrari permittet. Quo prestitio iuramento, si dominus rex, quem Deus advertat, isto sic jurato nolente vel inscio prohibitionem illam prosequi non cessaret vel ad usum illicitum eandem pertraheret vel pertractum forsitan sustineret, per moniciones erit reverenter cum ipso principe procedendum vel deferendum quantum potest regie dignitati; verumtamen juxta tenorem concilii de Lamhith<sup>7</sup> finaliter erit procedendum. Si autem absens fuerit, volumus atque precipimus quod iudex ipse ecclesiasticus eum, in cujus favorem dicitur impetrata, ad sui presentiam faciat personaliter evocari et ipse sic vocatus ex huiusmodi nostri

<sup>5</sup> Provincial council of Lambeth 1261 (*ibid.*, p. 751, 752).

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 748.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*; see above pp. 297-298.

vigore decetero personaliter venire teneatur; qui si venerit vel comparuerit coram iudice sic vocatus, iuramento ei injuncto et prestito per eundem, ut superius notatur, sive confiteatur sive neget agatur contra ipsum ut superius est tactum; si autem taceat et ad interrogata respondere noluerit vel iuramentum subire contempserit, habeatur penitus pro confesso et tamquam confessus puniatur contumax in hac parte; si autem ad iudicis presenciam evocatus trinis edictis venire renuerit, pena quae supra confesso imponitur ex presumptione hujusmodi violenta contra istum tergiversantem merito habita seu habenda isti, qui in non veniendo est contumax, non inmerito infligatur seu inflictam potius ipso facto incurrat; nec in illo casu manus vestras tanta malicia effugiat impunita.

Si autem monachus vel alius religiosus prohibitionis illicite fuerit impetrator aut illius quae licita videbatur abuser, si quidem eam nomine suo impetravit aut nomine abbatis aut prioris et conventus sine tamen superioris licencia aut mandato, omni administratione seu officio quod habet in monasterio careat ipso jure et ad omnem dignitatem, administrationem seu officium in suo monasterio perpetuo fiat inhabilis, inter novicios nichilominus retradendus. Si autem de abbatis aut superioris licencia et mandato monachus vel reliquus (*corr.* religiosus) alius impetrare talia vel talibus impetratis abuti presumpserit, abbas vel ipse superior, a quo mandatum hujusmodi vel licencia illicita emanavit, vel habuerit ratam ex postfacto, sua dignitate ipso jure perpetuo sit privatus et alius per electionem canonicam loco substituat ipsius qui a talibus illicitis sciat, velit et valeat abstinere, imminutibus penis eisdem clerico vel laico qui in actione personali clericum coram iudice seculari per litteram domini regis pertrahere sit conatus, forum iudicis ecclesiastici per eum modum estimans declinare, salvo nichilominus penis in concilio de Lamehyth contra eosdem editis et statutis.

### III.

#### THE WRIT 'CIRCUMSPECTE AGATIS' AND THE 'ADDITION.'

Edwardus Dei gratia rex Anglie etc. Ricardo de Boylond et sociis suis iusticiariis suis salutem. Circumspecte agatis de negotio tangente dominum episcopum Norwycensem et ejus clerum, non puniendo eos si placitum tenuerint de hiis quae mere sunt spiritualia, videlicet de correctionibus quas prelati faciunt pro mortali peccato videlicet fornicationibus, adulteriis et hujusmodi, pro quibus aliquando pena pecuniaria, maxime si convictus de hujusmodi sit liber homo. Item si prelatus puniat pro cimiterio non clauso, ecclesia discooperta vel non decenter ornata, in quibus casibus alia pena infligi non potest quam pena pecuniaria. Item si rector petat mortuarium in partibus ubi mortuaria dari consueverunt. Item si rector petat adversus parochianos suos oblationes, decimas, debitas et consuetas, vel rector agat contra rectorem de decimis minoribus vel majoribus, dummodo non petatur quarta pars alicujus ecclesie. Item si prelatus advocatus alicujus ecclesie petat a rectore pensionem sibi debitam, omnes vero hujusmodi petitiones sunt faciendi in foro ecclesiastico. De violenta manuum iniectione in clericos et in causa diffamationis concessum fuit alias quod placitum inde teneretur in curia christianitatis dummodo non petatur pecunia sed agatur ad correccionem peccati. Item de fidei lesione dummodo agatur ad correccionem peccati. In omnibus casibus predictis et consimilibus habet iudex ecclesiasticus cognoscere, non obstante regia pro-

\* Published by E. B. Graves, 'Circumspecte Agatis,' *English Historical Review*, XLVIII (1928) 15-16.

hibicione licet porrigatur. Datum Parisio(sic)anno regni nostri xiiii°. Explicit statutum de prohibicione regia.

*The 'Addition:'*

Incipit regia prohibicio. Sub qua forma impetrant laici prohibitionem in genere super decimis, oblacionibus, mortuariis, redempcionibus penitenciarum, violenta manuum iniectione in clericum vel conversum, in causa diffamacionis, in quibus casibus agitur ad penam canonicam imponendam. Respondet dominus rex ad istos articulos quod in decimis, oblacionibus, obventionibus, mortuariis, quando agitur ut predictum est, prohibicioni non est locus. Set si clericus vel religiosus decimas suas in horreo congregatas vel alibi existentes vendiderint pro pecunia alicui, si precium illud petatur coram iudice ecclesiastico, locum habet regia prohibicio, quia per vendicionem res spirituales fiunt temporales et decime transeunt in catallis. Item si[est] contencio de curia de jure decimarum originem habens de jure patronatus et earum decimarum quantitas excedat quartam partem valoris ecclesie, locum habet regia prohibicio. Item si prelati imponat alicui penam pecuniariam pro peccato et petat illam pecuniam, locum habet regia prohibicio, si coram prelati vel episcopis pecunia exigatur. Item si quis manus violentas injecerit in clericum, pro violata pace debent emende fieri coram rege et pro excommunicatione coram prelato vel episcopo imponatur pena corporalis, quam si sponte velit reus redimere dando prelato vel leso pecuniam potest nec in talibus est locus prohibicioni. In diffamacionibus libere corrigant prelati non obstante prohibicione, primo injungendo penam corporalem quam si reus redimere velit, libere recipiat prelati pecuniam licet regia prohibicio porrigatur. Datum Parisius anno xiiii°. Explicit regia prohibicio.

# The Pilgrim-Diary of Nikulas of Munkathvera: The Road to Rome.

FRANCIS P. MAGOUN, JR.

Fram! fram! Cristmenn, crossmenn, konungsmenn!  
(*Óláfs saga helga*, ch. 224.)

## I.<sup>1</sup>

AS traders, explorers, and sailor-warriors the Icelanders were in the Middle Ages familiar figures in many parts of western and southern Europe; to their far-flung expeditions, peaceful or predatory, the Icelandic family sagas bear ample and often exciting witness. This wide travelling does not, moreover, stop with secular journeys, and after the conversion of the island ca. A.D. 1000<sup>2</sup> the call to Rome and the Holy Land found frequent response in the hearts of the devout or the curious. "Forward! forward! champions of Christ, of the Cross, and of the king!" is the battle-cry in *Óláfs saga* quoted above.<sup>3</sup> Among the many mediaeval accounts and reports of pilgrimages by Icelanders to Rome and the Holy Land<sup>4</sup> none is so detailed, and hence so full of interest, as that by Nikulás Bergsson,<sup>5</sup> poet and apparently second abbot of the Benedictine monastery of Munkaþverá (dep. of Eyjarfjörður) in the north of Iceland.<sup>6</sup> This itinerary or, better, pilgrim-diary has survived, embedded, as it were, in a geographical miscellany;<sup>7</sup> it has been edited twice<sup>8</sup> and translated twice, once

<sup>1</sup>From the outset abbreviated titles are used, to which a key is given in §V, pp. 350-354, below. I take this opportunity to thank Professor Halldor Hermansson of Cornell University for certain most useful references. [Due to war-time conditions it has not been possible to procure for the notes the special characters used in the Scandinavian languages and in Old English. Ed.]

<sup>2</sup>For brief sketches of the introduction of Christianity see Knut Gjerset, *History of Iceland* (New York, 1924), pp. 48-70, and Jon Athils, *Íslandssaga* (2d ed., Reykjavík, 1923), pp. 38 ff., pp. 52 ff.

<sup>3</sup>Note the promise made to St. Peter by Hrafn the Red, when devils were on the point of dragging him down to the torments of Hell (*Njals saga*, ch. 157, §20): "Runnit hefir hundr thinn, Petr postoli! tysvar til Rooms ok myndi renna et thrithja sinn, ef thu leyfthir" ("Thy dog [i.e., humble servant], Apostle Peter! has run twice to Rome and would run a third time, if thou wouldest permit"). The devils forthwith let Hrafn go free.

<sup>4</sup>Note, for example, the materials and references in Werlauff 35-36, Riant 80 ff., and Oehlmann III, 257-67 ("Die Romfahrten der Isländer"). At this point I repeat a page or so from my paper, "The Rome of Two Northern Pilgrims: Archbishop Sigeric of Canterbury and Abbot Nikulas of Munkathvera," *Harvard Theological Review* XXXIII (1940), 277-89.

<sup>5</sup>See Werlauff 4-5; K XIX; Jonsson II, 113-14, 935-36.

<sup>6</sup>Former association of Nikulas the diarist with the Benedictine foundation at Thingeyrar was due to confusing Nikulas Bergsson of Munkathvera (d. ca. 1159), the diarist, with Nikulas Saemundsson, second abbot of Thingeyrar (d. ca. 1157?). All is clearly set forth by Eiríkur Magnússon, "Benedictines in Iceland", *The Downside Review* XVI (1897), 168-77, 258-67, esp. p. 176 (on N. Saemundsson), p. 262 (on N. Bergsson); Magnússon's article was translated into French for the *Revue Bénédictine* XV (1898): see esp. pp. 153, 193. The matter is not clearly presented by L. H. Cottineau, *Répertoire topo-bibliographique des abbayes et prieurés* (Macon, 1936 ff.), under "Thingeyrar" and "Thvera".

<sup>7</sup>The text of the diary proper runs in Werlauff from p. 15, l. 3 to p. 32, l. 9; in K from p. 12 l. 16 to p. 23, l. 21; cp. K XIX.

<sup>8</sup>By Werlauff in 1821 with a commentary, pp. 34 §18 ff., and by Kaalund in 1908 with some commentary (K XXI-IV) and with additional commentary in 1913 (Kaalund 61-105). Selections from Werlauff (Icelandic and Latin), dealing almost exclusively with Nikulas's tour of the Near East and the Holy Land are reprinted in K. C. Rafn, ed., *Antiquités russes d'après les monuments historiques des islandais et des anciens scandinaves* II (Copenhagen, 1852), 391 ff., esp. pp. 397-414. The route from Vevey (Switzerland) to Rome is reprinted

by Werlauff into Latin<sup>9</sup> and once into Danish by Kristian Kålund.<sup>10</sup> Nikulás's journey seems to have been made in 1154,<sup>11</sup> and the diary proper ends with the statement that it was taken down at the instruction (i.e., dictation, *fyrirsögn*) of the abbot himself ("*er rittinn ath fyrirsögn Nicholás abota*," K 23, 19). Now, since Nikulás became abbot at Munkaþverá in 1155 and died in 1159 or 1160, this statement, if correct, places his travel-diary between these dates, to which the data contained therein would refer (K XIX). The text is preserved in two Copenhagen manuscripts: *Arnarnagæan Ms. 194*, fol. 11-16, written in the west of Iceland in 1387,<sup>12</sup> and *Arnarnagæan Ms. 736 II* (K's 736\*), fol. 1, of ca. 1400.<sup>13</sup> In the passage preserved in both manuscripts (K 12, 26-16, 14; see Kålund's footnote to 12, 25 and 16, 4) various small differences appear. Taking into account the lapse of time between the writing of the prototext and of the two surviving manuscripts, it is not surprising to find occasional misstatements or confused statements which may well not be due to the author. An allusion of St. Olaf's Day (July 29th) that occurs in both manuscripts (K 15, 10 and p. 333, below) must, for example, have been introduced after the canonization of the Norwegian king in 1164 and thus after Nikulás's death in 1159 or 1160.<sup>14</sup>

Unlike the Anglo-Latin diary associated with Archbishop Sigeric's visit to Rome in 990,<sup>15</sup> Nikulás's diary, with its indication of routes and alternate routes, of stopping places, and, often, of the time required to journey from point to point,<sup>16</sup> is a veritable treasure for students of travel through the Holy Roman Empire during the first Hohenstaufen period (1138-1208). Yet Nikulás's work possesses more than mere itinerary value, for at many points it provides the reader with details about the places mentioned: he reports on churches and episcopal sees, the landscape, dialects, climate and the people; he regales with religious anecdotes and with echoes of Germanic heroic legend: Sigurd and Fáfnir (p. 323), Gunnar's snake-pen (p. 340), and Thithrek's Bath (p. 346).

## II.

The purpose of the present study is to assemble under the regional, place-, and river-names that Nikulás lists on his road to Rome (*Rómavegr*) such information (much old, but some, I hope, new) that may help the modern reader to live over this journey, memorable because so detailed for its period. Nikulás's sojourn in the Eternal City itself—with his catalogue of churches and his notes and observations on various and sundry memorabilia—has been the subject of an independent study.<sup>17</sup>

In the commentary which follows (§III, below) the location (with page- and line-number in K) are discussed in the order of their first appearance in the text. For convenience of reference each name is preceded by an arabic numeral. After each name is given, where known, a modern identification

from Werlauff (Latin translation only) by Solmi 1209-10, who refers to the Icelandic original as "Danish".

<sup>9</sup> Werlauff 15-32, in columns parallel to the Icelandic text.

<sup>10</sup> Kålund 54-61. Mention may be made of an outline (based on Werlauff) of the journey from Norway to Rome in Petersen 94-96.

<sup>11</sup> K XIX.

<sup>12</sup> K II.

<sup>13</sup> K XXXIII.

<sup>14</sup> The errors of statement in the description of Rome seem, on the other hand, mainly to belong to the prototext; see *Harvard Theological Review*, art. cit., p. 278 and *passim*.

<sup>15</sup> See Magoun, "An English Pilgrim-Diary of the Year 990," *Mediaeval Studies* II (Toronto, 1940), 231-52; to this I would now add references to Gröber's edition of 1905 and to Bédier II, 152 ff. (cited below).

<sup>16</sup> For an analysed time-table see Ludwig 120-22.

<sup>17</sup> *Harvard Theological Review*, art. cit. *supra*; to art. cit., p. 271, n. 14, I would now add an interesting and important reference, for which I am indebted to Professor Bernard Peebles of Fordham University: Benedetto Pesci, "L'itinerario romano di Sigerico Arcivescovo di Canterbury e la lista dei papi da lui portata in Inghilterra (anno 990)," *Rivista di archeologia cristiana* XIII (1936), 43 ff., esp. 49-58 (with useful map).

(including state, canton, or province), also references to special studies and to some large scale map. For general convenience reference is also made, where possible, to Andree's *Allgemeiner Handatlas* and to a recent Baedeker's guide-book. Following a geographical identification and a brief discussion of each name-form (at times corrupt, at times affected by popular etymology),<sup>18</sup> I discuss such other matters as Nikulás may introduce. Finally (§IV, pp. 347-359), I attempt a translation of Kålund's text (K), in which the names are numbered for convenience of cross-reference according to their numbers in the Commentary (§III). §V (pp. 350-354) includes the list of abbreviations referred to in footnote 1, above.

### III.

#### ICELAND.

(1) *Ísland*, n. (K 12, 26), Iceland. Andree 144, upper inset. ON *ís-*, combining form of *íss*, m. "ice" + *land*, n., i.e., "land of (drift-)ice," is the name given to the island by the Norwegian Flóki Glámsson (or. from his mother. Vilgerðarson), third discoverer (ca. 865), on account of the large amount of drift-ice which he observed in the spring in some firth; cp. mod. Icel. *ísafold*. f. "land of ice-floes," familiar from Bjarni Þórarensen's poem "Íslands Minni." Earlier names were *Garðarshólm* (Metzenthin 321) "Garthar's Island," given by Garðarr Svávarsson, a Swede, settled in Denmark and probably the first discoverer of Iceland (ca. 860); also *Snæland* (Metzenthin 99-100) "land of snow", with reference to the snow-capped mountains, given by one Naddoðr, a Norwegian, settled in the Faröes, probably the second (though perhaps the first) discoverer (ca. 860). See further *Reallexikon* II, 602-03, §3 and Metzenthin 48; cp. Langebek 32-33.

The statement that it took seven days, i.e., nychthemers "days and nights" (.vii. *dægra sigling*, K 12, 26 - 13, 1), to sail around Iceland (ca. 1300 km.) and equally long to journey to Norway (ca. 1300 km.) is, in general, substantiated by other reports (Werlauff 34 §18-19; Kålund 100-05; cp. Ludwig 120 and Cleasby-Vigfússon s.v. "*dægr*," 2).

The starting point in Iceland is not given. The pilgrims proceed to

#### NORWAY

(2) *Nóregr*, m. (K 13, 3, 4; 14, 8), Norway. On this name see Magoun-D 166 under "*Nor(ð)wegas*," to which add Kauffmann II, 184, n. 2; Karsten 226-28; Metzenthin 73-4.

From an undesignated point in Norway, possibly Bergen (cp. Petersen 95; Andree 115 B2), begins the pilgrimage proper to Rome, for which, as far as Mainz (16), two main routes are given: Route 1, taken by Nikulás, goes down the Jutland peninsula (3-9), across the Elbe (10) to Stade (11), thence via Paderborn (15) to Mainz (16). From Stade (11) he gives an alternate, more easterly route (Route 1a), which passes through Hannover (21) and Fritzlar (24) and rejoins Route 1 at Mainz (16). Routes 1 and 1a together form an irregular ellipse with a major axis of ca. 400 km. and a minor axis (at Paderborn, 15) of ca. 50 km. Routes 2 and 2a go by sea from Norway (2) to Frisia (i.e., Deventer, 27, and Utrecht, 28, respectively), thence up the Rhine past Cologne (29) to Mainz (16), where Route 2 joins Routes 1 and 1a, already described (see further p. 322, below).

<sup>18</sup> For a summarizing statement see Kaalund 91-94.

## DENMARK.

(3) *Ála-borg*, f., var. *Ála-sund*, n. (K 13, 4-5; 23, 17), Aalborg, ca. 30 km. from the east end of the Limfjord (ON *Límafjörðr*), Jutland (ON *Jótlund*). Andree 113 C1. ON *ála*, g. pl. of *áll*, m. "eel" + *borg*, f. "fortified place," so named, no doubt, from eel-fisheries; for this and other fish-names in Danish place-names see M. Kristensen, *NoB* XVI (1928), 115; Steenstrup 80, at top. On Aalborg as a starting point for pilgrimages see Werlauff 34-35 §§20-21; Riant 81; Oehlmann III, 257 ff., esp. p. 263. The variant *Ála-sund* refers to that arm of the Limfjord now known as Aalborg Sund.

(4) *Danmørk*, f. (K. 13, 4), Denmark, in Nikulás's day including, of course, Skåne and extending south to the *Dana-virki* defense-line on the Eider (8) in Schleswig-Holstein (see further under 10, below). Andree 113-114. On this difficult territorial name see Magoun-D 155 under "*Den(a)-meark*," to which now add Kauffmann II, 180-81; Karsten 24-25 §53, Lindquist in *NoB* XV (1927), 109-10; Zachrisson in *Arkiv* XLIV, tillägsband (Studier tillägnade Axel Kock, (1929), 494-98 (ON *Danir* "woodlanders"); Metzenthin 16-17.

It is reported to be a two-days journey (74 km., Kålund 96) to

(5) *Vé-björg*, n. pl. (K. 13, 6; 16-17), Viborg on Lake Viborg (Viborg Sø), prov. Jutland. Andree 113 C2; Werlauff 36 §22; K 110. ON *vé*, n. "(heathen) sanctuary" + *björg*, n. pl. "precipices (esp. by the sea) vs. *bjarg*, n. sg. "rock, boulder," i.e., "sanctuary by the sea-cliffs;" the original element *björg* was ultimately displaced by *borg*, f. "fortified place." Steenstrup 82-83, 93, under "Berg;" Hellquist under "vä;" Cleasby-Vigfússon under "vé," B, for Swedish and Danish local names.

At Viborg the pilgrims start on a week's journey down the Jutland peninsula, presumably following the important early (military) highway (Dan. *Hærvej*;" cp. OE *here-paþ*, *hereweg*) to

## GERMANY

(6) *Heiða-bær*, m. (K 13, 6), and

(7) *Slés-vík*, f. (K 13, 7), adjacent localities, which should be considered together in their context: *er viku för til Heiðabæjar; þá er skamt til Slésvíkr* "(from Viborg) it is a week's journey to *Heiðabær*; then it is a short distance to *Slésvík*." At issue here is the identification of the localities, the number of sites involved, and the significance, if any, of the order in which Nikulás mentions the names. Of these two sites Haddeby (*Heiðabær*) is the older but in the eleventh century it had been deserted and the settlement moved N across the Schlei estuary to the present Schleswig (*Slés-vík*). In Nikulás's time all that remained, no doubt, on the Haddeby Noor were the imposing semicircular ramparts and the fieldstone church which continued, as it still does, the tradition of the mid-ninth-century foundation of the great Frankish missionary Ansgar. Various suggestions have been made concerning the significance, if any, of the S-N order in which Nikulás gives these names and none, it may be said, are altogether satisfactory. Faced with the difficulties real and apparent, that seem to be involved, one might hazard the guess that we may have here a situation comparable to that existing in a little group of localities (see p. 333,

<sup>19</sup> On this highway see further *Scandinavian Studies*, XVII (1943), 169, n. 8.



below) near the Great St. Bernard Pass, where a scribal-mechanical reversal of the order of the names has evidently taken place. If this is the case, the prototext would have read: *er viku för til Slésvíkr; þa er skamt til Heiðabæjar* (Haddeby). Haddeby would presumably have been mentioned on account of its association with the famous Ansgar and his church and not as one of the "stops" on the route; cp. *Kiliandr* (18), below. For a much fuller discussion of the Schleswig-Haddeby problem see my paper, "The Haddeby and Schleswig of Nikulás of Munkaþverá," *Scandinavian Studies*, XVII (1943), 167-173.

From Schleswig-Haddeby the route continues S to

(8) *Aegisdýrr*, n. pl. (K 13, 7), the Eider (Dan. *Ejder*, Icel. *Egða*), forming in part the boundary between Schleswig and Holstein. The point of the river-crossing is not given but this was likely enough at the narrowing of the river-valley at or near the site of Rendsburg with its islands (Andee 59 D3), an important route-junction, first documented as a place in 1199 (see Schrecker 37-38). On the name *Aegisdýrr*, almost certainly a popular adaptation of OLG *Egidor* "Eider," see my paper "Fífeldor and the Name of the Eider," *NoB*, XXVIII (1940), 94-114; to the discussion there of the *-dor* element add Schnetz, *ZONF*, X (1934), 31-32, whose clever suggestion that this may be Celtic strikes me as unlikely on historical-geographical grounds, discussed in my article; for certain earlier special studies on the Eider-name see additionally Egli 279.

The immediately following territorial names (K 13, 8-9) may now be commented upon: *þar mætast þessi lönd: Danmörk ok Hollsetu-land Saxland ok Vinland* (var. *Vindland*) "there (on the Eider) these lands meet: Denmark and Holstein Germany and Wendish (i.e., Slavic) territory." On *Danmörk* see (4), above.

The form *Hollsetu-* with *-u* (also in K 13, 10) occurs elsewhere alongside *Hollseta*, g. pl. of *Holtsetar* "Holsteiners," i.e., "forest-settlers" (see Cleasby-Vigfússon, s.v.); the ON name renders OLG *Holt-Sáti* of the same meaning; for forms see F-J I, 1412 and for other *holt*-names cp. 1402 ff.; Oesterley 298; Metzenthin 42-43; on the extent and significance of this territory in early times see Hermann Hofmeister, *Urholstein* ("Altsachsen Forschungen," Vol. I, Glückstadt, 1932), esp. pp. 105 ff. The name was later distorted by popular etymology to Holstein (Dan. Holsten), with the folk-name converted into a regional name. That the older name of the region was *Holtaz*, m. or *Holta*, n. (the "forest" par excellence) seems clear from the derivative *Holtijar* "man of (the) Holt (region)" on the runic horn of Gallehus, Denmark.

*Saxland* is the native ON name for Germany, ordinarily thought of as beginning with the Saxon district south of the Elbe (10) and extending to the Rhine (30) (cp. K 11, 5-7), though once at least (K 11, 8) the Eider, rather than the Elbe, is taken as Germany's northern border. Later than *Saxland* is ON *þýð(v)erska* (Metzenthin 126-7), f. based on OLG *þíuðisk*, adj. (OHG *diutisk* "deutsch, German"); *þýskaland*, n. is mod. Icel. The element *Sax-* is the compounding form of *Saxar*, m. pl. "Saxons, Germans;" on the etymology see Magoun-A 81 under "*East-seaxna-land*," Metzenthin 91-93, and Karsten 126-27 on the common practice of a less cultured and civilized people (here the Danes) designating a more cultured and more civilized neighboring people (here the Germans) by the name of the particular tribe of the people closest to them. For other literary designations of Germany see Metzenthin under "*Germania*" and "*Theothonia*."

*Vin(d)-land*, n. shows in *Vin(d)-* the combining form of *Vindr*, m. pl. 'Wends,' here, as often, a generic term for various Slavic tribes (*Reallexikon* IV, 508, under "Wenden;" Kauffmann II, 185 ff.; Karsten 126; Matthias 223; Lubor Niederle, *Manuel de l'antiquité slave*, I [Paris, 1923], 131-34; Metzenthin 119-20); these tribes from the sixth to the ninth century filled in, east of the Elbe and north to Kiel, territory (OE *Winod-*, *Weonod-land*) earlier more or less evacuated by North German tribes. The boundary or border region between German and Slav was known as the *limes sorabicus*, *saxonicus*, or *Saxoniae* (Hofmeister, map facing p. 168; Schlüter in *Reallexikon* I, 423 §82; Ferd. Holthausen, *Altsächsisches Elementarbuch* [2nd ed., Heidelberg, 1921], pp. 9-10, §7), established by Charlemagne. Cp. Langebek 36: *Vindland er vestast næst Danmørku* (with reference to a number of Balto-Slavic tribes mentioned). The German reconquest of this *Vindland* was effected chiefly in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries; see Schlüter, *loc. cit.*, p. 428 §106.

Thus, while it is quite true that in Nikulás's day Denmark (N of the *Dana-virki*), Holstein (Transalbian Saxony, N of the Elbe), and the Slavic area (N and NE of the Elbe and including Mecklenburg) met in the region of Rendsburg,<sup>1</sup> one may well ask just what Nikulás meant by including *Saxland* in this complex boundary. Werlauff (36 §25) raised this question and, not without reason, charged Nikulás with making an "improper distinction" between *Saxland* "Germany" and *Hollsetu-land* "Holstein." If Nikulás thought of four distinct lands (peoples) as meeting at this point, then he has simply blundered, for only three peoples (Germans, Danes, and Slavs) are involved. There is, however, some reason to think that, properly or improperly, *Saxland* may have been intended merely as a sort of variant on *Hollsetu-land*, despite the fact that Nikulás evidently thought of *Saxland* "Germany" (p. 318, above) as beginning at the Elbe (K 13, 11); cp. Langebek 37: *hjá Saxlandi liggr Holtseta-land, en þar næst Danmørk*; for in the geographical miscellany preceding Nikulás's diary there occurs a statement by which the Holstein district is inferentially included within *Saxland*: *Fyrir norðan Saxland er Danmørk* (K 11, 8) "north of Germany is Denmark." If one could think that Nikulás understood or knew of such a modern seeming identification of Holstein with Germany, one might venture to render the passage (K 13, 8-9) thus: "There these lands meet: Denmark and Holstein, (i.e.,) Germany, and Slavic territory." But a final solution of the difficulty is, perhaps, not possible.

From the Eider, the route, probably approximating the present Rendsburg highway, continues south (see Schrecker 38-40) to

(9) *Heitsinna-bær* (f.) aa *Hollsetu-landi* (K 13, 9-10), almost certainly Itzehoe on the Stör, Schleswig-Holstein, and a naturally favorable point for crossing the river. Andree 59 D4; Baed. NG 117; Werlauff 37 §26; Riant 82; K 103; Kålund 92. Beside the addition of the habitative terminal *-bær*, m. "town, village," the ON form shows further distortion of this difficult LG name. For forms see F-J 1, 807 "*Echeho*;" Oesterley 324; Dohm ZsGH-SH XXXVIII (1908), 208; among early spellings, *Hezehoe* and *Hytzehoe*, with a prosthetic *h-*, are closest to Nikulás's *Heits-*.

<sup>1</sup>As it had in the time of Alfred the Great of England two and a half centuries earlier. Cp. the well-known statement attributed to a Norwegian Ottar (OE Oht- here) in Alfred's Orosius: *aet Haethum*,

*sé stent betuh Winedum and Seaxum and Angle and hyrth in on Dene* "Haddeby, which is at the meeting-point of Wends and Saxons (i.e., Germans) and (the district of) Angeln and belongs to the Danes".

From Itzehoe (9) the route very likely followed approximately the later-day Hamburg highway via Elmshorn to Uetersen (cp. Schrecker 40-41), whence there may have been a road down to Pinnau and to a suitable crossing place on the

(10) *Sax-elfr*, f. (K 13, 10), usual ON and Icelandic name of the Elbe, which in this part of its course divides Schleswig-Holstein from Hannover (Andree 59-60). The second element, *-elfr*, corresponds to MLG *Elve*, OE *Aelf*, *Ielf*, Germ. *Elbe*, Lat. *Albis*, and Med. Lat. *Albia* < Gmc. \**Albi*- "the clear one," a fem. formation on IE *albho-* "white;" see Falk-Torp under "Elv, I," WP I, 92-93; Hellquist under "älv;" Karsten 56; for forms see Oesterley 154 and F-J I, 91-92. ON *elfr*, f., is either a Scandinavian cognate of this Gmc. name or it may represent a spread into Scandinavian territory of the German river-name as a word for any very large river. Combined with ON *Gaut-* "Geatish" we have also, for example, ON *Gaut-elfr* "Göta älv, the Gotha river" and *Raum-elfr*, old name of the lower course of the Glommen in Norway; see Fritzner and Cleasby-Vigfússon under "*elfr*." *Sax-elfr*, lit. "German Elbe," is a fixed compound; on the combining form *Sax-* "German," see p. 318, above.

(11) *Stoðu-borg*, f. (K 13, 10-11, 12-13, 22), Stade on the Schwinge, Hannover. Andree 59 C4 or 62 F1; Baed. NG 115; Werlauff 37 §28; K 109; Kálund 92. The name Stade means "shore, river-bank," with reference to the location of the town on the Schwinge: OLG (OS) *strath*, OHG *stado*, m., *stad*, n.; cp. Germ. *Gestade*, *Staden*; for forms see F-J II, 854-55, under "*Stath*;" Oesterley 647. Nikulás's *staða*, f. "place, position" is, accordingly, semantically wrong, though his procedure, as practised here and frequently elsewhere, is clear enough: to form an Icelandic name, suggested by the sound of the foreign name (*ljóð-hýðing*) in question. Thus, utilizing ON *stoðu-*, combining form of *staða*, f. and with the sense of "standing, fixed, still," he makes up a name no doubt apprehended as "the standing, permanent stronghold or town" (cp. Cleasby-Vigfússon under *staða*).

Nikulás is now definitely in *Saxland* "Germany" (K 13, 11, and see p. 318, above), where, he tells us, Norsemen have much to learn in the way of fine manners (K 13, 11-12), a point reminiscent of Saxo Grammaticus's almost contemporary comment on German cooking, so attractive to Ingellus (*Gesta Danorum*, Bk. vi; Alfred Holder, ed., pp. 201-02). Stade is, furthermore, the first of a number of towns whose cathedrals are commented upon, though in the present instance mention of a *biskups-stóll ath Mario kirkju* (K 13, 13) is wrong. For Stade, belonging to the diocese of Bremen, never seems to have been the center of an episcopal see, nor is there any evidence of a church there dedicated to St. Mary (see Dehio NWD 465). It is clear that Nikulás had in mind the cathedral church of St. Mary at Verden (12), the next stop; in his day this latter was a wooden structure with a free-standing stone tower (Dehio NWD 483-84).

As noted p. 316, above, there are for the 400 km. stretch between Stade (11) and Mainz (16) alternate routes (Route 1 and 1a). The one taken by Nikulás is Route 1 and is the more westerly; to reach Mainz it passes through Verden (12), Nienburg (13), Minden (14), and Paderborn (15). As far as Minden (14), and perhaps to Paderborn (15), it follows the medieval Westfalian "Hellweg."

<sup>1</sup> For the stretch Stade-Minden see Mooyer 350 ff., esp. 355-56, for Nikulás's account. To Mooyer's article several later writers are

much indebted, e.g., Schmidt 450-52. For the road-section Minden-Paderborn see further Kretschmer 402, Routes 14-15. For sum-

(12) *Ferdu-borg*, f. (K 13, 14, var. *Frudu-*), Verden on the Aller (near its confluence with the Weser), Hannover. Andree 62 F3; Baed. NG 85; Werlauff 37 §29; K 102; Kålund 92. The name Verden is a petrified d. pl. of OLG *fard*, f., d. sg. *ferdi*, MLG *vart* or *verde*, f., in the sense "road, route, way;" early forms of this name appear in both sg. and pl.: *Ferde*, *Ferda*, *Verden*, etc. (F-J II, 857, under "*Fardium*;" Oesterley 714, col. 2; Egli 969). The name refers to the crossing here on the Aller of the north-south route Stade-Nienburg and the east-west route Celle-Bremen and thus means "at (the juncture of the) highways," semantically comparable to Strassburg (34) and other place-names associated with travel and road-building activity (cp. Helbok 101-02). Nikulás's *Ferdu-*, formally a wk. fem. g. sg., may be based on such a form as *Ferda*, cited above; if the spelling stands for *Ferðu-*, it suggests ON *ferð*, f. "journey, travel," whose combining forms are, however, *ferðar* (g. sg.) or *ferða* (g. pl.). Did Nikulás think of the name as meaning "town of travels"?

Here in Verden belongs the cathedral of St. Mary (Dehio NWD 483-84), erroneously placed by Nikulás in Stade (11), *q.v.* The var. *Frudu-*, occurring also under Walsrode (20), with *ru* for *er*, shows a wrong resolution of an *er-* abbreviation.

(13) *Nyjo-borg*, f. (K 13, 14-15), Nienburg on the Weser, Hannover. Andree 62 F3; Baed. NG 85; Werlauff 37 §29; K 106; Kålund 94 §5. Nienburg, looking back to an older *Nygen burg* (d. sg.) "(at) the new fortified place or town", is of the wide-spread Neu(en)burg, Newcastle, Châteauneuf name-type; for forms see F-J II 393 §7 and 394 bottom; Oesterley 483. Nikulás's *Nyjo-* may stand either for *Nýja-*, combining form of ON *nýr* in such local names as *Nýja-land* and one or two others (see Cleasby-Vigfússon under "*nýr*" IV) or it may represent an attempt to render phonetically LG *Nyhe burc* or the like (with *-h-* for older *-g-*; cp. Lasch 188 §353). "*tíð Nýr(r)ar borgar*" or "*tíð Nýborgar*" would probably have been a more orthodox Icelandic rendering of this LG name.

(14) *Mundio-borg*, f. (K 13, 15), Minden on the Weser, Westphalia. Andree 61 E4 or 63 G1; Baed. NG 10-11; Werlauff 37 §30; K 106; Kålund 92. Among older forms of this difficult name are *Mimidium*, *Mimthum*, *Mín(n)edum*, *Min(n)ethum*, also such short forms as *Mynda*, *Minda*, *Munda* (see F-J II, 294-95; cp. 347 "*Mundin*" and 349 "*Munitium*;" Oesterley 449; Weiss 99-101). The etymology of Minden is uncertain; for not very promising speculations see Weiss 98 ff., esp. 108-10; Jellinghaus 45 under "*dom*;" Helbok 51. Nikulás's *Mundio-*, formally g. sg. of *Mundia* and thus identical with the ON name of the Alps (see *Mundia*, 40, below), probably reflects a Germ. *Munda* or *Mundia* (see above) and is, despite Weiss 100-01, no more to be associated with ON *mynni*, *minni*, n. "river-mouth" than is the Germ. name to be connected with Germ. *-munde*, *Gemünde*, etc., of similar meaning (so Helbok 81).

*Pétrs kirkja*, f. (K 13, 16) is the cathedral of St. Peter, rebuilt after the fire of 1064 and consecrated in 1071/72, of which some portions are preserved in the present edifice, famous early Gothic hall-church (Lehmann 130-31, also Pl. 67, No. 286; Dehio NWD 353).

Immediately after his note on St. Peter's cathedral Nikulás remarks *Nú skiptaz tungur* (K 13, 16) "now the dialects charge," with *tunga*, f. in the sense

marizing statements see Matthiesen 186, n. 23, and Hofmann 16 ff. On the Westphalian "*Hellweg*", perhaps originally meaning "*lich-way*," see Jacob Grimm, *Deutsches Wörterbuch*, s.v. 1; for a most unlikely identification of the first element *Hell-* with

St. Helena *et al.* see F. Jostes, "*Helweg*", *Zs. d. Vereins für rheinische u. westfälische Volkskunde* VIII (1911), 225-27, countered by Höfler, *ibid.*, IX (1912), 64, who supports Grimm.

of "dialect" rather than "language" (rightly understood by Mooyer 356: "Dialekte" vs. Werlauff 16: "linguae," Oehlmann III, 264: "Sprache," and Kålund 55: "sprogene"). Werlauff (37 §31) suggests that a general (here impossible!) distinction between Low and High German is meant; Oehlmann, while praising Nikulás's linguistic interest (*loc. cit.*, n. 1), cannot see what speech-boundary is meant, while Kålund (K XXIII) finds the statement inexplicable, since Minden is in a purely Low German area and suggests (Kålund 66) that this statement may rather belong under Stade (11), esp. *Saxland* (K 13, 11), and refer to a transition from Scandinavian (Danish) to German. Otto Behaghel is similarly puzzled (*Geschichte d. deutschen Sprache* [5th ed., Berlin, 1928], p. 158, fn.). The fact of the matter seems, however, to be that Nikulás actually observed or had pointed out to him between Minden and Paderborn (15) the transition from the Northalbing dialect of Northern Low German (Lasch 17-18, §15, 2) to Westphalian (Lasch 13-14, §12), whose characteristic features would strike the ear of one sensitive to language. Any transition from Danish to German would, it may be noted, have taken place near the Eider (8).

The two-days' journey (K 13, 16-17) from Minden to Paderborn (ca. 64 km.) probably passed through the Porta Westfalica (Andree 61, inset map, bottom; Baed. NG, map facing p. 10) to Herford (Kretschmer 402, route 14; Hofmann 27, map) and west through Bielefeld (Andree 61 E4) or east through Detmold (Andree 61 E5) to

(15) *Pöddu-brunnar*, m. pl. (K 13, 17), Paderborn on the Pader, small tributary of the Lippe, Westphalia. Andree 61 E5 or 63 G2; Baed. NG 17-18; Werlauff 37 §32; K 107; Kålund 94 §3. The German name means "(the town) at the spring or source of the Pader" (cp. Egli 684); for forms see F-J I, 1587, II, 459-63; Oesterley 512-13; Gallée 47 §53e. Nikulás's *brunnar* (with pl. for the sg. of the Germ. name) correctly translates the Germ. equivalent *-born*; the first element (ON *padða*, f. "toad") is an example of sound-translocation, a popular etymology of sorts at work; see further Mágoun, NoB XXVIII (1940), 112, n. 80.

*Liborius kirkja*, f. (K 13, 18) is the cathedral of SS. Mary, Liborius, and Kilian, which appears to have suffered from fire in 1133 and to have been rededicated in 1143 (Dehio NWD 409 ff.); cp. Lehmann 133, col. 1. The relics of St. Liborius, bishop of Le Mans (France), who died in 396, reposed in this church from 836 to 1622, were stolen but were returned in 1627; the saint's reliquary (dating from 1627) figures as part of the present cathedral treasure (Dehio NWD 414).

A four days' journey of ca. 200 km. from Paderborn south to Mainz (16) presumably crossed the Westphalian Sintfeld (Andree 63 G2 or 65 C1) to Ober-Marsberg (cp. Hofmann 39, 42, and Horhausen, 17, below), thence probably to Twiste (Andree 65 C2, Hofmann 107), to Frankenberg on the Eder (Andree 65 C2, Hofmann 103-05), into the valley of the Lahn to Marburg (Andree 65 C3), Giessen (Andree 65 C3, Hofmann 97-08), Friedberg on the Wetter (Andree 66 C4), skirting the west side of the Wetterau gap between the Taunus and Vogelsberg, down the Wetter and the Nidda to the Main and, rounding Frankfurt, to

(16) *Meginzo-borg*, f. (K 13, 19; 14, 4, 6, 15), Mainz, at the confluence of the Main and Rhine, Rhine Hesse. Andree 66 B4/5; Baed. Rh. 288 ff.; Werlauff 37 §33; K 106; Kålund 92. Mainz looks back to a Gaulish *fundus*- or estate-name, *Moguntiācum* (e.g., IA 355, 5), *Maguntiācum* (IA 350, 5 and 355, 5, Ms. P), with shorter by-forms *Moguntia*, *Maguntia*, that may show a dropping of

the *âcum*-suffix or which may, from early on, have existed beside the longer name-type (see Skok in ZONF I [1925], 85-86). *Moguntiâcum* means the estate (*fundus*) belonging to one \**Mogontius* (see WP II, 258; Holder II, 611 "*Mogontia*" and under "*Mogontiâcum*"; Sturmfels 49). In early German documents the prevailing forms are Latin *Mag-untia*, *-entia*, etc. (see F-J II, 308-10; Kauffmann II, 152, n. 5; Holder, *loc. cit.*; Oesterley 422), and these are clearly the basis of the modern name, of which an intermediate MHG stage appears as *Megenze* with *i*-umlaut from the second following syllable (see Paul-Gierach 38 §40 A2, 2). Cp. the unrelated Old German personal fem. name *Maganza*, *Maginza*, *Meginza* <*magin-* "strength", which popularly may have been associated with the place-name in question; see Forssner 182 and n. 2. Nikulás's *Meginza*, implicit in *Meginzo-*, corresponds to this. The later German forms *Meinze*, *Mainz*, show the ordinary contraction of the group *-egi-* > *-ei-* (Paul-Gierach 70 §86, 1a).

On the cathedral of SS. Peter and Paul (K 14, 16), wrongly placed in Mainz, see pp. 328-329, below.

After reaching Mainz (16) from Paderborn (15), a four days' journey made without mention of intervening stops, Nikulás reverts to the Paderborn (15)-Mainz (16) stretch by referring to two places, Horhausen (17) and *Kiliandr* (18), which, he tells us, lie between Paderborn and Mainz. We have here, apparently, the first instance of a practice employed elsewhere by Nikulás, namely, of mentioning, apropos of one matter or another, places lying off his route (cp. Aachen, 30; Milan, 50; and Pisa, 72). His reason for referring to Horhausen (17) and *Kiliandr* (18) is, I think, probably to be sought in connection with his mention of the Eddic *Gnitaheiðr* (K 13, 20).

(17) *Horús*, n. pl. (K 13, 19), presumably miswritten for *Horhús*, is almost surely the old but now deserted settlement of Horhausen (*Horo-hûsun*) on the Diemel, Westphalia (F-J I, 1420-21, Oesterley 302), one-time Frankish *curia regis*, situated at the foot of the Eresburg, near Ober-Marsberg, and ca. 30 km. S of Paderborn (15). Andree 63 G3; Magoun Nikulás 214.

(18) *Kiliandr* (K 13, 20), next place mentioned after Horhausen (17), is crucial for the identification of *Gnitaheiðr*, mentioned in connection with it. Its identification is beset with difficulties of one sort or another, and none of the solutions generally offered is particularly satisfactory. Now, whatever *Kiliandr* may really be or mean—and admittedly it may be a gross distortion of some radically different name—the name as transmitted strongly suggests a connection with St. Kilian, Irish missionary to Germany in the late seventh century. Taking this as a hint, if it is a hint, I have ventured to suggest most tentatively an identification with Kilianstädten on the Nidda, some 5 km. above the junction of the Nidda and the Wetter and thus to all intents and purposes on the Icelandic pilgrims' route. See Magoun Nikulás 216-217. This proposal gains something in plausibility when taken in connection with what may now be said about *Gnitaheiðr*, familiar in ON literature as the site of Sigurd's slaying of Fáfnir.

The localizations proposed for *Gnitaheiðr* are as numerous as those proposed for *Kiliandr* and scarcely more satisfactory; students of the question would seem, generally speaking, to have worked either without much regard for the Icelanders' route or without close study of a map of the 200 km. stretch between Paderborn and Mainz which is here involved. See Magoun Nikulás 212 ff. Faced with what may well be the impasse of a corrupt text, I venture here, as in the case of *Kiliandr*, to propose a new location for *Gnitaheiðr*, not to be

sure as it "originally" was—for that we are unlikely ever to know!—but where Nikulás may have thought it to have been, namely, in the region of the Nidda valley (Niddagau), along whose lower course the route in question almost certainly ran for some distance. If this is right, we have an additional example of Nikulás's fondness for sound-translation (cp. Stade, 11, and Paderborn, 15). One can without great difficulty imagine that Nikulás heard mention of the Niddagau and, to be sure, in some such older form as *Nitahe*, *Nitehe*, which might have reminded him of the Eddic *Gnitaheiðr*; and once so reminded he would, in view of his evident interest in heroic matters, presumably be loath to leave it out of his narrative.<sup>1</sup>

After Horhausen (17) and *Kiliandr* (18), with its near-by *Gnitaheiðr*, Nikulás takes the reader back to Stade (11) to define Route 1a (see p. 316, above). This important medieval highway, in the past known as the "Hellweg von der Santfort" (Schmidt 450, 452; Kretschmer 402, route 16; Hofmann 49, 192), runs through Harsefeld (19), Walsrode (20), Hannover (21), Hildesheim (22), Gandersheim (23), Fritzlar (24), and Arnsburg (25), afterward rejoining Route 1 at Mains (16).

(19) *Horsa-fell*, n. (K 13, 22-23), Harsefeld on the Aue, Hannover. Andree 62 F/G2; Werlauff 37 §36; K 103; Kålund 93 §3. Older forms of this name appear variously as *Herse-veld(en)*, *Rosse(n)-velde* (Oesterley 257; F-J I, 1475); it means "open country for grazing horses" or the like. The name-types "*Herse-*" "*Rosse-*" reflect respectively OLG(OS) *hers*, n. and MLG *ros*, n. "horse", to which ON *Horsa-* (g. pl. of *hors*, var. of *hross*, m.) corresponds; for other names with *hros-* see F-J I, 1473 ff. For the second element, *-feld*, n., not represented in ON (where quite other words are used), Nikulás substitutes ON *fell*, n. "hill", common in Scandinavian place-names (cp. Cleasby-Vigfússon under *hross* and *fell*, for local names). Harsefeld is the site of an eleventh-century monastic church (Dehio NWD 178).

(20) *Valfo-borg*, f., var. *Frudu-* (K 13, 23), Walsrode on the Böhme, Hannover. Andree 62 G3; Baed. NG 13; Werlauff 37 §37; K 110; Kålund 92. See F-J II, 1193 §1 and Oesterley 733, for early forms: *Walves rode* "the cleared land of Walo (g. sg. Walwes) (Count of Anhalt);" on *-rode* see Helbok 98-101. ON *Valfo* (as if g. sg. of \**Valfa*) obviously represents an adaptation of the inflected forms of the German personal name Walo, with the habitative *-borg* replacing Germ. *-rode*, for which ON *ruð*, n. would have been the proper equivalent (see Cleasby-Vigfússon s.v. for *ruð* in local names). The *f* in *Valfo-* (= *v*) renders the *v* (*u*, *w*) in the German name and should not, of course, be emended to *s* as recommended by Petersen 94 and Kålund (K 110). It would

<sup>1</sup> In dealing with matters such as this any little hint may be precious. Such a hint was recently suggested to me in a letter from my colleague Professor Lee M. Hollander of the University of Texas. He writes (26 July, 1943): "The whole region, from Paderborn to Mainz, which Nikulas traversed is now practically all a 'smiling' landscape, and even a thousand years ago the occasional wooded eminences hardly suggested a place where a Fafnir would find a congenial lair. *Heithr* would signify a (treeless) mountain plateau. Now the one place where such terrain exists in that whole region is on the Feldberg, the highest eminence of the Taunus which according to my Baedeker is 880 m. (ca. 2800 ft.) On it is a small, swampy

plateau crowned with a group of big rocks called 'Brünhildenbett'. Now I know that is probably quite modern but the fact remains that the locality is apt to attract legendary associations. N.B. that the mountain is in plain sight from the Nidda valley . . . Some communicative fellow-traveller might have pointed out the mountain to Nikulas as they ambled along and possibly have related a legend; and the name of the creek may have reminded him of *Gnitaheithr*." All of which brings home the obvious lesson that in the study of itineraries, as in the study of place- and nature-names, there is often no substitute for an intimate personal acquaintance with the areas under consideration.

seem that the variant *Frudu-* must somehow have been carried down from the same variant to *Ferdu-* (12).

Mooyer (356), followed by Schmidt (452), identifies *Valfoborg* with Wolpe, i.e., Wölpe, Hannover (Andree 62 F3); but Wölpe, near Nienburg (13), is far off Route Ia and, with its older forms *Wilepe*, *Welipa*, etc. (F-J II, 1336, Oesterley 780) is formally impossible. Walsrode was the site of a Benedictine nunnery, founded before 984; Dehio-Gall NSuWf 15.

(21) *Hanabruin-borg*, f., var. *Habrunni-* (K 13, 23-14, 1), Hannover on the Leine. Andree 62 G4; Baed. NG 54 ff.; Werlauff 37 §38; K 103; Kålund 92. For early forms see F-J I, 1313 (cp. 1301) and II, 1544, and Oesterley 254: *Honôvere*, *Hanôvere*, *Hanôbere*, answering to MLG *hôchen*, *hôn* "high" + *ôvere*, d. sg. "shore, bank," i.e., "at, on the high river-bank" (Helbok 84, with a wrong stymology of *Ufer*), named with reference to the site of the town on the Leine; cp. Egli 391. For *â* < *ô* < Gmc. *au* (*hauhs*), cp. Gallée 75-76 §97, esp. for names with *hoh-*, and Lasch 65-66 §89. The ON form shows distortion: *Hana-brúin*, f. n. sg. "the cock's bridge," or "bridge on which the cock stood, crowed" or the like (cp. ZONF XIII [1937], 92!) cannot, of course, be reconciled syntactically in combination with *-borg*, nor can *Há-brunni*, m. d. sg. "high spring" (whatever that might be supposed to mean). *Hanabrunni-* no doubt rests on the type *Honôbere*. A proper ON translation of the German name would be *Há-bakki* or *Há-bakka-borg*.

On Hannover as a route-junction see Schmidt 467 ff.; Bruns, esp. 69-72; Dehio-Gall NSuWf 27 ff.

(22) *Hilldis-heimr*, m. (K 14, 1), Hildesheim on the Innerste, tributary of the Leine, Hannover. Andree 62 G4; Baed. NG 64 ff.; Werlauff 38 §39; K 103; Kålund 92. For early forms see F-J I, 1360 §1, and Oesterley 284: *Hild(in)esheim*, *Hiltens-*, *Hillines-*, etc. "Hildin's settlement or farm"; on *-heim* see Helbok 22-26. The ON name rests directly on the German. On location and traffic-routes see Schmidt 481 ff. (with hopeless etymology).

The bishop's throne (*biskups-stóll*, K 14, 1-2) was in the cathedral church of St. Mary, curiously enough not mentioned by title (*ath Mario kirkju* would be expected), begun after 1046 by Bishop Azelin and completed by Hezilo; Lehmann 116, Dehio-Gall NSuWf 126-27. The occasional designation of Hildesheim as Bennopolis derives from Dean Benno, 1047-56. The relics of St. Godehard (*enn helgi Gudhardus*, K 14, 2), bishop of Hildesheim 1022-38, are preserved in a reliquary of slightly later date than Nikulás's time (Dehio-Gall NSuWf 132).

On Hildesheim as a route-junction see Schmidt 481 ff.

(23) *Gandur-heim*, m. (K 14, 3), Gandersheim on the Gande, tributary of the Leine, Braunschweig. Andree 62 H5; Baed. NG 22; Werlauff 38 §40; K 102; Kålund 92. For forms see F-J I, 997-98, and Oesterley 200: *Gande(r)sheim*, *Gonnesheim* (see Gallée 45 §53), *Gandirsheim*, etc. "settlement or farmstead on the Gande." On the various forms of the Gande-name: *Gand-a*, *-ara*, *-ina*, of which the *ara*-type has survived in the modern place-name, see Seelmann, ZONF, XI (1935), 7, 12-14. The ON name rests directly on the German, unadapted, for example, to a formation with *gandr*, m. "round stick, staff, magic" as in *Gandvík*, f. "the White Sea."

In Nikulás's time Gandersheim was the site of the Benedictine nunnery of SS. -Anastatius and Innocent (Dehio-Gall NSuWf 155-56), where Hrotsvit wrote (ca. 935-1000).



(24) *til Fridla* (K 14, 3), Fritzlar on the Eder, Lower Hesse. Andree 65 D2, Baed. NG 307; K 102 under "*Fridlar*;" Kålund 92 "*Friðlar*." For forms see F-J I, 951-52, and Oesterley 193: *Fri(c)des lare*, *Fritizla*, etc. <MGH *vrides* m. g. sg. "enclosed area, district" + *lâr*, n. "natural or cleared grazing land" (Joseph Schnetz, *Das Lâr-Problem*, Würzburg, 1913, esp. p. 57; Gröhler II, 263-64; Helbok 46-47). The ON name seems to rest directly on the German, with (*til*) *Fridla* treated as g. pl. of nom. pl. *Fridlar* (rather than *Friðlar*). There is no evidence of adaptation to ON *friðla*, *frilla*, f. "concubine," for which we should have had *til Friðlu*.

(25) *Arins-borg*, f. (K 14, 3), Arnsburg on the Wetter, Hesse. Andree 66 C4, Werlauff 38 §51, K 99, Kålund 92. For forms see F-J I, 182 (accepting this identification), Sturmfels 4, and Oesterley 28 under "Arnsberg" (Westphalia), where the *burg*-forms should presumably be taken here: *Arn(e)s-*, *Arnis-burg* "Arn's fortified place," early the site of Cistercian foundation, now reduced to picturesque ruins (Dehio SWD 17-18, Hofmann 94). The first element is OHG, MHG *arn*, m. "eagle," of which OHG *aro*, Germ. *Aar*, is a by-form; the *i* in ON *Arins-* is presumably svarabhakti; on this name see Forssner 31-35. There is no adaptation to ON *ørn* or *ari* "eagle;" in Icelandic *Arins-* might be apprehended as g. sg. of *arinn*, m. "hearth."

Werlauff, followed by Petersen 94 (with query), Mooyer 356, and Schmidt 452, sought an altogether unlikely identification with Marburg, though rejecting the equally unlikely connection with Eresburg (cp. Horhausen, 17, above) as being off the route.

From Arnsburg (25) Nikulás goes on to Mainz (16), said to be not far distant (K 14, 3-5), though actually ca. 60 km. (Kålund 96); thus is concluded the eastern side of the ellipse, described pp. 316 and 323, above. Having indicated these alternate routes through middle Germany (Routes 1 and 1a), both starting at Stade (11) and ending at Mainz (16), Nikulás now sketches briefly still another, namely, Route 2 via Deventer (Netherlands) (see p. 316, above), which, with alternate Route 2a from Utrecht to a point near Arnhem (Andree 85 D3), passed through Cologne (29) to join Routes 1 and 1a at Mainz (16). Routes 2 and 2a evidently involve a sea-voyage from Norway, perhaps from Bergen (see p. 316, above) to Dutch Frisia (26), with Deventer (27) and Utrecht (28) as alternate continental destinations. From Utrecht to near Arnhem, where Routes 2 and 2a probably converge, it is a six days' journey to Cologne (29) and a journey of three days more up the Rhine (31) to Mainz (16) (K 14, 10-11, 14-15).

#### NETHERLANDS

(26) *Frijsland*, n. (K 14, 8, var.), Frisia, here the Netherlands south of the Zuider Zee. Since Nikulás places not only Deventer (27), but also Utrecht (28) in his *Frijsland*, it is clear that he thinks of Frisia as including old West Frisia (*Frisia occidentalis* of Frankish terminology), lying between the Zuider Zee and the Rhine (Andree 85 D2); by the twelfth century this region had passed under Frankish political sway. In a word, *Frijsland* is more or less equivalent to the Netherlands; cp. Langebek 37: *Næst Vallandi* (France) *er Flæmingja land* (Flanders), *en þar næst Frisland* (Frisia-Netherlands); see, further, Kauffmann I, 174-75; Norlind 210-14; Sydney Fairbanks, *The Old West Frisian "Skeltana Riucht"* (Cambridge, Mass., 1939), pp. 3-5, with sketch-map facing p. 3; K 102; Kålund 55. Today one would say *til Niðurlanda* or *Hollandz*. The ordinary ON spelling is *Frisland* (so K 11, 7); OFris *Frêslând*, Du *Vriesland*; on the origin and form of this ethnic name see Egli 332 under "Friesen;" *Reallexikon*

II, 99-101; Malone 145-46 under "*Frêsan*;" for forms see F-J I, 947-49; Oesterley 192-93; Metzenthin 28-9.

(27) *til Deventar* (K 14, 9), Déventer on the Ijssel, arm of the Rhine running into the Zuider Zee, prov. Overijssel, Netherlands. Andree 85 E2, Werlauff 38 §42, Riant 81, K 101, Baed. *Hol.* 195-96. For forms see F-J I, 692-93, Oesterley 1222, and NGN I (1885), 98, 145: *Daventre*, *Davontur*, *Deventre*, etc. The similarity between the early forms of Deventer and of Daventry (England) has been pointed out (cp. *The Place-Names of Northamptonshire* [Cambridge, Eng., 1933], 19, for notes by Ekwall and Ritter), with the suggestion that both names may mean "Dafa's tree" (but see now Ekwall *DEPN* 134 under "Daventry"). ON (*til*) *Deventar* is to be viewed as g. sg. of a fem. *Devent* (so K 102), in turn adapted from MLG *Déventer*, -tre; cp. *Trekt*, with g. sg. *Trektar* (28).

Riant 81 points out the Deventer was much frequented by Scandinavians in the Middle Ages; see also Norlind 161.

Route 2 to Cologne (29) presumably followed the Ijssel up past Zutphen and Rheden, being joined by Route 2a from Utrecht (28), perhaps just above Arnhem, thence to the Rhine to some point near Nijmegen; see Magoun, *Mod. Lang. Rev.*, XXXIX (1944), 40, n. 3, for literature.

(28) *Trekt*, f. (K 14, 9), Utrecht on the Crooked Rhine (Kromme Rijn), at the confluence of the Old Rhine (Oude Rijn) and the Vecht, prov. capital. Andree 85 D2, Baed. *Hol.* 188 ff., Werlauff 38 §42, Riant 81, K 110. For forms see F-J II, 1002 (top); Oesterley 709; Kauffmann II, 173, n. 3: *Traiectum* (*ad Rhenum*) "Rhine crossing" (IA 369, 2: Rhine route, Leyden to Strassburg), *Trecht*, *Tricht* (cp. Maastricht), etc., here reflected in this standard ON form (not with dropping of U-, as Kålund 92 would have it). Cp. *Trektar bók*, title of the well-known seventeenth-century Utrecht University Library Ms. of Snorri's *Edda*. The accepted mod. Icel. form is *Utrekt*, based on the mod. Dutch, whose U- is commonly explained as a reduction from OLG *ald*, *old* + *trecht* ("Het oude Trecht") "the old (Rhine) crossing," rendered in Med. Lat. as *Vetus Traiectum*. For other interpretations see Egli 961-62, and discussion in NGN III (1893), 250-51, 355; cp. NGN VI (1928), 57 ff., IX, 2; also W. Junghans, "Utrecht im Mittelalter," *Forschungen zur deutschen Geschichte*, IX (1869), 515 (on status of Danes and Norwegians). Med. Lat. *Ultra Traiectum*, *Ultraiectum*, etc., would seem to represent efforts at a learned etymologizing of Dutch Utrecht.

On the early, temporary Frankish designation *Wiltaburg* (e.g., Bede, *Historia Ecclesiastica* v, 11) "fortified place of the Wilti," see Holder III, 319-20.

The Norse pilgrims no doubt reached Utrecht by going up the Vecht from Muiden on the Zuider Zee (Norlind 161; Vogel, map).

Route 2a to its junction, probably just above Arnhem, with Route 2 from Déventer (27), now proceeds to Cologne (29) and is described as a six days' journey (K 14, 10-11).

#### GERMANY

(29) *Kolnis-borg*, f. (K 14, 11), also uncompounded *Kolnis*, g. sg. (K 14, 12), *Kolni*, d. sg. (K 14, 14), Cologne on the Rhine, Rhineland. Andree 86 E4 or 63 C4; Baed. *Rh.* 59 ff.; Werlauff 38 §44; K 104; Kålund 92. Rom. *Colônia* (*Claudia*) *Agrippinensis* or *Colônia Agrippina*; on Lat. *colônia*, f. "farm settlement," in the sense of an authorized Roman settlement, see Gröhler II, 28-29. There are several ON derivatives (see Fritzner), e.g., *Kolnari*, *Kolnisborgarmaðr*,

m. "inhabitant of Cologne," *kolneskr*, adj. "of Cologne." Mod. Icel. *Köln*, f. (cp. *kölnarvatn*, n.) is presumably a direct adaptation from Germ. Köln. For forms see F-J II, 1556; Oesterley 351; note further OE *Col(o)n* (Magoun-D 154), Du *Keulen*. ON *Kolnir* is a *ja*-stem, which, with the absence of *i*-umlaut, suggests, formally at least, the inflection of such mythological names as *Fáfnir* (Noreen 258 §371) and, still more strikingly, the local name *Okólnir*, m., of *Völuspá* 37, 6 (*á Okólni*); Kålund (K 104 and Kålund 92) favors a neuter gender, i.e., *Kolnir*, nom., but, in view of the lack elsewhere of *ja*-st. neuters without *i*-umlaut (Noreen 259 §372), I suspect that the ON nom. was *Kolnir*, m., as given by Petersen 96. Fritzner's *Kolnir*, f., I do not understand.

*Péturs kirkja*, f. (K 14, 12), the archiepiscopal cathedral of Cologne, is the church of SS Peter and Mary, on the site of the present cathedral; the church to which Nikulás refers was the second structure, completed in 1052; the present Cologne cathedral (Kölner Dom) was begun about 1248. See Werlauff 38 §44; Lehmann 119; Dehio-Gall *Rh* 153 ff.

Apropos of the archbishop of Cologne, who was also archchaplain of the Palace at Aachen and whose duty it was (K 14, 12-14) to consecrate the emperor of Germany in the Aachen cathedral (until 1531), Nikulás mentions Aachen (30), though this city did not lie on his route. For similar mention of important places presumably not visited by him, cp. Milan (50) and Pisa (72), below.

(30) *Aquis Grani*, Lat. dat.-loc. pl. (K 14, 13-14), Aachen, Rhine Province. Andree 64 B4, Baed. *Rh*. 2 ff., Werlauff 38 §45, K 99. Nikulás uses here (cp. *Pisis*, 72) the dat.-loc. pl. of what is perhaps a Gallo-Rom. sanctuary name, meaning "at the waters (sacred) to Gran(n)us," a Gaulish divinity, by *interpretatio romana* Apollo; see Holder I, 2037-39; PW 3. Halbb. (Stuttgart, 1895), 300-01 under "Aquae 44" and 14. Halbb. (Stuttgart, 1912), 1827 under "Grannus", at end; Langebek 28: *Aquisgranum*. The "waters" in question refer to the sulphur springs, especially to the thermae established at Aachen at the end of the first century A.D.; see A. C. Kisa, "Die römischen Antiken in Aachen. I. Aquae Grani," *Westdeutsche Zs. f. Geschichte u. Kunst*, XXV (1906), 1-10. Germ. *Aachen* reflects the d. pl. of OHG *aha*, f. "water, flowing water," likewise with reference to the thermal springs. On the French form of this name, Aix-la-Chapelle, see Gröhler II, 209 ff. (*aqua*), 381-82 (*capella*); for forms see F-J I, 37-38 ("Aquis Grani"); Oesterley 1; Egli 1. On the cathedral of Aachen see Lehmann 106, Dehio-Gall *Rh*. 106 ff.

From Cologne (29) Route 2 continues for three days (K 14, 14-15) up the

(31) *Rîn*, f. (K 14, 15, 20), the Rhine. Andree 63-67. On the etymology see Magoun-A 93 under OE *Rîn*, m. f., to which now add WP I, 140, and esp. Guntert, *ZONF* VII (1931), 245, for OCelt. \**Reinos* as the source of Gmc. \**Rînaz* vs. the specifically Gaul. *Rênos*; so, also, d'Arbois de Jubainville 211-12, 272, 326. OHG *Rîn*, Germ. *Rhein*, m., Du *Rijn*; the ON fem. gender is no doubt due to association with *á*, f. "river" in such combinations as *Rîn á* "Rhine river;" for a similar phenomenon in Germany see Karsten 58.

The route now follows the Rhine up to Mainz (16), mentioned here (K 14, 15) as the junction-point of Routes 2 and 1 and 1a (see pp. 316, 323, above). Up to this point Nikulás has deferred comment on church matters connected with Mainz (16). This he now introduces as follows:

*þar (er) erkibyskups-stóll ath kirkju Petri et Pauli* (K 14, 15-16), "there the archiepiscopal throne is in the church of SS Peter and Paul." As it stands, this statement is half wrong. Mainz was, to be surē, an archiepiscopal see;

its cathedral was, however, dedicated not to SS Peter and Paul, but to God and St Martin (Lehmann 126-127) and to SS Peter and Stephen (Dehio SWD 225-26 §I, 1-3); neither the relatively insignificant church of St Peter (Lehmann 144, Dehio SWD 241) nor of St Paul (Werlauff 38 §47) can well come into question here. The difficulty arises very likely from an error in the transmitted text, which seems to have skipped a stop at Worms (31a), with its cathedral of St. Peter. The prototext may have run somewhat as follows:

*þar* (in Mainz) *er erkibiskups-stóll at kirkju* <Martini et Stephani. *þá er dagför til Vormizo-borgar, þar er biskups-stóll at kirkju*> Petri et Pauli "there (in Mainz) the archiepiscopal throne is in the church <of SS Martin and Stephen. Then it is a day's journey to Worms, where the bishop's throne is in the church> of SS Peter and Paul." The omission which I assume in the exemplar of the two surviving manuscripts would be due to haplography; note *biskups-stóll at kirkju* (bis) in the reconstructed prototext. In justification of this somewhat extensive textual reconstruction I would point out the following: (1) In the transmitted text (K 14, 15-16) we are told that the distance from Mainz (16) to Speyer (32) (ca. 80 km.) is but one day's journey (K 14, 16), an abnormally long single day's trip for Nikulás, whose daily average is ca. 47 km. (see Ludwig 121, esp. 122; Schulte I, 99, n. 2; Kålund 97, esp. 99).<sup>1</sup> (2) It is, to say the least, very unusual that so important a place on the Rhine route as Worms in Rhine Hesse (Andree 65 B5) should be omitted entirely, while a smallish place like Selz (34) should be included. If Worms had been a stopping place between Mainz (16) and Speyer (32), the daily distances would work out to Nikulás's approximate average: Mainz to Worms, ca. 45 km.; Worms to Speyer, ca. 35 km. (3) The *kirkja Petri et Pauli* (K 14, 16) almost surely refers to the cathedral of St. Peter in Worms, built by Bishop Burkhard (1000-25) (Dehio SWD 458-59), here apparently fused with the once important church of St. Paul, probably also built by Burkhard (Lehmann 114; cp. Dehio SWD 459-60, 465-66) and now a museum. I do not believe that we have here, as in Stade (11)—Verden (12), a shift of a church from one town to another; the cases are quite different.

31a) (*Vormizo-borg*, f.), (from the reconstructed text given above), Worms, near the confluence of the Worms and the Rhine, Rhine Hesse. Andree 65 B5 or 68 F1, Baed. Rh. 370 ff. \**Vormiza* is based partly on MHG forms, partly on the forms, often distorted, occurring in *Thithrek's Saga* (II, 414, col. 1): *Verniza*, *Wermintza*, *Vermista*. Worms looks back to a Gallo-Rom. *Borbeto-magus*, *Bormito-magus*, etc. (see IA 355, 3; 374, 6) "settlement (Gaul. *magos* "plain" "village") on the Borbita (i.e., the Worms)," city of the Vangiones, whence the later, temporary designation *Vangio* or *Vangionum ciuitas*, in turn replaced by the reduced form of the earlier name, *Wormatia*, source of OHG *Wormiza*, *Wormaza*, MHG *Wormese*, *Worm(e)z*, *Wormize*. See further F-J II, 1424-25; Oesterley 785; Kauffmann I, 242, n. 16, II, 152, n. 6, 306; Holder I, 489; Longnon 113 §465; Gröhler I, 9-10, 20; d'Arbois de Jubainville II, 117 ff., esp. 121-22. The river-name *Borbita* "the Worms" is quite likely Ligurian; it is of uncertain meaning.

In view of the consistency of *e*-forms in *Thithrek's Saga*, the temptation to adopt \**Vermiza* rather than \**Vormiza* in the reconstructed text is strong; against this, however, is the complete lack of *e*-forms in the German records.

<sup>1</sup>Cp. the four days' jump from Paderborn (15) to Mainz (16), p. 323, above. I do not reckon with alternate Routes 1a, 2, and 2a, since these were not taken by Nikulás. The

present discussion represents an expansion of my briefer statement in *Mod. Lang. Rev.* XXXIX (1944), 39, n. 6.

May not such forms have existed, with a development parallel to that of *Maguntia* > *Megenze* > *Mainz*?

On the *kirkja Petri et Pauli* (K 14, 16) see pp. 328-329, above.

(32) *Spîra*, f. (K 14, 16), Speyer, at the confluence of the Speyerbach and the Rhine, Bavarian Palatinate. Andree 68 F2; Baed. *Rh.* 394 ff., Werlauff 38 §48; K 109; Kålund 91 §1. Gallo-Roman *Novio-magus* "new settlement" (IA 371, 4; cp. Magoun-D 166 under OE *Neomagon* "Nijmegen;" Longnon 104 §419; Dottin 85, n. 2), replaced in the fourth century by *Colônia, Civitas Nemetum* (Holder II, 708-09), based on the Gaulish name *Nemetes, Nemetae*, of a Germanic tribe, later still replaced by *Spîraha, Spîra*, old name of the Speyerbach, from which the mediaeval and modern town-name. Holder II, 1626-27; for a Germanic etymology, "to spue" <\*spîw- see F-J II, 839. See Kauffmann I, 242, II, 152, n. 7, 306, n. 2; Holder II, 1626-27; F-J II, 838-39; Oesterley 644-45; Egli 869; Althof II, 279. The ON form is taken directly from the German (so Kålund 91), though perhaps apprehended as ON *spîra*, f. "spar" (cp. Cleasby-Vigfússon, s.v., III).

The *Mario kirkja* (K 14, 17) is the cathedral of SS Mary and Stephen, built ca. 1060, rebuilt ca. 1080-1110; a second reconstruction was undertaken shortly after Nikulás's time (Dehio SWD 372-73; Lehmann 140).

(33) *Sels-borg*, f., var. *Selis-* (K 14, 18), Selz, near the confluence of the Selz and the Rhine, Lower Alsace. Andree 67 F3; Werlauff 38 §49; K 108. For forms see F-J II, 669-70 §2; Oesterley 629; Jan 233; Kauffmann I, 246, n. 6; Holder II, 1305-06 (Gaulish and meaning "salty"): *Saletio* (IA 354, 6), *Saliso*, *Salis*, *Salz*, *Selsse*, *Saelse*. The place-name is from the river-name; on French names reflecting salt-industry see Longnon 575-77 §§2663-69. ON *Sels-*, *Selis-*, probably represents a direct adaptation from German, though to an Icelander *Sels-* might well suggest ON *sel*, n. "shieling," Germ. "Sennhütte," common in Icelandic local names (Cleasby-Vigfússon, s.v., A II).

(34) *Stransborg*, f. (K 14, 18), apparently miswritten for *Strassborg*, Strassburg, near the Rhine, Lower Alsace. Andree 67 E3, Werlauff 38 §50, K 109. Gallo-Roman *Argentó-râte, -râton, Argentorâtus* (IA 354, 5), almost certainly meaning "the silvery, white, or bright stronghold;" see Holder I, 211-12; Gröhler I, 112-13 (*argento-*), 109-10 (*râto-*); WP I, 85, II, 86; Althof II, 278-79; Kauffmann I, 241; Egli 883 under "Strasse;" and Robert Forrer, *Strasbourg-Argentorate préhistorique, gallo-romain et merovingien*, II (Strassburg i. El., 1927), 771-81 (German text). For forms of the German name see F-J II, 904, Oesterley 663, Jan 235-36: *Stratisburg, Strassburg*, etc. "the fortified place at the route-junctions" ("eine Stadt der Verkehrslinien," Schulte 31), with reference to the meeting here of highways over the Alps from Italy into Germany, of a road to the Danube (Donaueschingen), and of one to Luxemburg and the Channel (Schulte II, map 1, at end). The name-type is common; cp. Oesterley 663.

*Mario kirkja*, f. (K 14, 19) is the cathedral of the Blessed Virgin (Liebfrau); Nikulás saw the structure which was begun in 1015 but which had suffered from fire in the years preceding his visit. The construction of the present basilica was begun ca. 1175; Dehio SWD 384-85; Lehmann 141.

The three day's journey (K 14, 19-20) to Basel (35) was made either by boat up the river or on foot up the Rhine shore, not likely by the inland

route via Schlettstadt i. El. and Kolmar (cp. Schulte I, 99, n. 2, and map at end of Vol. II).

## SWITZERLAND

The following section, from Basel (35) to *Péters spítali* (44), has been described as the "first germs of a Swiss guide-book" (W.A.B. Coolidge, *Swiss Travel and Swiss Guide-Books* [London, 1889], p. 9).

(35) *Boslara* (var. *Buslara*)-borg, f. (K 14, 20), "town of the inhabitants(?) of Basel," Basel (Fr. Bâle) on the Rhine, canton Basel-Stadt (vs. Basel-Land). TAS 1 and 2; Andree 83 E1; Baed. *Swi.* 4 ff.; Werlauff 38 §51; K 100; Kålund 91-92; PW Supplement-Bd. (Stuttgart, 1918), 197, under "Basel." Nikulás's form is not easy to explain, but it may be an adaptation (\**Boslari*, m.) of a MHG \**Baslære* "inhabitant of Basel;" cp. Fr. Kluge, L. Sütterlin, and E. Ochs. edd., *Nominale Stammbildungslehre* (3d ed., Halle, 1926), p. 19 §33a. *Basilia* of IA 364, 1; forms in Oesterley 44-45, Holder III, 811-12. The etymology is disputed. The once popular "Greek" interpretation, supposedly meaning *villa regis*, "Königsburg," seems to be out of the question. Historically quite dubious, too, is whether the name is Germanic (Alemannic), as suggested by S. Skutsch-Dorff, "Basel und Wesel," *Basler Zs. f. Geschichte u. Altertumskunde*, IX (1910), 168-73, who proposed as an etymon OHG *wasal*, n. "wet ground (?)," "water(?)," with a possible substitution of b- for w-; see Felix Stähelin, "Das älteste Basel," *Basler Zs.*, cit. *supra*, XX (1922), 127 ff., esp. p. 137, n. 2, at end. The name may be Celtic (cp. Stähelin 136, n. 2), though various like-sounding French names are Christian (from the saint's name or from Lat. *basilica*). A crux.

The literature on the name Basel is considerable and somewhat scattered. The following selected list of studies, ordered chronologically, offers, however, a representative picture of the scholarship and will lead to most earlier studies: A. Fechter, "Basilia und Robur," *Schweizerisches Museum f. historische Wissenschaften*, III (1839), 134-42 (Gaulish origin, but romanized); Andreas Heusler (d. 1921), *Verfassungsgeschichte d. Stadt Basel* (Basel, 1860), pp. 1-2; Egli 85-86 (survey of earlier, including eighteenth-century, interpretations); Albert Oeri, "Basilia u. Robur," *Anzeiger f. schweizerische Geschichte*, N.F., VII (1894-97), 401-03; Th. Burckhardt-Biedermann, "Römische Kastelle am Oberrhein aus d. Zeit Diocletians," *Westdeutsche Zs. f. Geschichte u. Kunst*, XXV (1906), 157, n. 86 (Celtic); S. Skutsch-Dorff, cit. *supra* (1910); Stähelin, cit. *supra* (1922).

(36) (*til*) *Solatra* (K 14, 21), Solothurn (Fr. Soleure), on the Aare, canton Solothurn. TAS 126; Andree 83 E2; Baed. *Swi.* 254 ff.; Werlauff 38 §51; K 109; Kålund 92. The Gallo-Roman name was *Salo-durum* (IA 353, 2), "Salo's (?) stronghold" (Holder II, 1317-18), or perhaps "Salzburg" (Gröhler I, 107); Egli 865-66; F-J II, 670; Oesterley 642. Ms. (*til*) *Solatra* is formally the gen. of *Solatari*, m. sg., or *Solatrar*, pl. (so K 109, Kålund 92); Ms. -*tra* may be a scribal distortion of MHG *turn*, *torn*, m. "tower, dungeon," which in the surviving German name has replaced the Celtic -*durum* of *Salo-durum*. Germ. *turn* ultimately passed into ON but may well not have been known to Nikulás. Or may *Solatra* preserve a reduced form of *Salodurum* (cp. *Bolotria*, *Bolodra* < *Bolodurum*, Gröhler 108)? Cp. *Kiliandr* (18, above). On the French development of the name cp. Longnon 38 §72 and Dottin 104 under "Balleure" < *Balodurum*.

The route from here to Vercelli (49) corresponds to the Roman routes of IA 353, 3-1; 352; 351; 350, 7, the latter continuing IA 355, 5 (Mainz)—353, 3 (Basel). See Schulte 492.

(37) *Vivils borg*, f. (K 14, 21), Wilflisburg (Fr. Avenches), ca. 3 km. S of Lake Murten (Fr. Morat), canton Waadt. TAS 328; Andree 83 D3; Baed. *Swi.* 271-72; Werlauff 39 §52; Riant 82, n. 2; K 110; Kålund 67-68, 92. Gaulish *Aventicum* (Holder I, 311; Gröhler I, 166), *Aventiculum Helvetiorum* of IA 352, 4 (between Moudon and an unidentified *Petinesca*), ancient capital of the Helvetii, means "town of the (guardian) goddess Aventia" (Holder I, 310-11). On the German name, Wiflisburg, see F-J II, 1297; Oesterley 764; and Jean Stadelmann, "Études de toponymie romande: pays fribourgeois et districts vaudois d'Avenches et de Payerne," *Archives de la société d'histoire du canton de Fribourg*, Tome II, 2<sup>me</sup> livraison (Freiburg/Schw., 1902), pp. 375-76. The underlying personal name is WGmc \**Wibil* (cp. Wevelsburg, Kr. Büren, Westf.), also recorded as *Wifel(e)* in English place-names, e.g., Wilcote(O) and Wiveliscombe(So); see Ekwall *DEPN*, under these names; cp. Egli 65 under "Avenches." The ON name shows adaptation to ON *Vífill* (Lind 1094-95, esp. 1095, at end of entry).

Wiflisburg reminds Nikulás of a point in the story of the sons of Ragnar Loðbrók, as told in the *Nornagests þáttur*, where Gestr says: *ek kom til þeira, þá er þeir (Loðbrókar synir) herjuðu suðr at Mundjofjalli ok brutu Vífilsborg* (Ernst Wilken, ed., *Die prosaische Edda*, I [Paderborn, 1912], 258, ll. 6-7). See Schulte I, 99. As Nikulás has it with reference to Wilflisburg: *hon (Vífilsborg) var mikil aðr Loðbrók(ar synir) brutu hana, enn nú er hon litil* (K 14, 21 - 15, 1).

(38) *Fívizu borg*, f., var. *Fruizo-* (K 15, 1), Vivis (Fr. Vevey), on the Lake of Geneva, at the mouth of the Veveyse, canton Waadt. TAS 464; Andree 83 C4; Baed. *Swi.* 313-15; Werlauff 39 §53; K 102; Kålund 68, 92; and Sigeric 245 §53, to which add Holder III, 419 ("*Viviscus*"). The variant *Fruizo-* shows scribal misinterpretation of a series of minims.

(39) *Marteins vatn*, n. (K 15, 2), "(St.) Martin's Lake," close to which Vivis (38) is said to stand (K 15, 1-2). The Lake of Geneva (*lacus Lemannus*) is meant. Andree 83 BC4. To explain Nikulás's designation of the lake, Werlauff 39 §53 proposed, though without conviction, some association with Martigny-Ville at the head of the lake (cp. Sigeric 244 after §50), but Riant 82, n. 3, is quite likely right in suggesting the influence of the church of St. Martin at Vivis (38); Riant is followed by K 105 and Kålund 68, 94; see Baed. *Swi.* 314 for this church, rebuilt in 1488. *Marteinn* is the ordinary ON adaptation of Lat. *Martinus*; see Lind *s.v.*

With this mention of the Lake of Geneva and with a locality in mind that is clearly at or near Vivis, Nikulás makes the following statement (K 15, 2-4): *þar koma leiðir saman þeirra manna er fara of Mundjo-fjall (the Alps) suðr, Frackar* (Northern French, cp. Metzenthin 27-8), *Flemingar* (Flemings, cp. Metzenthin 26-7), *Valir* (Southern French, cp. Metzenthin 114), *Englar* (English, cp. Metzenthin 20-1), *Saxar* (Germans, cp. Metzenthin 91-2), *Norðmenn* (Scandinavians, cp. Metzenthin 75-6). The reference is to the convergence here of routes from the north and west; he would have in mind his own route via Basel (cp. Schulte I, 42-43, 82, 99) and, e.g., that from the Frankish west, like that via Lausanne (cp. Schulte I, 43, 67, 82) described by Sigeric.

(40) *Mundja*, f., *Mundjo-fjall*, n. (K 15, 9, 12; 16, 7), the Alps, here no doubt

the Great St. Bernard pass itself (2491 m.), known in antiquity as *Mons Iovis*. OFr *Mon(t)gieu*, OE *Muntgïof*. Andree 83 D5; Werlauff 39 §56; Meissner 192-96; Fritzner s.v.; K 106; Kålund 68; Sigeric 244, at top. By *fjall* in *Mundjo-fjall* Nikulás may have meant more precisely the Grand Combin (Ker 420-21); see Baed. *Swi.*, map facing p. 361, and p. 371.

For a useful map, showing pilgrim-routes to Rome from the Alps south, including a number of places mentioned by Nikulás, see Bédier II, facing p. 152.

(41) *Mauricius borg*, f. (K 15, 5 and 8), St.-Maurice (d'Agaune), on the Swiss Rhone, canton Wallis—not to be confused with Bourg-St.-Maurice, dep. Savoie (France), near the Little St. Bernard (Andree 80 F4). TAS 483; Andree 83 D4; Baed. *Swi.* 328; Werlauff 39 §54; K 106; Kålund 68; Sigeric 244 §51.

The following statement (K 15, 5-7) refers to the common, though not well founded tradition, associating this site with St. Maurice, supposedly martyred nearby with 6666 of his companions, the so-called "Theban Legion:" *þar hvílir mann með allt líd sitt, .vi. þusundir ok .vi. hundrað ok .vi. tígir manna ok .vi. menn.*

(42) *Pétr's kastali*, m. (K 15, 7), "(St.) Peter's citadel," here said to be at St. Maurice (41), but *þar er Pétr's kastali* would seem actually to refer to Bourg-St.-Pierre (TAS 529; Andree 83 D5; Baed. *Swi.* 370-71) in the valley of the Valsorey (canton Wallis), now a Swiss customs-frontier and formerly the site of a hospice, whose importance diminished after the foundation by St. Bernard of his hospice at the top of the pass (see Sigeric 244 §49). Accordingly, Nikulás's identification of this citadel with St.-Maurice cannot be right, since Bourg-St.-Pierre is some 15 km. down the pass to the north. It seems all but certain that the order of stops has here been reversed (Meissner 194, n. 2) and that (42) should have preceded (43, *Bjarnardz spítali*) and should have been introduced by *þá er* rather than by *þar er*. See Werlauff 39 §55: K 107 (suggesting a stronghold at St.-Maurice); Kålund 68.

(43) *Bjarnardz spítali*, m. (K 15, 8-9), the hospice of the Great St. Bernard pass (2491 m.) and said to be a two day's journey from St.-Maurice (41), ca. 60 km. NNE. TAS 532; Andree 83 D5. See Werlauff 39 §56; Meissner 194, n. 2; K XXIII, 100; Kålund 68-69.

On this famous medieval hospice, of which this is the earliest mention, see Schulte I, 80-81; Baed. *Swi.* 371-72, map facing 361; *Pétr's spítali* (44); and for a useful bibliography of transalpine routes see Monneret de Villard 77, n. 1.

(44) *Pétr's spítali*, m. (K 15, 10), (St.) Peter's Hospice, here said (K 15, 9-10) to be up on the pass (see *Mundja*, 40). As Meissner suggests (194, n. 2), the personal names in (43) and (44) have been reversed, and the following meteorological observation no doubt refers to *Bjarnardz spítali* (43): *þar er opt ath Oláfs messo (July 29th) á sumarit snær á grjóti ok íss á vatni* (K 15, 10-11). These remarks certainly refer not to the Alps in general (K XXIII-IV) but to conditions in the immediate vicinity of the Great St. Bernard hospice (43, above). The *vatn* in question would be the little Lake of the Great St. Bernard (TAS 532) beside the hospice; this is to this day "sometimes frozen over even in summer" (Baed. *Swi.* 372; cp. Werlauff 40 §57; Kålund 69; EI XXX, 620, and plates 129, 130).

This St. Peter's hospice, which Werlauff 40 §57 confidently associated with a *monasterium s. Petri* and which is said to have been at the foot of the pass on the north side, is no longer extant; it no doubt belonged to Bourg-St.-Pierre



and presumably fell into disuse after the establishment of the great hospice at the top of the pass (Schulte I, 62; Meissner 194, n. 2; Ker 418).

ITALY

(45) *þræla þorp*, n. (K 15, 12), ON "the slaves' or the thralls' village;" cp. OSwed. *þræla borg*, ONorw *þræla borg*, f., old name of Oslo; see Hellquist under "Trälleborg," and for Scandinavian England Ekwall DEPn, under *þræll*. Due to its position here, i.e., between St. Peter's Hospice (44) and Aosta (46), it was identified by Werlauff (40 §58) with Etroubles (GCT 28; Andree 83 D5 or 125 B2; Baed. *Swi.* 375 and *NI* 216); so Riant 83; Schulte I, 99; Ludwig 121; Solmi 1212; K 110; Kålund 69, 94; Matthias 195 (though there seems to be no entry under "Etroubles"). Elsewhere Etroubles is referred to as *Restopolis*; see Scheffel 184; Oehlmann III, 254-56.

(46) *Augusta*, Lat. (K 15, 12, 15). Aosta, on the Dora Baltea (Rom. *Dura Baultica*), prov. Aosta, at the juncture of the routes from the Little and the Great St. Bernard. Rom. *Augusta Praetoria* or *Salassorum*. GCT 28; Andree 83 D5 or 125 B2; Baed. *NI* 213-14. See further Sigeric 243 under "Agust" (47), and Kålund 91. Aosta is described as a "good city" (K 15, 12; so, too, Siena, 78), of which we are told that the bishop's throne is in the church of St. Ursus (Orso) (*Ursus kirkja*, K 15, 13; var. *Ursulu* "of St. Ursula" is quite wrong!), where the saint's remains lie. This statement is incorrect, for the cathedral church of Aosta is dedicated to St. Mary and St. Gratus (fifth bishop of Aosta; see Ughelli). The church which is dedicated to St. Ursus, guardian saint of the city, is the collegiate church of S. Orso; see Ughelli<sup>1</sup> IV, 1532C, Ughelli<sup>2</sup> IV, 1097AB; Werlauff 40 §59; Kålund 69 (not commenting on the error of statement); Solmi 1212. On a toll collected at the portal of S. Orso see Oehlmann III, 248-49.

(47) *Marteins kamrar*, m. pl. (K 15, 14), in all likelihood Ponte S. Martino, near the once fortified (Fort) Bard near Donnaz (GCT 42; Andree 125 B2; Baed. *NI* 211; *EI* VI, 164), on the Dora Baltea (prov. Aosta) at the mouth of the Valle di Gressoney and about midway between Aosta (46) and Ivrea (48). For this identification see Werlauff 40 §60; Riant 83; K 105; Kålund 69, 92; Solmi 1212-13, and for details about the river gorge at Bard see Oehlmann III, 235, 246-47, and Schulte I, 14.

The problem which the name *Marteins kamrar* presents is rather one of interpretation than of identification. The first element, *Marteins*, is, as in *Marteins vatn* (39). Formally, the second element can only be viewed as the pl. of ON *kamarr*, m. "privy" (<Lat. *camera privata*) and was presumably so apprehended. The question remains, however, how Nikulás hit upon it. Werlauff would see the right answer in Lat. *camera*, "vault, roof," supposedly with reference to an arched effect of the narrow, rocky defile of the river gorge (cp. Ker 421), though Solmi (1213, n. 1) suggests that this is not the effect produced and urges with historical arguments a derivation from a *Camera s. Martini*, with *camera* in the sense of "customs house," in the charge of *camerarii*, "treasury officials," or the like; cp. MHG *kamer(e)*, *kamerære*, in related senses. Whether Nikulás understood this meaning of *camera* may, however, perhaps be queried; for, if he had, one might have expected a *Marteins tollbúð*, *tollhús*, or the like (to illustrate with modern words). But Solmi's interpretation of *camera* may be right; if not, "court, palace" or important building of some sort might be considered; for such a development in meaning in

France see Longnon 591-92, n. 1. Dating from a century or so earlier is a reference to a locality almost surely on the Dora Baltea: *Camera* (Oehlmann III, 252, n. 1); cp. Bédier II, 151 and n. 1. Finally may be noted the parallel stopping place in Sigeric's diary, *Publei* (46), near Verrès (Sigeric 243, to which add Gröber 522, 46).

(48) *Jøfor-ey*, f. (K 15, 14), Ivrea on the Dora Baltea, prov. Aosta. GCT 42; Andree 125 B2; Baed. NI 209. The ON name, meaning "warrior's island" or the like, is a popular adaptation of late Lat. *Ivoreia* < Gaul. *Eporédia*. See Sigeric 243, 45, to which add d'Arbois de Jubainville 292-93 and Holder I, 1450-52. On the adaptation to ON *ey*, f. of Ital. names in *-(e)ia*, cp. *Papey* (51) and *Sikiley* (under *Pisis*, 71).

(49) *Frið-sæla*, f. (15, 16), ON "bliss of peace," used for Vercelli, at the confluence of the Sesia and the Canterana, prov. Vercelli. GCT 57; Andree 125 C2; Baed. NI 221; see further Sigeric 243 under "*Vercel*" (43), and Philip 374 under "*Verseans*" (40). Nikulás's *Frið-sæla* is probably, as Jónsson II, 936, suggests, merely a fanciful sound-translation of the Roman name *Vercellae*. From here the name may have been carried over into *Thíthreks's Saga* I, 30: *og borg þá er heitir Fritila, er Væringjar kalla Fridsælu*; see Matthias 94-95, esp. at end of entry "*Fritila*."

*þar er byskups-stóll ath Eysebius kirkju* (K 15, 16-17) refers to the cathedral of Vercelli, dedicated to bishop Eusebius; see Kålund 69; EI under "Vercelli;" and esp. Ughelli<sup>1</sup> IV, 1024C-25A; Ughelli<sup>2</sup> IV, 745D-46A.

(50) *Mélans-borg*, f. (K 15, 18), Milan, on the Olona, prov. Milano. GCT 45; Andree 125 D2; Baed. NI 52-54; K 106; Kålund 92. Gaulish *Mediolānum*, "central point on the (Lombard) plain," with reference to Milan's geographical position, > \**Meialāno* > \**Meilāno* whence, with reduction of the diphthong, Ital. *Milano*; cp. OE *Mægélán*. On the name see WP II, 61, near bottom; Dottin 16, 23, 80, 86; Holder II, 497-521; Gröhler I, 129-30 (for many examples in Gaulish territory of this wide-spread name-type); and Matthias 132-36, esp. p. 136, on the development and pronunciation of the name. From early times Milan was the center of an extensive net-work of highways.

Here Milan is said to be one day's journey east from the main road to Rome (*austr af Rómaveg*, K 15, 17-18), with Vercelli (49) as the point of orientation. Milan is mentioned quite incidentally, perhaps to indicate a junction with the doubtful *Iljans-vegr* (54). For other places not on his route, yet mentioned by Nikulás, see Aachen (30) and Pisa (72).

(51) *Papey*, f. (K 15, 19, 23), Pavia, on the Ticino, ca. 3 km. above its junction with the Po, prov. Pavia. GCT 59; Andree 125 D2; Baed. NI 132-35; Werlauff 40 §63; K 107; Kålund 94; Sigeric 242, 41, and Philip 374, 37; Matthias 156-57: for OE *Pafie* Magoun-A 91. Late Lat. *Papia* (*urbs*) for Rom. *Ticinum*. Nikulás's form represents a popular adaptation of the older Ital. *Papeia*, *Paveia*, to the not uncommon ON place-name *Papey* < *papa* + *ey*, "(Irish) priests' island;" see Cleasby-Vigfússon under *papi*, m., and *Reallexikon* II, 602, col. 1. On the adaptation to ON *ey*, f. of Ital. names in *-(e)ia*, cp. *Jøforey* (48).

The following statement requires comment: *þar er keisara-stóll ath Sirus-kirkju; þar hvílir hann; þar óx upp Martinus biskup, ok hann á hofut-kirkju eina* (K 15, 19-22) "the emperors' throne is there in the church of (St.) Syrus; there his (St. Syrus's) remains lie; there (in Pavia St.) Martin grew up, and he has a principal church there." The "emperors' throne" (*sedes imperatoris*),

here said to be in the church of St. Syrus (bishop of Pavia, ca. 300), refers to the throne in the old coronation church of San Michele, dating from the eleventh century and completed in 1155, in which, among others, Henry II (d. 1024) and Frederick II (d. 1250) were crowned kings of Italy (Baed. NI 133); on the church see Ughelli<sup>1</sup> I, \*3-\*4, Ughelli<sup>2</sup> I, 1075C, 1076CD, 1077B; Werlauff 40 §63; Kålund 70;; Solmi 1213. As to St. Martin, born in Pannonia ca. 316, tradition has it that he spent part of his youth in Pavia; see the *Catholic Encyclopaedia*, IX (1910), 732.

(52) *Plazinza*, f. (K 15, 22-23, 25), *Plazinzo-borg*, f. (K 21, 7-8), Piacenza, near the Po, prov. Piacenza. Rom. *Colônia Placentia*. GCT 60; Andree 125 D2; Baed. NI 442; K 107; Kålund 91; Sigeric 242, 38; Philip 374, 36 (*Plesense*). The ON form of this name appears as *Placenzo-borg* in *Strengleikar* (J. R. Keyser-C. R. Unger, edd., 85, 36; 86, 38; 88, 4), also as *Placenzina* (*ibid.*, 86, 27).

*þar er byskups-stóll ath Mario kirkju* (K 15, 22-23) refers to the cathedral, a Lombard romanesque basilica of 1122 (Baed. NI 443), dedicated to the Virgin (Ughelli<sup>1</sup> II, 245C; Ughelli<sup>2</sup> II, 195C: *Dei parae Virgini in coelum assumptæ*).

For the route from here to Rome in various itineraries see Oehlmann IV, 300-03.

(53) *Padus*, Lat. m. (K 15, 24), the Po, largest of the Italian rivers, correctly said to flow between Pavia (51) and Piacenza (52). The form is Latin (cp. K 107, Kålund 91) here as elsewhere (K 44, 9). On this river-name of uncertain etymology see Holder II, 902-20. For OHG and MHG *Pfât* see Matthias 162-64. The older, probably Ligurian name may have been *Bodincus*, -encus. "the deep one;" see EI XXVII, 572; Nissen I, 183 ff.

(54) *Iljans vegr*, m. (K 15, 25; 23, 14-15), a very disputed route-name. The context in which the two references to it occur is, in translation, as follows: (1) "Between Pavia and Piacenza there runs a big river which is called the Po. Then one comes to that route (to be taken by those) who journey the *Iljans-vegr* (var.: that route which the *Iljans-vegur* follows)" (K 15, 23-25). (2) "But the more easterly (route, the) *Iljans-vegr*, is a nine weeks journey" (K 23, 14-15). This second mention comes immediately after, and in contradiction to, a route not further defined, but which is said to be a scant six weeks journey from Rome(?) to the Alps and thence three weeks more to Haddeby (6); the latter route (vs. *Iljans-vegr*) is presumably the route taken by Nikulás and described (from north to south) in the present itinerary. What is *Iljans*? Two very obvious place-names suggested themselves to Werlauff 53-54 §178: (1) the pilgrim center of St.-Gilles<sup>1</sup> (S. Aegidius) in Provence, dep. Gard, France (Andree 93 D2; see further Bédier I, 416 ff., III, 355 ff.: the "*via Tolosana*"). (2) The little town of Ilanz on the Swiss Rhone, canton Graubünden (TAS 409; Andree 84 H3). The ON name of St.-Gilles in Provence appears elsewhere in ON as *Iljansborg* (Schütte 32, n. 2); the saint himself, in the ON personal name *Iljan*, *Elyan*, etc. (Lind 621); cp. also *Iljans-messa*, f. Supporters of the identification with St.-Gilles perforce recommend the radical emendation of *eystra* (K 23, 14) "more easterly" to *vestra* "more westerly;" in justification of this step one may adduce the apparent example of confusion of direction in *Styrjo-land* (61). So Werlauff, followed by Riant 85-86; Rajna *Archivio* 29, n. 2 (with some reserve); Schulte 100-01; Fritzner s.v.; Meissner 194, n. 3; K 23,

<sup>1</sup>Cp. MHG. *Gilje* with Romanic *l* for *d* liquid, cf. M. K. Pope, *From Latin to Modern French* (Manchester, 1934), §645, pp. 230-231. (Paul-Gierach 32 §33, 2, A. 3). For the development of intervocalic 'di' to the

fn. 14 ("e., fejl for vestra"), 104; Kålund 89-91 (but note his: "Spørgsmålet kan næppe afgøres," p. 91); Schütte 32. Oehlmann III, 265-67, urging against textual emendation, supports the Graubünden Ilanz, which could in Nikulás's time have been reached through the Lukmanier or Greina passes (Andree 84 G3). A more daring but far less convincing emendation of *Iljans-* to *Mélans-* (i.e., Milan, 50) is urged by Solmi 1213-15. Apart from the perhaps not crucial difference between the Graubünden Ilanz and ON *Iljans*, the chief objection to be raised against the Ilanz-identification is rather the relative insignificance of Ilanz and hence a certain unlikelihood of its name being given to what Nikulás, at any rate, regarded as an important international route. In a word, both St.-Gilles and Ilanz offer considerable difficulty. Most recently Wilh. Wiget ("Iliansvegr," *Arkiv*, XXXIV [1922], 343-46) suggests that *Iljan* may reflect the Rhaeto-Romanic name of the Julier Pass, cited *Gilgia*, or perhaps better *Djüldja* (so August Kübler, *Die romanischen u. deutschen Örtlichkeitsnamen d. Kantons Graubünden* [Heidelberg, 1926], p. 234 §1688) (Andree 84 I4, TAS 517). Should Wiget's identification be right, the course of the *Iljansvegr* would have been Milan-Como-Chiavenna-Julier Pass (Pass del Djüldja)-Chur-Reichenau; on the pass and the route see Oehlmann IV, 172-79; Schulte 13 f., 46 f. (and Index); Scheffer 207-13. ON *Iljan* is, however, phonetically far from *Djüldja* or the like (or Lat. *Julius*, Ital. *Giulio*, from which the name may well be derived; so Kübler); one might expect something on the order of *Djúl-* or *Jul-*, not *Il-*. When all is said and done, Kålund 91 may be right in saying: "Spørgsmålet kan næppe afgøres."

(55) *Eiríks spítali*, m. (K 16, 1-2; 21; 7), "Eric's Hospice," said to stand eight miles (K 21, 7) S of Piacenza (52) on the way to Borgo S. Donnino (56). The founder of this hospice was Eric I Svendsson, king of Denmark from 1095 to 1103 (K 93, s.v.). See Werlauff 51 §151 and K 101; Kålund 70 notes that the site of, and other details concerning, this hospice cannot be determined; he also calls attention to the account of the establishment of this hospice given in *Knýtlinga saga*, chap. 74 (ed. *Fornmanna sögur*, XI [Copenhagen, 1828], 301): *Eiríkr konúgr snéri þá til heimferðar, en er hann kom til borgarinnar Placencia, þá setti hann spítala skamt frá borginni* ("King Eric then turned to his home-journey, and when he came to the city of Piacenza, then he established a hospice near the town"). On this and other similar foundations see Rjana 112. Schütte 32-33 suggests a locality near Fiorenzuola d'Arda (GCT 72; Andree 125 D3); on Fiorenzuola; ca. 20 km. SE of Piacenza (52), see Sigeric 242, 47 and Solmi 1215, n. 2.

(56) *Domna borg*, f. (K 16, 1), Borgo San Donnino, since 1927 incorporated in Fidenza, prov. Parma. GCT 73; Andree 126 E3; Baed. NI 445; Sigeric 242, 36 (*Sanctae Domnine*); Philip 373, 34 (*Seint Domyne*); K 101; Kålund 70, 92; Bédier II, 206-11. The town took its name from St. Dominus, martyr of Parma.

At Borgo S. Donnino the route leaves the Claudian Way and turns south, probably passing through Medesano (GCT 73, Schütte, map at end) and meeting the Taro (57) very likely at or near Fornovo di Taro (prov. Parma) (cp. Sigeric 241, 35-34), thus joining the "*strata vallis Tarii*" (Schütte 48, Rajna 113).

(57) *Tár*, m.(?) (K 16, 2), the Taro river. Gallo-Lat. *Tarus*, later also *Tarius*, probably meaning "the swift one;" see d'Arbois de Jubainville 151-52; Holder II, 1738; PW, 2d ser., 8. Halbb. (Stuttgart, 1932), col. 2457; *EI* XXXIII, 277; Gröhler I, 102-03; Werlauff 41 §66; K 109; Kålund 91; Solmi 1215, n. 3. On

certain characteristics of this river as here described (K 16, 2-5) see Magoun, *Modern Language Notes*, LV (1940), 598, under "blaungaz."

(58) *Társ-borg*, f. (K 16, 5), Borgo Val di Taro, older official name Borgotaro, prov. Parma; Med. Lat. *Burgum Vallum Tari(i)*. GCT 84; Andree 125 D3; Baed. NI. 457; *EI* VII, 488; K 109; Kålund 70, 92; Solmi 1215. An important route-junction (Schütte 48-50).

(59) *Munbard* (K 16, 6, 7, 10; 17, 9), Med. Lat. *Mons Bardonis*, Ital. *Monte Bardone*, OFr *Munt Bardon*, etc., common medieval designation of the crest of the Ligurian Apennines (see Schütte 26, n. 1). Baed. NI 457; Andree 125 D3; *EI* X, 447-48; Werlauff 41 §67; Meissner 195-96; K 106; Kålund 70 and n. 1; Philip 373, 27 (*Mont Bardon*); Sigeric 241 between (32) and (33), where the reference is no doubt specifically to the much used Cisa pass (see Bédier II, 214 ff.). On the present journey, since the route runs from Borgo Val di Taro (58) to Pontremoli (65), the Icelanders probably crossed *Munbard* over the Bratello Yoke (see Schütte 43, n. 1, 44, 46, 48, 54, and map at end) and not, as Schütte 33 proposed, and Solmi 1216 and n. 1 echoes, the Cisa pass used by Sigeric.

A brief digression, involving three names (60-62), follows:

(60) *Langbarðaland*, n. (K 16, 6-7), "land of the Langobards," i.e., "long-bearded men," Lombardy, correctly said to include the area extending south from the Ligurian Apennines (*Munbard*, 59), north to the Alps (*Mundja*, 40). On the underlying Germanic tribal name see *Reallexikon* III, 123-25; Malone 174-75; Olivieri 313-15; Kauffmann II, 65-79; Magoun-A 88-89; Solmi 1216; Metzenthin 62-3. Alongside of *Langbarðaland* as here (also mod. Icel.), it may be noted that *Thithrek's Saga* (II, 407-08), shows variously: *Lunbardi*, *Lungbardi*, *Lingbardi*, *Langbardi*, suggesting the influence of thirteenth-century German *Lumbardie*; see Matthias 125, bottom; Fritzner under *Lumbarðaland*.

(61) *Styrjo-land*, n. (K 16, 9), ON "land of the sturgeon (*styria*, f.)." Mention of the Alps in connection with the definition of Lombardy (60) leads to a definition of the great mountain-system stretching from the Gulf of Genoa to Vienna (see *EI* II, 591 ff., under "Alpi," esp. map facing p. 592). Nikulás's definition runs: *Annar endir Mundjo-fjals* (40) *kemr til sjófar vestr aa Styrjo-landi; enn annar austr í Feneyjarbotnum* (62) (K 16, 8-9) "one end of the Alps runs to the sea (Gulf of Genoa) westward in the Stura region(?); the other, east to the lagoons of the Venetian littoral." The latter part of this definition refers to the so-called Venetian Alps (Andree 125 G1), ca. 50 km. N of Venice. The first part, i.e., the remarks on *Styrjo-land*, is less clear: the element *Styrjo-* naturally suggested to Werlauff 41 §68 the South-German district of Styria (Steiermark), whose name occasionally is given to a division of the Alps E of the Hohe Trauern. But since this *land*, "region," is said to be east (Ms. *austr*), not west (*vestr*) of Venice, Werlauff suggested the possibility of an error for *Spánland*, "Spain;" Werlauff was obviously influenced by Langebek 37: *Mundiu fiall geingr. fra Feneya botnum austan ok uestr aa Spanland*; he is followed by Solmi 1216. Of course the Alps do not run to Spain, and it is hard to imagine that Nikulás thought that they did so. Kålund (K 109 s.v.), with German Styria (Steiermark) in mind, asks if we may not have here an error for *Liguria-land*, with reference to the Ligurian Alps, a group of the Maritime Alps; the palaeographic difficulties connected with

such an emendation are, however, considerable. Later he (Kålund 71 and n. 1) came close to what is, I think, the right answer, namely, an identification with the river-name *Stura*, occurring twice in Italy. Kålund actually had in mind the valley of the *Stura* (Rom. *Stura*), tributary of the Po (Baed. NI 206; Andree 125 B2). Lying just south of the Graian Alps, the Po *Stura* might be thought of as a western boundary of the Lombard area. However, in view of Nikulás's statement that the mountains reach or approach the sea (*tíl sjófar*), I think that we must associate his *Styrjo-land* not with the Po *Stura*, but with the more southerly *Stura di Demonte* (GCT 80, 91; Andree 125 B3; Baed. NI 198-99), tributary of the Tanaro (prov. Cuneo), which empties into the Gulf of Genoa; its basin can be associated with the Maritime Alps. See also Metzenthin 101. On the Celtic river-name *Stur(i)a* see Ekwall ERN 381-82, DEPN 426-27; Holder II, 1641. Nikulás's *Styrja* is obviously different from *Stura* and may have been influenced either by the ON fish-name, "sturgeon," or by knowledge of the two North-German *Sturia*'s; the *Stör*, a tributary of the Elbe, in Schleswig-Holstein, and the *Stuhr*, in Oldenburg.

(62) *Feneyja botnar*, m. pl. (K 16, 9); cp. *Feneyjar* (K 20, 17; 24, 26-27), the lagoons (*botnar*) in the region of Venice, prov. Venezia. Cp. GCT 51, 52, 65; Andree 125 G2; Baed. NI xxxiv, 347-38; Langebek 37. ON *Fen-eyjar*, f. pl., "bog-, marsh-islands," is a sound-translation (Kålund 93 §3: "en næsten genial gengivelse") of Ital. *Venezia*, here perhaps not the "city" of Venice but rather the Venetian "region" (cp. K Vol. III, p. 46, 6-7, where *Aquileja* is placed in *Feneyjar*); Rom. *Venetia*, "country, region of the Veneti." As I pointed out in NoB XXVIII (1940), 113, n. 80, *botnar* (cp. *hafbotn*, K 20, 16) here refers not to the Gulf of Venice (sg.) (as K 101 and Matthias 207-08 under "Venedisches Meer"), but to the numerous large lagoons (pl.), formed by the building up of *lidí* or elongated mud-banks, parallel to the main shore near Venice (cp. the *Lido*), for which ON *lón*, n., might have been a better word. *Fenidi*, -edi, of *Thithrek's Saga* (II, 402) is evidently based on such earlier German forms as *Vénedi(e)* vs. the modern *Venédig* (Matthias 203-04).

Two difficult names (63-64) follow, both said to be up in *Munbard* (59).

(63) *Crucis markaðr*, m. (var.: *m. eða borg*) (K 16, 9-10), a hybrid formation, consisting of Lat. g. sg. *crucis* "of the Cross" and ON *markaðr*, m., "market." The locality, not identified, is said to be up in the Ligurian Apennines (*á Munbardi*, 59); the name suggests an Ital. *foro* or *mercatale della Croce*, or the like; it can scarcely be Santa-Croce sull' Arno of Matthias 84. Werlauff 41 §69, followed by Riant 83 and Meissner 195, notes a S. Croce sul Taro, whose existence is, however, queried by K 100 (s.v.) and Kålund 94 and 71, n. 2, who also notes as geographically unsuitable a little commune of S. Croce del Magra on the Gulf of Spezia. Is this possibly a reference to the Cento Croce pass (Schütte 46)? A puzzle.

(64) *Fracka skáli*, m. (K 16, 10), lit. "shieling of the Franks or French;" Werlauff 41 §69, followed by Meissner 195, would, perhaps rightly associate this with Villa Franca (GCT 95; Andree 125 D3; Repetti V, 777), on the left bank of the Magra, located, however, beyond and below Pontremoli (65) (cp. Schütte, and map at end); so hesitantly K 102 (cp. Kålund 71, 94); Solmi 1216 and n. 2, identifies it with a *Villa Francorum* or *Villa Franca*, a day's journey between Pontremoli (65) and Aulla (66?). If Villa Franca is meant, the order of stops is dislocated and (64) should follow (65). It can scarcely be Castel-Franco di Sotto in the Val-d'Arno (Repetti I, 545) of Matthias 78.

(65) *Montreflar* (K 16, 11), no doubt Pontremoli, at the confluence of the Verde and the Magra, prov. Massa, important gate-way to the route over the Cisa Pass and the Bratello Yoke (*Munbard*, 59). GCT 84; Andree 125 D3; Baed. NI 457; Werlauff 41 §70; K 106; Kålund 92; Philip 373, 26 (*Pount Tremble*). The name (Lat. *Pons Tremuli*) means the "bridge by which aspen trees grow" (Sigeric 240-41, 31, "*Puntremel*"). Werlauff's suggestion, followed by Gröber 520, 31, Matthias 165, Kålund 92, and Solmi 1216 and n. 3, that Ms. *Montreflar* shows a transposition of letters: \**Pontremlar* > \**Montreplar* > *Montreflar*, may well be right.

(66) *Mario gilldi*, n. (K 16, 11, 15), ON "guild or confraternity under the protection of St. Mary." This place or building is said to be one day's journey from Pontremoli (65); after *Mario gilldi* come Borgo S. Stefano di Magra (67) and Luni (68). This locality is most likely in or near Aulla in the Val-di-Magra (prov. Massa) (GCT 96; Andree 125 D3; Baed. NI 457); Aulla would be a natural stopping place (cp. Sigeric 240, 30, to which add Gröber 520, 30). This "guild" has not been identified. Solmi 1216 and n. 4 sensibly favors a location near Aulla as against the unlikely identification with S. Maria della Suorte on the Gulf of Spezia (not on GCT 95-96?), put forth by Werlauff 41 §71, K 105, Kålund 71 and n. 3.

(67) *Stéphānus borg*, f. (K 16, 15), (Borgo) S. Stefano di Magra (now merely a railway station), prov. La Spezia. GCT 95; Andree 125 D3; Sigeric 240, 29, to which add Werlauff 41 §73, K 109, Kålund 72, Solmi 1217, n. 1; Volpe 346 under "S. Stefano, val di Magra." As in the case of Horhausen (17) and perhaps *Clemunt* (81), Nikulás introduces Borgo S. Stefano out of order, i.e., after Luni (68), between which and *Mario gilldi* (66) it is correctly said to stand.

(68) *Luna*, f. (K 16, 12, 15, 18, 19), near the present ruins of Luni (prov. La Spezia), ca. 3 km. NE of the mouth of the Magra on the Aurelian Way in the Val-di-Magra; once great Etruscan sea-port. GCT 96; Andree 125 D3; Baed. NI 276. The modern form in -i is by analogy with other Ital. names in -i <Lat. dat. loc. pl. -is (cp. Vercelli, 49 above). See further Sigeric 240, 28, to which add Jung 81; Werlauff 41 §72; K 105; Kålund 71-72; Schütte 31; Solmi 1216-18; Philip 372, 23 (*Lune*). In the Middle Ages Luni was noted as a route-juncture from Spain (*Spánn*, m., K 16, 18), especially from Santiago (S. Iacobus) de Compostela (prov. La Coruna) in Galicia (*frá Jácóbs [landi]*, K 16, 19, in ON tantamount to "Galicia"; see Riant 74, 180; Bédier II, 216; Metzenthin under "Galicia" and "Jákóbsland;" A. H. Krappe, "The Norsemen at Luna," *Scandin. Stud.*, XVIII (1944), 71-78.

*Luna-sandar*, m. pl. (K 16, 12), *Lunu-sandar* (K 16, 16), lit. "sands of Luni," standing by sound-translation for the region of La Lunigiana, older Lunisiana. Located in the Lunigiana is said to be the *ormgarðr*, *er Gunnar var í settr* (K 16, 16-17), i.e., the famous snake-pen into which Gunnar was cast.<sup>1</sup>

For some distance down the coast from Luni the route now approximates, though is not identical with, the ancient Aemelian Way (Sardi 157, 160-74, 224).

(69) *Mario borg*, f. (K 16, 16), like Borgo S. Stefano (67), said to lie between *Mario gilldi* (66, Aulla?) and Luni (68), may stand for Sarzana (prov. La Spezia).

<sup>1</sup>For discussion of Nikulás's *Lunu-sandar* pen, see Magoun Nikulás, 211-212.

GCT 96; Andree 125 D3; Baed. NI 276; Volpe 53 ff. So Werlauff 41 §73; K 105 with query; Kålund 72; Solmi 1217 and n. 1. If the identification with Sarzana is right, the site is presumably so designated from its cathedral of St. Mary; see Ughelli<sup>1</sup> I, 893D; Ughelli<sup>2</sup> I, 833C; Repetti V, 187-88. Cp. *Kristino borg* (82) for Bolsena. If *Mario borg* is not Sarzana, one might think alternatively of the "castello di S. Maria," later the site of Castelnuovo di Magra (Repetti I, 573; Volpe 57, 71). It can scarcely be equated with the "Castel Fort" of the chansons de geste; cp. Bedier, II, 217.

(70) *Kjófor* (*m?* or *n?*) *unt* (K 16, 18), said to be south of Luni (67). A difficult name. Werlauff 42 §75 makes two suggestions: (1) If (*m*) is right, we may have to do with Mont Cheverol (see Bédier II, 218), i.e., Capriglia (Repetti I, 470), near Pietrasanta, prov. Pisa (GC8 104; Baed. NI 278; Repetti IV, 216 ff.; Jung 81 and n. 1; Sardi 171-2). This is rejected by Kålund 72-73 as too unlike the ON word, but ON *Kjófor*- (perh. *Kjöfor*-) and OFr *Chever*(ol)- are not so unlike! (2) If (*n*) is to be read, Werlauff compares *Caferonianum*, modern Garfagnana < *Carfaniana* (Repetti II, 400 ff.), a region ca. 40 km. E of the Lunigiana in the upper valley of the Serchio (Andree 125 E3). Riant 83 suggested a Monte Corbolo, at whose base Luni lies; this is cited by K 104 and Kålund 72 (without approval). Solmi 1218 and n. 1 favors the Garfagnana interpretation. It may be pointed out that in Sigeric's itinerary (Sigeric 240, 27) Camaioire (cp. Sardi 170) occupies the corresponding position (i.e., the stop between Luni and Lucca). I favor the Mont Cheverol-Capriglia identification (cp. Bédier II, map facing p. 152).

(71) *Lúka*, f. (K 16, 19, 24; 17, 4), Lucca, prov. Lucca. Rom. *Lúca*. GCT 113; Andree 126 E4; Baed. NI 531; on the history and etymology see Sigeric 239-40; Philip 372, 20 (*Lukes*); Werlauff 42 §77; K 105, Kålund 73, 91. On Lucca as a pilgrim center see Schnürer 278, n. 20; Bédier II, 221-29.

*þar er byskups-stóll ath Mario kirkju; þar er Róða sú, er Nichædemus lét gera eptir Guði Sealfum* (K 16, 20-21). The Cross, here referred to, is the famous crucifix of Lucca, since 1107 at least in the cathedral dedicated to St. Martin (not to St. Mary!); it is known as the "*Vultum Sanctum*" or "*Volto Santo*" (Fr. "saint Vou de Lucques"); cp. K XXII; Kålund 73; and EI XXI, 559, for photograph. Its manufacture was attributed to Nicodemus; see Almerico Guerra, *Storia del Volto Santo di Lucca* (Lucca, 1881), esp. Index under "Nicodemo" and "Miracoli;" Bédier II, 221-28; Schnürer 271-306; Ughelli<sup>1</sup> I, 840D-41A; Ughelli<sup>2</sup> I, 791B. Note the appeal to this "*Rode of Lukes*" in the Middle-English *Piers Plowman* B VI, 102, C IX, 109. The miracles described by Nikulás do not seem to be reported elsewhere.

From Lucca to Siena (78) it is said to be a three days' journey. At this point Nikulás digresses for a moment to comment on the great sea-port of Pisa (72), quite obviously not on his route, as Rajna *Archivio* 28, n. 1 alone seems to have noticed; Oehlmann IV, 301, n. 11, wrongly assumes a side-trip.

(72) *Pisis* (Ms. *Pifs*), Lat. dat.-loc. pl. (K 16, 25), Pisa, on the Arno, now ca. 10 km. from the sea, prov. Pisa. On the case form cp. *Aquis* (30). Rom. *Pisa* and *Pisae*, perhaps an Etruscan name. GCT 104; Andree 126 E4; Baed. NI 516 ff.; Jung 80; Repetti IV, 297 ff.; EI XXVII, 392 ff.; Werlauff 42 §78; K 107; Kålund 91; Solmi 1219 and n. 2 (misunderstanding Werlauff). Nikulás describes Pisa as S of Lucca (K 16, 24); SSW would be more accurate. In Nikulás's day Pisa was at the height of its power as a mercantile center,



active in trade with the Levant (Monneret de Villard 75). Nikulás (K 16, 25-27) reports the presence there of large trading vessels or dromonds (ON *drómundar*) from Greece (*Grikkland*, mod. Icel. *Grikkland*), Sicily (*Sikiley*; on -ey cp. *Joforey*, 47), also of men (merchants) from Egypt (*Egiptaland*), Syrians (*sýrlendzkir* <*Sýrland*, "Syria," Lat. *Syria*), and Africans (*Affrikar*), presumably referring to North Africa, west of Egypt, i.e., Berber or Lybian peoples.

After this digression on Pisa, Nikulás resumes his journey from Lucca (71), following the pilgrim route (*via romea* or *francesca*) SW toward Fucecchio on the Arno. Cp. Sigeric 239, 26-24; Bédier II, map facing p. 152; Sardi 223 ff.; Rajna *Archivio* 35, n. 1 (later known as the *Traversa lucchese*, i.e., cross-country road from Lucca to Fucecchio).

(73) *Arn Blakr*, m. (K 16, 27-28), ON "black Arno," a village (*þorp*), near or at Fucecchio, said to be S (better SE) of Lucca (71) and certainly to be equated with the *Aqua* (miswritten for *Arna* or *Arno* with Insular *r*?) *Nigra* of Sigeric 239, 24 and *Arle le noir* of Philip 372, 17, in turn to be identified with the so-called *Arno nero* (Repetti II, 358, col. 1; Gröber 519, 24), surely not the *Arno bianco* of Kålund 73, 93 (*Arle le blanc* of Philip, 372, 16) nor the port of Pisa or Leghorn, as suggested by Werlauff 42 §79. On the *Arno nero* see Repetti II, 358, col. 1; Jung 69 ff.; Bédier II, 219-20; Solmi 1219 and n. 3.

(74) *Mattildar spítali*, m. (K 16, 28), "Hospice of Matilda" (of Canossa, countess of Tuscany, 1046-1115). Neither Werlauff 42 §80 nor Solmi 1219 locate this foundation beyond suggesting that it must be near Pisa (71) or *Arn Blakr* (73). Repetti I, 76; Riant 83; Gröber 519 identify this with the great hospice (Rajna 114) of S. Jacopo di Altopascio in the Val-di-Nievola (prov. Lucca), between Lucca and Fucecchio and no doubt rightly (GCT 105; Andree 126 E4; Baed. NI 538; Sigeric 239, 23; *L'Ospital* of Philip 372, 19). K 106 refers to Riant, but notes (K XXII) that the details cannot be controlled; later Kålund accepted Riant's localization of Altopascio (Kålund 73). On Matilda see Jung 78-79; *EI* XXII, 569-69.

Nikulás notes that, by establishing this foundation, Matilda redeemed a pledge to the monks of Monte Cassino (Andree 128 D3) to build a hospice (*þi leystiz hon af ór Montakassin ath láta reisa spítal; ok skal hvern mann ala um nott*, K 16, 28-30).

(75) *Sanctinus borg*, f. (K 16, 30), perhaps (Borgo) San Genesio, ca. 3 km. NE of San-Miniato, prov. Pissa, and near the confluence of the Elsa and the Arno. A difficult name, placed between Matilda's Hospice (74), perhaps at or near Altopascio, and Poggibonsi (76). Formally *Sanctinus* is St. Santin, third-century bishop of Meaux, whose name has been given to several French towns (Longnon 440 §2034; Gröhler II, 423), but I find no trace of this saint's name in Repetti, either as a place-name or in association with a church in any likely town. The form in the Ms. may be distorted. Werlauff 42-43 §81 would identify it with *Seint Denis de Bon-repast* (Philip, 371, 15), which, in turn, Jung 65; Gröber 519, 22; Bédier II, 228 identify with Borgo S. Genesio. Werlauff also notes a *Buo(n)-riposo* between Pisa and Siena. Riant 83 proposed San Miniato (from St. Minias, Florentine martyr, d. 250) (GCT 105; Andree 126 E4 or 127 A1; Repetti V, 79 ff.), and is doubtfully supported by K 108. Later, Kålund 73, 92, suggests, still doubtfully, Borgo S. Genesio, later joined to San Miniato (Repetti I, 352-53); so Oehlmann IV, 302, apparently followed by Jung 65, n. 6.

Solmi 1219 suggests that *Sanctinus* shows a scribal error for *Sanc denis* (cp. Philip, above), better perhaps *San Dinis*, with Ms. *ct* for *d*, and he may well be on the right track. If this is correct, Nikulás is using the name *Dionysius*, represented by some form of the semi-learned French *Denis*. Of course, *Genesio*, i.e., St. Genesius, Roman martyr, whose name was given to the *borgo* in question, is not *Dionysius* (St. Denis); nevertheless one may perhaps wonder if to a foreign ear the two names in contemporary Italian pronunciation might not have sounded much alike (cp. *diurnum* > Ital. *giorno*, Fr. *jour*) and if the more familiar was not substituted for the less familiar saint. This may likewise explain Sigeric's *Sancte Dionisii* (Sigeric 239, 22; Gröber 519, 22), standing in a similar position on the *via romea*. If Nikulás wrote *Dinis* or *Denis*, it would further seem that he got the name somehow through French channels (French pilgrims?).

The pilgrims are now quite evidently proceeding up the Val-d'Elsa and toward Siena (78).

(76) *Martinus borg*, f. (K 16, 30-17, 1), by easy confusion with the name of St. Martin, common in place-names, almost surely miswritten for *Marturus borg*, rendering *Borgo (vecchio) Marturi*, site of the Benedictine abbey of St. Michael (Repetti IV, 480; *EI* XXVII, 59), founded in 998 (Repetti I, 22-23), near the *Podium Bonitii*, on which a little fortified town was built between 1155-56, namely, Poggibonsi on the Elsa, prov. Siena. GCT 113; Andree 126 F4 or 127 A1; Baed. *RCI* 22; *EI* XXVII, 592-93. So tentatively Riant 83; Oehlmann IV, 302; K 106; Kålund 57 (Poggibonsi ?), 73-74 ("anses for at være Poggibonsi"); cp. further Matthew Paris's *La Martre* (Ludwig 128, n. 3) and *Martirburg* of Wolfger, bishop of Passau (*ibid.*, 102, n. 4), both names standing for Poggibonsi.

Ms. *Martinus* has, however, supporters. Werlauff 43 §81 suggests a *suburbium* s. *Martini*, i.e., the suburban community of Siena, Terzo S. Martino (Repetti V, 383 ff.), but this is quite unlikely since the pilgrims have not yet reached Siena (78); nor is Solmi's suggestion (1219, n. 5 and 1220) of S. Martino di Fosci, a little beyond San Gimignano (Andree 127 B1-2; see Sigeric 238, 18; Gröber 518, 18, is wrong here) much more plausible. Too far back on the route, and thus scarcely to be considered here, are Castel-Martini near Fucecchio (Repetti I; 565) or San Martino a Castiglione near San Miniato (Repetti III, 103-04).

Poggibonsi, an important stop and possible route-junction (Rajna *Atti* 113), is surely meant.

(77) *Semunt* (?) (Ms. *Semt*) (K 17, 1). Another difficult name, the discussion of which involves *Langa syn* (78), which apparently stands for Siena. Werlauff 43 §82, followed by Riant 83, Oehlmann IV, 302, n. 5, and Solmi 1220, takes *Semunt* (?) as Siena, viewing *langa syn* (78) as an appellation ("unde amplius prospectus," Werlauff 21). Kålund (K 17, n. 1) seems to admit this as a possibility, though evidently preferring to identify *Langa syn* with Siena itself; in his Register (K 108) he defines *Semunt* as "bjærg(?) nær Siena, uvist hvor", and similarly later (Kålund 74: "kan ikke nærmere bestemmes"). After all, the very significance of Ms. *Semt* is far from clear. It is, for example, sheer idle speculation to think about, say, Monteriggione (Repetti V, 242; Andree 127 B1), once famous castle in the Val-d'Elsa, on the hill of Petrognano (Repetti IV, 151) and midway between Poggibonsi and Siena.

(78) *Langa syn* (K 17, 1), almost surely Siena, prov. Siena. GCT 120; Andree

127 B1; Baed. RCI 26 ff.; Repetti V, 295 ff.; Jung 52-57. The unlikely alternative is to take *langa syn* as an appellative (Werlauff 21: "unde amplus prospectus"), referring to *Semunt*(?) (77), in turn identified with Siena, as does Werlauff and a few others (see *Semunt*, 77). But *langa syn* does not seem to be proper Icelandic; cp. ON *langsýnn*, adj., "farsighted" and mod. Icel. *langsýni*, f. (or -*sýnis*, n.), "long-, farsightedness, hypermetropia." The ordinary ON word meaning "unde amplus prospectus" "offering a wide or distant prospect, view" is *viðsýnn* (so under *Luna-sandar*, 67), with the sb. *viðsýni*, f. "wide prospect." *Langa syn*, however inept a compound, is almost surely a place-name and refers to Siena (K 105: "sandsynligvis;" Kålund 74: "utvivlsomt"). The second element, *Syn*, would seem to be a more or less direct adaptation of Ital. *Siena*, with a treatment of the *ie* comparable to such medieval German forms as *Sin*, *Syn* (Matthias 184-85). *Langa* is less easy to explain: Siena occupies a markedly elevated position (hence med. Germ. *Hôhiu Siene*, *Hôhe Sin*, etc., Matthias, loc. cit.) and spreads over three hills; this geographical extension, rather than any distant view (Kålund 74: "med vid utsigt"), may have prompted the use of *Langa* here, as in various Scandinavian place-names (cp. Cleasby-Vigfússon under *langr*, adj., V).

Nikulás comments on various special features of *Langa syn*: It is a "good town" (*góð borg*, K 17, 2; so of Aosta, 45); there is a bishop's throne in the church of St. Mary (in Siena) (Ughelli<sup>1</sup> III, 619A, 620A; Ughelli<sup>2</sup> III, 526B, 527A). His final observation is that the women there are very beautiful (*vænstrar*, K 17, 3); on this last point see Jung 57, n. 3.

(79) *Klerka borg*, f. (K 17, 3), lit. "clerics' town," rendering *S. Clericus*, in the Middle Ages a by-form (by popular etymology?) of *S. Quirico d'Orcia*, prov. Siena. *Klerka*, g. pl. of ON *klerkr*, m. "cleric," in many compounds has the force of "ecclesiastic, pertaining to the church." GCT 121; Andree 127 B1; Baed. RCI 55; Sigeric 237, 12; Philip 371, 9 (*Seint Cler*); Werlauff 43 §83; K 104; Kålund 74, 92; Matthias 166 for Low German *Sijnt Clericum* (*Clerico*); I do not understand Gröber's comments (517, 12) on this name.

At some point north of Acquapendente (80) (K 17, 8) the pilgrims cross a mountain (K 17, 5), *Clemunt* (81, below).

(80) *Hanganda-borg*, f. (K 17, 5, 8), lit. "city of the water-fall" (see Fritzner under *hangandi*, m., "water fall"). The name translates Acquapendente, "precipitous stream," at the confluence of the Quintaluna and the Paglia, prov. Viterbo. GCT 129; Andree 127 B2; Baed. RCI 57. The Ital. name refers specifically to the sharp 200 m. drop (fall), which the Quintaluna takes here in joining the Paglia. Werlauff 43 §84; K 103; Kålund 74, 94; Sigeric 236-37, 9; Philip 370, 6 (*Eke Pendannte*); Solmi 1220 (bottom) is wrong in assuming an error in orientation or direction in the text. *Hengilsborg* might have been a better rendering; cp. Icel. *Hengill*.

(81) *Clemunt*(?) (Ms. *Clemt*) (K 17, 5, 8), as noted above (before 80), a locality north of Acquapendente (80). We are further told that it is a mountain (*fjall*, K 17, 5), on which is a stronghold (*kastali*, K 17, 6), called locally *Mala Mulier*, in Icelandic *ill kona* (K 17, 6-7); the people there (in the castle?, in the region?) are said to be "very bad" (*en versta þjóð*, K 17, 7). This seems to refer to the hill on which Radicofani stands. GCT 129; Andree 127 B2; Baed. RCI 56; Jung 44-46. Werlauff 43 §85: Montichielli (Lat. *Mons Clœlii*) on which a citadel, later called Radicofani (*vulgo dicta*); also formerly called St. Peter's (cp. Sigeric 237, 10: "*Sancte Petri in Pail*"). Riant 83-84: Monte-Chielle. K

100: "mountain range in southern Tuscany" and compares Riant. Kålund 54 glosses "Radicofani," and *ibid.* 74, ll. 15-25, points out that *Clemunt*, while formally corresponding to Montechiello (Lat. *Monticulum*), a mountain top NE of S. Quirico (in the Val-d'Orcia, Repetti III, 563-65), clearly enough ("tydelig nok") refers to Radicofani, lying to the south of this. Below the castle runs the only road leading to Rome over the lowest pass in this region (so Solmi 1220; Repetti I, 396). On the southern slope of the eminence is a village Callemala < *callis*, "declivity," "mountain path" + *malus*, "bad." (cp. Repetti III, 29).

(82) *Tuscia* (Ms. *Ruscia*) f. (K 17, 9 and n. 9), later Lat. name for Etruria (PW 11 Halbb. [Stuttgart, 1907], 720-27; *EI* XXXIV 572), later Tuscany (*EI* XXXIV, 579 ff.). Mod. English "Tuscany" corresponds to late Lat. \**Tuscan-ia*; the Ital and Germ. *Toscana*, to the adj. *tuscanus*. Werlauff 43 §86; K 108 under "*Ruscia*," 110 under "*Tuscia*," Kålund 57, 74, 91 (where the emendation is assumed); Solmi 1220; Nissen II, i, 278 ff.; Repetti V, 556 ff.; *EI*, cited above; Metzenthin 110 under "*Tuskania*."

Nikulás (K 17, 8-9) describes Tuscany as extending from Acquapendente (80) to the Apennines (58), and this is approximately correct; to have placed the southern edge of Tuscany at Viterbo (85) would have been somewhat more exact. Ms. *Ruscia* suggests some sort of scribal confusion with the ON name of Russia (ON *Rúcia*, *Rúciland*, etc., Metzenthin 86-87).

(83) *Kristíno borg*, f. (K 17, 10), lit. "city of St. Christina," conventional epithet for Bolsena, prov. Viterbo, where St. Christina was martyred and where there is an eleventh-century church dedicated to her. GCT 137; Andree 127 BC2; Baed. *RCI* 117. On the epithet, St. Christina, for Bolsena see Werlauff 43 §87; K 104; Kålund 74, 94; Solmi 1221; Sigeric 236, 8; Gröber 517, 8; Philip 370, 5; Matthias 68, with *Sant Crístinen Se* and in German sources *Lacum s. Christinae* for the Lake of Bolsena (Lago di Bolsena).

Nikulás (K 17, 10-11) reports the tradition that St. Christina's relics are there and that her footprint is marked in a stone (Werlauff, *loc. cit.*).

Here the *via romea* joins the old Cassian Way (Rajna 113), coming in from Chiusi.

(84) *Fla(vian)s borg*, f. (K 17, 11-12), Borgo (or Vico) S. Flaviano, once a suburb of Montefiascone (prov. Viterbo), where there still is a twelfth-century church, dedicated to St. Flavian, bishop of Constantinople, d. 449. The name is a conventional epithet for Montefiascone (cp. 83, above). GCT 137; Andree 127 C2; Baed. *RCI* 123; Werlauff 43-44 §88; K 102; Kålund 74, 94; Solmi 1221; Matthias 144; Gröber 516, 7 Sigeric 236, 7.

(85) *Boternis borg*, f. (K 17, 12), Viterbo, prov. Viterbo, on or near the site of Rom. \**Sorrinum* (Nissen II, i, 343-44). GCT 143; Andree 127 C2; Baed. *RCI* 124 ff.; Sigeric 236, 6. See further Werlauff 44 §89; Riant 84; K 100; Kålund 74-75; Solmi 1221. The Ms. spelling o is likely an error for i, or perhaps e, probably *Biternis borg* in the prototext; the latter spelling corresponds to the common med. Germ. and Fr. *Biterne* (Matthias 220-21; cp. Bédier II, 229, n. 1, and Philip 370, 3).

(86) *þiðreks bað*, n. (K 17, 12-13), lit. "Thithrek's (steam?)-bath," said to be at or near Viterbo (85), where there is a warm spring, but in all probability to be identified with Bagnoregio (prov. Viterbo), between Bolsena (83) and (ca. 5 km. NNE of) Montefiascone (84), thus somewhat off the route; cp.

Magoun Nikulás 212, n. 10, for literature. GCT 137; Andree 127 C2.

The older official name, Bagnorea, looks back to Lat. sb. adj. *balnearia* "warm springs," but is referred to in the eighth century as *balneum régis* (also *régium*) by Paulus Diaconus (see Werlauff, Matthias) and was thought by Muratori to have been established by some Gothic rex, probably Theoderic the Great (d. 526). *Thithrek's Saga* (II, 357, 392, 397; cp. Erichsen 434, 459) refers to *þiðreks bað* as a place (*í þeim stað, ibid., II, 392*). The modern name, Bagnoregio, is a restoration of the Med. Lat. *balneum régis* (since 1922). The tradition may be genuine, or not. On the name-type (i.e., bathing establishments) in France see Longnon 146 §569-70; Gröhler II, 233-34.

(87) *Sútarinn Micli*, m. (K 17, 13-14), Sutri (major), prov. Viterbo. GCT 143; Andree 127 C2 and inset K7; Baed. RCI 130. Rom. *Sutrium*: IA 286, 3. Nikulás's form is obviously adapted to ON *sútari*, m. "tanner" (Lat. *sutor*, m. "souter, shoemaker"), the whole as if "the big tanner." Werlauff 44 §91; Riant 84 (who appears to equate this with *Sútarinn litli*, 88) K 109; Kålund 75; Sigeric 236, 4; Gröber 516, 4; Bédier II, 231-35; Solmi 1221; Matthias 189; Philip 370, 2 (*Sucre*). On Sutri as a pilgrim stop see Rajna *Archivio* 31; Tomassetti V, 636-37.

(88) *Sútarinn Litli*, m. (K 17, 14), Sutri (minor?), said to be a day's journey S from Sutri (major) (87) and near Monte Mario (89); *hjá Frekins-brecku* (K 17, 15. Investigation has failed to reveal a "little" or "lesser" Sutri (Solmi 1221). Several suggestions have been made as to places which might suit the conditions here laid down; that some of these are hopelessly wrong is due to earlier wrong identifications of *Fegins-brecka* (89). Werlauff offers three possibilities: (1) Nepi (GCT 143), 10 km. E of Sutri and quite off the route. (2) Cesano (GCT 143; Andree 127, inset K7), almost half-way between Sutri (major) (87) and Rome. (3) Posta della Storta (GCT 143), near the old Etrurian city of Veii (Andree 127, inset K7) and almost half-way between Cesano and Rome. Both Cesano and La Storta lie, it may be noted, near the Cassian Way. Kålund (K 109 and Kålund 75, 94, somewhat tentatively) favors La Storta. In his consideration of Werlauff's proposals Solmi (1221-22) regards Nepi as the least unacceptable of the alternate sites proposed but goes on (1222) to urge tentatively Baccano, once important stopping place in the Cassian Way (see Sigeric 236, 3).

Is there, perhaps, some confusion between Sutri and La Storta? A crux.

(89) *Fegins-brecka*, f. (K 17, 15), lit. "slope or hillside of joy," i.e., *Mons Gaudii* (OFr. Montjoie), medieval pilgrim name of Monte Mario (*Mons Marius*), NW of the Vatican on the Cassian Way (cp. K 17, 15-16; N of Rome), from whose meridian Italian longitude is reckoned. Rom. *Clivus Cinnae*, later *Mons Malus* (Monte Malo). GCT 149, 150; Andree 127, inset K8; Baed. RCI 476; Rajna *Archivio* 48-49; Neckel, *Arkiv* XXVII (1911), 368-69; Bédier II, 237-52; Kålund 75, with unnecessary reservations. Some readers will think of Wordsworth's sonnet "The Pine of Monte Mario at Rome." On this same place-name in Norway see Fritzner, s.v. Werlauff 44 §91 suggests an adaptation of *Mons Faiani* and is followed by Riant 84 (Monte Fajano) and K 101, who notes that this is the present Monte S. Angelo, S of Tivoli (Andree 127, inset L8); but Monte S. Angelo (Fajano), ca. 25 km. E of Rome, is far off the Icelanders' route and hence quite unlikely. Tomassetti V, 645-46, would identify *Fegins-brecka* with Monte Fagliano (GCT 143) and with a church of S. Angelino di Vetralla (Andree 127, inset K7), but this is ca. 15 km. before

Sutri (major) (87) and hence is also most unlikely. Monte Mario is no doubt meant.

With this last stop on the outskirts of the Eternal City<sup>1</sup> we take leave of Nikulás Bergsson of Munkaþverá, after having accompanied him on his long and, no doubt, arduous pilgrimage from Iceland to Rome; yet, as Geoffrey Chaucer once said (*Astrolabe*, Prol.), "diverse pathes leden diverse folk the righte way to Rome."

A translation of Kålund's text (K) now follows, in which the local names are numbered according to the preceeding Commentary (§III).<sup>2</sup>

#### IV. TRANSLATION

##### ICELAND-NORWAY

It is said that all around Iceland (1) is a seven days' sail with a strong favoring wind, provided that this changes as the occasion demands; for it is not possible to make use of one wind (i.e., one always from the same direction). So, too, between Iceland and Norway (2) it is reckoned an equally long sail.

##### DENMARK

From Norway (Bergen?) the first stage is to travel to Aalborg (3) in Denmark (4). Pilgrims to Rome report that from Aalborg it is a two days' journey to Viborg (5).

Then it is a week's journey to Haddeby (6). Then it is a short distance to Schleswig (7), then a day's journey to the Eider (8). There (near Rendsburg?) these lands meet Denmark and Holstein, Germany, and Wendish (i.e., Slavic) territory (pp. 318-319). Then it is a day's journey to Itzehoe (9) in Holstein. Then one crosses the Elbe (10) to Stade (11). In Germany the people are most gracious, and there the Scandinavians pick up much to imitate. In Stade (*read Verden*) the bishop's throne is in the church of St. Mary.

Then it is a two days' journey to Verden (12). Then it is a short distance to Nienburg (13). Then comes Minden (14), where the bishop's throne is in the church of St. Peter. Here the dialects change (pp. 321-322). Then it is a two days' journey to Paderborn (15); a bishop's throne is there in the church of St. Liborius, where the saint rests. Then it is a four days' journey to Mainz (16). Between these places (i.e., Paderborn and Mainz) there is a village called Horhausen (17), another called *Kiliandr* (18), and there (near *Kiliandr*?) is the Gnita Heath, where Sigurd slew Fáfnir.

There is a second route from Stade (to Mainz): take the more easterly route across Germany to Harsefeld (19), thence to Walsrode (20), thence to Hannover (21), then to Hildesheim (22), where the bishop's throne is where St Godehard (Gotthard) rests (in the church of St. Mary). Then to Gandersheim (23), then to Fritzlar (24), then to Arnsburg (25); then it is not far to Mainz, to which we have previously journeyed. The Scandinavians travel these two main routes, and these routes meet at Mainz (16) if these are taken. And that (i.e., one of these two routes) is the route of most people.

<sup>1</sup> On his sojourn in Rome see p. 315, n. 17, above.

<sup>2</sup> For the useful sketch-map on p. 348 I

am most grateful to my son, Francis P. Magoun, 3d; this map includes localities of certain or almost certain identification.



FRANCIS P. MAGOUN, JR.

NETHERLANDS

There is still another route to take from Norway to Rome: to (Dutch) Frisia (26), (namely,) to Deventer (27) or to Utrecht (28), and there men receive staff and scrip and a blessing for the pilgrimage to Rome.

GERMANY

From Utrecht it is (via Arnhem) a six days' journey to Cologne (29), where the archbishop's throne is in the church of St. Peter. The (German) emperor must receive his consecration at the hands of the (arch)bishop of Cologne in that church that is (in the town) called Aachen (30). From Cologne it is a three days' journey up along the Rhine (31) to Mainz (16), where the archbishop's throne is in the church of <SS. Stephen and Martin. Then it is a day's journey to Worms (31a), where the bishop's throne is in the church of> SS. Peter and Paul (pp. 328-329). Then it is a day's journey to Speyer (32), where the bishop's throne is in the church of St. Mary. Then it is a day's journey to Selz (33). Then it is a day's journey to Strassburg (34), where the bishop's throne is in the church of St. Mary.

SWITZERLAND

Then it is a three days' journey to Basel (35). Then one travels away from the Rhine a day's journey to Solothurn (Soleure) (36). Then it is a day's journey of Wiflisburg (Avenches) (37); the town was important before (Ragnarr) Lothbrók's sons destroyed it (p. 332), but now it is very insignificant. Then it is a day's journey to Vivis (Vevey) (38), which stands on the Lake of Geneva (39), where converge the routes of those men who travel south over the Great St. Bernard Pass (40), (namely,) Franks (Northern French), Flemings, French (Southern French), Englishmen, Germans, and Scandinavians (p. 41). Then it is a day's journey to St. Maurice d'Agaune (41), where the saint rests with his whole (Theban) legion of six thousand six hundred and sixty-six men; then is Bourg-St.-Pierre (42). From St. Maurice d'Agaune it is a two days' journey to the St. Bernard Hospice (43); it is situated up on the mountain (i.e., on the Grand Combin). Up on the Pass is St. Peter's Hospice (44), where there often is on St. Olaf's Day in the summer (July 29th) snow on the rock and ice on the lake (of the Great St. Bernard).

ITALY

South of the Pass is Etroubles (45). Then comes Aosta (46), a good town, where the bishop's throne is in the church of San Orso, where the saint rests. Then comes Ponte S. Martino (47). Then comes Ivrea (48); between here and Aosta it is a two days' journey. Then it is a two days' journey to Vercelli (49), where the bishop's throne is in the church of St. Eusebius, where the saint rests. Then east (i.e., NE) off the road to Rome it is a two days' journey to Milan (50). If thou journeyest the direct route to Rome, then it is a day's journey to Pavia (52), where the (coronation-) throne of the emperors is in the church of St. Syrus, where the saint rests. There Bishop Martin (of Tours) grew up and he has a cathedral there. Then it is a day's journey to Piacenza (52), where the bishop's throne is in the church of St. Mary. Between Pavia and Piacenza there flows a large river which is called the Po (53). Then those who travel the route via St.-Gilles (Provence, France?) (54) meet this route (to Rome). South (i.e., SE) of Piacenza it is a day's journey to Borgo San



Donnino (56); between these (Piacenza and Borgo S. Donnino) is the Hospice (55) of Eric (I of Denmark). Then comes a river that is called the Taro (57); it is a big stream, and all filth that is thrown into it sinks to the bottom. To the south (i.e., SSW) is Borgo Val di Taro (58).

Then one must cross the mountain-range that is called *Munbard* (i.e., the Ligurian Apennines) (59). Lombardy (60) is the name of the region south from the Apennines and north to the Alps; one end of the Alps runs to the sea westward in the region of Stura (prov. Cuneo?) (61), the other eastward to the lagoons in the region of Venice (62). Up in the Apennines (Bratello Yoke) is *Fracka skáli* (63) and *Crucis markaðr* (64).

Then comes Pontremoli (65). Then it is a day's journey to the Guild of St. Mary (in or near Aulla?) (66). Then comes Luni (68), where the Lunigiana region (lit., "sands of Luna") is near the town; there one can walk ten miles over these same fine "sands of Luna" (the Lunigiana), and there are towns in all directions and from there there is an extensive view. Between the Guild of St. Mary (66) and Luni is Borgo S. Stefano (67) and Mary's castle (Sarzana?) (69). Some men say that the snake-pen that Gunnar was put in was in the Lunigiana (p. 340). Then south from there is *Kjófor(m)unt* (Capriglia?) (70). At Luni the routes from Spain and from Santiago de Compostela (Galicia) join (p. 340).

It is a day's journey from Luni to Lucca (71); there the bishop's throne is in the church of St. Mary (*read* St Martin), where that crucifix (i.e., the *volto santo di Lucca*) is that Nicodemus made in the image of God Himself: it has spoken twice; once it gave its shoe to a poor man; another time it bore witness in favor of a calumniated man. South (i.e., SW) of Lucca is that town that is called Pisa (72); thither merchants with large trading vessels from Greece and Sicily, men from Egypt, Syrians, and Berbers repair (p. 342).

There is to the south (i.e., SE of Lucca) a village that is called *Arn blakr* (i.e., Arno nero) (73). Then comes Matilda's Hospice (at Altopascio); by this (foundation) she redeemed her pledge to Monte Cassino to have a hospice built; and it must put every man up for the night. Then comes *Sanctinus borg* (Borgo S. Genesio?) (75). Then comes *Martinus borg* (Poggibonsi?) (76). Then comes *Semunt* (77). Then comes Siena (78), a good town, where the bishop's throne there is in the church of St. Mary; the women there are very good looking. It is a three days' journey from there to San Quirico (79), another day's to Acquapendente (80). Then one goes over the mountain that is called *Clemunt* (81) (Radicofani?); there is a castle on its summit that is called "Mala Mulier," "Bad Woman" as we (Icelanders) say, where the people are very bad. Acquapendente is south of *Clemunt*. From there north to the Ligurian Apennines it is called Tuscany (82). Then it is twelve miles to Bolsena (83), where the saint (Christina) rests and (where) her footprint is (marked) there in a stone. Then it is eight miles to Borgo S. Flaviano (84). Then it is a day's journey to Viterbo (85); Thithrek's Bath (86) is there. Then it is ten miles to Sutri (major) (87); then it is a day's journey to Sutri (minor) (88) (La Storta?); this is near Monte Mario (89), which is near Rome on the north.<sup>20</sup>

#### IV. ABBREVIATIONS

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<sup>20</sup> For Nikulas's sojourn in Rome itself see n. 17, above.

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- Baed. RCI *idem*, *Rome and Central Italy*, 16th ed., Leipzig, 1930.
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